




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No. 50

INFORMATION ON RUSSIA

REPORT

(POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC)

OF THE

COMMITTEE TO COLLECT
INFORMATION ON RUSSIA

PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT
BY COMMAND OF THE KING



PRESENTED BY MR. LODGE

JULY 12, 1921.—Ordered to be printed

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
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INTRODUCTION.

MY LORD:

A committee to collect information on Russia was appointed on May 17, 1920, and was constituted as follows:

The Right honorable the Lord Emmott, G. C. M. G., G. B. E. (chairman).

Sir Ellis Hume-Williams, K. B. E., K. C., M. P.

Sir William Ryland Dent Adkins, K. C., M. P.

The Right honorable William Brace, M. P.

Mr. H. E. Garle, barrister at law (secretary).

Mr. L. G. M. Gall, formerly of the Anglo-Russian Commission, attached to His Britannic Majesty's embassy, Petrograd, was appointed to assist the committee.

On the 23d of July, 1920, the Right honorable William Brace, M. P., resigned owing to the pressure of other public duties, and Maj. Watts Morgan, C. B. E., D. S. O., M. P., was appointed on August 10 in his place.

On December 24, 1920, Mr. H. E. Garle resigned his duties as secretary of the committee owing to ill-health, and Mr. L. G. M. Gall was appointed secretary in his stead.

The terms of reference to the committee were—

To inquire into conditions under which British subjects were recently imprisoned or detained in Russia and generally to obtain information in regard to the economic and political situation in that country.

On the 4th November, 1920, the committee submitted an interim report to your lordship upon the conditions under which British subjects were recently imprisoned or detained in Russia.

We now have the honor to present to your lordship a report upon political and economic conditions in Russia in accordance with the terms of reference given above.

The various phases of the revolution in Russia have been accompanied by many and far-reaching changes, and transformations are taking place at the present time which are likely, in our judgment, to be no less important than those which have gone before. The influence of these changes is clearly marked upon the course of present events, and although it can not be said how far they will be transient or lasting, it is clear that they must have an important bearing upon the future development of society, both in Russia and other countries.

We doubt whether the supreme importance of a close study of events in Russia, and of their causes and of their effects upon politics, society, and economic thought, in Europe and throughout the world, is adequately realized. We venture to suggest that such a study would be of the highest value to mankind.

The Right Hon. the EARL CURZON of Kedleston, K. G., etc.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

NOTE.—1 arzen=2½ feet; 1 pood=36 pounds (about); 1 sazhen of wood=12.7 cubic yards (about); 1 desyatine=2.7 acres (about); 1 verst=½ mile (about).

REPORT (POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC) OF THE COMMITTEE TO COLLECT INFORMATION ON RUSSIA.

POLITICAL SECTION.

ATTITUDE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS) AND OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL TO INTERNATIONAL LABOR.

1. The soviet government was established in Russia by the bolshevik, or Communist Party, on the overthrow of the provisional government in October, 1917. It has, therefore, remained in power for three years.

2. The Russian Communist Party has developed plans for the international application of communist principles. In Russia there is established what purports to be a communist form of government, by means of a so-called dictatorship of the proletariat based on the ruins of the old capitalist society which they had destroyed.

3. The interest which this communist experiment presents extends far outside Russia and is enhanced by the fact that the bolsheviks base the expediency of their international policy on the prevailing unrest. This appears from the theses of the Communist International,¹ an institution founded at Moscow in February, 1919, for the purpose of organizing and uniting the activities of communists in all countries. These theses prescribed the attitude to be adopted by communists with regard to international labor. They were published in No. 12 of the Communist International, the official organ of the communist or Third International in anticipation of the second world congress of the International held in Moscow during the summer of 1920, and show the premises upon which this international attitude is based. The following extracts are translated from the theses:

(1) The economic results of the war, the complete disorganization of peace time economy, the wild rise in prices * * * all drive the broad masses of the proletariat along the path of struggle against capitalism.

(2) Economic disorganization, seizing one country after another, extends more and more. It shows even the tired workers that it is insufficient to fight merely for higher wages and shorter hours, and that the capitalist class is daily becoming less able to reestablish the State economy and to guarantee the workers even those conditions of life which they enjoyed before the war.

The same theses state that:

(3) This struggle (the economic struggle), by the proportions and character which it is assuming more and more day by day, reveals itself as a revolutionary struggle having as its object to destroy the capitalist order.

(4) It is the task of the Communist Party to organize all workers on a basis of the existing economic chaos and to lead them in the fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of broadening and deepening the struggle, intelligible to them all, for the workers' control of industry.

¹ The theses of the Communist International appear to be principally intended to instruct communists in Russia and other countries regarding the aims, methods, and problems of the international communist movement.

The methods to be pursued are:

(5) To instill into the consciousness of the broadest masses of the people * * * the conviction that the bourgeoisie are to blame for economic chaos, whereas the proletariat, in advancing the slogan of the workers' control over production, is striving to organize industry, to abolish speculation, disorganization, and dearth.

(6) So to deepen the consciousness of the masses that they become convinced that systematic economic restoration on a basis of capitalist society, which would mean their enslavement afresh, is now impossible.

The reason for the methods recommended are stated thus:

(7) An economic organization corresponding to the interest of the working classes is only possible when the State is in the hands of the working masses, when the strong arm of the workers' dictatorship proceeds to abolish capitalism and to inaugurate a new socialist construction.

4. The extracts quoted show that the world-wide appeal to revolution contained in the theses is founded on the view that the industrial unrest left by the war affords a favorable opportunity for inducing the "broadest masses of the people" to believe, in the first place, that economic chaos, due to the capitalistic régime, exists throughout the world, and, in the second, that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" will lead to a better organization of industry and to the abolition of speculation, scarcity, and want.

5. This report, the result of an examination into political and economic conditions in Russia, will show how far the experiment in Russia lends support to the latter claim. That country is providing the possibility of effective judgment on the results that may be expected to follow attempts to reconstruct society on communist principles introduced by revolution and maintained by force. It is most important that the course of the Bolshevik movement—its past, which has conditioned its present, its purposes and methods, the results it has achieved and the circumstances in which they have been accomplished—should be closely studied, for it is claimed to be the pioneer of an international communist revolution and to have pointed the way to a new and better economic order.

A SKETCH OF THE BOLSHEVIK MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA.

INFLUENCE OF (a) THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

6. At the beginning of the twentieth century Russia was, politically and economically, the most backward country in Europe.

7. The democratic ideas arising out of the French Revolution had exercised a profound influence upon the political history of other countries, and did much indirectly to inspire the economic changes which are associated with the growth of modern industry. They were, however, political rather than social and economic in their main effect upon the history of the nineteenth century. The idea of liberty came to be understood as signifying political freedom, and that of equality as meaning equality before the law rather than as directed toward a social and economic leveling of mankind.

INFLUENCE OF (b) THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION.

8. The "industrial revolution," on the other hand, gave birth to a form of political thought which interpreted liberty and equality in terms of social and economic leveling rather than in the more

restricted sense in which these words were understood earlier, and this form of political thought, in its extreme formulation, aimed at establishing the dictatorship of the industrial and agricultural proletariat over all other classes in the State. The exponents of these views believed that only thus would it be possible to give the working masses an equality of opportunity and of participation in the fruits of the productive energies of the State, which they believed could not evolve under a capitalist structure of society.

THE RUSSIAN AUTOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVE WESTERN THOUGHT.

9. These two streams of thought did little to modify the policy of the autocratic government of Russia. They exerted, however, a marked influence upon the Russian "intellectuals."¹

THE RUSSIAN "INTELLECTUALS."

10. The Russian "intellectuals" form only 5 per cent of the population of Russia. A large part of this minority, of varying shades of liberal opinion, were prepared to accept a constitutional government under a monarchy. A lesser section, deriving their views from Proudhon, Lassalle, Fourrier, Engels, and Marx, aimed at the overthrow of the monarchy and the realization of a socialist republic on lines more or less moderate or radical, according to their views.

THE POLICY OF THE AUTOCRACY.

11. Except for short intervals, during which a liberal atmosphere prevailed at the court, the policy of the Russian autocracy was reactionary and obscurantist. As a result of this policy, the progressive intellectual forces of the nation were divorced from all practical participation in the government of the State, and most of the avenues of public service were closed to them. The lives of the intellectuals were passed for the most part in speculative studies, and the restraints imposed upon them tended to divert their energies into abnormal channels and led them to engage in secret and subterranean activities as a means of self-expression. The repression exercised created a fertile soil for the growth of progressive opinions, and more especially for the extreme form of these opinions, and developed a political psychosis among educated Russians which gave birth to the revolutionary movement in Russia and powerfully contributed to predetermine the extreme course which the revolution ultimately took. Moreover, the autocracy failed to discriminate between those of its opponents who were in favor of a constitutional monarchy and those who advocated the abolition of the monarchy and the setting up of a republican form of government. This weakened the constitutional reformers and gave additional strength to the revolutionary republicans.

¹ The word "intellectuals" is used in this report instead of and in preference to the word "intelligentsia," which is frequently met with in the history of modern Russia. It is a term not easy of definition. The Russian "intelligentsia" may be said to have been those whose opportunities of education opened to them the possibility of finding an interest in political, economic, social, and philosophic questions.

WARS AND REFORM.

12. It is to be remarked that the liberation of the Serfs in 1861, the establishment of the Duma in 1905, and the overthrow of the autocracy itself in 1917 proceeded largely from the pressure of forces released in the course of the unsuccessful conduct of wars. The Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the European War of 1914-1917 clearly revealed the inefficiency and corruption of the Government, and how inadequate it was to meet the increasing demands of modern military technique and organization, which had come to depend more and more for their efficient functioning upon a stable political administration and a highly developed economic structure.

EMANCIPATION AND ZEMSTVA—THE ROAD TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.

13. The wave of liberalism which passed over Russia in the years following the Crimean War swept even into the ranks of the official bureaucracy. The emancipation of the Serfs was followed in 1864 by the law instituting zemstva or county councils, elected from all classes and charged with a restricted competence over matters relating to local government. It would be difficult to exaggerate the possibilities of gradual progress toward constitutional government which these reforms opened up. Unfortunately, however, the enthusiasm which prevailed was hysterical in its fervor. The hopes kindled among the intellectuals often found extravagant expression in the liberal papers of the day and in the ill-considered utterances of individuals. As a result, the autocracy became afraid to proceed with a policy which had been dictated on their part partly by conviction and partly by fear.

INFLUENCE OF REACTION ON THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT.

14. Reaction set in and was strengthened by certain terrorist outrages, perpetrated by disappointed enthusiasts, and culminating in the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. The continuance of a reactionary policy under Alexander III and throughout the earlier years of Nicholas II deepened, on the one hand, the feelings of disillusionment experienced by the liberals of the sixties, and, on the other hand, obscured the potentialities of the zemstva as progressive organs of local self-government, preparing the way for the realization of a responsible parliamentary system.

THE RISE OF RUSSIAN INDUSTRY.

15. The textile industry had been already firmly established during the forties and fifties around Moscow and Petrograd. The rise of other Russian industries may be said to date from the sixties. It was promoted by—

- (1) The emancipation of the Serfs, which placed on the market an almost unlimited supply of cheap labor.
- (2) The extensive development of the railway system, which provided improved communication.
- (3) The foundation of new banks and other credit institutions.

16. The mineral wealth of the Donetz Basin in the south of Russia was now exploited for the first time on a large scale, and blast furnaces began to spring up. A modification of the law affecting the formation of joint stock companies led also to an enormous increase of commercial enterprises.

EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYED.

17. The class of industrial workers rapidly increased in number. They lived for the most part in towns and crowded together in narrow areas, developing, as they grew, new needs and formulating new demands and powerfully contributing by their labor to the prosperity of the State. Side by side with the workers, there grew up a class of industrial magnates, controlling and directing their labor, and leaning for support from the early days of Russian industry upon the privileged classes. A study of industrial conditions in Russia discloses a disregard on the part of employers for the dignity of human life and for the social dangers proceeding from the physical and psychological results of sweated labor often performed amid surroundings of a degrading and dehumanizing character. Similar abuses have prevailed in other countries, but it is necessary to emphasize that an enhanced danger attaches to them in a state where liberal minds are impelled more and more by the policy of the government to give revolutionary expression to their aspirations.

THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN RUSSIA.

18. The writings of Socialists in western Europe had long been known in Russia, but their influence had hitherto been confined to the ranks of the intellectuals. With the growth of Russian industry a change began, and in the seventies and eighties of the last century the philosopher Mikhailovsky and Plekhanov began to make a special study of the industrial movement in Russia, to address their writings to the Russian workers and to speculate as to the future. Mikhailovsky thought it would be possible in Russia to profit by the experience gained from western countries so as to avoid the capitalist stage of society in Russia and pass on directly to the practical realization of socialism. Plekhanov was the first Russian writer to popularize Marxism in Russia. His early writings were devoted to exposing the fallacy of Mikhailovsky in thinking that it was possible to dispense with a capitalist stage in Russia, which he, Plekhanov, maintained had already begun. The speculative activity of the seventies was followed by a period of industrial depression, and many factories were compelled to dismiss large numbers of their employees. Strikes broke out in Moscow, and the government replied by the factory act of 1886, which made strikes illegal, while endeavoring to remove abuses which had grown up in the workshops during the early industrial period. A further industrial depression in the early nineties and the frustrated hopes of a more liberal régime aroused by the accession of Nicholas II in 1894 increased the discontent among the workers. These events created a common basis of activity between the socialist publicists of the intellectuals and the workers. Plekhanov continued in his writings to make Marxian doctrines more widely

known and was soon joined by Peter Struve and V. I. Ulianov (Lenin). The fruits of their work are seen in the foundation of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1898.

THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY.

19. In the five years between the foundation of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1896 and the second congress of the party, held in London, 1903, four groups began to define themselves within it. They are, beginning with the Right groups and ending with the Left—

(1) The mensheviks, led by Martov¹ and supported by Dan and Abramovich, prominent members of the Jewish Bund Party, which was divided in its support of the various factions of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party.

(2) The "Plekhanovtsy," or followers of Plekhanov,² who were regarded at that time as Left mensheviks.

(3) The "Leninites," or bolsheviks of the Right, led by Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Rykov.

(4) The bolsheviks of the Left, known as the "vperedovtsy," or "forwards," led by Bogdanov, Lunacharsky,³ Pokrovsky, Alexinsky, Axelrod, and Maxim Gorky.

MENSHEVIKS AND BOLSHEVIKS.

20. The division in the party which gave birth to the menshevik and bolsheviks took place at the London congress on 1903, where these factions were respectively in the minority and majority, and took their name from the Russian translation of these words: "men-shinstvo" and "bolshinstvo." They differed both on points of doctrine and points of method—

A. *Doctrine*.—According to the bolshevik interpretation of Marxist theory, society has broken up in the course of history into irreconcilably antagonistic classes—broadly speaking, the classes of those who have and those who have not. The State has emerged out of the shock of these opposing forces and from the necessity of restraining them. It has, therefore, tended to become, in the words of Engels, "the State of the most powerful and predominant class which, by means of the State, also became the predominant class politically, thereby obtaining new means for the oppression and exploitation of the oppressed classes"; or, according to Marx, the State has become the organ of class domination, the organ of oppression of one class by another. The bolsheviks attack the mensheviks and social revolutionaries, accusing them, in the words of Lenin, of trying to "correct" Marx in such a way as to make it appear that the State is an organ for the reconciliation of classes, and this lending their support to parliamentary institutions. Proceeding from their conception of the State as "the product and the manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonism" (Lenin) and as the organ of class domination,

¹ Martov is still president of the central committee of the Menshevik Party. He left Russia recently and is now in Berlin. He advocates the political recognition of the soviet government.

² Plekhanov died in 1918.

³ Lunacharsky is the People's Commissary, or minister for education in the soviet government since the soviet government was formed in October 1917, with Pokrovsky as his assistant.

the bolsheviks formulate the following program to be carried through in three stages:

(1) The overthrow of the capitalist State and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

(2) The dictatorship of the proletariat leading to a gradual "withering away" of the State.

(3) The realization of the communist ideal on the "withering away" of the State, i. e., the ordering of society on the principle of "from each according to his ability to each according to his need" and the interchangeability of persons in the accomplishment of the various tasks necessary to the life and welfare of the society.

The majority of the mensheviks and social revolutionaries on the other hand showed themselves ultimately, on the overthrow of the autocracy, to be prepared to pursue the realization of the socialist state by evolutionary means.

B. (1) *Method.*—The mensheviks desired to subordinate illegal to legal methods of opposition against the government. The bolsheviks, on the other hand, while not entirely repudiating legal action, wished to create a widespread organization of secret societies, to which they proposed to subordinate the legal bodies.

(2) The mensheviks opposed a centralized system of party administration as tending to suppress initiative in the local organizations of the party. The bolsheviks on the other hand wished to invest the central committee of the party with semidictatorial powers in the interest of strict party discipline and to form a powerful revolutionary weapon.

(3) The two groups agreed that a revolution would promote the advantage of the bourgeois parties. They differed, however, in their attitude to the provisional government which would arise on the overthrow of the autocracy. The mensheviks somewhat strangely held that the social democracy should not participate in the provisional revolutionary government, but stand aside as an extreme revolutionary opposition. The bolsheviks, on the other hand, demanded that the party should participate in the revolutionary government, to defend the interests of the proletariat against the bourgeois parties, and at the same time discredit the parliamentary form of government.

PLEKHANOVTSY AND VPEREDOVTSY.

21. The "Plekhanovtsy" for some years cooperated with the "Leninates," more out of a desire to maintain the unity of the party than from any fundamental differences dividing them from the mensheviks of the Right led by Martov. For similar reasons the "Leninates" estranged the "Vperedovtsy" from them, and were accused by them of departing from bolshevik principle in the concessions they tried to make to the mensheviks. The leaders of the "Vperedovtsy" were the directors of the propagandist school on the island of Capri and at Bologna.

1905 REVOLUTION.

22. The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party played an important part in the revolutionary year of 1905, and more especially in the great strike movement which began in the autumn of that year.

As a result of these strikes, the first soviet or council of workers was formed at Petrograd under the presidency of Khrustalev-Nosar, a prominent member of the bolshevik section of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. Later, when Khrustalev was arrested, L. D. Trotsky was elected in his stead. The initial success which they obtained during the political and economic disturbances in 1905 ended, however, in failure, partly because they were weakly organized, partly because the peasants failed to rise en masse as was hoped, and partly because the boycott of the elections to the Duma by the bolshevik section of the party lost them sympathy. The boycott of the Duma by the bolsheviks unquestionably hastened reaction and strengthened the conservative forces in the Government.

ACTIVITIES OF THE BOLSHEVIKS.

23. From 1897 to 1917 the members of the industrial proletariat in Russia rose from three to five millions, forming in the latter year about one thirty-fifth of the population of Russia. It was to this class, the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, that the bolsheviks principally addressed themselves. Their activities were, however, considerably hampered by the prominence which they gave to conspiracy. Their leaders were known to the police, their movements closely shadowed, and their work interrupted by arrests, sometimes of a wholesale character. From time to time whole series of their organizations were suppressed, notably in 1907-8, when they were almost completely destroyed throughout Russia. The blow dealt to the party during these two years was so serious that Lenin temporarily abandoned any idea of restoring the secret organizations and advocated the diversion of the party's energies to training at the party schools abroad those who were to become active propagandists in Russia. It seems clear, therefore, that, with the exception of the isolated activities of men like Victor Pavlovich Nogin in the Moscow district, the bolsheviks were cut off entirely from the workers for some years.

24. The strain due to constant police surveillance, the knowledge that members of the party were sometimes themselves agents of the secret police both in Russia and abroad, and the necessity of conducting their activities illegally did much to explain the atmosphere of secrecy and suspicion which prevailed in the party. According to the statement of one who was a member of it in former days, "klichkas," or aliases, were widely used in the party, so that one member would not know the real name of other members with whom he associated, or in any case only those of a few, and would therefore find it more difficult to betray members of the party wholesale to the secret police if he happened to be a spy. An elaborate secret organization existed for arranging the passage of members and of correspondence and literature of the party from Russia to Europe. For example, there was a country house situated among the lonely marshes and forests not far from Suwalki whither members who were trying to leave Russia would repair, receive the necessary false passports, and await a propitious moment for passing across the frontier. On the other side of the frontier they would usually be met by one of the staff of the Berlin bureau who would direct them as to their farther journey. In Berlin itself there was, about 1907, a house where mem-

bers of the party traveling through Berlin were received. In order that the suspicions of the police should not be aroused, the establishment was also actually maintained as a house of ill fame so that those passing to and fro at unusual hours did not attract attention. Litvinov was in charge of the Berlin bureau at that time.

PARTY DIVIDED BETWEEN EUROPE AND RUSSIA.

25. The party headquarters had grown up abroad, and it was in Paris, London, Stockholm, and Prague that the principal conferences and congresses were held. It was, therefore, arranged that half the central committee of the party should live in Russia and the other half reside abroad. The difficulties of coordinating the work of the party were thereby increased. The severity of the censorship made it impossible to utilize the postal services, and it was therefore necessary to devise secret means of communication between those in Russia and those abroad. Conferences and congresses could only meet with great difficulty owing to the cost of transporting representatives abroad and the necessity of obtaining false passports in the majority of cases to enable them to cross the frontier. Many of those who were summoned were often prevented from leaving Russia by arrest, and the elections of delegates by the workers to conferences abroad were often conducted under conditions which impaired or destroyed the claim of those elected to represent the industrial workers of the districts for which they stood.

26. It is beyond the scope of this report to do more than give this brief description of how the bolsheviks sprang into being and of the circumstances under which their political activities were carried on. We have, however, placed under Appendices VI and VII translations from two documents which have been placed at our disposal. We are led to attach importance to Appendix VI because it throws light upon the methods by which Lenin endeavored to impose his views upon the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party and also upon what has been said in paragraphs 23 to 25 above. It embodies the fourth and fifth chapters of a work entitled "Materials on the History of the Social and Revolutionary Movement in Russia, Volume I, The Bolsheviks," being a collection of documents on the history of bolshevism from 1903 to 1916 in the possession of the former Moscow secret service. The volume was prepared for the press and supplied with a preface by M. A. Tsyavlovsky and published in Moscow in 1918 with the consent of the soviet authorities as possessing historical interest. This book was lent to the committee by the courtesy of M. Klishko, the secretary of the Russian trade delegation in London. It contains a series of reports furnished by the most trustworthy agents to the department of police under the old régime, and includes those of Malinovsky, a prominent member of the bolshevik section of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, whose election to the Duma was largely due to the support of the police. This fact, therefore, taken in conjunction with the care which, we are informed, was exercised by the department in testing the accuracy of its intelligence, lends support to the authenticity of the information which the book contains. A perusal of Chapters IV and V will show—

(1) The virtual dissolution of the foreign bureau of the central committee by Lenin. Lenin caused his followers to withdraw from

the bureau on the refusal of its menshevik members to agree to call a plenary meeting of the central committee.

(2) An agreement to convoke a general conference of the party at a meeting of seven persons summoned by Lenin and including Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Semashko, in addition to himself.

(3) The appointment of Rykov, the only member of the central committee at liberty in Russia, to arrange the elections to the proposed conference and his instructions (a) to obtain from the party organizations in Russia an approval of the action taken in dissolving the foreign bureau, and (b) to assure a bolshevik majority at the conference by procuring the election of bolshevik representatives only.

(4) The attempt of Lenin to dictate to his own followers in virtue of his power of attorney over the bolshevik funds; the remonstrances of Kautsky and Clara Tsetkin¹ against him.

(5) The arrest of Rykov² and certain of his associates in Russia and the circumstances under which the election to the conference were subsequently conducted.

(6) An account of the Prague conference in 1912.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR, AUGUST, 1914.

27. The outbreak of war in August, 1914, threw the Socialist Parties throughout the world into confusion. The resolutions adopted by the Second International against war and providing for international strike action in the event of the outbreak of war—resolutions taken in 1900 at the Paris conference, at Stuttgart in 1907, in Copenhagen in 1910, and in Basle in 1912—remained dead letters and entirely without effect. A great stream of the population in the various belligerent countries flowed into the war, and not only were the official leaders of the Socialist Parties powerless to fight against this, but in a large number of cases they abandoned their opposition to capitalist government and gave their whole-hearted support to the war.

EFFECT ON RUSSIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY.

28. The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party suffered no less than others from the effects of the crisis. Alexinsky, formerly one of the "Vperedovtsy," or "Forwards," the extreme wing of the bolsheviks, left the bolshevik group and joined the so-called social patriots. Plekhanov, who had for so long been associated with the bolsheviks and especially with Lenin, also stood out for the war. Martov, the leader of the mensheviks, held fast to his internationalist views, and maintained his former opposition to war in general, while continuing to oppose Lenin. The Social Democrat members of the Duma, bolsheviks and mensheviks, declined to vote for war credits. It is, however, difficult to exaggerate the paralyzing effects of the war on socialist leaders, and by far the most helpless were those who, while declining to support the war, nevertheless found themselves outcasts from the masses and unable to do more than bow before the tide of events.

¹ Clara Tsetkin was present as the representative of the Communist International at the recent congress of the French Socialist Party at Tours.

² Rykov is president of the Supreme Council of People's Economy in Soviet Russia at the present time.

LENIN'S THESIS ON THE WAR.

29. Lenin alone stood firm. In the autumn of 1914 he published his thesis on the war. He pointed out that the European war had definitely assumed a character of a bourgeois, imperialist war; its sole, real purpose was to plunder countries and to fight for markets. Its tendency was to befool, disunite, and murder the proletariat of all countries in the interests of the bourgeoisie. He censured the conduct of the leaders of the German, Belgian, and French Social Democrats, who had voted for war, as treachery to socialism and the spiritual bankruptcy of the Second International. He professed to see the cause of this in the predominant influence of petty bourgeois opportunism in the international, and declared the task of the future international to be the irrevocable and decisive emancipation of socialism from bourgeois influence.

LENIN'S ANTIWAR UTTERANCES.

30. Turning to the situation in Russia, Lenin stated that the task of the Russian social democracy was merciless and unconditional struggle against the Great Russian and "Tsarist—monarchical—chauvinism," and against the efforts of the Russian Liberal Intellectuals to defend it. He therefore defined the program of the Russian social democracy as follows:

(1) Widespread propaganda advocating socialist revolution among the troops, and especially at the front, emphasizing the necessity of directing their weapons not against their brothers, "the hired slaves of other countries," but against the reactionary bourgeois government and parties in all countries. Hence it became necessary to organize illegal groups among the troops of all nations for the purpose of disseminating propaganda in all languages. Besides this, there must be a merciless struggle against the chauvinism and patriotism of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois of all countries. He appealed to the revolutionary conscience of the working masses, who bore on their shoulders the whole burden of the war, against the leaders who had betrayed socialism.

(2) Republican propaganda advocating the establishment of republican forms of government throughout Europe.

INFLUENCE OF THE WAR ON LENIN.

31. It has been said that the war impelled Lenin further toward the Left, away from a more central position which, it has been seen, he formerly adopted in the Bolshevik section of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party.

32. It would, in our opinion, be truer to say not that his views swung further to the Left but that his attitude toward the possibility of realizing his views in practice underwent a change with the war and made him feel that the outbreak of the European struggle, promising physical and economic suffering proportionate to the wide area over which it was waged, would bring revolution nearer in one or other, perhaps in all, belligerent countries. Thus, while bitterly

opposing the war and the mutual extermination of the proletariat in the interest of the bourgeois classes, he gradually began to calculate the possibilities of overthrowing capitalist society on a basis of the proletarian suffering which the war would bring about. It was not, therefore, that the war occasioned any fundamental change in Lenin's views. It was only that as the war went on, and widespread suffering was caused and extended more and more, that his ideas passed from the realm of shadowy political speculation to that of ideas whose realization the morrow might see.

LENIN AND THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL, BERNE, MARCH, 1915.

33. At a conference of foreign sections of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, held in March, 1915, at Berne, on his own initiative, Lenin further developed his attitude to the war, and declared the necessity for establishing the Third International, which he was to succeed in doing exactly four years later in Russia.

ZIMMERWALD CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER, 1915.

34. In September of that year he was present at the International Conference of Socialists opposed to the war held at Zimmerwald, where he advocated the publication of a manifesto urging the necessity of bringing the war to an end and replacing it with civil war in the various belligerent countries.

KIENTHAL CONFERENCE, SPRING 1916.

35. In the following year he was present at a Second International Conference held at Kienthal, where he bitterly attacked the mensheviks for the support they had given to the war. In answer to this attack, Martov, representing the mensheviks of the Left, presented to the conference a declaration of the Petrograd menshevik workers, censuring the social patriots and even those who had consented to serve on the war industry committee established in connection with the war. On this occasion Lenin, supported by Radek and Rosa Luxemburg, proposed to the conference that a policy of general strikes, sabotage, and armed revolt should be resorted to for the purpose of bringing the war to an end.

CAUSES LEADING UP TO THE REVOLUTION.

36. We now proceed to consider the position in Russia toward the end of 1916, and to outline a series of factors which contributed collectively to demoralize the Russian army, to undermine the economic structure of the State, to discredit the autocracy, and thus create that atmosphere of despondency, despair, and apprehension which prevailed throughout Russia in the month of February, 1917.

37. The course of the war showed—

(1) *Russian industry and the war.*—That Russian industry, still in a relatively primitive stage of development, could not supply the technical equipment necessary to make a large army a potential fighting factor under conditions of modern war.

(2) *The administration and the war.*—That the administration was corrupt and inefficient, and ill-suited to concentrate, adapt, and develop the resources of the country for the successful prosecution of the war.

(3) *Incompetence.*—That great numbers of men were mobilized indiscriminately, without regard to the maintenance of enterprises essential to the State both at home and at the front, or to the possibility of training and equipping those who were called up. Thus, in 1916, there were thousands of unemployed soldiers in Petrograd and other centers, who, while as yet unaccustomed to army discipline, were left idle in the barracks.

Deterioration of railway services.—That, in a special degree, the railway services suffered (a) serious depletion, both of their experienced administrative staff and skilled mechanics; (b) owing to the transformation of certain railway repair shops into factories for the preparation of munitions.

This occasioned a decline in the efficiency of the railway services, which ultimately became progressive. It was evident in 1916 that the transport system was no longer able adequately to maintain, at one and the same time, the supply of the armies at the front and of the population at home.

38. This state of affairs reflected very seriously on the operations of the army. The failure to supply sufficient heavy artillery, machine guns, rifles, and ammunitions exposed the army to enormous losses at the hands of an enemy admirably equipped with the most powerful and deadly weapons of modern war.

THE POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

39. Moreover, the shortcomings observed in the Government at home were repeated in the administration of the army and in the handling of forces in the field. Absence among the officers of moral leadership over their men, deficiency of military knowledge, more especially among junior officers, and in the more highly technical branches of the service, was revealed as time went on. There was, moreover, an absence of sympathy among the officers for their men, which in many cases gave rise to bitter feeling against the officers among the rank and file.

CASUALTIES.

40. A statement of the losses of the Russian army from August, 1914, until February, 1917, is essential to an understanding of the situation, both in the army and in the country, immediately prior to the revolution. The casualties of the army in the first 10 months of the war are said to have been 3,800,000, and a Russian staff officer has estimated the total losses up to the beginning of the revolution at 10,000,000, and expressed the opinion that the army had had to be replaced three times entirely along the whole front of 700 miles during the period August, 1914, to January, 1917. It is also said that the famous offensive of Brusilov in the summer of 1916, as a result of which 400,000 prisoners were captured, cost a similar number of lives, while a statement was issued by the soviet government in 1918 according to which the losses of the Russian army in killed during the European war are estimated at 1,700,000.

TREACHERY.

41. These colossal losses created an extraordinary impression throughout the army. In addition to the incompetence and disorganization everywhere prevailing, it was suggested that treachery was also active, and that forces were at work at the court whose object it was to promote the defeat and dissolution of the army with a view to making inevitable the conclusion of a separate peace between Russia and the Central Powers. By the autumn of 1916 a large number of officers and the majority of the intelligentsia—patriotic, active, and resolute—had been led to the conviction that a state of affairs had arisen which could not be allowed to go on. It has been said that 18 months before the revolution broke out discipline in the army had begun to be affected as a result of the disorganization both at the front and in the rear and the enormous casualties sustained, and that revolution became a common subject of discussion among the officers in the messes of the guard regiments.

COURT SCANDALS—PROGERMAN INFLUENCE.

42. The revelation, in the course of this year, of the scandals proceeding at the court, and, associated with the name of the Monk Rasputin, still further deepened popular resentment against the autocracy. The appointment of Shtürmer, a notorious pro-German, as prime minister in December, 1916, was quickly followed by the murder of Rasputin. It is held by many that the revolution may be said to have begun with these events.

FOOD SHORTAGE, SPRING, 1917.

43. It was in these circumstances that the Duma met in February, 1917. During this month blizzards interrupted railway traffic and the delivery of flour to Petrograd. The bread supply failed. Long queues were to be seen throughout the city, and in the working-class quarters bread was scarcely to be obtained at all. A series of mass demonstrations began. The bridges across the Neva were drawn up, but thousands of hungry men and women poured across the frozen river and made their way to the Nevsky Prospect on the other side.

THE REVOLT OF THE GUARD REGIMENTS.

44. On the morning of Monday, the 28th February/13th March, four guard regiments revolted, disarmed their officers, and killed or arrested them. The revolution had begun.

THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION.

45. The revolution was sudden, spontaneous, and all-embracing. All classes of the population gave to it their active support or tacitly acquiesced in it. It was so sudden and unexpected that there were no signs of any premeditated plan of revolutionary action. The soldiers of the Petrograd garrison, ignoring or opposing the orders of their officers, flowed out onto the streets of Petrograd and joined the hungry crowds of workmen.

REVOLT OF THE PETROGRAD GARRISON—HELPLESSNESS OF THE LIBERAL MEMBERS OF THE DUMA.

46. The Liberal members of the Duma, who had created the atmosphere in which the revolution broke out, found themselves taken unawares and were utterly powerless. The provisional committee of the Duma, which was formed during the political crisis preceding the revolution, was unable to restrain the forces which the revolution had released. The city was in the power of a mass movement, irresponsible, uncontrolled, and uncontrollable.

FORMATION OF SOVIETS OF WORKERS', SOLDIERS', AND PEASANTS' DEPUTIES.

47. On Tuesday, the 1st/14th March, M. V. Rodzyanko, the president of the provisional committee of the Duma, proceeded to communicate by telephone with the staffs on the various fronts, and thus secured the adhesion of the officers throughout the army to the revolution. At the same time the soviet of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies was being formed upon the model of the soviet of 1905, in the Tavrichesky Palace, where the Duma used to hold its sessions and where the provisional committee of the Duma was then sitting. The provisional committee represented, broadly speaking, the Liberal elements of the Intellectuals. The soviet, on the other hand, represented the Russian Socialist movement.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT FORMED.

48. On Wednesday, the 2d/15th March, the provisional government was formed. The executive committee of the soviet declined to put forward its candidates for posts in the Government, and confined itself to appointing a committee to act as an intermediary between the soviet and the provisional government. A. F. Kerensky alone of the Socialists considered it his duty to enter the Government, and accepted the post of minister of justice.

49. It is important for the purpose of this report that the character of the soviet, the atmosphere in which it worked, and its attitude toward the provisional government should be clearly understood—in the first place, because the soviet was regarded as the leader of the revolution by the workers and soldiers in Petrograd and by the rank and file of the army and the popular masses throughout Russia; second, because it was in the soviet that the bolsheviks were represented and in it that they came to play a more and more influential and ultimately a dominant rôle. The provisional committee of the Duma, on the other hand, loomed vaguely in the minds of the masses as a reactionary remnant of the old order which had passed away. The tide of revolutionary events swept over it and it soon became forgotten. The provisional government, to which it had given birth, inherited the popular suspicion with which it was regarded.

THE CHARACTER OF THE SOVIET.

50. The Petrograd soviet consisted of about 1,000 members, who were elected or appointed during and immediately after the revolution in a haphazard and indiscriminate manner from the military

units of the Petrograd garrison and factories in and about the city. The soviet appointed an executive committee of about 100 persons to transact current business and direct its work.

ATMOSPHERE.

51. The executive committee in action at this period presented a picture of utter chaos. It sat daily from 1 o'clock, throughout the afternoon and night and often far into the morning. No rules of procedure had as yet been elaborated for it. The agenda was usually decided on the spot by the committee as a whole. At times not one of the questions which it was elected to discuss was decided, and often irrelevant issues arose which diverted the attention of members from questions under discussion. The occasions upon which plenary sessions of the soviet were held are described by M. Stankevich¹ as affording an example of "catastrophic disorder." Most of those who attended these turbulent assemblies were taking part in political life for the first time and many of them were half illiterate. Additional confusion was introduced into the activities of the soviet, inasmuch as its individual members took occasion to act in the name of the soviet on a number of questions, large and small, without consulting the executive committee and without its knowledge. M. Stankevich concludes, with the following words, a graphic description of the conditions under which the soviet conducts its work: "Most important decisions were taken often as a result of an entirely chance majority. There was no time to think, for everything was done in haste, after sleepless nights, and in confusion. Physical fatigue was general. Broken sleep, endless sessions, absence of regular meals, living on bread and tea, with sometimes a soldier's dinner eaten from mess tins without knives and forks."

52. Friction between the provisional government and the soviet immediately arose owing to the following reasons:

(1) The soviet, while declining to participate in the Government and share its responsibilities, took executive action independently of the provisional government, notably in the case of the soviet's famous order No. 1,² recommending the formation of soldiers' committees in the army.

(2) The soviet, showing an instinctive tendency, made inveterate by custom, to assume a negative attitude to the existing Government and distrusting the provisional government as the representative of bourgeois interests, put forward a series of demands which were tantamount to reducing the authority of the Government to impotence. The soviet made the following demands, among others: The substitution of militia, subordinated to organs of local self-government, for the police, the retention of arms by the Petrograd garrison, and liberty—otherwise committees—in the army.

¹ M. Stankevich, although an Army officer, was elected to represent his regiment on the Petrograd soviet in March, 1917. The description of the soviet given above is taken from his book "Vospominaniya (Reminiscences, 1914-1919," published in Berlin in 1920.

² Order No. 1 was issued by the soviet on the 2nd/15th March, to the Petrograd garrison, but was subsequently published throughout the army.

RESULTS OF THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY.

53. We now pass to the situation brought about by the revolution in the army. It has been seen—

(1) That discipline was undermined in the army before the revolution, and that the rank and file were weary of war.

(2) That the officers of the Russian army did not command as a whole the respect and confidence of their men, and that a gulf was thus created between them.

(3) That a number of officers had begun to regard revolution as inevitable if Russia was to remain in the war and play an efficient part in it.

54. It was in these circumstances that, in accordance with the recommendations contained in order No. 1, issued by the Petrograd soviet, soldiers' committees or soviets sprang up throughout the army. The complete absence of any plans governing the formation and procedure of these committees reproduced, on a far greater scale, the chaos which has been described in the Petrograd soviet and still further increased the confusion which a change of this fundamental character might be expected to cause in the army. Committees were everywhere formed on different lines, in some cases with officers and in others without. The functions of the committees, their duties and powers, and the methods by which they were elected were invariably left to the discretion of each particular committee itself.

The result of these disrupting influences was—

(a) That the officers supported the provisional government and the soldiers supported the soviet.

(b) That the army, upon which the Government relied to maintain the front against the enemy, and for support within the country in the last resort, lost all cohesion and became a source of danger to the Government itself.

RESULTS OF THE REVOLUTION IN THE COUNTRY.

55. The effect of the revolution in the countryside was an almost universal tendency on the part of the peasants to seize the estates of the landed gentry. In some cases the landowners or their agents were killed or driven away. The lands of the church were not exempt from this spontaneous and uncontrollable movement. Soviets of peasants' deputies sprang up in all parts of the country, and either began to exercise a dual power with the local representatives of the provisional government or took local affairs entirely into their own hands. The zemstva (boards of local self-government) came to be looked on with suspicion and to lose their authority. This was because—

(1) They were regarded as the creation of the old régime.

(2) The gentry serving on them were (a) opposed to the wholesale seizure of the land and (b) supported the provisional government in its war attitude.

(3) The bolsheviks, in the summer of 1917, began to agitate in the villages, to encourage the peasants to go on seizing the land and to discredit the zemstva as being organs for the oppression of the peasants by the landowners.

The eight months from February to October, 1917, may be divided into three periods:

THE FIRST PERIOD, FEBRUARY 28 TO APRIL.

56. During these two months the Petrograd soviet enjoyed enormous popularity and authority. Representatives of the army and provincial soviets flocked to it from the front and from all parts of Russia, clamoring for direction and advice. The Petrograd soviet was for this brief space of time the embodiment of the revolution. We have seen, however, that whatever opportunity this unique position might have given the Petrograd soviet of becoming an organizing and controlling authority in the revolutionary movement was destroyed by the chaos which confused its own counsels.

THE SECOND PERIOD, APPROXIMATELY FROM MAY TO JULY.

57. It was one of the ironies of the revolution that the Petrograd soviet lost its popularity at the time when its leaders had succeeded in introducing into it those elements of organization which were essential to any utilization of the unique position in which it found itself after the outbreak of the February revolution. It was also at this time that the soviet had come to realize the necessity of the participation of its representatives in the provisional government. The cause of this loss of popular confidence was the necessity under which the soviet found itself of defining its attitude toward the European war. Whatever prestige the provisional government had had among the people melted away after the declaration of Milyukov, as foreign minister, supporting the acquisition of the Dardanelles by Russia on the successful conclusion of the war.

58. An unbridgeable gulf separated Milyukov's views from those expressed by the soviet in its manifesto to the people of the world published on the 27th of March. So strong was the tide of popular feeling in favor of the manifesto that the provisional government itself was compelled to state its preparedness to raise the question of peace without annexations and contributions in its diplomatic relations with Allied Governments. But, with the arrival of more and more grave news from the front with regard to the growing disorganization of the army; with the arrival of foreign delegations of labor representatives, urging the necessity of the Russian army continuing to fight in the name of democracy for final victory over the Central Powers; with the necessity for representatives of the soviets to participate in the provisional government, unless they were prepared, as they were not, to assume the entire responsibility for the government of a disordered country—a sudden change swept over the Petrograd soviet. This change was marked by the decision of the soviet, accompanied, however, by various reservations, to support the war. The result was that among the troops in the Petrograd garrison, throughout the army, and in all parts of Russia the soviet lost popularity. The soviet proceeded to send its representatives to the front for the purpose of influencing the army committees to persuade the soldiers to fight. While, therefore, the relations between the Petrograd soviet and the government, in spite of the change, can not be said to have undergone any material

improvement, the effect of the soviet's support of the war and of the entry of its members into the provisional government identified it, in the mind of the masses, with the provisional government as pursuing a policy which was opposed to the collective will of a spiritually exhausted and physically wearied people. Meanwhile the bolsheviks had begun to play an important part in the soviet, and Trotski almost immediately after his arrival from America succeeded in establishing an ascendancy at its meetings by his unbounded energy and fiery oratory.

THE THIRD PERIOD, JULY TO OCTOBER.

59. The hopes which had been raised of an improvement in the discipline of the army were dashed to the ground by the failure of the June offensive. The bolsheviks, whose representatives had begun to appear on the army committees, upon the town soviets, and in the countryside, exploited the defeat to the utmost. They emphasized in their public utterances the inability of the army to fight further on behalf of a cause which they declared to be that of the class enemies of the proletariat and of the poor peasantry. Their prestige among the masses grew uninterrupted, and, as the summer wore on, they began to develop more and more as a power in the Petrograd Soviet itself. The provisional government became a helpless figurehead. The misunderstanding between Kornilov and Kerenski finally discredited both the government and those who saw the only hope of successfully opposing the bolsheviks in the establishment of a military dictatorship. Amidst the divided counsels and mutual recriminations of those whose united action was essential to the stemming of the advancing tide the provisional government became a melancholy specter of governmental impotence. Alone among this babel of dissentient voices the cries of the bolsheviks "Down with the war," "Peace and the land," and "The victory of the exploited over the exploiters" sounded a clear and certain note which went straight to the heart of the people.

60. In the course of October the bolsheviks secured the majority of the Petrograd Soviet. In the first days of November a manifesto was issued by the soviet signed by two bolsheviks, Podvoisky and Antonov, calling upon the troops of the Petrograd garrison to rise to the support of the soviet, which the manifesto declared to be in danger. With this manifesto what is known as the October¹ revolution may be said to have begun. For two or three days action on both sides was paralyzed by fear and uncertainty. The government were afraid to act, because they felt the last shreds of power had slipped from them, the bolsheviks because they could not bring themselves to believe that the government were powerless to deal a counter-blow against them. Finally, however, they occupied the government buildings one by one without opposition. The provisional government simply melted away.

61. In the course of this introduction we have endeavored to show—
(1) How the bolsheviks came into being as a section of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party.

¹ According to the Julian calendar, which was subsequently discarded by the bolsheviks, the date was in October. According to the Gregorian calendar it was in November.

(2) The divergence in views between the bolsheviks and the mensheviks.

(3) The circumstances in which the activities of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, and more especially of the bolsheviks, were carried on.

(4) The attitude of the bolsheviks to the European war which broke out in August, 1914.

(5) An outline of the causes leading up to the Russian revolution of February, 1917.

(6) An outline of the events leading up to the bolshevik coup d'état of October, 1917.

62. Our conclusions with regard to the prewar activities of the bolsheviks are that—

(1) The bolsheviks strengthened the reactionary forces in the Imperial Russian Government by boycotting the elections to the first Duma, and thus helped to destroy any possibility there might have been for an evolution toward democracy in Russia under the old régime.

(2) The severity of the police repression instituted after the reaction in 1907 made it impossible for the bolsheviks to establish and maintain contact with more than a small proportion of the Russian industrial proletariat, and this contact was often interrupted by the arrest of their members and the dissolution of their organizations in all parts of Russia.

(3) The Marxist doctrines advocated by the bolsheviks were unintelligible to all but a few of those workers to whom they were addressed.

(4) Such influence as the bolsheviks succeeded in obtaining in Russia before the first revolution of February, 1917, is largely to be explained by the fact that the conditions of political and economic oppression in which the Russian workers lived made them willing to support any political program which aimed at the overthrow of the autocracy in Russia.

(5) The bolshevik party thus became divided into two parts—

(a) A small and narrow minority of doctrinaires, holding extreme political views.

(b) A large majority of workmen to whom Marxist doctrines were either unintelligible or imperfectly understood.

(6) Hence arose a small, highly disciplined bolshevik staff, claiming to be the only true interpreters of Marx, and seeking to rivet their influence upon the Russian workers and to forge out of them a powerful and obedient weapon for the realization of their political aims.

(7) After the revolution of February, 1917, the bolsheviks gradually obtained widespread popular support. Their program offered peace to the army, land to the peasants, and the control of industry to the industrial worker. Their success was made possible and assisted by—

(a) The political chaos and economic disorganization existing in Russia.

(b) The war weariness prevailing in the army and among the population as a whole.

(c) The inability of the provisional government successfully to meet the great burden of responsibility imposed upon them—a responsibility increased by having to encourage the continuance of

military operations by a country where unsuccessful war had largely contributed to bring about a revolution.

(d) The successful subversive propaganda carried on by the bolsheviks themselves.

63. The absence of detailed and authoritative information has prevented us from making a chronological survey of the history of Russia during the last three years. We have, however, attempted to give in the following pages some account of the structure of the soviet government and soviet institutions and of various aspects of life in soviet Russia during recent months.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS.

64. According to article 12 of the soviet constitution, the supreme authority in the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic is vested in the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and during the period between the sessions of the congress in the All-Russian central executive committee.

THE VILLAGE SOVIETS.

65. In order to understand how the All-Russian Congress of Soviets is elected, it is necessary to take into account the smallest units of government. These are the village soviets.

THE "VOLOST" SOVIETS.

66. The next unit above the village in order is the "volost." The "volost" soviet is somewhat analogous to our rural district council, if these councils were composed of representatives of privileged voters in each village.

THE "UIEZD" SOVIETS.

67. Next above the "volosts" in order of size comes the "uietzd," which may be compared in area to an English county, but the "uietzd" or county soviet in Russia is not made up only out of village soviets united to form a "volost" soviet. There are also included in the "uietzd" representatives of all towns in the area with populations not exceeding 10,000 each. Each such town is a separate unit corresponding with a "volost" or group of villages, and the two kinds of units are found in combination in the "uietzd," just as in an English county council the electoral divisions are either single urban districts or aggregates of villages. But in Russia, alike in town and village, it is the workers and peasants who form the basal unit, not as in most modern democratic States, the adult population, irrespective of occupation or opinion. It will be seen, therefore, that the "volost" soviets are combined and absorbed in the "uietzd" soviets. Thus the "uietzd" soviet is composed of representatives of all the "volosts" in the area, plus representatives of all the soviets of towns in the "uietzd" not exceeding 10,000 inhabitants each.

68. Next in order above the "uiezd" we have the soviet of a government, or province,¹ of Russia. Each government or provincial soviet is composed of representatives of each "uiezd" in the government or province, together with representatives of each town in the province, one representative being elected to the provincial soviet for every 2,000 inhabitants in each town. The soviets of towns under 10,000 inhabitants are therefore doubly represented, once as part of the "uiezd" and again through the representative which they send direct to the provincial soviet.

THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS.

69. Finally, above the soviets of the governments or provinces is the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The All-Russian Congress is composed of representatives of the soviets of each government or province in Russia and of representatives of each town of 25,000 inhabitants and upward. A town of 25,000 inhabitants is entitled to send one representative to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, a town of 50,000 sends two representatives, and so on. In cases where a town has, for example, more than 25,000 and nearer 50,000 than 25,000 inhabitants, then it will elect two members. One representative is sent to the All-Russian Congress for 125,000 inhabitants of the country districts in each province.

DOUBLE REPRESENTATION OF TOWNS.

70. Here again the towns of 25,000 inhabitants and upward have double representation. Their soviets send delegates to the government or provincial soviet and also to the All-Russian Congress. In this way, for example, a town of 75,000 inhabitants would send three representatives direct to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and at least 37 representatives to the congress of soviets of the province in which it happened to be situated. In addition, therefore, to a certainty of representation by three members directly elected by it to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the town in question has the possibility of having some of its 37 members on the congress of soviets of the province to which it belongs elected to the All-Russian Congress. In actual practice some members of town soviets returned to the government congresses are always elected to the All-Russian Congress, and in the majority of cases in numbers far exceeding their proportion numerically to that of the representatives of the country districts at these provincial congresses, where both town and country soviets are nominally represented. In practice representatives of the trade-unions are found on the town soviets and also on the congresses of soviets of the various Russian provinces, and trade-union representatives are also elected both from the town soviet and from the congress of the soviets of the province in which the towns happen to be situated to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets at Moscow.

71. While there is no provision in the soviet constitution for the special representation of trade-unions as such at the All-Russian

¹ In this report the words "province" and "provincial" are used to denote a division of Russia which officially has become known as a "government" since, in the time of the Tsars, these were areas placed under a separate governor. In this report the word "government" is reserved for the central authority.

Congress, nor on the subordinate bodies, official trade-union representatives are elected to the All-Russian Congress from the town soviets and from the congresses of provincial soviets. The effect of this, therefore, is still further to strengthen the representation of the towns on the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, as the great majority of the trade-union representatives live in the towns. Thus in all these organs of administration the influence of the towns is apparently increased and that in a country which is predominantly rural.

HOW TOWN SOVIETS ARE ELECTED.

72. In towns or cities one representative is elected to the town soviet for each 1,000 inhabitants, but not less than 50 and not more than 1,000 representatives can be elected to a town soviet. The powers possessed by the deputies thus elected extend over a period of three months. Each town soviet elects an executive committee, one member being elected to the executive committee for each 50 members of the soviet; not less than three and not more than 15 persons can be elected as members of the executive committee of the town soviet except in the case of the cities of Petrograd and Moscow, where not more than 40 can be so elected. Town soviets should meet not less than once a week, and are convened by the executive committees at the discretion of the latter or on the demand of not less than one-half of the members of the soviets.

HOW VILLAGE SOVIETS ARE ELECTED.

73. In the villages one representative is elected to a village soviet for every 100 inhabitants in the village, and the total number of representatives thus elected should be not less than three and not more than 50. An executive committee is elected by the village soviets on the same lines as laid down in the case of the town soviets mentioned above. The constitution indicates, however, that where feasible questions of local government should be decided directly by a general assembly of the electors in the village. Meetings of village soviets should be held not less frequently than twice a week.

HOW "VOLOST" SOVIETS ARE ELECTED.

74. The "volost" soviets are elected by the representatives of the soviets of all the villages in a particular "volost" on a basis of one representative being elected for every 10 members of each village soviet. In cases where village soviets have less than 10 members they send to the "volost" soviet one representative each. Meetings of the "volost" soviets should be held once a month and are summoned by the executive committee of the "volost," which committee should not exceed more than 10 members in number.

HOW THE "UIEZD" SOVIETS ARE ELECTED.

75. The congresses of "uietzd" or county soviets are composed of representatives of the village soviets on a basis of 1 representative for every 1,000 inhabitants, and towns not exceeding 10,000 inhabitants send representatives to these congresses. Not more than 300 repre-

sentatives can be elected to the soviets of an "uiezd." Each "uiezd" soviet elects an executive committee of not more than 50 members. Meetings of "uiezd" soviets should be summoned by the executive committees of the "uiezd" once every three months. It is stated that the village soviets of districts numbering less than 1,000 inhabitants unite for the purpose of electing joint representatives to the "uiezd" soviets.

HOW THE GOVERNMENT CONGRESSES OF SOVIETS ARE ELECTED.

76. It has been seen above that one representative of the town soviets is elected for every 2,000 inhabitants in a particular town to the congress of soviets of the province in which the town is situated, and one representative is sent to the congress for every 10,000 inhabitants in the country districts throughout the province. The total number of representatives for an entire province should not exceed 300. It is also stated that in cases where an "uiezd" congress of soviets is called immediately preceding the congress of the soviets of the province in which the "uiezd" is situated, representatives are elected to the provincial soviets by the "uiezd" soviets and not by the "volost" soviets. The evidence of our witnesses shows that in many cases during the civil war elections to the All-Russian Congress have not been held, and that the executive committee of the town soviets and of the provincial congresses of soviets have appointed from among their number delegates to represent the towns or country districts, as the case may be, at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. This practice was encouraged by the central committee of the Russian Communist Party with a view to preventing any radical change in the personnel of the All-Russian Congress. In the chapter dealing with the eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, it will be seen that the failure of the executive committee to summon their soviets and to hold elections regularly was the subject of censure in Zinoviev's speech at that congress.

77. In other words, the All-Russian Congress no longer consisted of persons chosen by provincial or town soviets, which in their turn were chosen by smaller units, and so back to the individual voter, but were made up of persons nominated from the top by the executive committees from their own number. Instead of being the apex of a structure composed at each stage of elected bodies, it was merely a collection of members of executive committees selected by those committees themselves.

78. According to article 26 of the soviet constitution the All-Russian Congress of Soviets should be summoned by the All-Russian central executive committee not less than twice a year. Recently, however, the congress has assembled not more frequently than once a year.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF PROVINCIAL, "UIEZD," AND "VOLOST" SOVIETS.

79. Each provincial soviet elects an executive committee of not more than 25 persons, and this executive committee is responsible for summoning meetings of the soviet once in three months.

80. Congresses of "volost," "uiezd," and provincial soviets must be summoned by the executive committees of these congresses, respectively. In addition to the meetings to be summoned within the prescribed periods mentioned above, meetings are also summoned on the demand of the soviets of localities, the inhabitants of which represent not less than one-third of the population of the particular "volost," "uiezd," or provincial soviet in question.

COMPETENCE OF THE VILLAGE, "VOLOST," AND "UIEZD" SOVIETS.

81. Each soviet—village, "volost," "uiezd," and provincial—is the highest authority within the particular territory which it represents, except in the case of the soviets of the villages, where, as has been mentioned above, questions of administration are decided, where expedient, directly by a general assembly of electors. The representatives of the village soviets have to subordinate their action, however, to the decision of the "volost" soviets, and the "volost" soviets in their turn find a higher authority in the "uiezd" soviet, the "uiezd" in the provincial soviets, and the provincial soviets in the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. It is to the functions and competence of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets that we now turn. But the whole of this description will be misunderstood if it is not remembered that those who elect soviets at any stage are not the adult population as under democracies, but are the population with many categories of persons remaining unenfranchised.

THE FRANCHISE IN SOVIET RUSSIA.

82. According to article 64 of the soviet constitution, it is stated that the following citizens of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic of either sex who, at the time of the elections have attained the age of 18 years, are accorded the right to elect and to be elected to membership in the soviets:

(a) All persons obtaining their means of livelihood by productive and socially useful labor, as well as persons engaged in domestic service, who thereby enable the former to carry on their productive labors, such as workmen and servants of all kinds and categories engaged in industry, trade, agriculture, etc., peasants and cossack cultivators not using hired labor for the purpose of securing profit.

(b) Soldiers and sailors of the soviet army and navy.

(c) Citizens who belong to the categories enumerated in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this article but who have in some degree lost their working capacity.

Article 65 states that the following classes are deprived of a vote, *viz.:*

(a) Persons using hired labor for the sake of profit.

(b) Persons living on unearned increment, such as interest on capital, income from industrial enterprises and property, etc.

(c) Private traders, trading, and commercial agents.

(d) Monks and ecclesiastical servants of churches and religious cults.

(e) Employees and agents of the former police, of the special corps, of gendarmes and of branches of secret police department, and also members of the former reigning house of Russia.

- (f) Persons duly recognized as mentally afflicted or insane, as well as persons placed in charge of guardians.
- (g) Persons sentenced for crimes of speculation and bribery to a term fixed by law or by a judicial sentence.

POWERS OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS.

83. Under the soviet constitution of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, whether properly elected according to the articles of the constitution or principally nominated by the central government, as appears to have occurred during the civil war, has the widest powers, and, in the period between its sessions, these powers are exercised by the All-Russian central executive committee which the congress elects. Among these powers are:

- (a) The confirmation or alteration and addition to the constitution of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.
- (b) The general direction of the entire foreign and internal policy of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.
- (c) The establishment and alteration of frontiers, as well as the alienation of any part of the territory of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic or of the rights belonging to it.
- (d) The determination of the powers possessed by and the boundaries between the various soviet organizations of the "oblasts," which go to make up the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, as well as the settlement of disputes among them.
- (e) The admission into the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic of new federal parts of the soviet republic and the acknowledgment of the withdrawal of any part of the Russian Federation from the union.
- (f) General division of the territory of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic for administrative purposes, and the confirmation of provincial unions of soviets, making up an "oblast."
- (g) The establishment and change of the systems of weights, measures, and currency within the territory of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.
- (h) Relations with foreign powers, the declaration of war, and the conclusion of peace.
- (i) The contracting of loans, customs, and commercial treaties, as well as the conclusion of financial agreements.
- (j) The establishment of a general plan of public economy and of its different departments within the territory of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.
- (k) The confirmation of the budget of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.
- (l) The fixing of a general system of State taxation and of compulsory services.
- (m) The establishment of a plan of organization for the armed forces of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.
- (n) General State legislation, jurisprudence, and judicial proceedings, civil and criminal legislation, etc.
- (o) The appointment and dismissal of individual members of the council of people's commissaries, as well as of the entire council of people's commissaries as a whole, and also the confirmation of its chairman.

(p) The publication of general decrees concerning acquisition and loss of rights of Russian citizenship, and concerning the rights of foreigners on the territory of the republic.

(q) The right of general or partial amnesty.

Article 50 comprehensively states that:

"Besides the matters above indicated the All-Russian executive committee have the right to deal with all questions which they recognize as pertaining to their jurisdiction."

Again in article 51:

"The following questions fall exclusively within the competence of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets:

"(a) To confirm, amplify, and modify the principles of the soviet constitution.

"(b) The ratification of peace treaties."

84. In practice, however, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets is unable to exercise any effective control on the questions enumerated above. Having regard to the fact that the congress has been composed in the past of from 1,000 to 2,000 members, and that the session of the congress does not last more than seven days, it is clear that there is no opportunity of detailed discussion of the majority of the questions enumerated above, and also our evidence goes to show that a large number of members of the congress have had no experience of public affairs and apparently no previous training or information on the matters which come before them.

THE ALL-RUSSIAN CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

85. The all-Russian central executive committee is the supreme authority in Russia according to the soviet constitution during the periods when the All-Russian Congress of Soviets is not sitting. It is elected annually by the All-Russian Congress, and about 100 persons styled "candidates" are also elected, who are available to take the place of members of the committee who may, by reason of appointments to posts in the provinces, illness, death, or other causes be unable to take their places upon it. As a result of a decision taken at the eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets the number of members on the all-Russian central executive committee was increased to 300. The all-Russian central executive committee may be said to have had its origin in the central executive committee of the Petrograd soviet established after the Russian revolution of February, 1917.

THE PRESIDIUM.

86. The all-Russian central executive committee elects from among its members a presidium. The presidium and other members of the seventh all-Russian central executive committee, which was in office during 1920, were replaced by the presidium and members of the eighth all-Russian central executive committee, who were elected at the meeting of the eighth congress of soviets which assembled at Moscow on the 20th of December, 1920. The lists of the presidium of the seventh and eighth all-Russian central executive committee are given side by side below. In view of their importance some information regarding individual members of them follows. The lists

have been divided into Right (R), Center (C) and Left (L), according to their political orientation in the Communist Party.

SEVENTH PRESIDIUM, 1920.

President:

1. Kalinin, M. I. (C).
2. Kamenev, L. B. (C).
3. Enukidze, A. S. (R).
4. Lutovinov, Y. (C).
5. Rykov, A. I. (R).
6. Muralov, A. I. (C).
7. Nevsky, V. I. (C).
8. Sapronov, B. P. (R).
9. Badaev, A. E. (C).
10. Kisilev, A. S. (R).
11. Bukharin, N. I. (L).
12. Rakovsky, K. G. (C).

EIGHTH PRESIDIUM, 1921.

President:

1. Kalinin, M. I. (C).
2. Kamenev, L. B. (C).
3. Enukidze, A. S. (R).
4. Lutovinov, Y. (C).
5. Rykov, A. I. (R).
6. Stalin, I. V. (C).
7. Vladimirskey, M. F. (C).
8. Sapronov, B. P. (R).
9. Kutuzov, I. I. (R).
10. Tomsky, M. P. (R).
11. Petrovsky, G. I. (L).
12. Zalutsky, P. (L).
13. Smidovich P. G. (L).

87. In view of the importance of the presidium the following biographical notes regarding its members are given:

1. M. I. KALININ.

Kalinan was born in 1875, and is a peasant from the Tver Province. He was formerly employed upon the municipal railways in the city of Tver. He has been for many years associated with the bolshevik group of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party and was formerly engaged in reorganizing branches of the party which had been destroyed as a result of the repressive measures undertaken by the Russian police against the Socialist Parties. After the death of Sverdlov in 1919, he was elected president of the all-Russian central executive committee. He is said to be a man of colorless personality, and it is suggested that he was for this reason proposed as a candidate for the presidency, it being thought likely that he would not exercise a disturbing influence on the political situation. He takes great interest in the activities of the department for propaganda among the peasantry, which has been established under the auspices of the central executive committee and is constantly making tours throughout Russia for the purpose of addressing meetings of peasants.

2. L. B. KAMENEV.

Kamenev was born at Tiflis on the 22d of July, 1883, and from 1904 onward was actively engaged on political work in the Moscow group of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. In 1905 and 1907 he took part in the conferences of the party in London, and in 1908 attended the conference of the party held in Paris. From 1910 onward he lectured at the propaganda school established by the Lenin group of the party at Lonjumeau, near Paris, taking as his subject "The History of the Bourgeoisie in Russia." During this period he was busy preparing a brochure in reply to a pamphlet which had been published by Martov, the Menshevik leader, against the bolsheviks. Martov's pamphlet was entitled "Saviors or Destroyers," and Chapter IV, which devoted special attention to bolshevik practices, was entitled "An Orgy of Trickery." In 1912 Kamenev attended the so-called "General Conference of the Party," convoked by Lenin at Prague in January of that year. With the exception of two Menshevik representatives the 18 members of the conference were bolsheviks *see Appendix*. On the outbreak of war in 1914, Kamenev made an antiwar speech before a conference in Finland, which was attended by four bolshevik members of the Duma, Petrovsky, Badaev (who have been mentioned above), Samoilov, and Muranov. In this speech he pointed out that the only true policy for a Marxist was "war against war." He, together with others who attended the conference, were subsequently arrested on a charge of defeatist activities and condemned to exile. After the outbreak of the Russian revolution in the spring of 1917, Kamanev became a member of the Petrograd Soviet and later, after the bolshevik revolution in the autumn of that year, he became a member of the Moscow Soviet, of which he was ultimately appointed president, and also member of the all-Russian central executive committee. In July, 1920, he was appointed to proceed to England as head of a soviet peace delegation, and the circumstances of his departure from England in

August in connection with revelations as to bolshevik propaganda are well known. Kamenev in January, 1921, was appointed president of the emergency commission for the supply of the capitals, established by the council of labor and defense to take special measures in regard to the serious fuel crisis which has become extremely acute during the last few months. He is said to have married Trotski's sister.

3. A. S. ENUKIDZE.

Enukidze is a Georgian, and is one of the most attractive personalities in the bolshevik party, according to information we have received from more than one source. He has long been associated with the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, is regarded as an honest and upright man and as belonging to the Right wing of the bolshevik party. He is a friend of Chertkov, who was the secretary of Tolstoy. He is said to have been instrumental in saving the lives of a number of innocent persons who were condemned to death by the extraordinary commission during the revolution. In February, 1921, Chicherin offered the mediation of the soviet government in the hostilities which had arisen between Georgia and Armenia and proposed that Enukidze should proceed to Georgia as mediator.

4. LUTOVINOV, Y. K.

Lutovinov is a member of the collegium of the All-Russian central soviet of trade unions and one of the secretaries of Kalinin, the president of the All-Russian central executive committee.

5. RYKOV, A. I.

Rykov is said to have been born on Saratov of peasant parents in 1881 and to have become a clerk and a translator into foreign languages. He was for many years one of the right-hand men of Lenin in organizing the bolshevik group of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. He has always been a moderate communist and was anxious to compose the differences between the bolsheviks and mensheviks in former days. He is president of the supreme council of people's economy in Moscow at the present time.

6. MURALOV, A. I.

Muralov is a young and energetic communist who was the first commandant of the Moscow military district after the bolshevik revolution of October, 1917. He is an agricultural expert and rumors were circulating in Moscow during the summer of 1920 that there were possibilities that he would replace Sereda as people's commissary for labor. These suggestions have, however, so far received no justification in fact. A manifesto by Muralov prescribing certain means of fighting against the failure of the harvest this year will be found in the Derevenskaya Bednota (the Village Poor) for the 14th of August, 1920. Maralov was a member of the seventh All-Russian central executive committee (1920).

7. NEVSKY, V. I.

Nevsky is a member of the editorial collegium of the publishing department of the soviet government, and is also associated with the work of the agitation-propagandist section and of the distributing section of the department. Nevsky is also director of the section for propaganda work in rural districts and of the peasants' section under the secretariat of the central committee of the Russian Communist Party.

8. SAPRONOV, B. P.

Sapronov has been for many years a well known trade-union worker and a member of the bolshevik section of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. It will be seen that he is mentioned in paragraph 189 as one of those moderate communists who have begun to protest against the autocratic action of the council of people's commissaries.

9. BADAEV, N. E.

Badaev is an old party worker of the bolshevik section of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. He was a member of the Fourth Duma, 1912-1917, and in 1914 was arrested for participating in a conference of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in Finland (Sept. 30 to Oct. 1) where Kamenev delivered an important speech against the European war. Badaev was subsequently exiled. Soon after the revo-

lution of February, 1917. Badaev became a member of the Petrograd Soviet, and, after the bolshevik coup d'état of October, 1917, he became a member of the All-Russian central executive committee and later of its presidium. He used to take a prominent part in the administration of Petrograd and was until recently president of the Petrokommuna, or Petrograd food administration. It is said that he then fell under a temporary cloud owing to charges of speculation, which were preferred against him, and even that he was summoned to Moscow and imprisoned in the Butirky gaol. The latest information shows that, if he was in prison, he was speedily released, as he is now said to be a prominent official in the people's commissariat for food at Moscow.

10. KISILEV, A. S.

Kisilev was a member of the seventh All-Russian central executive committee and a member of the presidium of that committee. He was president of the soviet of the industrial area of Ivanovo-Voznesensk in the government of Vladimir, not far from Moscow, and is president of the All-Russian Miners' Union.

11. BUKHARIN, N. I.

Bukharin was the son of a councillor of the Russian court, and born in 1879. He belonged to the Orthodox Church and was a student of Moscow University. He early became associated with the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party and was arrested in 1902 as a member and organizer of a committee of the party in the Zamoskvorietsky district of Moscow, and was exiled to the Archangel Province. Shortly after the outbreak of the Russian revolution in February, 1917, Bukharin became a member of the Petrograd Soviet, and after the bolshevik revolution of October, 1917, he became a member of the All-Russian central executive committee and a member of the presidium of that committee. He is a member of the central committee of the Russian Communist Party. On the 27th of January, 1918, he was appointed by a decree of the commissaries of the people a member of the governing body of the People's State Bank. He is also a member of the editorial collegium of the publishing department of the soviet government. Bukharin is one of the most prominent communist theorists and may be regarded as the leader of the communists of the Left. He was immediately elected a member of the executive committee of the Communist International on its foundation, in March, 1919, at a time when the more moderate communist leaders, including Lenin himself, were elected not as members, but only as candidates to the executive committee. Bukharin's literary activities are varied, and he frequently contributes to the various soviet newspapers, especially in Petrograd, where he lives. As far as western Europe is concerned, the most interesting of his works is his Communist Programme, which was first published in 1918, again in 1919, and a third edition of which is understood to have been published in 1920. The following is an extract from Chapter XIX of the Communist Programme.

"The International Republic of Soviets will liberate from oppression hundreds of millions of those who live in the colonies. The 'civilized robber powers' have tortured and torn the population of the colonial countries by a bloody régime. European civilization has been supported on the blood of ruthlessly exploited peoples in distant countries overseas. The dictatorship of the proletariat—and only it—will free them."

The best known, however, of his latest works in Russia are *Economics of the Transitory Period*, and *Political Economy*, both published during 1919-20. With regard to policy, he has always been opposed to the suggested granting of concessions in Russia to foreign capitalists and has recently been actively engaged with some success in influencing the rank and file of the Communist Party, who have shown signs of opposing the concessions policy as a departure from communist principles.

12. RAKOVSKY, K. G.

Rakovsky was intimately associated before the war in the Socialist politics of Rumania, but also maintained relations with the bolshevik group of the Russian Socialist Democratic Labor Party. After the outbreak of the war he took part with Lenin in various meetings of Socialists. In February, 1916, he made a speech before Socialists at Berne in which he declared that the Third International was already founded and that its aim should be to take vengeance for the war in the struggle for the social revolution. In the soviet government Rakovsky occupies a prominent position. He is a member of the central committee of the Russian Communist Party and president

of the council of people's commissaries for the Ukraine. After the conclusion of the peace of Brest-Litovsk between soviet Russia and Germany in 1918 Rakovsky was appointed a member of the delegation of the All-Russian central executive committee to proceed to Berlin for the purpose of attending meetings of German trade-unionists and Socialists. The delegation was, however, prevented from entering Germany by the German authorities.

13. STALIN, I. V. (DZHUGASHVILI).

Stalin is undoubtedly the ablest of the many Georgians who are working under the soviet government, and there is reason to believe that, as an organizer and a man of action Stalin is second only to Trotsky. He was formerly one of the principal organizers of the bolshevik section of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party and a close collaborator with Lenin. He was twice exiled to the Vologda Province and once to Siberia. After the outbreak of the Russian revolution of February, 1917, he became a member of the Petrograd Soviet and after the bolshevik coup d'état of October, 1917, he became people's commissary for State control and people's commissary for nationalities, i. e., dealing with the affairs of the non-Russian nationalities of Russia of which he is a representative himself. In this latter capacity he was associated with the endeavors of the soviet government to set on foot a subversive propaganda in the east. He was also for some time military commissar of the southwestern Russian front during 1918-19. In August, 1920, he attended the Muhammadan communist congress at Baku, and thence proceeded to Erivan, in Armenia, and Angora, the headquarters of Mustapha Kemal Pasha in connection with the negotiations proceeding between the latter and the soviet government. He has a reputation for remarkable force of character and considerable ability.

14. VLADIMIRSKY, M. F.

Vladimirsky is assistant people's commissar for internal affairs; was a candidate for the presidium of the seventh All-Russian central executive committee; that is to say, he was one of those elected to take the place of the actual members in case of their inability to be present at a meeting owing to illness, death, or other reasons.

15. PETROVSKY, G. I.

Petrovsky was born in the Province of Kharkov, and represented the workers of the Ekaterinoslav Province in the Second and Fourth Dumas. Petrovsky was a prominent member of the Russian Social Democratic Party before the war. In December, 1912, he was one of those who took part in the sessions of the central committee of the party at Cracow in Poland, where Lenin, Zinoviev, Stalin, and Malinovsky, the spy, were present. He was one of the so-called bolshevik "shestiorka" or "six" in the Fourth Duma. He declined to attend a propaganda school which Lenin proposed to set up abroad in 1913. He attended the conference of the members of the central committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party held in Galicia in September, 1913, where Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Badaev were also present, and was appointed by the conference to proceed to Kiev to collect funds for the party. When the war broke out, Petrovsky attended a meeting of members of the bolshevik section of the party in Finland, on which occasion Kamenev was present and made a speech condemning the war. As a result of this meeting, Petrovsky and others who took part in it were arrested and exiled. After the outbreak of the revolution of February, 1917, Petrovsky returned from exile and became a member of the Petrograd Soviet. After the bolshevik revolution of 1917 he occupied the post of people's commissary for agriculture and later people's commissary for finance. He was a member of the seventh All-Russian central executive committee during 1920. In January, 1921, he was elected president of the central executive committee of the Ukraine soviet government.

16. KUTUZOV, I. I.

Kutuzov is a candidate of the seventh All-Russian central executive committee, and president of the central committee of the Textile Workers' Union.

17. TOMSKY, M. P.

Tomsky is president of the All-Russian central soviet of trade-unions, also a candidate of the presidium of the seventh All-Russian central executive committee.

18. ZALUTSKY, PETER.

Zalutsky is a Left member of the Petrograd Soviet.

19. SMIDOVICH, P. G.

Smidovich is a Left member of the Moscow Soviet and a member of the seventh All-Russian central executive committee which has just gone out of office. He is a member of the collegium of the Moscow Soviet of people's economy.

88. The All-Russian central executive committee is evidently too large to take direct executive action. It is, however, to be regarded as governor and controller of the executive departments of State which divide between them the actual supreme control of national affairs. The chief branches of this executive are—

(a) The supreme revolutionary tribunal, which has some analogy to the supreme court of judicature in England, and resembles more the revolutionary tribunals of the France of Robespierre.

The tribunal was presided over in 1920 by Comrade Ozol, who was a candidate to the central executive committee at that time. He is, we believe, identical with an Ozol who took part in the terrorist activities of the Maximalist section of the Social Revolutionary Party in 1907-8. Krylenko, who is identical with the Krylenko who became commander in chief of the army after the October revolution, is public prosecutor under the tribunal. The functions of the supreme revolutionary tribunal are vague.

The Official Handbook states:

The supreme revolutionary tribunal of the All-Russian central executive committee deals with matters of high State importance intrusted to it by decrees of the presidium of the All-Russian central executive committee. Under the tribunal there are two departments:

(1) The investigation department—

(a) Examines cases of high State importance which are removed from the competence of the ordinary courts and transferred for examination by the supreme revolutionary tribunal and pronounces decision upon cases referred for investigation by the All-Russian central executive committee, and

(b) Conducts investigations into cases referred to it from various judicial and other institutions presenting reports to the presidium of the All-Russian central executive committee regarding the progress made with them.

(2) The cassation department—

(a) Examines complaints and protests on cases arising in all tribunals of the republic, and

(b) Controls the activity of these tribunals.

THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIES.

89. (b) The council of people's commissaries has some analogies to the British executive government, the actual people's commissaries forming a kind of cabinet. It is actually appointed by the All-Russian central executive committee. According to the Official Handbook of Central and Local Institutions of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic—

The soviet of people's commissaries directs the general administration of the affairs of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. It publishes decrees, orders, instructions, and in general takes all measures necessary for the regular and speedy ordering of the affairs of the State. All these measures are subject to reference to the All-Russian central executive committee for consideration and confirmation.

90. It is expressly stated in the soviet constitution that the soviet of people's commissaries is wholly responsible to the All-Russian

Congress of Soviets and the All-Russian central executive committee. Individual commissaries and members of collegia are responsible to the council of people's commissaries and the All-Russian central executive committee.

91. There are 16 people's commissariats and a people's commissary¹ stands at the head of each of them and is supported by an assistant people's commissary.

92. A collegium, the members of which are confirmed in their appointment by the soviet of people's commissaries, is attached to each people's commissary and sits under his presidency.

93. These people's commissariats and the people's commissaries and assistant people's commissaries attached to them are:

Commissariat.	People's commissary.	Assistant people's commissaries.
1. War.....	L. D. Trotskyi.....	Sklyansky.
2. Internal affairs.....	F. E. Dzerzhinsky.....	M. F. Vladimirsky.
3. Justice.....	D. I. Kursky.....	Not known.
4. Ways and communications.....	Yemshanov.....	{V. M. Sverdlov. Borisov. ¹
5. Finance.....	N. N. Krestinsky.....	S. E. Chutskaev.
6. Education.....	A. V. Lunacharsky.....	M. N. Pokrovsky.
7. Posts and telegraphs.....	A. M. Lyubovich (acting).....	Not known.
8. Public health.....	M. A. Semashko.....	Z. P. Soloviev.
9. State control (workers' and peasants' control).....	I. V. Stalin.....	A. V. Avanесов.
10. Nationalities (non-Russian nationalities of Russia).....	do.....	N. Narimanov. ²
11. Agricultural.....	A. P. Sereda.....	N. N. Osinsky.
12. Labor and social welfare.....	V. V. Schmidt.....	A. N. Vinokurov.
13. Foreign affairs.....	G. V. Chicherin.....	L. M. Karakhan.
14. Food.....	A. D. Tsyuryupina.....	N. P. Bryukhanov.
15. Foreign trade.....	L. B. Krasin.....	{Yazikov. A. M. Lezhava.
16. Supreme council of people's economy.....	A. I. Rykov.....	{V. P. Milyutin. G. I. Lomov.

¹ Borisov was assistant minister of ways and communications under the provisional government in 1917.

² Narimanov is now president of the Azerbaijan soviet government, which was established at Baku in April, 1920, and it is therefore doubtful whether he still retains the post of assistant people's commissary for nationalities.

94. Everything possible has been done to insure the accuracy of the above list. Some confusion is created by the fact that certain people's commissaries, while still retaining their posts nominally are principally, if not entirely, engaged on other work. For example, Krasin continued to retain the post of people's commissary for ways and communications eight months subsequent to his leaving Russia as vice president of the Russian trade delegation, which ultimately proceeded to England. During his absence Trotski assumed control over the commissariat of ways and communications, but this was only temporary and he did not, as suggested in the European press, replace Krasin as people's commissary. Similar doubts arise as to the exact position of Dzerzhinsky, who, in addition to being nominally people's commissary for internal affairs, is also president of the All-Russian and Moscow extraordinary commissions and assumed Kamenev's post as president of the Moscow Soviet on the latter's departure for England as president of the soviet Russian peace delegation. It would seem impossible that Dzerzhinsky should have succeeded in discharging responsibilities so many and varied, and support is lent to this by the fact that Vladimirsky has been men-

¹ The president of the council of the people's commissaries is V. I. Lenin.

tioned in the Moscow Wireless Press as people's commissary for internal affairs, although no statement regarding his official appointment to this position has been seen by us. We are inclined to think that Dzerzhinsky still retains the nominal title of people's commissary for internal affairs, but that Vladimirsy exercises complete control over the work of the commissariat.

95. It also appears that Stalin has for some time ceased to take an intimate part in the work of the workers' and peasants' control, and that in addition to his other work as people's commissary for nationalities he has devoted a considerable amount of time to military work. In these circumstances Avanesov, the assistant people's commissary of the workers' and peasants' control, has virtually been in charge of the commissariat.

96. If it has been difficult to establish who is actually people's commissary in some of the commissariats, the difficulties of following the rapid changes in the personnel of the collegia attached to the various commissariats is far greater. Some of the members of these collegia are important men, while others are insignificant. In these circumstances, therefore, it is not proposed to touch upon the personnel of the collegia here.

THE MALY SOVIET.

97. (c) The Maly or small soviet has analogies to a committee of the cabinet in this country and, as regards its composition, to the committee of national defense during the war and, as regards its work, to a committee of the cabinet for drafting legislation.

This council is, in the words of the Official Handbook, a commission for "examining all such legislative proposals and questions of administration as demand preparatory discussion in detail and giving a final decision in the name of soviet of people's commissaries in respect of those of them upon which the unanimous agreement of all members of the Maly Soviet, together with representatives of the departments interested and the people's commissary of justice is obtained." In cases where disagreements arise in the Maly Soviet the question in dispute is referred for decision to the soviet of people's commissaries. The Maly Soviet is elected by the soviet of people's commissaries, principally from members of the collegia of the people's commissariats of justice, workers' and peasants' control, internal affairs, finance, people's economy, and labor, including one representative from each. The following are members of the Maly Soviet: Anikst, Galkin, Kozlovsky, Milyutin, Chutskaev, Obolensky, and Sheverdin. Anikst is the representative of the commissariat of labor, Galkin the representative of the workers' and peasants' control, formerly known as the people's commissariat of State control; Kozlovsky represents the ministry of justice; Milyutin, who came to England as a member of the trade delegation in the course of the summer, represents the supreme council of people's economy; Chutskaev represents the commissariat of finance, as also does Obolensky.¹ We have been unable to ascertain what department is represented by Sheverdin, but it is suggested that he is identical with an official of the same name who is a member of the financial department of the supreme council of

¹ Obolensky is also a member of the presidium of the supreme council of people's economy.

people's economy. Anikst is a prolific writer in the *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* (Economic Life) and in various official publications and trade-union journals. Obolensky is understood to have shown considerable opposition to the policy of wholesale nationalization. All the members of the Maly Soviet may be regarded as moderate communists.

THE COUNCIL OF LABOR AND DEFENSE.

98. (D) The council of labor and defense was a committee of people's commissaries established during the civil war against Denikin and Koltchak for the purpose of coordinating the activities of all commissariats and institutions under the soviet government, dealing with or affecting the army. The council has now been reconstituted, in accordance with the decision taken at the Eighth All-Russian Congress, as a committee of the people's commissaries charged with controlling the whole of the economic life of the country and with elaborating and supervising the execution of a unified plan of economic administration.

The following are members of the council:

- (1) The president of the council of people's commissaries, as president of the council of labor and defense.
- (2) The people's commissary for war.
- (3) The president of the supreme council of people's economy.
- (4) The people's commissary for labor.
- (5) The people's commissary for ways and communications.
- (6) The people's commissary for food.
- (7) The people's commissary for agriculture.
- (8) The people's commissary for the workers' and peasants' control.
- (9) A representative of the All-Russian Soviet of Trade Unions.

ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIES.

99. The following is a suggested division of people's commissaries and assistant people's commissaries, into Right, Left, and Center, according to the political position occupied by its various members in the Communist Party in those cases where we have found it possible to form a judgment:

Right: A. I. Rykov, A. V. Lunacharsky, M. A. Semashko, G. V. Chicherin, L. B. Krasin, A. V. Avanesov, V. M. Sverdlov, V. P. Milyutin, G. I. Lomov, —— Lezhava, M. N. Pokrovsky.

Center: V. I. Lenin, L. D. Trotzki, N. N. Krestinsky, I. V. Stalin, V. V. Shmidt, A. D. Tsyuryupa, M. F. Vladimirska, —— Sklyansky, N. Narimanov, A. M. Lyubovich.

Left: F. E. Dzerzhinsky.

100. It would appear at first sight that the Right are far stronger than is actually the case. In actual fact Rykov and Krasin are the only members of the Communists of the Right mentioned above who have any influence, and the evidence which we have received goes to show that this influence is small. On the other hand, the Center is represented on the council by four strong men in Lenin, Trotzki, Krestinsky, and Stalin. It is not, however, in the council of people's commissaries, which may be compared to the cabinet in other countries, that the ultimate power lies, but in the central committee of the Communist Party, to which we now turn.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

101. According to statements which have appeared in the Moscow Wireless Press, and which have been confirmed by witnesses, the bolshevik or Communist Party in Russia was said to number 600,000 members during 1920. Another estimate gives the number of members in the party as 150,000, and this is probably a more accurate statement. If, therefore, the population of Russia at the present time is computed at 120,000,000, 1 in every 200 Russians may be said, if the larger estimate is adopted, to be a member of the Communist Party, and only 1 in 800, if the more modest estimate of 150,000 members is taken.

102. It may appear strange that the destinies of a great country should be controlled by such a small percentage of its total population. It must be remembered, however, that 85 per cent of the Russian people are peasants who are mostly illiterate, and as yet incapable of organized political action, and that they have got the land they desired for generations and only wish to be left in peace to work it. It has also to be taken into account that complete control is exercised by the bolshevik government only in towns and in the country along and adjacent to railway lines and the great waterways of Russia; that in districts further removed from these arteries their control, though still present, is less effective; and that in areas remote or by nature difficult of access the peasants live undisturbed save for the occasional visits of communist propagandists. It must also be recognized that the Communist Party, although numerically insignificant in comparison with the population of Russia, is undoubtedly the most highly organized political group existing in Russia to-day. Its members, drawn principally from the population of the towns, and more especially the capital cities of Moscow and Petrograd, are mostly picked men. They are bound together by strict party discipline, and taught to believe that a high responsibility attaches to them as communists for the defense and expansion of the revolution, whether by arms against internal enemies or against the present economic disorganization of Russia, and they are often punished if guilty of delinquency or failure more severely than others who are not members of the party. The Communist Party were assisted in their efforts to consolidate and extend their power in Russia by the fact that the Russian people were demoralized by the European war and the initial convulsions of the revolution; that they became utterly exhausted as a result of the economic disintegration following the bolshevik revolution and the outbreak of civil war; that the bolsheviks practiced a policy of widespread terror; and that the political, administrative, and moral bankruptcy of the White Russians gained for the Reds the active or tacit support of the majority of the Russian people in the civil war.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

103. Unfortunately we have been unable to obtain a list of the members of the central committee of the Russian Communist Party relating to a period later than January, 1920, in which month the Official Handbook of Central and Local Institutions of the Russian

Socialist Federative Republic was published. From that book the following list, comprising the members of the central committee at that time, has been taken. We offer the following arrangement of the members mentioned in this list according to their political views:

Right: M. P. Tomsky.

Center: V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin, G. V. Zinoviev, L. B. Kamenev, N. M. Krestinsky,¹ L. D. Trotsky, K. V. Radek, A. G. Beloborodov, K. G. Rakovsky, A. I. Muranov, M. I. Kalinin, P. I. Stuchka, G. E. Evdokimov, L. P. Serebryakov.

Left: N. I. Bukharin, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, E. D. Stasova.

104. We are informed that the changes which took place in the personnel of the central committee as the result of the all-Russian congress of the Russian Communist Party held in May, 1920, were not important. It would appear, however, that Menzhinsky, a member of the "Osoby Otdiel" (special department of the all-Russian extraordinary commission),² became a member of the committee in the course of 1920, as he was recently stated to be a member of the political bureau of the central committee.

THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

105. The political bureau of the Communist Party may be regarded as the supreme directing force in the party and of the soviet government. In addition to Menzhinsky, the members of it are said to be Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Krestinsky, the last named being also secretary of the central committee.

THE CENTRAL STAFF OF COMMUNIST DETACHMENTS.

106. Attached to the central committee of the Communist Party there is the central staff of communist detachments. This organization is responsible for assembling, dispatching, and generally controlling the communist detachments which are called upon from time to time to work on tasks of special difficulty and urgency. Thus they demonstrate the reality of communist leadership wherever there is important work to be done. These detachments have been utilized in a variety of ways—to clear snow from the railways at a time of emergency, to work long hours in the railway repair shops on special occasions, to lead workers on occasion when extraordinary efforts are being made in the towns and in the country to cope with problems of food and fuel supply, etc.

107. Under the central staff of communist detachments there is also a department for dealing with the national minorities; that is to say, the non-Russian nationalities of Russia. The various sections of this department—Georgian, Armenian, Lettish, Lithuanian, Tartar—are charged with carefully following the progress of communist organizations in these areas and with assisting these organizations to extend their influence and to disseminate bolshevik propaganda. The activities of the department of national minorities among the Georgians, Armenians, and Tartars of the Caucasus are

¹ Krestinsky may be more accurately described as Center inclining toward the Left.

² The functions of the "Osoby Otdiel" of the all-Russian extraordinary commission are to combat espionage, military White Guard conspiracies and all forms of counter-revolutionary activity in the army, in the war departments, and at the front, and to control the administration of all the branches of the "Osoby Otdiel" at the front and in the army.

concentrated in the "Kav-Bureau," or Caucasus bureau. Elena Stasoya is intimately associated with the work of the department, and has recently been arranging for the support of communists in Georgia with funds and literature. A Georgian, Dumbadze,¹ and an Armenian, Sevastyanov, are said to be two of the most prominent agents working under her in the Kav-Bureau.

108. A department of national minorities is said to work in collaboration with the various sections of the people's commissariat of nationalities.

109. A peasants' section has been organized under the central committee, and Nevsky was head of this section during 1920. There were proposals to open in Moscow a "peasants' house," where peasants arriving in Moscow could find lodgings.

110. The greatest energy and devotion is shown by some of these communist propagandists who go out to work in the villages. Witnesses have informed us that in some cases they have been received with marked hostility, and a witness saw the mutilated body of one of them who had been killed by the peasants of a village near Smolensk. Owing to the hostility of the peasants toward the towns, and to the soviet government in particular, but mainly owing to the backwardness of the peasantry, the results achieved by these indefatigable propagandists appear to be in inverse ratio to the magnitude of their efforts.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND DEMOBILIZATION.

111. The central committee of the Russian Communist Party has recently begun to prepare for an intensive campaign of propaganda among the soldiers whom it is proposed to demobilize from the Red army. According to a Moscow wireless message, dated the 5th of January, 1921, and signed by Preobrazhensky, a secretary of the central committee of the Russian Communist Party, and Litkens, deputy chief of the political education department attached to the central committee, all government soviets, district military committees, and government political educational soviets are instructed to take the following measures in connection with the demobilization of Red army soldiers:

(1) To discharge Red army soldiers only after the maximum amount of propaganda has been spread among them and they have been supplied with propagandist literature.

(2) To continue to supply with propagandist literature discharged soldiers traveling from their regimental depots to their homes.

(3) To mobilize the best party workers in districts where discharged soldiers arrive, with a view to continuing communist propaganda among them, and to form in the principal towns of the various governments committees of three, consisting of one representative of the executive committee of the government soviet, a representative of the political education department of the government, and a representative of the war commissariat, to carry out this work of propaganda.

¹ Dumbadze is a nephew of Gen. Dumbadze, who formerly occupied a position at the court of the Czar. Dumbadze was seriously implicated in the army supply scandal with which Gen. Sukhomlinov was connected in 1916, and after the first revolution he was tried and sentenced to be exiled to Siberia. After the Bolshevik revolution, he is said to have returned to European Russia, and to have been appointed to a responsible post in the soviet organization of army supply at Kiev. According to the latest information, he is now a member of the Georgian Soviet at Tiflis.

112. Another wireless message, dated the 5th of January, signed by Krestinsky, secretary of the political bureau of the central committee of the Russian Communist Party, directs that all communists who have been serving the Red army shall be withdrawn from their unit and registered at the political administration of the war revolutionary soviet, with a view to being placed at the disposal of the Communist Party committees for a period not exceeding six months. It would appear that most of these communists will be utilized as propagandists among the demobilized soldiers.¹

113. In conclusion attention may be drawn to the predominance in the Communist Party to-day of that morbid atmosphere of secrecy and suspicion which was a marked characteristic of the activities of the bolsheviks in prerevolutionary days when the party led, for the most part, an illegal existence. Now, as then, a determined effort is made to make the party an extremely powerful, mobile, and well-disciplined minority, a close communist caste which aims at leading the masses under an iron dictatorship toward a gradual realization of the communist ideal. So far from trying to increase the membership of the party an attempt, supported by the extremists, is being made carefully to purge the party of all unstable and untrustworthy elements. The necessity of aiming at an exclusive communist caste is dictated by the conviction of the leaders that the broadening of the ranks of the party would inevitably be followed by anemia as a result of which true communism would gradually wither away. It is this consideration which has caused the bolsheviks to establish in Russia a government more centralized than the government of the Czar, and it is against this centralized and semiautocratic form of government that the tide of inevitable reaction is now beginning to set in.

ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL LIBERTY IN SOVIET RUSSIA.

ELECTIONS.

114. Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the constitution of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic are respectively directed to guarantee to the workers real freedom for the expression of their views, real freedom of assembly and of association. We have endeavored to ascertain from witnesses, and from documentary evidence, how far the rights for which these articles provide are enjoyed by the Russian people.

115. With regard to the exercise of these rights at elections, we quote the following examples from the evidence which has been given by our witnesses before the committee:

1. MR. A. E. COPPING'S EVIDENCE.

(Mr. Copping proceeded to Russia as the correspondent of the Daily Chronicle toward the end of January, 1920; he remained there for two months and left Moscow toward the end of March.)

He gives the following description of an election which he attended while in Moscow:

"It was an election of one of the government institutions or one of the government departments; I mean they were constituents. They had to elect a certain

¹ According to our latest information, it would appear that the partial demobilization of the army is being accompanied by a great increase in desertion, large numbers of soldiers leaving their units while awaiting demobilization orders.

number of members for the Moscow Soviet—6 or 10 or some number like that. There was a corresponding number of candidates who were bolsheviks and there was a lesser number who were mensheviks and independents. They took it in turns on the platform, one on each side, to state their views, and the mensheviks and independents were quite emphatic in what they said. They evidently had a sense of freedom of speech: they were under no fear, and they spoke out perfectly freely; and the other side did the same. There seemed to be quite as much freedom at that meeting as one would have in a political meeting in the East End of London, and the same sort of uproar was going on all the time. The mensheviks, for instance, said: 'It is a shame to treat the middle class in the way that you are doing; they ought to have food and they ought to have votes.' This was most unpopular, as they only represented a minority of the audience, and they were met with cries of 'Traitor'; 'traitor to the revolution.' The only point I make is that they had perfect freedom to say these things, although they happened to be quite unpopular at that meeting. The result of that meeting was that all the bolsheviks were elected, and not one single one on the other side. I was much interested to see how they would take the vote, because in a large theater, consisting of stalls, pit, and three balconies, it looked as though it would be extremely difficult short of actual ballot papers. They partitioned the whole audience up into sections. For instance, each gallery was cut into three sections; for each section two scrutineers were appointed, one representing the bolsheviks and the other representing the opposition, and in each section the counting was taken separately. * * * Each section was invited to vote separately. From the platform they were distinctly told which section was voting—'Now, the middle of that gallery.' Then in that section hands would be held up for the bolsheviks and for the other side; so that it was perfectly easy for the whole of the audience to check the figures. In our section of the gallery I have really forgotten the numbers, but they were very disproportionate. I think there were about a dozen on one side and about 38 on the other, and some little question was raised—somebody thought instead of 8 it should be 10, say, and the vote was taken again. The voting took a long time. When the result of each section was arrived at, it was signified by shouting out to the platform, the figures were taken down, and afterwards all these results were put together. The impression left on my mind was that it was absolutely fair; that the whole thing was straight and correct."

Mr. Copping's evidence goes to show that freedom of speech was enjoyed by those who attended this election and that, in so far as members of the mensheviks and independent political groupings were present, there appears to have been no interference, as far as Mr. Copping was able to observe, with the right of association. It does not, however, show how far freedom of assembly for party purposes is enjoyed by political groups opposed to the bolsheviks.

2. MR. J. PARKINSON'S EVIDENCE.

(Mr. Parkinson was chief engineer at the textile mills of the firm of N. N. Konshin, of Serpukhov, near Moscow.)

Mr. Parkinson stated that the Serpukhov Soviet was composed of representatives elected from members of the local soviets or committees in the factories and representing the various districts of the town of Serpukhov. Mensheviks and communists took part in the elections, but the communists seemed to have shown most bitter hostility to the mensheviks. The Serpukhov Soviet was controlled entirely by communists. Although in his opinion they did not number more than 10 per cent of those engaged at the mills, he stated that the communists always succeeded in getting their candidates onto the soviet by fair means or foul.

3. MR. J. E. CHARNOCK'S EVIDENCE.

(Mr. Charnock was manager of cotton mills belonging to the firm of Vikul & Savva Morozov at Orekhovo Zuevo.)

Mr. Charnock stated that he had witnessed elections which had taken place at Orekhovo Zuevo. The voting at these elections took place by ballot and was compulsory. The electorate were instructed to vote for the communist candidate and threats were made that if they did not do so they would be deprived of their food ration.

4. MR. RALPH WRIGHT'S EVIDENCE.

(Mr. Wright was the manager of a textile mill at the town of Fgorievsk in the Province of Ryazan.)

Mr. Wright stated that he had been present at the elections to the Egorievsk Soviet and also at elections which had taken place to the board of the cooperative society in Egorievsk. He said that it was the custom to appoint a president of the election assembly who would read out the list of candidates who were proposed for election. This list was made up entirely of communists, whose names were taken from some of those who had been members of the old soviet and others who were representatives of the various factory and other soviets in the town. The president of the election assembly used to ask those who wished to oppose the list and say what their objections were. If anyone did so, however, they were usually imprisoned. It was the general custom for the communists to prolong the speeches of their various candidates, as a result of which most of the audience were tired out and left the assembly. The communists then took the vote and received a majority.

5. MR. RICHARD LUNN'S EVIDENCE.

(Mr. Lunn was the head of a textile factory which did spinning for the Balashinsky Textile Mills.)

Mr. Lunn stated that the voting at elections to the mill committee in his factory and in the district where he worked took place by show of hands and not by ballot.

Examples 3 and 4 show that intimidation was practiced by the communists at elections and that the right to give free expression of opinion was thereby violated. It also appears from example 3 that elections often took place by ballot, and from example 5 they appear sometimes to have taken place by show of hands. The election which Mr. Copping describes also seems to have been decided by a vote by show of hands. With regard to these different methods of voting, it is to be noted that there is no prescription as to the manner in which polling should be conducted in the electoral law of the constitution. It is apparently left to the electoral commission of each electoral unit to decide whether voting is to take place by a show of hands or by ballot, or whether a proportional or majority system of voting is to be adopted.

HOW COMMUNISTS TURN THIS TO ACCOUNT.

116. There is evidence that the Communist Party has turned to account this indefiniteness of the electoral law, and that proportional representation has been adopted where the party had reason to anticipate defeat at the hands of nonparty and menshevik candidates, and majority representation where it was confident of success. An election to the soviet of the food committee of the Smolensk Province (known as the Gubprodkom), which took place, according to the evidence of a witness, in the spring of 1920, illustrates this. Five deputies were to be elected to represent 1,000 workers. About 280 workers attended the election, and 196 voted on a show of hands for the menshevik candidate and 75 for the bolshevik.

The president of the electoral assembly was about to declare the result, when a communist member of the electoral commission informed him that the military convoy (Vo-Okhra) of 150 soldiers, attached to the Gubprodkom to guard supplies, had been given an opportunity of voting by secret ballot. According to this ballot 150 votes had been cast for a communist candidate. The result of the election was therefore declared to be: For the communists, 75 plus 150, equals 225; and for the mensheviks, 196. On this, great indignation was shown and the meeting was dissolved in disorder. On the following day a protest, signed by 500 persons, was presented to the electoral commission. It pointed out that—

(1) As the soldiers were scattered throughout the Province several days must necessarily elapse in taking a poll among them. The electoral commission, however, only announced the holding of the election on the day before it actually took place.

(2) The Menshevik Party had not been informed that such a ballot would take place, and were therefore unable to submit their list of candidates to the soldiers.

(3) No representative of the Menshevik Party had been present at the count of votes after the ballot.

The president of the electoral commission, however, informed those who presented the protest that the election had been confirmed on the previous night and that no further action could therefore be taken.

RED ARMY ELECTION AT SMOLENSK.

117. There is also evidence relating to a Red army election which took place in the Smolensk Province. On this occasion a number of communist canvassers toured the army addressing various units and, at each meeting, read out the names of the communist candidates for the election. On the following day these names were published as those of the candidates elected to the Red army soviets, and their election was duly confirmed. No other party was allowed to address meetings in the army or to put forward a list of candidates. The army in the Smolensk district was 50,000 strong. The elections in the town of Smolensk itself took place in the Nikolaevsky barracks, the necessary announcement being made by Prikaz or army order.

MOSCOW ELECTIONS.

118. While we are informed that it was not possible for such violations of the electoral law to take place in Moscow as in the Provinces, Government offices and factories which had elected noncommunist representatives were liable, on one pretext or another, to be placed in an inferior category for receiving rations. In some cases arrangements were made by the communists that as few electors as possible should be present at election, and this practice seems to have been general in other parts of Russia. There is evidence, for example, of an election to choose three deputies to represent the glavod or central board of waterways. The election was announced to the workers two hours before it was actually to take place and was appointed to be held in one of the central halls in Moscow. Half an hour before the meeting began the various noncommunist workers came to the hall. A little later a telephone message was received at the hall, saying that the election had been fixed to take place at another hall which was situated in a distant quarter of the city. Many of the workers were tired, and, as no tramways were available, they were faced with a long walk. In these circumstances the number of the noncommunist workers attending the election was much reduced. The communists who had remained at the factories were given timely information of the change and succeeded in reaching the hall. As a result, therefore, the communist candidates were elected. The practice of challenging elections where menshevik representatives were elected and of causing new elections to take place has also been reported, and as an example of this the case of the well-known

menshevik leader Dan may be quoted. Dan was elected by the workers of the publishing house of Sytin to represent them on the Moscow Soviet. The meeting was immediately challenged and five new elections took place. As, however, the workers reelected him on each occasion, the communists are said to have finally acquiesced. In the case of Abramovitch, whose name has been mentioned above, and who was elected to represent the Triokhgorod factory on the Moscow Soviet, the communists were successful in challenging the election, as he was not reelected.

A SMOLENSK ELECTION.

119. A third account of an election, which also took place in the town of Smolensk, offers an example of an election among the members of a trade-union for the purpose of choosing persons to represent the union on the Smolensk Soviet. As the result of the voting, which took place in this instance by show of hands, four nonparty representatives and one menshevik, who was not a member of the union, were elected to the Smolensk Soviet. The communists challenged the election on the ground that the menshevik in question was not a member of the union. The mensheviks maintained that there is no clause in the electoral law under the constitution of the soviet republic which makes it obligatory for representatives of trade-unions on the various soviets to be members of the particular trade-union which they represent. An examination of the active and passive electoral law, chapter 13, which deals with the rights of electing and being elected to the soviets, enjoyed by the citizens of the soviet republic, does not bear out the contention of the communists. There is nothing in this chapter or elsewhere in the constitution which provides for the necessity of trade-unions being represented by actual members of the unions in which elections take place. The communists, however, were successful in arranging for a second meeting to take place for the purpose of holding a new election. The holding of this election was only announced to the workers by the electoral commission about an hour before work ended on the afternoon of the day on which it was appointed to take place, and occasion was taken to distribute among the workmen as they passed out of the factory free tickets for a bolshevik cinematograph entertainment.

120. It was the opinion of the mensheviks that this distribution of free tickets was specially designed by the communists for the purpose of diverting the workers from the election meeting. This meeting, in spite of the maneuver, resulted in the return of the same candidates. The communists were not yet satisfied, however, and decided to hold a third election, which was attended by a larger body of people than had been present at the preceding meeting. The feeling at this meeting ran so high in support of the five candidates already elected that the communists were convinced of the hopelessness of further protest, and did not put the question to the vote a third time.

PETROGRAD ELECTIONS.

121. The following passage describes elections to the Petrograd Soviet, which took place in December, 1919. It has been translated from the journal of the minority of the Social Revolutionary Party, the Narod, which is published in Moscow. According to the article from which the translation was made the minority social revolutionaries put forward lists of candidates at only two factories—the wagon and locomotive workshops of the Nikolaevsky Railway.

The elections in the wagon workshops took place on Tuesday, the 23d of December. Comrade Zorin¹ (member of the presidium of the Petrograd Soviet, member of the Petrograd branch of the Russian Communist Party and one of the right-hand men of Zinoviev, president of the Petrograd Soviet and president of the Communist International), made a speech at the election meeting on behalf of the communists, while Comrade Broitman spoke on behalf of the minority of the Social Revolutionary Party.

The list of the minority social revolutionaries was carried without exception. The communists then decided to dissolve the election. Under cover of the article of the constitution on the right of recalling deputies by a general assembly of the workers, the communists proceeded to agitate that the general assembly of workers in the wagon workshops should pronounce as invalid the elections which had taken place. At a second electoral assembly, which took place on the 27th of December, the communists brought to the meeting members of the Communist Union of Youth and communists from the locomotive workshops. Neither category had any right to vote. The workers demanded their withdrawal, which was achieved only after long disputes. After speeches by a number of workers asking that the agitation of the communists should not be upheld, the assembly, by a great majority, pronounced the election valid. After the assembly, an agent of the extraordinary commission at the factory made a report on Comrade Rudakov, member of the Petrograd organizing bureau of the minority of the Social Revolutionary Party, and on the following day a descent was made upon his domicile for the purpose of arresting him. He was not arrested, however, as he was not at home. The wife of Comrade Rudakov was then arrested as a hostage.

In the locomotive workshops (Alexandrovsky Engineering Factory) the election took place on the 26th of December. Comrade Zorin again spoke on behalf of the communists. The representative of the party in power again made the timeworn attacks against the social revolutionaries. The representative of the Social Revolutionary Party replied. When Comrade Zorin attempted to retort, cries of "Down with him" were raised among the workers. As in the wagon workshops, the list of the minority of the Social Revolutionary Party was passed without exception. The Petrograd Social Revolutionary Organization thus has 10 representatives in the Petrograd Soviet (Comrades Karasev, Golodkov, Lavrentev, Bystrov, Kavulin, Rodionov, Semeniuk, Bochkov, and others).

122. The general tenor of the evidence given before us with regard to elections and the exercise of political liberties shows that the interference of the bolsheviks with political liberty, which began with the dissolution by force of the constituent assembly in January, 1918, became much greater after the beginning of the civil war in the late summer of 1918. It became difficult, and in some cases impossible, for parties, whether socialist or other, who were opposed to the bolsheviks to continue to exist legally. In these circumstances such political activities as they were able to continue had largely to be carried on in secret.

123. We are informed that a general proscription of their political opponents was carried out by the bolsheviks during the period preceding and immediately following the advance of Denikin on Orel, in the early summer of 1919.

¹ Zorin formerly lived for many years in America and experienced conditions of great poverty and hardship.

124. In some cases even during this proscription, political groups opposed to the bolsheviks were able to take advantage of special conditions to continue their party existence. This is shown by the following example: The mensheviks, who were always strong in the northwestern Provinces of Russia, were able to improve their position in Smolensk as the result of a strike which paralyzed the railways in that area in the summer of 1919. It is said that the communists were unable to liquidate the strike, and were obliged to approach the menshevik leaders and ask them to use their good offices as intermediaries with the strikers. The menshevik leaders did so, and were accorded in return a certain measure of political liberty. But the general persecution went so far at that time that orders are said to have been issued by the central committee of the Communist Party throughout Russia that measures should be taken to expel all mensheviks and social revolutionary members from the soviets at all costs. Later, when Denikin's forces had been driven back and were in general retreat, this policy of proscription became less severe. Another wave of oppression passed over soviet Russia at the time of the attack made by Yudenich on Petrograd in the autumn of 1919.

125. In January, 1920, when it became clear that the armies of Denikin and Kolchak were unable to offer further effective resistance to the bolshevik armies, the pressure upon the parties opposed to the bolsheviks began to relax, and the mensheviks and social revolutionaries once more—although with great difficulty—managed to secure seats on the soviets in small numbers. With the resumption of hostilities between Poland and soviet Russia, in April, 1920, another period of persecution began, and the extraordinary commission began to arrest and imprison the representatives of the opposition parties. In this connection the arrest and imprisonment of Kefali, a prominent menshevik leader of the Moscow Printers' Union, together with other menshevik members of the council of that union, is said to have been connected with the visit of the British labor delegation to Moscow. A letter, one of the signatories to which was Kefali, addressed to members of the British delegation, pointing out the political inequalities existing in soviet Russia, was intercepted by the bolsheviks and published in the Moscow *Pravda*, with certain observations by Sosnovsky, a well-known member of the Communist Party. The activities of the mensheviks in the Moscow Printers' Union appear to have occasioned considerable alarm and discussion in communist circles in Moscow, and the Moscow and Petrograd papers were full of references to them for some weeks during this time. Later, in August, the old menshevik leader, Dan, was arrested and sent in exile to the Province of Vyatka. Dalen¹ and Troyanovsky, two other well-known mensheviks, were also arrested and imprisoned in Petrograd about the same time. The leader of the Social Revolutionary Party, V. M. Chernov, formerly president of the Russian Constituent Assembly in 1917, was persecuted by the extraordinary commission owing to an outspoken speech delivered by him on his sensational appearance at a meeting in Moscow attended by three members of the British labor delegation. He succeeded, however, in eluding the frequent attempts made to arrest

¹ According to the latest information Dalen, who, together with Troyanovsky, was subsequently set at liberty, has succeeded in leaving Russia, and has arrived in Berlin.

him, and in November, 1920, he succeeded in escaping abroad. Considerable indignation was aroused in social revolutionary circles, both in Russia and abroad, by the arrest of Mme. Chernov and her daughter as hostages for him. She has, however, now been released.

126. News has also been received recently regarding the confinement for many months under revolting conditions in the Yaroslav prison of six prominent members of the Social Revolutionary Party—Gotz, Vedenyapin, Goncharov, Morozov, Mukhin, and Timofeev—all of whom suffered imprisonment and exile under the old régime. According to information received by the menshevik representatives in this country, M. Kuchin-Oransky, member of the Kiev committee of the Russian Social Democratic Party, who is said to have served in the Red army at the beginning of the war with Poland, has been condemned without trial to forced labor in a concentration camp; in Mogilev and Vitebsk, Samara and Smolensk, mensheviks have been arrested, and 17 are said to have been expelled from the Ukraine by Rakovsky, president of the council of people's commissaries in the Ukraine Government, and sent to the Russian-Georgian frontier.

127. In connection with this policy of repression it is contended by the bolsheviks that the civil war against Denikin, Kolchak, and Yudenich, and the hostilities in northern Europe between the soviet forces on the one hand and the Allied and White Russian forces on the other placed the soviet government under the necessity of imposing restraints upon political liberty similar to those which were imposed in this country under the defense of the realm act for the purpose of the safety of the State at a time of national peril. The legality of these repressive measures is defended by reference to article 23 of the constitution of the soviet republic, which empowers the Russian socialist federative soviet republic to deprive individual persons and groups of rights which they may use to the detriment of the socialist revolution. The provisions of the defense of the realm act, however, were such as to impose only temporary restraint upon the liberty of the individual, and the operation of those provisions did not cause more than an infinitesimal percentage of the citizens of this country to be deprived of their freedom, and then only after their cases had been tried by a properly constituted court, in accordance with the usual judicial procedure.

128. Finally, we are led to conclude that:

(1) Ruthless suppression of parties and persons opposed to the bolsheviks coincided with the advance of the White Russian forces operating on the various fronts, and that when the immediate danger had passed away moderating influences began to prevail.

(2) Unrestricted freedom of speech, assembly, and association, as provided for under the constitution of the soviet republic, are exercised only by members of the Communist Party, and then only in so far as communists obey the instructions of the central organizations of the party, for evidence has been given to us regarding cases where communists have been imprisoned by the soviet authorities as a result of the criticism which they have directed against the soviet government in the course of exercising the rights accorded to them under the constitution.

(3) The Cadet and other parties to the Right of them have been prevented from exercising any political activity, and may be said to have disappeared.

(4) The mensheviks and social revolutionary parties have experienced vicissitudes, varying at different times from a complete suppression to a sensible curtailment of their political liberties and an effective interference in their exercise of them.

THE EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION.

The extraordinary commission, or Chrezvychaika, has played, and still plays, such an important rôle in soviet Russia that it seems necessary to describe its origin, functions, and activities in considerable detail.

THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT—THE EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION AS THE INSTRUMENT OF THE PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP.

129. It has been seen that the Marxist school of political thought postulated the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat immediately after the overthrow of the capitalist government by revolutionary means. The dictatorship of the proletariat formed the subject of various resolutions at the congresses of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, and finds a place in the program of the party accepted by the conference held at London in 1909 and exhibited in Appendix VII of this report. It does not appear, however, that any precise conceptions were formed as to the methods by which this dictatorship was to be carried out, and it was only after the October revolution and the problems with which it confronted the bolsheviks that it became necessary for the latter to define their attitude to it. The machinery established by the soviet government and associated more than any other soviet institution with the dictatorship of the proletariat is the All-Russian extraordinary commission. The extraordinary commission has been mentioned and its functions defined in the interim report completed by the committee in accordance with the terms of reference directing it "to inquire into conditions under which British subjects were recently imprisoned or detained in Russia."

NO TERROR DURING FIRST SIX MONTHS OF BOLSHEVIK RULE.

130. The coup d'état of October, 1917, as a result of which the soviet government was established by the Bolshevik or Communist Party, was not immediately followed by the inauguration of a terrorist policy. Several ministers of the former provisional government were, however, arrested and imprisoned under onerous conditions in the fortress of Saints Peter and Paul, but were subsequently released after a comparatively short period of confinement. On the other hand, several persons of military and political reputation were allowed to go their way without interference. The case of Gen. Krasnov, who had commanded a detachment of Cossack Cavalry in support of the provisional government against the bolsheviks, is an example of this. He was set at liberty on giving his parole not to take part in the future in any operations against the soviet government. Later, however, he broke his parole and fought against the bolsheviks in the armies of Gen. Denikin and Gen. Yudenich.

MARTIAL LAW NECESSARY TO REESTABLISH ORDER IN PETROGRAD.

131. The state of affairs in Petrograd during the winter of 1917 was deplorable. Law and order were hourly set at defiance by the criminal elements of the population, whose ranks were swelled by deserters from the army all over Russia and from the Petrograd garrison. A series of robberies, often accompanied by violence and sometimes by murder, took place both by night and by day. The representatives and officials of foreign States were not immune from molestation, and the Italian ambassador on one occasion and a secretary of the British Embassy on another were robbed in the streets. Additional disorder was caused by attempts to loot the various stores of wine, which had remained in all parts of the city after the decree had been promulgated forbidding the sale and consumption of intoxicating liquor. The former machinery for the preservation of public order and the administration of law and justice had passed away with the fall of the provisional government. Meanwhile, the bolsheviks had not evolved, and, indeed, had not as yet an opportunity of evolving so soon after their seizure of power, any system for maintaining public order and protecting the lives and property (in so far as they were allowed to retain property) of private persons. The institution of the people's courts did little or nothing to mitigate the disorder prevailing in Petrograd, and they appear in their initial stages to have confined their attention to dealing with the alleged offenses of their class enemies. The sanctions of the law were temporarily suspended, and there was nothing to replace them except the arbitrary and summary methods associated with martial law. The city was, indeed, declared on more than one occasion to be in a state of siege. In these circumstances, thieves were often shot at sight, and the suppression of looting gave rise, more especially in the case of the wine shops, to sanguinary battles in the streets. By these summary measures order was more or less restored in Petrograd by the middle of 1918. In Moscow, where severe fighting had taken place at the time of the October revolution and where similar crimes were common, although less frequent than in Petrograd, order was also reestablished in the course of 1918.

132. Throughout this early period, therefore, no calculated policy of terrorism can be said to have been practiced. In reaching this conclusion we are not unmindful of the brutal murders of A. I. Shingarey and F. F. Kokoshkin by sailors and Red Guards, who penetrated into the hospital where they were lying sick and shot them as they lay in bed. This terrible crime does, however, but illustrate the inability of the soviet authorities, more especially during this first period, to exercise control over those for whose actions they, as a Government, were responsible.

DIFFICULTIES OF BOLSHEVIK GOVERNMENT OWING TO (1) STRIKE OF GOVERNMENT AND BANK OFFICIALS, (2) LACK OF ADMINISTRATORS IN BOLSHEVIK RANKS, (3) EXPANSION OF STATE CONTROL DEMANDING A PROPORTIONATE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF EXPERIENCED OFFICIALS.

133. We now pass to the events leading up to the institution of the terror. The ease with which the October revolution was accomplished in Petrograd is to be explained rather by the unpopularity of the pro-

visional government among those who might have been expected to support it against the bolsheviks than by the exertions of the bolsheviks themselves. Antibolshevik circles in Petrograd and other parts of Russia seem to have been inspired with the belief that the bolshevik government would prove itself no more stable than the Paris Commune of 1871, and would fall from power as rapidly as it had risen to it. The prevalence of this view encouraged various acts of opposition to the soviet government. For example, a number of officials in the various ministeries and the staffs of the banks and other credit institutions in the capital struck work by way of protest against the bolsheviks and the violent means by which they had seized power. This strike of the bank staffs was financed by some of the prominent industrial magnates in Petrograd. The difficulties of the bolsheviks in providing for the carrying on of the administration were thereby greatly multiplied. At the same time their numerical strength was not great, and the number of those among them capable of filling administrative posts with efficiency was smaller still. On the other hand, the inauguration of a socialist policy, involving the taking over of the banks and factories by the State, caused an expansion of the administration to limits hitherto unknown. In these circumstances the dislocation, inseparable from a change of government achieved by violence and increased by the revolutionary policy inaugurated, became widespread, and the Government found itself in a critical position, and fell a prey to apprehension and fear.

INCREASED OPPOSITION TO THE BOLSHEVIK GOVERNMENT AFTER THE BREST-LITOVSK PEACE—TERRORIST ACTION BY SOCIAL REVOLUTIONARIES.

134. The signing of the peace at Brest-Litovsk by the bolsheviks with the Central Powers on the 3d of March stimulated the opposition to the soviet government throughout the country. It caused a revulsion of feeling against the bolsheviks among the numerous Left Wing of the Social Revolutionary Party, which had hitherto been inclined to support the soviet government. They immediately set to work, and one of the results of their activities was the murder of Count Mirbach, the German representative in Moscow, during the summer of 1918. Among the nonsocialist circles, on the other hand, hopes rallied round Gen. Alexeiev, Kornilov, Denikin, and Kaledin, who were endeavoring to raise a national army in the south of Russia. They also looked to the Allies. With these hopes on their part, anxiety and fear increased in the soviet government.

HOPES OF ALLIED INTERVENTION—BEGINNING OF CIVIL WAR IN SUMMER OF 1918.

135. As the year 1918 wore on, the antibolshevik armies of Denikin and Kolchak began to take form in the south of Russia and Siberia, the Czecho-Slovak troops set out on the march to join Kolchak's forces in Siberia, and in the autumn the intervention of the Allies began. The atmosphere in Moscow, whither the Government had removed, became full of plots, or rumors of plots, of mingled expectations and disappointments, of alternate hope and despair.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT UNDER NECESSITY OF ORGANIZING MILITARY DEFENSE.

136. The soviet government were thus placed under the necessity of defending by force of arms the power which they themselves had seized by violence. The country was faced with civil war. The old army had melted away. A new one had to be created to meet an enemy with whom a large number, if not the majority of the Intellectuals within soviet Russia, sympathized. It was under these conditions that the bolsheviks instituted a policy of terrorism against their political enemies. The instrument of this terrorist policy was the all-Russian extraordinary commission.

137. The all-Russian extraordinary commission is nominally a department of the People's Commissariat for Home Affairs, and F. E. Dzerzhinsky,¹ formerly a member of the Left Wing of the Polish Party of socialists, is at once people's commissary for home affairs and president of the all-Russian extraordinary commission. The headquarters of the extraordinary commission were established at Moscow. In every government of soviet Russia departments of the extraordinary commission were set up, nominally subordinate to the central body at Moscow, but enjoying a measure of independence, greater or less, according to the distance from the central government of the areas in which they operated. According to the Official Handbook of Central and Local Institutions of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, the cassation department of the supreme revolutionary tribunal "examines complaints and protests with reference to cases which have been dealt with in all tribunals of the republic." If, therefore, the extraordinary commission is included in these tribunals, it would appear that persons sentenced by the various branches of the extraordinary commission, central and local, have a right of appeal to the cassation department of the supreme revolutionary tribunal. Our evidence, however, leads us to conclude that the majority of the sentences pronounced by the extraordinary commission were promulgated without any opportunity of appeal being afforded to those who were sentenced.

138. We offer here the following account of these departments, based on information in the Official Handbook of Central and Local Institutions of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic:

1) The Osoby revolutsionny tribunal, or special revolutionary tribunal, is charged with "merciless struggle against wholesale speculation in goods, included in the State estimates, against offenses committed in the State service against persons accused of theft, false pretenses." It is stated that the Osoby revolutsionny tribunal is to be guided in its judgment exclusively by the interest of the revolution and is not bound by any forms of legal procedure. Its sessions are public.

2) The functions of the Osoby Otdiel are to combat espionage, military, White Guard conspiracy and every form of counter-revolutionary activity in the army, in the central military departments, and at the front. It has jurisdiction over all branches of the Osoby Otdiel at the front and throughout the army.

139. The Osoby Otdiel and its branches, and the part they played in the army, merit special attention, for it is through their activities more than in any other way that the Extraordinary Commission

¹ Dzerzhinsky was, until February, 1921, also president of the Collegium of the Moscow extraordinary commission. According to the most recent information, it appears that he had vacated this post and has been replaced by Messing.

came to exercise such enormous power in Russia. It will be remembered that from the time of the February revolution until the signing of the peace at Brest-Litovsk, an ever-hastening process of dissolution was to be observed in the Russian Army. The soldiers deserted in thousands, crowding the trains from the front, and dispersed throughout the towns and villages of Russia. A large number of soldiers, nevertheless, remained with their regiments; there they continued to draw rations, to live idly, and to lose whatever element of discipline had survived the revolution. The army became little more than a work-house of insubordinate and able-bodied persons. Such was the foundation upon which an army had to be created capable of opposing effectively the armies of Denikin and Kolchak.

140. It is clear that there could be no question of organizing an even tolerably efficient military machine until discipline had been restored, and there could be no question of doing this without a ruthless exercise of force.

141. The reorganization of the army coincided with the establishment of extraordinary commissions for combatting counter-revolution and sabotage among the civil population. And they were soon set up in the army, partly for the purpose of keeping watch over the large number of officers of the old army, whose services were utilized for drilling and training the new forces, and partly to assist the restoration of discipline by punishing desertion and other forms of insubordination. As has been mentioned in paragraph 139 above, the Osoby Otdiel was the name by which the military organization of the extraordinary commission was known. If, therefore, it is borne in mind that the soviet government maintained armies in the field in Siberia, the south of Russia, the Ukraine, on the Polish front, and against the Letts and Estonians and Judenich, consisting of considerably over a million men, and that extraordinary commissions were active on all these fronts and freely enforced the death penalty, the extent of its power becomes easily apparent.

142. Evidence as to the power and authority possessed by the branches of the Osoby Otdiel has been given to the committee by—

(a) Capt. Horrocks, of the Middlesex Regiment, who had opportunities of observing the functioning of the Osoby Otdiel in Siberia. Capt. Horrocks stated that Podlanovsky was the head of the Osoby Otdiel in Siberia, and that actually, although not nominally, he exercised paramount authority in that area.

(b) Mr. Hewelcke, His Britannic Majesty's vice consul at Baku who testified to the considerable authority possessed in Baku by Pankratov, who was president of the Osoby Otdiel of the Eleventh Bolshevik Army.

143. Continuing our account of the more important departments of the extraordinary commission—

(c) There is also a so-called secret department known as the "sekretno-operativny" department, presided over by M. Y. Latsis, and

(d) An interdepartmental commission presided over by the Lettish lawyer Stuchka,¹ who, like Dzerzhinsky, is a member of the all-Russian central executive committee and of the central committee of the

¹ Stuchka was president of the Extraordinary Commission at Riga at the time when that city was in the hands of the Bolsheviks, and is said to have acted with great severity and ruthlessness.

Russian Communist Party. Victor Pavlovich Nogin, who came to this country as a member of the Russian trade delegation in May, 1920, represents the central board of the textile industry on this commission. V. A. Avanesov represents the workers' and peasants' control upon it. Mantsev, with whom the Rev. Mr. North came into contact in Russia, is assistant to Dzerzhinsky on the Moscow extraordinary commission.

ARRESTS.

144. The evidence given before the committee by British subjects recently returned from Russia, with reference to the conditions obtaining in Russian prisons, has been summarized in our interim report. It shows that it was usually the practice for the officials of the extraordinary commission to arrest prisoners in the middle of the night, and that these arrests were often accompanied by violence and threats, and sometimes by robbery and confiscation of property.

PRISON CONDITIONS.

145. Although we have not had an opportunity of making an examination of Russian witnesses, similar to that conducted in the case of British subjects, the evidence of the latter, who were invariably imprisoned together with Russians, leads us to conclude that the treatment accorded to the Russians was worse than that meted out to foreigners. Reference to the sections of our interim report, dealing with the conditions under which British subjects lived in prison, will do something to suggest the nature of the treatment to which Russians themselves were subjected, more especially when it is remembered that they were, on the whole, treated worse than the British.

EXECUTIONS.

146. It is clear that Russians were executed in large numbers, sometimes, according to our evidence, in a wholesale manner and on a scale which would suggest a far greater total number of victims than is presented by official figures of the number of persons shot by the extraordinary commissions in the course of 1918-19. According to Two Years' Struggle on the Home Front, by Latsis, these figures, from January, 1918, to the end of July, 1919, and embracing 20 Russian Provinces, total 8,389 in all.

ORIGIN, PURPOSE AND ACTIVITIES OF THE EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION.

147. We now proceed to give examples of the activities of the extraordinary commission derived from official soviet sources. The origin, purpose, and activities of the extraordinary commission are set forth in a pamphlet entitled, "Two Years' Struggle on the Home Front," by M. Y. Latsis, who is, as has been seen above, the president of the secret department of the All-Russian extraordinary commission in Moscow, a member of its collegium, and of the interdepartmental committee attached to it. He was for some time president of the Ukraine extraordinary commission, and is therefore in

a position to speak with authority upon the work of institutions in which he himself has occupied several responsible positions.

148. In Section I of the pamphlet, Latsis describes the conditions which brought the All-Russian extraordinary commission into being. He refers to machinery set up by the autocracy and the post-revolutionary provisional government for the purpose of suppressing sedition, and proceeds to establish what he regarded as the necessity for creating a similar instrument under the workers' and peasants' government with the object of enforcing the dictatorship of the proletariat and of frustrating the efforts of the dispossessed classes to restore their lost class hegemony. He writes:

In order that we might not be beaten, it was necessary to crush the enemy * * *. The workers' and peasants' government created a special organ * * * the All-Russian extraordinary commission, for combating counter-revolution, speculation and sabotage. The need of this organ was the more acutely felt, as the soviet government had no apparatus for spiritual¹ reeducation. The schools remained as before * * *. The masses of the people were still imbued with the old spirit * * *. Hence the necessity of an apparatus for compulsion and purification * * *. Those must be crushed, who crush us * * *. It was necessary to anticipate the possible outbreak of counter-revolutionaries in order to preserve the lives of our comrades and the organization of the soviet government * * *. Only pharisees and blockheads can deny the necessity for combating counter-revolution, although such denials have been all too frequent * * *. About two years' work now lies behind the extraordinary commissions. This work speaks for itself.

149. We give now certain extracts made from this pamphlet and from No. 1 of The Red Terror, the organ of the extraordinary commission for combatting counter-revolution on the Czecho-Slovak front, published at Kazan. The extracts afford an example of the work accomplished by the extraordinary commission in connection with the seven categories of its activities directed against—

- (a) Sabotage.
- (b) Counter-revolutions.
- (c) Speculation.
- (d) Crime in the Government service.
- (e) Brigandage.
- (f) Peasant revolts.
- (g) Desertion.

(A) SABOTAGE.

150. Section (3) of Two Years' Struggle on the Home Front is devoted to sabotage. It offers examples of two forms of sabotage. They are: (1) Striking against the soviet government and (2) Ca' canny, i. e., work purposely done inefficiently to the detriment of the soviet government.

(1) STRIKES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.

151. The strike of the bank employees against the soviet government immediately after the October revolution had taken place is given as an example of (1). The activities of the central board of the All-Russian Union of Bank Employees are described, and it is stated that prominent Petrograd industrialists gave financial support to the strike. After stating that the strike funds amounted to approx-

¹ The word "perevospitanie" translated here as "reeducation" is difficult to render literally into English. It means absorption of fundamentally new ideas.

imately 2,000,000 rubles, according to documents received by the extraordinary commission, Latsis concludes:

Only by depriving the officials of this material support was it possible, by reacting on their stomachs, to compel them to obey the new Government. * * * The officials began to work.

(2) CA' CANNY.

Two examples are given of ca' canny. They are:

(A) ON THE RAILWAYS.

The railway men dispatched food trains from one town to another without bringing them to their proper destination. Thus, a food train dispatched from Saratov to starving Petrograd made two journeys there and back, and again found itself at Saratov.

(B) IN THE FOOD ADMINISTRATION.

1. Agents of the food administration instead of causing the delivery of food at the places where it was needed accumulated supplies at points where the enemy could easily get at them and take possession of them.

2. The food militia instead of guarding consignments proceeded themselves to burn goods stations, for example, that of Ryazan.

The section on sabotage concludes: "We have shot saboteurs and imprisoned them, but notwithstanding this a considerable number of them have succeeded in hiding from us up to the present time (1920) and are destroying our food organizations and transport. * * * There is only one means of ridding ourselves of this poison—to burn it out with a red-hot iron. The extraordinary commission is doing this."

(B) COUNTER-REVOLUTION.

152. Some 30 cases of alleged counter-revolutionary activity are described in the course of section (5) of Two Years' Struggle on the Home Front. One of these examples refers to the assassination of Uritsky and Volodarsky, and the attempt on the life of Lenin, which are attributed to the right wing of the Social Revolutionary Party. Latsis claims that the extraordinary commission were aware of decisions taken by the right social revolutionaries to commence a policy of terrorism against communists occupying responsible posts. Boris Savinkov, formerly minister for war under the provisional government when Kerensky was prime minister and Filonenko, who was involved in the misunderstanding between Kornilov and Kerensky, are mentioned as playing a leading part in planning these terrorist acts. Latsis writes:

Savinkov himself set to work. The master showed his hand. Volodarsky and Uritsky were torn from the ranks of our foremost warriors. He aspired higher. He wished to kill the leader of the world proletariat, Comrade Lenin. But the murderer, the hysterical Kaplam, missed her aim. The extraordinary commission exacted a heavy toll for these murders. In Petrograd alone 500 persons were shot in answer to the shots fired at Comrades Lenin and Uritsky.

Those who dreamed of killing a revolution by the murder of its leaders seriously wounded themselves, and a whole year passed before the wound dealt them by the proletariat was healed.

153. Another of the examples of counter-revolutionary activity given by Latsis is that of a revolt of soviet naval forces at the fortress of Krasnaya Gorka. A conspiracy alluded to as the Kronstadt conspiracy is mentioned as taking place with the object of raising at the same time a revolt against the soviet government and handing over the fortresses to the forces of Yudenich, who were operating against

the Red army on the northwestern front. The officer commanding the third naval division, Kulesh Shishkov, described as formerly an officer in the dreadnaught *Andrei Pervozvanny*, and Nekliudov, who commanded the fortress Krasnaya Gorka, and the majority of the officers of the Kronstadt garrison, are said to have played a leading part in the conspiracy. Apparently the conspirators hoped that the crews of the two dreadnaughts *Andrei Pervozvanny* and the *Petro-pavlovsk* would join them. This did not happen, however, and additional confusion was caused by signals being given prematurely for the revolt to take place. Latsis states that the Osoby Otdiel (special department of the all-Russian extraordinary commission) succeeded in bringing to light the principal organizers of the revolt and in connecting them with a White Guard organization, known as the national center. A description of another conspiracy in which the national center is said to have been involved is given and a certain Dmitri Nikolaevich Shipov is said to have been a leader and to have received money from the Allies, sums being found in his possession. A list is given of several persons who were shot for complicity in this affair.

154. The following figures, taken from the same source, give the number of counter-revolutionary organizations discovered during 1918 and 1919:

Counter-revolutionary organizations discovered.

	1918	1919 (7 months).	Total.
Cadets.....	20	8	28
Black Hundred.....	68	39	107
Right social revolutionaries.....	19	15	34
Left social revolutionaries.....	5	45	50
Mensheviks.....	12	6	18
Miscellaneous.....	18	157	175
Total.....	142	270	412

Lower down on the same page it is stated that 1,637 persons were shot for counter-revolutionary activities in 1918 and 887 during the first seven months of 1919, and that 455 persons were shot for incitement to revolt during the same period of 1918-19.

(C) SPECULATION.

155. Latsis rather humorously describes the speculator as "a cunning cove." He describes speculators as contriving to convey spirits in specially made tins strung round their stomachs and thighs, and as concealing cotton and lace in eiderdowns, supposedly filled with flock, using the cotton and lace instead of flock. Tobacco, he says, they transport in corn sacks and precious stones in boiled eggs. He admits that speculation flourishes to such a degree that 60,000,000 rubles change hands daily in the Sukharev market. He speaks of the part played by railway workers in speculation, about which we have had evidence from witnesses.

For the furtherance of their dirty dealings, the speculators enter into agreement with the railway workers, the militia, and even the soviet civil servants. In return for a respectable consideration the railway man will see that these speculated wares are

transported quicker than soviet wares, whilst the militia man will disappear from his post at the very moment when the speculator is carrying off his goods.

156. According to Latsis, the extraordinary commission has shot about 100 persons for speculation, for thefts connected with speculation 819, throughout the whole period of its activity from the beginning of 1918 to September, 1919, while fines have been imposed to the amount of 127,000,000 rubles, without counting the goods recovered, which are estimated at thousands of millions of rubles. With regard to these figures it is to be remarked that a list of persons shot for various offenses by the extraordinary commission (the figures are said to relate to 20 Russian Governments and appear to cover the period from the beginning of 1918 to September, 1919) is set out on page 75 of the same work. According to these figures, 39 persons were shot for speculation in 1918 and 32 during the first seven months of 1919. These figures do not correspond with those mentioned previously by Latsis, and no explanation is given by him which would account for the discrepancy. The latter figures are, in any case, so small as to suggest inaccuracy, having regard to the general tenor of the evidence presented before us.

157. Evidence with regard to speculation was presented to us by a witness who returned from Russia in April of this year. He was employed in a cooperative organization in the town of Smolensk, and had occasion to proceed to Moscow three or four times a year for the purpose of obtaining certain supplies which he was authorized to secure by the local authorities at Smolensk. He stated that speculation had become widespread, but that at first efforts had been made to suppress it. It had so far continued, however, to develop and flourish that according to his observations on later visits to Moscow it had become a permanent institution. Mrs. Sheridan's account in the "Times" of November 26 of her visit with Litvinov to the Sukharev market confirms this. The Sukharev and other markets which they visited were essential as a supplement to the food administration of the city. In the circumstances, therefore, the officials of the extraordinary commission and of other government departments connived and even directly participated in illicit trade. In the words of Mr. Churchill, it is a case of "Physician comb thyself."

(D) CRIME IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE.

158. "During 1918, 157 persons and during the first seven months of 1919 more than 100 persons were shot for crimes committed by them while employed in the Government's services; 8,818 persons were proceeded against in all; of these, 849 for theft, 391 for treachery, 945 for gross neglect of duty, 422 for accepting bribes, and 6,211 for miscellaneous offenses."

159. A statement made by the witness mentioned before throws light on the above. Mention has already been made to his evidence with regard to speculation, in which he refers to the participation of Government officials in speculative trade. He gave us the following description of methods of transacting business: "If a man comes to Moscow authorized to purchase, let us say, for example, a certain quantity of paper, he may very well spend six months in Moscow, exhausting in vain all the legitimate channels for obtaining it. If, however, he knows the ropes, he would go to the proper official and

say: 'I want 2,500 poods of paper by to-morrow: 500 are yours if you have it ready by noon.'" This evidence of corrupt practices in the Government service is confirmed by Dr. Sokolov, who arrived in England from Petrograd in September, 1920.

(E) FIGHT AGAINST BRIGANDAGE.

160. "The extraordinary commissions deal very simply with such persons (brigands); they remove them from society once and for all, i. e., shoot them. Now, then, 'the last decisive battle' of the proletariat against the old world is taking place, the activities of brigands are not to be borne, for they enfeeble our fighting capacity and render victory more difficult. Every worthless member of society should be rooted up, in order that the whole organism may not perish; this is what we are doing with brigands.

"Throughout the whole period of this activity 1,450 brigands have been shot by the extraordinary commissions, and some thousands of the less harmful have been imprisoned."

(F) THE OPERATIONS OF THE EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSIONS IN THE VILLAGES.

161. Latsis states in his book that during the period January, 1918, to September, 1919, the extraordinary commissions had to deal with about 340 peasant revolts and that 1,050 soviet workers and 3,057 insurgents were killed in the course of these risings. Latsis points out that the risings were the result of incitement by social revolutionaries and White Guards, and maintains the "fists" or rich peasants supported them, presumably for the purpose of defending their substance, while the poorer peasants were either forced to participate in them or were deceived into doing so. Latsis continues: "At the first failure the 'fists' and leaders flee, and the blow falls upon the 'village poor.' The extraordinary commission therefore, as a rule, releases the majority of the rioters and seeks out the leaders and settles with them." The following two examples of the activities of the extraordinary commission in the countryside are taken from the "Red Terror," No. 1, dated November 1, 1918:

(1) KURMYSH (PROVINCE OF SIMBIRSK).

A description is given of the operations of a column of men with machine guns, under the orders of the Central Extraordinary Commission at the front against a body of 500 counter-revolutionaries who are said to have fortified themselves strongly in the town of Kurmysh. The troops of the extraordinary commission succeeded in occupying the town after a hot fight lasting 16 hours. They lost 6 men and 2 horses and the enemy 36 men. Thirty-five supporters of the soviet government who had been condemned to death by counter-revolutionaries were liberated and 109 White Guards shot by the extraordinary commission in the course of suppressing the revolt.

(2) VYATKA COMMISSION.

Witnesses have informed us that the peasants of the Vyatka Province have repeatedly shown great hostility to the soviet government, and, according to the "Red Terror," the soviet government appear to have found it necessary to establish a special extraordinary commission in the Vyatka Province. This commission consisted of 24 workers under the command of Comrade Putte. The commission reported that from September 2 to October 20, 1918, 136 persons were shot throughout the Vyatka Province. The names of those executed are given.

(G) THE FIGHT AGAINST DESERTION.

162. Latsis, in "Two Years' Struggle on the Home Front," shows that desertion from the Red army during the civil war became so serious that it became necessary for the extraordinary commissions to devote special attention to dealing with it. He states that the soldiers of the Red army began to flee in crowds, that they began to organize themselves in bands under the leadership of counter-revolutionaries and to raise the standard of revolution in the countryside, and that at the time when he wrote (the "Two Years' Struggle on the Home Front" was published in 1920) desertion was increasing in the Provinces of Tambov, Smolensk, Orlov, Novgorod, Tula, and Kazan. Considerable disturbances appeared to have been caused by desertions in the northwestern Provinces. For example, deserters are said to have organized Jewish pogroms in the Province of Gomel and to have terrorized the local population in the district of Orsha. It is evident that desertions took place mostly during the summer and that deserters usually returned to the army when the cold weather began. The desertions increased to such an extent, however, that Latsis states that the extraordinary commissions were obliged to resort to armed force against deserters and that many deserters had been shot. Up to September 8, 54,697 deserters had been collected in the Ryazan Province alone and dispatched to the front, and Latsis claims that desertion was on the decline at the end of 1920. Our evidence goes to show that desertion from the army increased after the resumption of hostilities between Russia and Poland in April, 1920, more especially when the Poles succeeded in driving the Russians back from Warsaw.

FATE OF ACCUSED DETERMINED BY CLASS.

163. Having given these examples, derived from soviet sources, of the activities of the extraordinary commission, we now propose to offer an indication, also drawn from official soviet sources, as to the method assumed by the officials of the extraordinary commission in carrying out the duties with which they were charged.

The following instructions were issued by M. Y. Latsis, at that time president of the extraordinary commission, for combating counter-revolution and sabotage and speculation on the Czecho-Slovak front, and were published at Kazan in No. 1 of *The Red Terror*, dated November 1, 1918, from which quotations have been made above: "We are no longer waging war against separate individuals, we are exterminating the bourgeoisie as a class. Do not seek in the dossier of the accused for proofs as to whether he opposed the soviet government by word or deed. The first question that should be put is to what class he belongs, of what extraction, what education and profession. These questions should decide the fate of the accused. Herein lies the meaning and the essence of the Red Terror."

THE CLERGY.

164. The following extract from *The Red Terror* relates to the clergy:

November, 1918. For the attention of Perm, Vyatka, Nizhny-Novogord, Penza, Saratov, Cheboksary, Astrakhan, and Tsaritsin.

The most extensive and unbridled agitation of the priesthood against the soviet government is to be observed throughout the district behind the front. In towns and villages, which from time to time have to be abandoned by the soviet forces under pressure of White Guards and Anglo-French bands, priests play the rôle of informers, deliver up soviet workers to the torture of the bandits, and meet the enemy willingly.

In view of this flagrant counterrevolutionary activity among the clergy, I order all extraordinary commissions operating behind the front to devote special attention to the clergy, to establish careful supervision of them, to shoot each of them, notwithstanding his clerical dignity, who dare to oppose the soviet government in word or deed. This order to be circulated to all "uezd" and "volost" soviets.

No. 30.

LATSSIS,
President of the Extraordinary Commission at the Front.

A QUESTION OF AMNESTY.

165. The destruction of the bourgeoisie as a class is again referred to below:

("Red Terror" No. 1. November 1, 1918.)

To all the extraordinary commissions at the front:

In anticipation of the anniversary of the October revolution, many soviets have begun to talk of an amnesty to political offenders. I hereby declare that to decide questions about an amnesty is not the task of individual soviets. It is for the All-Russian Congress, or its central executive committee to do this.

There must be no weakening, no discharge of prisoners. The struggle is only now flaming up. It must be carried on to the end, the bourgeoisie destroyed as a class and then we can speak of amnesty.

LATSSIS, President.

166. It is clear from the above extracts that the extraordinary commission had ceased to be an organization whose functions were confined to defending the soviet government and revolution against the activities of its enemies. The instructions of Latsis to his subordinate officials show that he was determined to make the extraordinary commission an offensive instrument against the bourgeoisie, and that he conceived the efforts of the extraordinary commission—as the organization for enforcing the dictatorship of the proletariat—to be directed to the extermination of the bourgeoisie by force. Dzerzhinsky, the president of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, Peters and Bokaev, the president of the Petrograd Extraordinary Commission, appeared to share these views. They were supported by Bukharin, who is regarded as expressing in his writings and speeches the views of the communists of the Left. Karl Radek, also a prolific writer and propagandist, is said to have leaned toward this group, although it is now suggested that he is more moderate.

167. A perusal of the names of those associated with the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission and the Moscow Extraordinary Commission leads us to remark that, whereas the names of many of those who were well known as prominent members of the party in former days are to be found as people's commissaries and members of the presidia and collegia of other commissariats and institutions of the soviet government, none of those whose names are mentioned in the list of officials of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission and the Moscow Extraordinary Commission (published in the Official Handbook of the Soviet Government) appear to have played an active and important part in the history of the Russian Social Democratic

Labor Party. We do not think that there are any names in the list of officials of the extraordinary commission given in the Official Handbook of the Central and Local Institutions of the Russian Socialistic Federative Soviet Republic, which even remotely compare in past reputation and party influence with those of, for example, A. I. Rykov, L. B. Krasin, Semashko, Stalin, Lunacharsky, and Pokrovsky. Only in the list of members of the interdepartmental committee of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission are there to be found among the representatives of other commissariats and departments on that committee names which are well known to any student of the revolutionary movement in Russia.

168. Now that soviet Russia is at peace, speculation will arise as to what will be the future of the extraordinary commissions in Russia. It is clear that in the course of the civil war the extraordinary commissions and, more especially, the military branches of them ("Osoby Otdiel"), have acquired enormous power, and the need for the exercise of this power will disappear, or be considerably reduced, now that the soviet government have decided to demobilize part of the army. Attention is however drawn later to the various schemes for conscripting and militarizing labor, and for the militarization of certain branches of the public service, which have either been decided upon or are in course of discussion in the soviet government to-day. The speeches of Trotski support the suggestion that he and his followers desire to make the war commissariat, as a result of its military experience, the kernel of the economic organization of the soviet government now that peace has come.

169. It appears to us inevitable that the extraordinary commissions will be equally essential to the carrying out of the conscription and militarization of labor as they proved themselves to be in carrying out the organization of the army and in maintaining its discipline during the civil war. In these circumstances, it would seem that Trotsky will find himself under the necessity of drawing closer to Dzerzhinsky, and that the leaders of economic reconstruction in Russia will tend to divide into two camps, namely, that of Trotsky, supported by the war ministry and the extraordinary commission on the one hand, and that of Rykov and his supporters on the supreme council of people's economy on the other.¹

THE CONTROLLING BOARD, OR THE "RABOCHIE-KRESTYANSKAYA INSPEKTSIYA" (THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' CONTROL).

170. Under the Imperial Government in Russia there was a government department whose duty it was to check, revise, and control the work of all other departments, not only financially, as is partially done by His Majesty's treasury, but also in regard to the general conduct of their public duties. This department is in a sense the most powerful of government departments, and it exists in soviet Russia to-day under the title of the "Raboche-Krestyanskaya Inspeksiya," the translation of which, "workers' and peasants' control," may be rendered more intelligently in English as "the controlling board." Its activities, although mainly critical and in that

¹ According to the most recent information, which it has not yet been possible to verify, the newly elected all-Russian central executive committee contains a larger element than formerly of militant communists and of those who are connected with the extraordinary commission.

sense destructive, have a direct bearing upon constructive work. The controlling board was formerly known as the people's commissariat of state control. Its function is to supervise, control, and actively to criticize the work of the various departments and institutions of the soviet government. It is clear that the functions of a ministry of state control would be far more widely extended and its responsibilities increased under a revolutionary government, handicapped by lack of experience and pursuing an advanced socialist policy than in England and France, where no widespread policy of nationalization has taken place, and where the machinery of the State, although greatly extended temporarily during the European War of 1914-1918 has not been disturbed by revolution. It is to be regretted that we have been unable to obtain sufficient information regarding the activities of the controlling board in soviet Russia to prepare a comprehensive statement of the work which it has accomplished since the bolshevik revolution of October, 1917. There is reason to believe, however, that the board of control possesses a more efficient organization than any other of the people's commissariats with the possible exception of the war ministry and that of the people's commissariat for ways and communications. In this respect it is placed in a more favorable position than other commissariats, inasmuch as the majority of those serving in the central departments of the controlling board at Moscow were formerly officials of the ministry of State control under the Imperial Russian Government. These officials have, therefore, been able to give the controlling board much valuable experience, and to extend the benefits of that experience to the new elements which have been introduced into state control since the bolshevik revolution. This experience was largely denied to the bolsheviks in their endeavors to carry on the administration of other government departments, more especially during the first year after their advent to power. We have had access to several copies of the *Izvestiya Raboche-Krestyanskoi Inspektei* (Bulletin of the Controlling Board) for 1920, and also to an official report upon the soviet food administrations, dated December, 1919, by A. G. Mashkovich, who is, according to the Handbook of the Central and Local Institutions of the R. S. F. S. R., in charge of the department of state control which supervises the work of the food organizations. Extracts from this report and from the bulletin mentioned above will be found in the economic section of the report. They are valuable because they show that the state control is in the habit of trenchantly criticizing the inefficiency and maladministration which may be revealed by its investigations in the various government departments. Attempts have recently been made to render the work of the controlling board more effective, and wider powers have been conferred upon it.

171. During the height of civil war, when it was necessary to make wide and immediate provision for the needs of the army, the controlling board found itself in a position somewhat similar to that of His Majesty's treasury during the war. A marked tendency arose for military departments and institutions working in connection with the war to enlarge and to emancipate themselves from the control of the department charged with exercising a control over expenditure and a general supervision over the activities of Government offices. This was accompanied by certain abuses. The

recognition of the necessity for investing the department exercising control with supplementary powers appears to have inspired a decree of the All-Russian central executive committee, dated the 9th of April, 1919. Up to that time the functions of the controlling board were confined to supervision of the financial and economic life of the State. By the decree of the All-Russian central executive committee, however, dated the 9th of April, 1919, these functions were extended to include the making of investigations regarding (1) the legality of action taken in the various departments, and (2) the speedy and efficient conduct of the administration of the State in general. In cases where these investigations revealed misconduct or gross negligence on the part of Government officials, the control was charged with prosecuting such persons in the courts. The board was also required to advance suggestions for the simplification and general improvement of the soviet administration as a result of the information which would be derived by its representatives in various departments in the course of their revisionary duties.

172. Each department of the controlling board is, broadly speaking, identical with the particular people's commissariat which it is intended to control. For example, the military and naval section concerns itself with the work of the war department and the naval commissariat, while the section of ways and communications is concerned with the people's commissariat of railways, the section of rural economy with that of the agricultural commissariat, etc., while the section of education and propaganda is responsible for controlling the activities of the people's commissariats for foreign affairs and nationalities, as well as those of the people's commissariat for education.

173. Special interest attaches to the section of so-called "flying revisions," of which Gukovsky, who was subsequently appointed head of the soviet economic mission at Reval, was formerly director. The purpose of this section is to make sudden and unexpected visits to the premises and investigations into the work of one or other of the people's commissariats or departments of these commissariats, with a view to obtaining better information as to the general standard of administrative efficiency prevailing. There was also established, appointed under the controlling board, a bureau of complaints, which is charged with hearing and investigating complaints and declarations from Russian citizens against alleged illegal actions on the part of Government officials.

174. In the spring of 1920 it appeared that the period of civil war was drawing to a close, and a movement gained ground still further to strengthen the controlling board. Considerable feeling had grown up in the Communist Party that a determined attempt must be made to arrest the growth of bureaucracy in the Government bureaucracy which, as has been remarked above, tended to become irresponsible and uncontrolled during the civil war, and in the case of the commissariat of food, to attain almost incredible limits of incompetence and corruption.

175. This feeling was partly also the beginning of discontent in the lower ranks of the Communist Party, not only against the growth of an irresponsible and uncontrolled bureaucracy, but also against the narrow domination exercised over the Communist Party by its central committee. This discontent became more marked in the

course of the summer and autumn of 1920, when the events leading up to the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets were touched upon.

176. A decree accepted by the All-Russian central executive committee, dated the 7th of February, 1920, entitled "A statute concerning the controlling board," was evidently intended to meet the desire which prevailed for the strengthening of the controlling board and for the participation by the workers and peasants in its activities. It is stated in the first paragraph of this decree that—

The increasing number of economic and administrative problems engaging the attention of the soviet republic, imposed upon the board of control by the decree of the 9th of April, 1919, a highly responsible and complex task of supervision and control, with the object of assuring the speedy execution of the statutes and decrees of the soviet government in all branches of State economics and administration.

and further that the task of coping with the economic and administrative problems concerning the soviet government can only be carried out "on condition of the participation of the broad masses of the workers and peasants in the work of State control, which simultaneously creates the possibility of preparing and instructing them in the direction of the organization of the State," and therefore the people's commissariat for state control has been reconstituted as the controlling board, and retains as such the rights and obligations of a commissariat of the people, and a people's commissary will stand at the head of it.

177. According to article 3 the functions of the former controlling board have been extended and the name of the board changed from that of the people's commissariat of state control to the workers' and peasants' control.

The controlling board has been instructed—

(a) To proceed forthwith to reorganize all the organs of the former State control, attracting to this the broad masses of the workers, for the effecting by them of control over all the organs of State administration, economic and social organizations.

(b) To oppose bureaucratic methods and departmentalism in the soviet institutions, rendering control more effective, by means of flying revisions and the pursuit of investigations into all the organs of the soviet, supervising the execution of all decrees and statutes of the soviet government, both in the center and locally, and their suitable adaptation to existing conditions, and to verify the activity of all organs of the soviet government from the standpoint of the results achieved by them.

(c) To supervise the organization in all institutions dealing with all manner of complaints and declarations and their proper liquidation, and also the formation of a special bureau under the controlling board for receiving statements regarding irregularities, malversations, and illegal actions of officials.

(d) To present for the consideration of the central and local government authorities concrete proposals, worked out on a basis of observations and investigations made for simplifying the organization of the soviet government, the liquidation of organizations pursuing identical objects, uneconomic activity, administrative inefficiency, and upon the reformation of the whole system of administration in one or other departments of the State structure.

(e) To impose upon the controlling board the duty of ascertaining how far the workers and peasants participate in the control and with what results, from the standpoint of the instruction of the workers and peasants, in the work of State administration.

178. To assist it in carrying out these instructions the controlling board was accorded the right, under the decree, of participating at all conferences and meetings of all the people's commissariats, and their local departments, and of all organs of the soviet government and social organizations in general, for purposes of revision and intelligence, with a consultative voice, and also the right to appoint members of the controlling board to take an active part in the daily work of all the soviet institutions, not excluding people's commis-

sariats, and, in general, all rights which were vested in the organs of the former state control.

179. Article 6 of the decree states that anyone enjoying electoral rights under the constitution of the R. S. F. S. R. can be a member of the controlling board; that special attention should be devoted to attracting women to take part in its labors, and that no person occupying a responsible position in the administration of enterprises or higher administrative posts should be chosen as a member of the control.

180. Under this new decree the central and provincial departments of the former department of state control continued to exist and those employed have continued to receive their remuneration as civil servants. These officials would, it appears, form the trained nucleus responsible for initiating the representatives of the workers and peasants into the working of the various departments of administration elected by the soviets in the factories and in the country districts.

THE EIGHTH ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS.

181. In our account of the structure of the soviet government it has been shown that, nominally, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets is, during its brief sessions, the supreme power in Soviet Russia. We give a description in this section of our report of the political atmosphere in which the last session was held toward the end of December, 1920, of some of the speeches made by bolshevik leaders at the congress, and of the decisions at which the congress arrived.

THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE SEVENTH AND EIGHTH ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS.—(1) WAR AND EVENTS ABROAD—THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND THE ALLIES—MUTUAL SUSPICIONS—TRADE NEGOTIATIONS—ATTEMPTS TO SUBSIDIZE THE DAILY HERALD WITH BOLSHEVIK MONEY—RETENTION OF BRITISH SUBJECTS IN PRISON IN SOVIET RUSSIA.

182. At the time when the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets assembled in Moscow a year ago, it appeared that the soviet government had nothing to fear from the armies of Yudenich, Denikin, and Kolchak, or from foreign intervention. There were hopes that the soviet government would no longer be embarrassed by a state of war and that economic reconstruction would become possible in Russia on the restoration of peace. The declaration made by the Supreme Economic Council in Paris on the 16th of January, 1920, with regard to the resumption of trade relations between Russia and western countries strengthened these hopes, and it was eventually arranged that a Russian trade delegation should proceed to England to discuss with representatives of the Supreme Economic Council the conditions under which commercial relations between Russia and Europe might be reestablished. The course of these negotiations was retarded at first by the reluctance of the soviet government to allow the trade delegation to proceed to England without M. Litvinov. Secondly, the renewal of war between Poland and Russia, and the initiation of an offensive by Gen. Wrangel against the bolshevik armies in the Crimea aroused suspicions that forces were working against peace both in Russia and in allied countries. An atmosphere

of distrust was thus created and reacted unfavorably on the trade discussions. The recognition of Gen. Wrangel's administration by the French Government increased the doubts of the bolsheviks as to the good faith of the allied Governments in desiring to resume trade with Russia. Thirdly, the revelation of attempts to subsidize a British paper, the Daily Herald, with bolshevik money, in which M. Litvinov and M. Kamenev were involved, further increased the difficulty of continuing the trade negotiations, and gave rise to a feeling that the soviet government would have discouraged any such attempts at propaganda by their official representatives had they been sincere in their intention to reestablish commercial relations and in their frequently expressed desire that Russia should live at peace with other people. Fourthly, the necessity for bringing pressure to bear upon the soviet government to effect the release of British subjects imprisoned in Russia, was another cause of delay and also served to shake confidence in the good intentions of the bolshevik government.

183. *Trade difficulties.*—It was found possible, however, in the endeavors to arrive at a trade agreement, to prepare a preamble in July, embodying fundamental conditions, to which the British and soviet governments agreed. Later, serious difficulties arose in working out the final draft of the agreement, owing to the reluctance of the soviet government to acknowledge debts due to foreigners in respect of services rendered to Russia in the past, and the question as to how far gold and goods dispatched by the soviet government to England and other countries would be immune from seizure by those who might claim to attach them in settlement of debts due to them.

184. *Bolshevik propaganda.*—Finally, a deadlock arose, owing to the desire of the British Government to introduce into the trade agreement an interpretation of an article in the preamble, relating to the undertaking of the soviet government to abstain from propaganda against the interests of Great Britain. Such was the position with regard to the trade agreement when the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets assembled in Moscow on the 23d of December, 1920. Meanwhile the soviet government were able, during 1920, to conclude peace with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Georgia, to sign an armistice with Poland, and to enter into negotiations with Italy.

185. *Azerbaijan, Bokhara, and Armenia.*—Other changes which took place between the meetings of the seventh and eighth congresses were the establishment of a soviet form of government in Azerbaijan, Bokhara (in Russian Central Asia), and in Armenia, and, in Europe, the decision of the Independent Socialist Party in Germany, and of the Socialist Party in France to join the Third International.

(2) THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA.

186. It has already been mentioned in paragraph 125 that the overthrow of Denikin and Kolchak was followed by the relaxation of the terror and that the mensheviks and social revolutionaries began to be elected, although infrequently and with great difficulty, to the soviets in various parts of Russia. A great spirit of hope spread abroad that the clouds of war were lifting at last and that

brighter days would dawn now that peace seemed near at hand. Everyone seems to have felt this. A number of communists—we are inclined to think the majority—welcomed with relief the possibility of peace after the civil war, in the course of which the best part of communist idealism had disappeared and a narrow and ruthless dictatorship been established. Those who were opposed to communism also welcomed the approach of peace, because they thought the removal of external pressure and the complicated problems of economic reconstruction would cause dissension among the bolsheviks and ultimately bring about their downfall.

187. *Adverse influences of fresh hostilities with Poland—Satisfactory peace between Russia and the west made almost impossible—Suspicions strengthened.*—The renewal of war between Russia and Poland destroyed these hopes; partly despair at disillusionment in their hopes of peace and partly the traditional enmity which has grown up between the Russians and the Poles, were responsible for a sudden ebullition of Russian national feeling in what was regarded as a war against unprovoked aggression. There is no question but that this renewal of the attack upon Russia very considerably strengthened the more extreme and irreconcilable element in the Russian Communist Party, and that it weakened the party of pacific reconstruction in a corresponding degree. At the same time, in our opinion, the resumption of hostilities between Russia and Poland not only made more difficult the paving of the way toward a reestablishment of normal relationships between Russia and western countries, but also did much to confuse and make more complex the internal situation in Russia itself. The attack of the Poles was accompanied also in the Crimea by offensive action on the part of Wrangel. The central group of the Communist Party, which look forward to peace from the dual standpoint of the strengthening of Russia economically and the precipitation of revolutionary events in other countries, received a great accession of power. They claimed that the renewal of the Polish war and the resuscitation of Denikin's forces under Wrangel was one more attempt of the reactionary influences at work in entente cabinets to bring about by force the downfall of the soviet government, and they were strengthened in their suspicions that the entente powers would only contemplate a resumption of trade relations with Russia if they had reason to hope that the transition from war to peace would tend to divide the soviet government and perhaps lead to its destruction. This again opened up the question whether any possibility of a durable peace, which there might have been between capitalist countries and a government, which is by its very nature a declared enemy of capitalism, was not removed by these events. The terror began again in Russia, and some of its effects are dealt with in paragraphs 125 and 126 of this report.

188. *Criticism preceding the Eighth All-Russian Congress.*—It is usual for criticism at meetings and in the press to precede the opening of an important State assembly, nor is it remarkable that criticism against the Government should be bitter in a country which has fallen into an advanced state of economic chaos. The inquisitorial activities of the extraordinary commission during the last two years in Russia have, however, created an atmosphere of fear in which organized public opinion is impossible and criticism of the Government difficult and dangerous even for communists. The fact,

therefore, that criticism of the Moscow Government's policy is bitter and general and arose in the Communist Party in a form sufficiently acute for it to be mentioned in and finally to dominate other questions in the bolshevik press renders it more worthy of careful attention than might otherwise have been the case.

189. *Communists criticize the council of people's commissaries and the central committee of the Russian Communist Party—Opposition to the autocratic policy.*—Considerable opposition has been manifested among the rank and file members of the Communist Party against what is regarded as the unconstitutional action of the council of people's commissaries in promulgating a number of important decrees without submitting them for consideration to the All-Russian central executive committee, which is, according to the soviet constitution, the supreme legislative and executive authority in the soviet government in the interval between the meetings of the All-Russian congress of soviets. This dissatisfaction with the council of people's commissaries is part of a very general opposition among communists against the narrow, autocratic policy of the central committee of the party, and more especially of the political bureau of five, which endeavors to control the central committee and through it the Government of Russia. This movement has gained ground in the trade-unions. At a meeting of Moscow organizations of the Russian Communist Party held in October, 1920, Sapronov,¹ an old bolshevik trade-union worker and a member of the presidium of the seventh All-Russian central executive committee, was among those who attacked Lenin and the central committee of the party. The general tenor of the speeches made on this occasion was that there was no real dictatorship of the workers and peasants in Russia, but only a dictatorship of the central committee of the Communist Party, and that the economic disorganization in the country was largely due to the incompetence of a new soviet bureaucracy which had replaced the bureaucracy of the old régime. At another meeting, held some weeks later, Shlyapnikov, president of the central committee of the metal workers' trade-union, and formerly people's commissary for labor, opposed Lenin upon the same subject in a wordy debate. He was subsequently sent to Archangel, it is said, in a sort of honorable exile, but has since returned.

190. *Opposition to concessions to foreign capitalists.*—Dissatisfaction has also been expressed by the lower ranks of the party against Lenin's policy of offering concessions to foreign capitalists with a view to assisting the economic regeneration of Russia. These communists can not reconcile the granting of such concessions with true communist policy. It appears to them that to lease Russian lands and Russian labor to foreign capitalists is an abandonment of communist principles. Communists, both moderate and extreme, have protested against this policy, and Bukharin, the leader of the Left wing of the party, has been trying to exploit the misgivings of moderate communists against concessions and to win them over to his side. Our evidence with regard to stormy debates which have taken place at meetings of the Moscow Communist Party is confirmed by a report of these meetings in the journal *Kommunistichesky Trud*, an organ of the Moscow district of the Communist Party of the Mos-

¹ Sapronov is said to belong to the painters' trade-union.

cow soviet. In this report it is stated that Bukharin took a prominent part in these discussions and that Lenin was placed under the necessity of promising to reply to the various objections which had been made against the policy of granting concessions to foreigners.

191. *Rykov admits party crisis—Bureaucracy in the supreme council of people's economy—Trotski v. Rykov—Wholesale militarization.*—The dissensions which have arisen in the Communist Party were alluded to by A. I. Rykov, the president of the supreme council of people's economy. In the course of an account of the proceedings of the Moscow Government soviet reported in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* for the 24th of November, 1920, an attack was made upon the supreme council on that occasion by members of the central group of the Communist Party, which controls the soviet government, on the ground that the council had failed to carry out the resolutions of the Ninth All-Russian Congress of the Communist Party regarding the necessity for attracting the working masses to participate in the economic administration of the State. There is reason to believe that this attack was made apparently under pressure of the bitter criticism of the bureaucracy existing in the Government. The supreme council of people's economy, to which is subordinated some 30 glavs and centers of various branches of industry and to which is intrusted the task of coordinating the activities of the people's commissariats of food, agriculture, labor, industry, and finance, has undoubtedly fallen a victim to the worst evils of departmentalism, and an increasing demand has been made for "a unified economic plan" and for a radical reorganization of the economic institutions of the Republic. In the course of his defense Rykov stated that the impoverishment, exhaustion, and weariness of the working masses on the one side and the extreme inadequacy of the party forces on the economic front on the other were fundamental causes of the dissatisfaction which had arisen in the Communist Party. They had, in his opinion, created schism and strife in the party which has assumed a rather acute form at the present time. A further confirmation of these dissensions is contained in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* for the 10th of December. Reference is here made to an article published by a certain Ardvov in the Bulletin of the People's Commissariat for War that Trotski is not on good terms with the supreme council. Trotski is also said to entertain a plan for militarizing the trade-unions and to have endeavored to get this plan sanctioned by the special committee appointed to consider the future activities of the trade-unions, of which Trotski is himself a member. The compulsory measures contemplated in the agrarian law and the proposals for militarizing the supreme council of people's economy and the trade-unions suggested that the possibility was not excluded of a policy of wholesale militarization being adopted.

192. *Opposition to the agrarian law—Compulsion and the peasantry—The food commissariat v. the commissariat of agriculture.*—The new agrarian law proposed by the soviet government has also aroused hostility not only in the Communist Party and among the peasantry but in the departments of the Government itself. Dissensions have arisen between the people's commissariat for agriculture and the people's commissariat for food. The agrarian law has been originated by Osinsky, a member of the collegium of the people's commissariat for food, and is opposed by Mitrofanov, a member of the collegium of

the agricultural commissariat. The cardinal purpose of this law is to make it obligatory upon the peasant to cultivate a given area of land and to deliver to the Government authorities the produce of this area over and above what is necessary to support himself and his family. Mitrofanov has pointed out that as the Government is not yet in a position to regulate exchange between town and country by giving the peasant manufactured goods and agricultural machinery and implements, the peasant has no inducement to resume the cultivation of areas left untilled in recent years. In these circumstances he suggests that the peasants should be allowed to give the Government a certain percentage of what they produce and allow them to dispose of any surplus as they wish. Osinsky¹ maintains that to allow them to dispose of any portion of their grain as they like would be to encourage speculation, and he prefers, therefore, to rely on compulsory measures for making the peasant sow prescribed areas of land and deliver to the Government all but the amount considered essential for the needs of himself and those dependent on him. It is difficult to see how compulsion can be made effective over a population of 100,000,000 peasants, and it is clear that the Government will have little or nothing to give the peasants unless the resumption of trade relations with the West makes it possible to import large quantities of agricultural goods and manufactured wares in general use.

193. *Soviet government invite popular discussion of proposed agrarian law—Kamenev on Bureaucracy—Trotski on concessions.*—A fortnight before the opening of the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets the soviet government published the preliminary draft of the agrarian law in order to make possible discussions regarding it in the provincial soviets. It would seem that the Government took this important step owing to criticism of the unconstitutional actions of the councils of people's commissaries, to the demand that the workers and peasants should be allowed to participate more widely in the work of the Government, and to the strength of the opposition which the agrarian proposals had aroused among communists in the Government itself. Support is lent to this view by the speech of Kamenev to the congress of Moscow provincial soviets, which took place in December a few days before the All-Russian congress met. He emphasized the necessity for delimiting the competence of the council of people's commissaries and the All-Russian central executive committee, and spoke of the attraction of the workers and peasants to a fuller participation in the government of the country as essential to combating the growth of bureaucracy. Trotski, in a speech made on the same theme, assured his audience that concessions to foreign capitalists were to be regarded as bones cast to imperialist dogs.

194. Such was the position of the soviet government, both as regards its external relations and internal affairs when the Eighth All-Russian Congress assembled at Moscow on the 23d of December, 1920.

195. *Supreme power in the central committee of the Communist Party.*—In estimating the results of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets it must be remembered that important decisions on new and critical problems are not taken by the congress. It is customary for

¹ According to recent information, Osinsky has been appointed as assistant people's commissary for agriculture.

reports to be made to the congress upon the course of events during the preceding year at home and abroad and for a general statement to be submitted to the congress on the policy which the soviet government intends to pursue during the ensuing year. A vote of confidence in the Government is then taken, after which the congress divides up into a series of committees for the purpose of entering into a more detailed discussion of the principal measures by which the Government desires to give practical effect to the general policy outlined in the speeches of representatives of the Government before the plenary session of the congress. The opportunity for adequate discussion of the past actions of the Government and their proposals for the future may be measured by the fact that in the first place the congress does not last more than eight days and that it is attended by more than 2,000 delegates; in the second place, the accounts of elections in soviet Russia, given in paragraphs 114-128, and the evidence of our witnesses regarding the political activities of the extraordinary commissions, support the conclusion that a variety of electoral subterfuges and a liberal exercise of arbitrary power are employed by the soviet authorities to insure the election to the congress of those who will support the Government, or, at all events, not oppose it. It is in the central committee of the Communist Party, in the council of people's commissaries, and, to a lesser degree, in the presidium of the all-Russian central executive committee, and not at the All-Russian congress, that questions like the resumption of trade relations are discussed and decisions taken upon them. There is no question of the All-Russian congress exercising any control over the policy of the soviet government under such conditions as have existed hitherto. We now pass to the actual events of the congress itself as far as we have been able to obtain information regarding them.

196. *Members of the congress—Agenda of the All-Russian congress.*—According to a Moscow wireless telegram dated the 21st of December, the number of the delegates to the congress who had registered up to that date were 1,395, of whom 1,211 were stated to be communists, 73 nonparty members, and 1 a member of the Bund Party. *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* for the 24th of December, states that on the 22d of December there were estimated to be 2,418 delegates to the congress, and that, of these 1,539 communists, 101 nonparty members, and 1 representative of the Bund Party were present as members having the right of voting; 702 communists, 56 nonparty members, 5 representatives of the Bund Party, 4 social democratic mensheviks, 1 anarchist-Communist, 1 anarchist- universal, 2 minority social revolutionaries, 1 member of the Left Social Revolutionary Party, and 2 communist sectionalists and 3 others (whose political denomination could not be made out owing to its illegible printing in the copy of the paper in our possession) were present with a consultative voice only. According to a Moscow wireless message dated 21st of December, the agenda of the congress was as follows:

- (1) Reports of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Soviet of People's Commissaries on Foreign and home policy.
- (2) Fundamental tasks for the reorganization of national economy.
- (3) Reestablishment of industry.¹
- (4) Reorganization of transport.

¹ It is interesting to note that the trade union question, which had already become acute, does not appear on the agenda of the congress.

LENIN'S SPEECH—FOREIGN RELATIONS—(1) THE WEST.

197. Lenin began his address to the Eighth All-Russian Congress by a short review of the foreign relations of the soviet government during the past year. He observed with satisfaction that the new war with Poland—unprovoked by Russia—had been brought to an end, and that the conditions of the peace about to be concluded with Poland were more favorable to soviet Russia, notwithstanding the defects sustained by the Red army near Warsaw, than those proposed to Poland by the soviet government in April, 1920. He warned his audience of the possibilities of a new war and of the resuscitation of Wrangel's army as the instrument of a new military attack upon soviet Russia. With regard to other wars, peace has been concluded with a number of States which formerly existed as part of the Russian empire. The relations between the soviet government and these States were improving steadily, and differences of opinion which had arisen with the Latvian Government were being adjusted.

(2) THE EAST.

198. Turning to the east Lenin welcomed the establishment of soviet republics in Bokhara, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, as showing that the soviet system was acceptable not only in industrial countries but also in agricultural lands. It was hoped that a treaty would shortly be signed with Persia. Relations were being cemented between the soviet government and Afghanistan and Turkey. With regard to the latter country, the Entente had done everything in their power to render relations between Turkey and western Europe impossible, and had created the possibility of a rapprochement between Turkey and soviet Russia.

THE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ENGLAND.

199. The conclusion of a trade agreement with Great Britain had been retarded by conflicting currents of opinion in the British Government itself, but the desire for peace with Russia had led to the establishment of soviets of action by British workers. The longer the conclusion of the trade agreement was postponed the more acute would become the present financial crisis in England.

DEFENDS POLICY OF CONCESSIONS.

200. In connection with the trade agreement, Lenin defended the policy of granting concessions to foreign capitalists. It would be ridiculous to talk of Russia's economic independence while the soviet republic remains a backward country. He welcomed the criticism of certain peasants that concessions were a capitulation before the capitalist world; it showed they were imbued with socialist thought. The granting of concessions had, however, been carefully thought out: guarantees would be demanded from those who received them, and it was essential that everything should be done to promote trade relations without delay.

COMPULSION PLUS MORAL SUASION ON WORKERS AND PEASANTS
ESSENTIAL TO ECONOMIC VICTORY.

201. He reminded his audience that a long series of wars had hitherto decided the fate of revolutions. They had completed one chapter of war. They must prepare for the next chapter. Without economic restoration they would be unable to hold their own in it. It was therefore essential that the workers and peasants, and more especially the peasants, should cooperate whole-heartedly to improve production, and a widespread propaganda should be begun to that end. To achieve these economic aims it would be necessary to unite compulsion with moral suasion as successfully as they had done in the Red army. Compulsory measures did not frighten the masses of workers and peasants who saw in them their support; while soviet propaganda, so successful during the war, must show them that they would be unable to escape from the "precipice of economic breakdown," on the edge of which they now found themselves, without establishing new forms of state unity.

THE AGRARIAN LAW.

202. With regard to the agrarian law, devoted to strengthening agricultural productivity, he said that Russia was a State of small farmers, and that the transition to communism had faced them with difficulties greater than would have arisen in other conditions. In the attainment of their economic objectives, the assistance of the peasants was ten times more necessary than it had been during the war. The peasants were not socialists. There was therefore more reason for union among the communist workers. "They must tell the peasants that it was impossible to continue freezing and dying of starvation indefinitely." If such conditions continued they would be broken in the next chapter of war. There must be a larger area of land under cultivation next spring, and there was no hope of salvation unless this economic victory was obtained. They recognized their obligation to the peasants. They had taken their bread in exchange for paper money. They would compensate them as soon as industry was restored, but for that purpose a surplus of agricultural products was essential. The food position was, however, better, and the statistics showed that four times (200,000,000 poods) the amount of food had been produced in the third year of the revolution than in the first (50,000,000 poods). Three hundred millions were, however, necessary if the food position was to be completely restored. Without this, there could be no talk of economic restoration or of the electrification of Russia.

TRANSPORT AND ELECTRIFICATION.

203. With regard to transport, decree No. 1042 provided for its restoration within five years. Great attention would have to be paid to fuel and resources of peat exploited to replenish supplies. He drew attention to the report of the state commission for electrification. He regarded electrification as the economic part of their party program. In future engineers and agricultural experts would be members of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets as well as politi-

cians. The danger which Russia presents to the capitalist world depends on the improvement of her economic life. As long as she remains a small farmer country capitalism would find more favorable acceptance than communism. The foundation and basis of their interior enemy (capitalism) has not been removed. Electrification would help them to move it. Therefore he stated communism to be the soviet power plus electrification of the whole country.

RYKOV'S THESES.

204. According to a Moscow wireless message, dated the 23d of December, 1920, A. I. Rykov, president of the supreme council of people's economy, presented to the congress a series of theses on the means of reestablishing industry. He recommended the following measures:

GUARANTEE FOOD AND CLOTHING TO WORKERS.

(1) Systematic and, as far as possible, complete supply of workmen engaged in industry with clothing and food, making use, when necessity arises, of the stores and the supply organizations formerly used for the Red army.

HOUSING.

(2) Improvement of housing and conditions of life for workmen.

RETURN SKILLED MEN FROM ARMY TO FACTORIES.

(3) Immediate return of skilled workmen from demobilized detachments of the Red army and distribution of these workmen among factories, works, and mines in accordance with industrial plans.

LABOR BATTALIONS.

(4) Utilization of military detachments and military organizations for carrying out economic work under the direct orders of economic organizations.

TECHNICAL EDUCATION.

(5) Further development of professional education and training of engineers and technical and skilled workers. Special efforts must be exerted to organize special educational establishments for workmen.

LABOR CONSCRIPTION OF UNSKILLED LABOR.

(6) The utilization of unskilled labor must in future be carried out by means of labor conscription and labor mobilization, for which it is first of all necessary to make use of all workers in towns and villages who are not engaged in productive labor.

INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY OF LABOR.

(7) Measures must be taken for increasing the output of labor. The abolition of unauthorized absence from work is one of the first conditions of normal work in factories.

PROPAGANDA.

(8) A great part of the work of increasing and intensifying labor must be played by industrial propaganda, which must be directed by the best forces of the trade unions and the economic organizations.

IMPROVED TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT.

205. Rykov also emphasized the necessity for the improvement of the technical resources of the Republic and of utilizing scientific means of cultivation and artificial manure in agriculture, and of extending the use of motor tractors and electric plows. He concluded by stating that the economic program of the Republic must be directed to the further reorganization of railways, transport, mining, metallurgy, construction of machinery, and the organization of stores of foodstuffs, fuel, and raw materials.

206. The theses of Rykov differ in little from the recommendations made at the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets which took place a year ago.

207. Rykov made the following comparisons between the economic conditions existing in 1919 and 1920:

1. 1919 (August–October), 57,576,000 poods of food made available; 1920, 140,652,000 poods of food made available.

2. 1919, 7,155,000 cubic sazhens of wood consumed; 1920 (10 months), 11,183,000 cubic sazhens of wood consumed.

3. 1919, 36,881,000 poods of coal produced; 1920 (10 months), 341,232,000 poods of coal produced.¹

4. 1919, 67,100,000 poods of peat obtained; 1920, 82,300,000 poods of peat obtained.

5. 1919, 15,183 wagon loads per month transported by rail; 1920, 24,926 wagon loads per month transported by rail.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM ABROAD.

208. Rykov referred in his theses to "the attraction of technical means and forces from other countries for the development of the productive forces in soviet Russia, to enable us to begin the exploitation of the vast and deserted areas of northern and eastern Russia, and to erect in the area of the republic of soviets enterprises for which we must have the highly technical skill of western Europe and America."

TROTSKI ON STANDARD LOCOMOTIVES AND MACHINERY.

209. Trotski's speech in the Congress emphasized the importance of standardization, not only of locomotives but of machinery in general. He describes standardization as socialism in technical matters. During the second half of 1921 they might expect to receive from abroad about a thousand locomotives of the best type. Transport on the Russian railways had improved, and for 12 trucks on every hundred versts in 1920 there were 23 in September. The increase thus amounted to 90 per cent. The tasks of transport which confronted the supreme council of transport—the interdepartmental organization for transport—were carried out on an average in full, and if a decrease in transport had taken place in July and August, this was owing to the fault of the people's commissariat for food and the supreme council of people's economy, which did not bring up their freights in time. With a view to facilitating the sys-

¹ Principally due to the recovery of the Donetz basin by soviet Russia.

tematic use of railways a plan for the utilization of the railways in 1921 had been based upon the potentiality of each engine available for running. It was estimated by the people's commissariat for ways and communications that the railway services were in a position to accomplish 4,600,000,000 versts during the coming year. In 1920 the railways had accomplished only 2,200,000,000 versts.

WATER TRANSPORT AND RAILWAYS.

210. Turning to the question of water transport, Trotski stated that the position of water transport, notwithstanding the importance it represented in the life of the country, was more unsatisfactory than railway transport.¹ Before the war 2,200,000,000 poods were carried by water and 2,700,000,000 by rail. The soviet had, however, received only 40 to 50 per cent shipping from the old régime and has been handicapped by their ignorance of administration. The first necessity was to adapt to the administration of the waterways the methods which they had adopted with a view to restoring the railways. He claimed that the introduction of centralization had already given satisfactory results and that 583,000,000 poods of cargo had been conveyed by water in 1920 compared with 341,000,000 poods in 1919, and, if the distances covered were taken into consideration, the results achieved in 1920 were two or three times greater than those achieved in 1919. He regarded the transport of 160,000,000 poods of crude oil from Azerbaijan as one of their greatest economic successes. He paid tribute to the work accomplished by the chief railway political department superintending the reorganization of transport.

Now that the position as regards transport has been improved the railway political department² was being handed over to the railwaymen's trade-union, which would be responsible for developing the work of the department in future. Attention had been drawn to the unfavorable conditions of life of the railwaymen. During the coming year special provision must be made for remedying this. During the present winter, if the railway lines were blocked with snow, they proposed to call upon the peasants to clear them. They would say to the peasants, "It is hard for you, but you must clear the railway lines; you are only lending to communism what it will return to you. Communism will liberate you from serfdom, will make you free in your land and your village and will educate you, and you will realize that you are not only a citizen in your 'volost,' but a czar in your country and the master of creation."

ZINOVIEV'S SPEECH AGAINST BUREAUCRACY.

211. Zinoviev's speech to the Congress was principally devoted to the necessity of combating bureaucracy and, contrary to expectation, to the trade-union question. He pointed out that to fight bureaucracy means to fight economic chaos and misery, to raise the efficiency of labor, and the level of the people's culture, to get back

¹ Water transport is under the administration of the "glavvod," or central board of waterways, a department of the supreme council of people's economy.

² Department established for the purpose of intensive propaganda on the railways directed to the improvement of transport.

from military institutions the necessary workers, to attract more workers to participate in the activities of the central government, to perfect and simplify the economic administration of the soviet republic, and to give new life to the local soviets. He said that the soviets must be assemblies where the working classes are taught simultaneously to make the law and to obey the laws which they have made. It was essential that the soviets should be elected regularly and that the members of the soviets and their executive committees should be elected in accordance with the prescribed rules. Any executive committee which failed without sufficient reason to call at least one meeting of the soviet a month should be deprived of its rights, and immediately be reelected, and the same should occur in the case of the presidium of an executive committee which failed to summon meetings of the committee regularly.

SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S IMPAIRED CLAIM TO REPRESENT RUSSIAN PEOPLE.

212. It is interesting to mark the views of Zinoviev upon the functions of the trade-unions and to compare them with those of Trotski. Zinoviev informed the congress that the soviets must not in any case replace the trade-unions, which should be made the main-springs of the economic life of the country. The revival of activity in the trade-unions and the growth of their influence in the domain of national economy, the collaboration of the soviets and trade-unions for the raising of national efficiency, is the best means of combating bureaucracy. It is evident from Zinoviev's speech that the soviet government was in grave need of reformation,¹ and that, in so far as meetings of soviets are not held and elections to them do not take place, the claim of the soviet government to represent the workers and peasants of Russia is an empty one.

DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE CONGRESS.

213. As far as we have been able to obtain information, the following decisions among others were taken by the congress:

(1) That all decrees regarding the general regulation of the political and economic life of the country and all decrees which might change in any important principle the present program of work of the people's commissariats or other institutions of the soviet government must be examined by the all-Russian central executive committee.

(2) That drafts of all decrees and orders proposed concerning questions of political and economic importance, and also the more important decisions which it is proposed to take regarding military matters, etc., must be published by the presidium of the all-Russian central executive committee at least two weeks before the plenary session of the all-Russian central executive committee, in order that the provincial soviets may be afforded an opportunity to discuss these proposals before a final decision has been taken upon them.

¹ The following is contained in a Petrograd wireless message dated the 6th of February: Circular issued by the presidium of the all-Russian central executive committee concerning regular reelection of soviets and the convocation of the congresses of soviets at regular intervals: "The cruel civil war demanded the greater part of the best soviet workers for the front and rendered it necessary that the work of the civil soviet organizations should be under the control of the executive committees of the soviets and congresses, and especially of the presidium of the all-Russian central executive committee and of the supreme revolutionary soviet. With the cessation of military operations on all fronts of the republic we enter the paths of peaceful reconstruction. It is imperative that the working masses should be induced to take part in creative work, for their participation means the beginning of constitutional rule. Having regard for the transition toward a new phase of our life, the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets has decided to carry out periodical renewals in the village, volost, municipal, and other soviets at an appointed time, and also to convene congresses of soviets, i.e., to carry out reelections to municipal and village soviets in accordance with article 57, clause (b) of the constitution."

(3) That the presidium of the all-Russian central executive committee should be accorded authority to revoke decisions of the council of people's commissaries.

(4) That the presidium of the all-Russian central executive committee should decide all conflicts or disagreements arising between the people's commissariats and other central institutions of the soviet republic on the one hand and the local executive committee and other local institutions on the other.

(5) That all decrees and regulations of high State importance and requiring immediate decision, including decisions relating to war and foreign policy, must be submitted for consideration to, and are subject to ratification by, the council of people's commissaries.

(6) That the all-Russian central executive committee should extend and develop its control over the activities of the various departments of the soviet government and over the local soviets, and should examine regularly the reports of the people's commissariat and establish a special commission for the purpose of conducting investigations into the work of the people's commissariats and of the provincial executive committees and local institutions of the soviet government.

(7) That the all-Russian central executive committee, in conjunction with the council of people's commissaries, should conduct a bimonthly investigation of the administrative personnel in the various commissariats and other central institutions of the soviet government, and should also prepare a list of persons whose ability recommended them as suitable for utilization in an executive capacity in the government.

(8) That the all-Russian central executive committee should henceforward consist of 300 instead of 200 members, and that the sessions of the committee should be held not less than twice a month.

(9) That a partial demobilization of the army should take place.

(10) That the competence of the council of labor and defense, which hitherto has devoted its attention to military purposes, should be reconstituted for the purpose of adapting its energies to the peaceful work of economic reconstruction.

(a) The council of labor and defense should function as a commission of the council of people's commissaries.

(b) The council of labor and defense should be composed of (1) the president of the council of people's commissaries, as president of the council of labor and defense; (2) the people's commissary for war; (3) the president of the supreme council of people's economy; (4) the people's commissary for labor; (5) the people's commissary for ways and communications; (6) the people's commissary for food; (7) the people's commissary for agriculture; (8) the people's commissary for the workers' and peasants' control; (9) a representative of the all-Russian soviet of trade-unions.

(c) The council of labor and defense is charged with the control of the whole economic life of the country and with elaborating and supervising the execution of a unified plan of economic administration.

(d) All departments and institutions of the soviet governments are subordinate to the council of labor and defense and will comply with orders received from it.

(e) The all-Russian central executive committee retains the right to cancel decisions of the council of labor and defense.

(11) That the all-Russian central executive committee should carry out the proposals for the electrification of Russia on the lines contemplated in the report made by Engineer Krzhanovsky.¹

(12) That with regard to transport: (1) Rail and water transport should be united under a single administration. (2) That a standard type of locomotive and rolling stock should be adopted for the purpose of facilitating construction and repairs. (3) That additional efforts should be made to provide for the repair of locomotives and rolling stock and to arrest the deterioration of locomotives, rolling stock, and permanent way. (4) That everything should be done to improve the standard of life of the railway employees.

(13) That the peasants should be supplied with seeds and agricultural machinery.

(14) That supplies of raw materials, manufactured goods, fuel, food and clothing, should be concentrated from reserves in the hands of the central government and in the provinces, and be placed at the disposal of the provincial soviets or councils of people's economy for distribution to the workers in industry as a premium for extra work.

¹ Krzhanovsky was a member of the bolshevik section of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party before the war, and at one time a member of its central committee.

214. The remaining sections of our report on political conditions deal with—

(1) Trade-unions, the treatment of which in a socialist state is a subject of special interest to all other countries where such organizations exist. The subject derives additional importance from the fact that in Russia controversies on their proper place and functions in the soviet state are one of the chief causes of the present crisis in the Communist Party.

(2) The peasants, who form at least four-fifths of the population of Russia, and who are likely to play a decisive part in her future.

In addition we have added short notes on foreign affairs, education, religion, and law and justice.

THE TRADE-UNIONS IN SOVIET RUSSIA.

THE RUSSIAN TRADE-UNION MOVEMENT—PERSECUTION OF THE TRADE-UNIONS UNDER THE AUTOCRACY.

215. The trade-union movement began in western Europe when workers in a particular trade began to form associations for the purpose of protecting their own interests against their employers and trying to better their own conditions of life. At first these unions were purely economic bodies; later, with the growth of socialist thought and the attention paid by socialists to industry and the industrial worker the aims of the trade-unions tended to become partly political as well as economic, and in the case of certain unions politics exercised a greater influence than economics. In Russia, the policy of the autocracy, which helped largely to create the most narrow and extreme form of socialist thought in Europe, made impossible the organization of trade-unions except illegally and in secret ways. The Russian trade-union movement was therefore driven from the first days of its illegal and persecuted existence to make common cause with the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party and was thus inevitably identified with the principal political aim of that party—the revolutionary overthrow of the autocracy.

REFERENCE TO RUSSIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY PROGRAM (APPENDIX VII).

216. A reference to the translation of the program of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, elaborated at the conference of the party held in London in 1919, will show how closely the party endeavored to identify its aims with those of the industrial worker.

217. A great development of the trade-unions followed the Russian revolution of February, 1917. The same confusion and lack of any directing and coordinating organization characterized this development as in the case of the soviets of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies, which sprang up in circumstances related in paragraphs 47 to 52.

CONFUSION BETWEEN TRADE-UNIONS AND FACTORY SOVIETS AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY, 1917.

218. In the case of the trade-unions, however, confusion, became worse confounded, because the soviets in the factories largely usurped and duplicated their activities, and threatened to develop as entirely

independent bodies. It was not until the First All-Russian Trade Union Congress assembled in January, 1918 (after the October revolution) that it was finally decided that the factory committees should be subordinated to the trade-unions.

BOLSHEVIK EFFORTS TO CAPTURE THE TRADE-UNIONS.

219. The campaign begun during the summer of 1917 by the bolshevik group of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party to capture the majority of the soviets all over Russia, was accompanied by a similar campaign to win over the trade-unions to bolshevism. The third trade-union conference, which took place on the 20th of June, 1917, at Petrograd, was divided into a Right wing—including the mensheviks, social revolutionaries, and the representatives of the Jewish "Bund," which supported the Government, and a Left wing, led by the bolsheviks, which attacked the Government, and advocated the cessation of the war, the workers' control of industry, and the destruction of the coalition between the socialists and the bourgeoisie.

EXTENSION OF BOLSHEVIK INFLUENCE IN INDUSTRIAL AREAS.

220. The conference ended in favor of the moderates, but as the summer wore on the bolsheviks began to extend their influence among the leather workers of the Moscow government, the miners of the Don Basin, and the textile workers of Ivanovo-Voznesensk. The unsuccessful attempt of Kornilov to march on Petrograd against the provisional government had the effect of increasing the discontent in the trade-unions against the Government. This is shown by A. Lozovsky in his book, *Trade-Unions in Soviet Russia*, as follows:

(1) The Petrograd Council of Trade-Unions asserted that the provisional government were "sacrificing the interests of peace and of the masses to the allied and Russian imperialists" and demanded the establishment of a special committee for the defense of Petrograd against counter revolution.

(2) The Moscow metal workers declared that there were "no separate conflicts of metal workers, textile workers, and leather workers, there is only one great national conflict between labor and capital."

(3) The All-Russian conference of textile workers, which took place in September promised "the fullest support to the soviets in their struggle for power, for only such power can save the country from economic and political ruin and improve the position of the working class."

THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION, 1917.

221. The trend in the trade unions-toward the Left was clearly marked at the Democratic convention which took place at Petrograd in September. Nine-tenths of the trade-union delegates, representing 1,893,100 workers, were opposed to the provisional government, and 70 out of 117 delegates were said to belong to the bolshevik party.

THE TRADE-UNIONS' PART IN THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION OF OCTOBER, 1917.

222. The trade-unions played an important part in the October revolution. With the exception of the associations of commercial and bank employees, the printers' union, the higher-grade employees

of the railway union, and the postal and telegraph workers, the Russian trade-unions supported the October revolution, and armed detachments of trade-unionists were formed to oppose the government and to protect the factories.

AFTER THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION.

223. Immediately after the October revolution a question of supreme importance for the future of the trade-unions in Russia arose. This question was: What were to be the functions of the trade-unions in a socialist state? It arose in connection with the action taken by the bank employees' union, which, supported financially by some of the employers, struck work against the newly established soviet government. It is a question which, notwithstanding its importance, has not yet been finally decided in Russia at the present time.

224. Lozovsky represents the official bolshevik attitude to the strike of the bank employees' union in his pamphlet on the growth and development of the trade-union movement of Russia. He asks how, in a country like Russia, where the socialist revolution has taken place, there can be any room for strike funds, strikes, and other weapons and methods of the class struggle employed by the proletariat against their class enemies. He states that the Russian trade-unions have been led by experience to decide that—

(1) To strike against the bourgeoisie is the sacred right of the proletariat in their struggle against the exploiter.

(2) To strike against the workers' revolution is an act of hostility against the working class and is, therefore, a crime against Russian and international socialism.

Our evidence shows that neither then nor more recently can this view be said to have obtained general acceptance among trade-unionists in Russia. For example, at the First All-Russian Trade Union Congress, which assembled at Petrograd in January in 1918, a certain number of representatives, led by mensheviks, demanded that the trade-unions should remain independent. They claimed that the same relations should exist between the trade-unions in soviet Russia and the soviet government as existed between the trade-unions and the governments of other countries. They desired to maintain the freedom of the class struggle, the right to strike, and to retain strike funds. They maintained that the communist contention that there is no need for trade-unions to possess machinery for bringing pressure to bear upon a socialist soviet government implies that the policy of such government must be accepted by every worker or association of workers on the ground that it claims to be a workers' and peasants' government, and is therefore to be regarded as incapable of pursuing a policy contrary to the workers' will.

225. With regard to the vital question as to the functions of the trade-unions under the new government, it was decided at the First All-Russian Trade Union Congress that—

(1) "The factory committees or soviets" (mentioned in paragraph 218) should become the local organs of the trade-unions, thereby finally deciding the question as to what was to be the relationship between the trade-unions and the factory soviets; after this the factory committees were usually composed of representatives of the trade-unions, the supreme council of people's economy, and of the rank and file of the particular factory.

(2) The workers' control committee, which had been set up in industry after the October revolution, should form part of the general economic organization of the soviet republic, and were to be regarded as the basis of economic administration of the state.

(3) The most intimate cooperation was desirable between the trade-unions and the people's commissariat for labor.

(4) The people's commissariat for labor should carry out the resolutions of the all-Russian central council, or soviet of trade-unions, and of the principal trade-union congresses.

(5) The most important industries—the coal, oil, iron, steel, and chemical industries, and railway transport—should be placed under a strong centralizing control, described as "trustification."

(6) The closest cooperation should be observed between the trade-unions and the council of soviets of workers' delegates, and the trade-unions should be gradually converted into "organs of socialist government, participation in which must be obligatory upon all persons engaged in any given industry."

226. The resolution that the trade-unions should ultimately become departments of the soviet government, i. e., be nationalized, quoted in the last paragraph, not only provoked opposition among menshevik and nonparty trade-unionists, but also aroused misgivings among some communist trade-unionists. The following resolutions passed at the Second All-Russian Trade Union Congress, which met in January 1919, afford evidence of these misgivings:

The task of socializing all means of production and the organization of society on a new socialist basis demands stubborn, prolonged work on the reconstruction of the whole government machine, the creation of new organs of control and regulation of production and consumption resting upon the organized initiative of the masses of the workers themselves.

This compels the trade-unions to take a more active and energetic part in the soviets, by direct participation in all the state organs, by organizing mass proletarian control over their activities, by carrying out separate tasks which might confront the soviet government through their organizations, by cooperating in the reconstruction of various state departments, and by the gradual substitution of them by their own organizations by means of fusing the organs of the union with those of the state.

It would be a mistake, however, in the present stage of development of trade-unions with the, as yet, imperfect state organization, immediately to convert the unions into state organs and to merge the former into the latter or for the unions to usurp the functions of the state. The whole process of complete fusion of the trade-unions with the state organs (the process which we call nationalization of trade-unions) must take place as the inevitable result of their joint close and harmonious working and the preparation by the trade-unions of the broad masses of the workers for the task of managing the state machine and all the administrative organs.

227. The feeling aroused by these misgivings increased in volume, and was assisted by the difficulties which arose in adjusting the relations of the trade-unions and the people's commissariat of labor in accordance with the decisions of the First All-Russian Trade Union Congress stated in paragraph 225. Departmental relations are never easy to adjust, and in this case the difficulties were greater owing to the clash of personal views. The question obviously required delicate handling, and was better left obscure than too sharply defined. According to Lozovsky—

The whole wages policy, i. e., the state regulation of wages, standardization of labor, questions of labor discipline, etc., is exclusively conducted by the trade-unions, while the commissariats merely confirm the decisions arrived at by the trade-unions. Protection of labor and the distribution of labor power are carried out by the commissariat of labor, while the trade-unions control these departments through their representatives.

228. These difficulties were accompanied by a failure to establish smooth working relations between the trade-unions and the supreme council of people's economy. It had been agreed that representatives of the trade-unions should participate in the work of the various economic departments of the soviet government—departments which were concentrated in the hands of the supreme council of people's economy. It was arranged that collegiates, or boards of four or five

persons, representing the supreme council of people's economy, trade-unions and the workers of the particular factory, should be responsible for the administration of individual works. In practice, however, this system worked badly, as is admitted by Trotski in his writings and published speeches on the trade-unions, and the dissatisfaction thus created was increased owing to the industrial disorganization everywhere prevailing, to which the inefficiency of the collegiate system contributed.

229. The failure of the collegiate system had two results. On the one hand, the trade-unionists who had demanded the independence of the trade-unions began to blame the supreme council of people's economy for the rapid fall in production, with its consequent terrible effect upon the life of the industrial workers, and the beginnings were seen of a trade-union party, which adopted a syndicalist standpoint and advocated a concentration of organization, direction, and control of Russian industry in the hands of the trade-unions. On the other hand, the second result of the failure of the collegiate system was to strengthen the position of those in the soviet government who desired that the trade-unions should be incorporated in the soviet government. During the 15 months of civil war which elapsed between the meetings of the Second and Third All-Russian Trade Union Congresses the first of these tendencies mentioned above was temporarily submerged beneath the surface of military events. The second tendency—toward the nationalization of the trade-unions—became more clearly confined during the civil war, and found its most precise and extreme expression in Trotski, the people's commissary for war. Two diametrically opposed trade-union policies thus developed, the one leading to syndicalism and the trade-unionizing of the state, the other to the swallowing up of the trade-unions in the state. We now pass to consider the circumstances in which Trotski came to be the leader of the group which advocates the nationalization of trade-unions, and thus to precipitate a grave crisis, not only in the trade-unions but also in the communist party itself.

230. Trotski's experience in the army during the civil war and his knowledge of the demoralizing effect which shortage of food in the towns had upon the Russian worker, led him to believe that it was necessary to introduce in industry those methods of conscription and militarization which had been necessary in the army during the war; he was convinced that only by making the conscription and militarization of industry the basis of the economic policy of the soviet government would it be possible to secure the labor necessary to restore the industrial production of Russia. In the course of a remarkable speech delivered before the Third All-Russian Trade-Union Congress in 1920, he paid a tribute to the part played by prominent trade-unionists in the work of organizing, disciplining, and leading the Red army at the front; and he maintained that when the time came for a transition from war to peace, these trade-union leaders would have to continue these services in organizing the workers in Russia on a basis of the conscription and militarization of labor. He maintained that the characteristics of social development find in militarism their most finished, beveled, and acute expression; that a harsh internal régime is inseparable from military organization and that it brings clearness, form, accuracy, and responsibility to the highest possible standard. Such qualities were of value in every branch of activity.

The German railways owed their efficiency largely to the appointment of noncommissioned officers and officers to administrative posts in the department of ways and communications.

In Russia they had found that a trade-unionist who had undergone a course of military training returned to his union as good a proletarian as ever, but he returned tempered like steel, made a man of, more independent and more decisive because he had become accustomed to responsibility. They could not hope in Russia for a free flow of workers from the labor market, therefore compulsion was necessary. The producing trade-unions of the ruling working class had neither the same tasks, nor did they adopt the same methods as trade-unions in bourgeois countries. All workers were forced to belong to trade-unions in Russia. Economic compulsion and political compulsion are manifestations of the dictatorship of the working class in two closely allied departments. In short, the path toward socialism lies through the highest and most intensive development of the state; that was the period through which Russia was passing. Before disappearing the state assumed the most merciless form, imperatively grasping the lives of its citizens on every side. The army had gripped men with the most severe compulsion, and the state organization must do the same in this period of transition. Such are Trotski's views upon trade-unions.

231. Meanwhile, during 1919, interdepartmental friction and inefficiency grew worse, and, at the same time, so did the general economic situation of the country. It was in these circumstances that Trotski took over the people's commissariat of ways and communications after Krasin's departure with the Russian trade delegation for London in March, 1920, and achieved improved results. His experience in this capacity led him to attack bitterly the triplification of functions between the supreme council of people's economy, the people's commissariat of labor, and the trade-unions, and, more particularly, the failure of the supreme council and the people's commissariat for food, to take advantage of the better transport facilities available during August and September by not having ready at the various stations in the Provinces the food supplies for which rolling stock was waiting. He was thus fortified in his belief that the adoption of a general policy of militarization, including conscription of labor and the nationalization of the trade-unions, was the only means of restoring industrial production in Russia. Not only Trotski, but other prominent members of the soviet government had become convinced that a radical reorganization of the economic institutions of the Republic was necessary if any progress was to be made toward the economic regeneration of Russia; and, although they might not agree with Trotski's views on industrial reconstruction, it was plain to all that no plan of reconstruction could be decided upon until the position and functions of the trade-unions had been determined once and for all.

232. During the autumn it became evident that Trotski's proposals for the conscription and militarization of labor and his conception of the part to be played by the trade-unions in carrying it out had aroused great opposition in the trade-union movement. Support is lent to this by—

(1) Trotski's admission made in a speech to the transport workers that the policy of militarization was evoking an opposition which had not yet subsided.

(2) Transport workers, who accused Trotski, on the occasion of this speech, of mistrusting the working class, and who condemned militarization of labor and advocated a policy of decentralization.

(3) The following statement of a communist in Economic Life, that:

The inconsistency of the position is shown by those more excitable revolutionaries who, like Comrade Trotski, want so seize the bull by the horns * * * the unpreparedness of the trade-unions to carry out tasks set clearly before them at all the various conferences, and their exhaustion by the war, have made them merely organizations for the supply of soviet officials instead of organs of economic dictatorship. * * * The Russian worker, freed from political oppression, remains actually a slave economically.

233. This opposition was led by those who, as mentioned above, had always stood out for the independence of the trade-unions, and is represented by three groups. They are (1) the "labor opposition," (2) the "Democratic Centralists," (3) the "Ignatov" group.

(1) THE "LABOR OPPOSITION."

The "labor opposition." This group is led by Shlyapnikov, president of the All-Russian Miners' Union and formerly people's commissary for labor. It demands that—

(a) The organization, direction, and control of the economic life of Russia should be placed in the hands of the trade-unions.

(b) The various branches of industry should be divided up for administrative purposes among the trade-unions, each branch of industry being organized and directed by the trade-union representing the workers in that particular branch. Under this system, therefore, the miners' union and the metal workers' union would be responsible for working the coal and metal industries, the trade-unions representing the textile operatives for working the various branches of the textile industry.

(c) Appointments to administrative posts in the organization and direction of industry should be made as the result of elections conducted by the representatives of the trade-union charged with managing the industry in question, or by the general body of members of the union.

(d) The All-Russian central soviet of trade-unions should coordinate and control the activities of the trade-unions charged with the management of the various branches of industry, and the acceptance of candidates put forward by the all-Russian central soviet of trade-unions to fill administrative posts in the economic departments of the State must be obligatory upon the supreme council of people's economy.

The proposals of the labor opposition are, therefore, syndicalist in character, and they were bitterly attacked on this ground by Lenin in an article, remarkable for its incoherence, published in the Moscow *Pravda* for the 21st of January, 1921.

(2) THE "DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISTS."

234. The broader aspects of the crisis are seen in the theses of the groups standing for "Democratic Centralism," led by Sapronov, a communist workman, who is said to be president of the painters' trade-union. The Democratic Centralists regard the trade-union question as being part of the crisis which has arisen in the Communist Party itself, and therefore they deal more with general political questions in their theses than with the trade-unions. According to

the Democratic Centralists the following factors, among others, have contributed to bring about the present crisis:

- (a) The decline in the general standard of party conduct and in party spirit among the communist rank and file.
- (b) The dead hand of bureaucracy, paralyzing the innumerable departments of the Government and especially the principal Government bodies, such as the all-Russian central executive committee and the council of people's commissary. This bureaucracy has been strengthened by the decisions taken at the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party with regard to militarization of labor and to individual control in the factories, and has led, according to thesis 3, to a weakening of the party and ~~soviet~~ organization and to a process of decomposition from above.
- (c) The practice of conferring privileges, often in an entirely improper manner.
- (d) The growth of discontent among the Communist rank and file which has given birth to unhealthy symptoms among the less class conscious members of the party, and has even led them to act contrary to party interests.
- (e) The decisions of party conferences advocating (1) the attraction of the broad masses of the party to a more intimate participation in party life; (2) improved contact between central and local organizations and the masses; and (3) the abolition of privileges have remained a dead letter.
- (f) The efforts made to maintain intact the existing personnel of all the principal executive departments and institutions, as clearly shown in the election of the new all-Russian central executive committee and its presidium—notwithstanding the above decision and above all, the resolutions of the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

The Democratic Centralists therefore regard the trade-union crisis as one of the results of the disorganized influences which have been introduced into the Russian Communist Party by the abuses set out above. The members of the group therefore direct attention not so much to the trade-union question in itself as to the wider and more vital question of purifying the Communist Party from the disintegrating forces which threaten to destroy it from within and, with it, the existing Russian Government. They maintain that, if the party is to recover from the present crisis in which it finds itself, the following measures, among others, must be taken:

- (1) The political bureau of five and the organizing bureau of the central committee of the Communist Party must become in actual fact executive organs responsible to the central committee of the party in plenary session.
- (2) Representatives of the Moscow, Petrograd, and provincial committees of the party should be admitted to sessions of the central committee where questions other than secret questions are discussed.
- (3) Freedom must be accorded to all members of the party to express their opinion in the press, at party congresses, and in all responsible party and soviet organizations.
- (4) A systematic exchange of administrative personnel must take place between the Central Government and the Provinces, between the trade-union and the supreme council of people's economy.
- (5) Party conferences must be held three times a year.
- (6) The functions of the all-Russian central executive committee and of the soviet of people's commissaries, which have been arrogated by the political bureau of the central committee of the party, must be restored.
- (7) A radical renewal and purging of the leading party and soviet organizations, notably of the central committee of the Communist Party and of the people's commissary, must take place.

235. The Democratic Centralists do not, therefore, advocate such a radical program of reconstruction as that contemplated in the syndicalist program of the labor opposition group. The views of the Ignatov group are not sufficiently distinct from those of the Democratic Centralists to justify description here.

LENIN AND THE TRADE-UNION CRISIS.

236. Some time before the theses of the labor opposition and the Democratic Centralists were published, Lenin saw clearly that a strong body of feeling against Trotski's proposals of militarization was forming. He therefore resolved to compromise and lent his support to a central trade-union group represented by M. P. Tomsky, president of the all-Russian central soviet of trade-unions; S. Lozovsky and Y. Rudzutak, both members of the presidium of the central soviet. They may be said to have represented since October, 1917, the official soviet government trade-union attitude. They had in the past opposed those who stood out for the independence of the trade-unions in the soviet republic, and have and continue to support the policy of promoting a gradual fusion between the trade-unions and the economic departments of the state. They opposed Trotski's trade-unions program just as uncompromisingly as they opposed those who advocated the independence of the unions. As far back as the first week of September, 1920, Tomsky had sharply opposed Trotski at a conference of the Russian trade-unions held at Moscow, and had attacked him again at a plenary session of the central committee of the Russian Communist Party on the 9th of September.

On the latter occasion Trotski outlined a rough draft of his proposal on militarization of labor and bitterly criticized the bureaucracy existing in the Government. Tomsky appears to have retorted by pointing to the bureaucracy existing in the transport workers' trade-union, where Trotski has a certain following and where special measures of militarization have already been introduced. At the meeting in question attacks appear to have been made against the Government both from the side of Bukharin and of Sapronov and Shlyapnikov as well as from that of Trotski, and the position became so acute that it was found necessary to form a buffer group in the central committee as an emergency measure, with a view to trying to compose the differences which have arisen. At one time the attack was in danger of developing into a personal attack on Lenin himself, and it seems to have been as a result of this that Lenin withdrew from direct participation in the debates and that Zinoviev took his place. As a result of the position which had been created it was decided to review the whole trade-union question, and a special commission was appointed by the Communist Party to investigate and report upon the tasks of the trade-unions during the period of industrial reconstruction in the immediate future. The following were appointed members of this commission: S. Lozovsky, M. P. Tomsky, Y. Rudzutak,¹ Andreev, A. I. Rykov, G. E. Zinoviev, L. D. Trotski, K. Lutovinov.

Trotski refused to serve on the commission,² which Lenin stated in his article on the party crisis still further deepened the schism in the party. The opposition against his proposals did not abate.

237. Nothing was done at the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets to settle the trade-union question, but the position of Trotski seems to have grown weaker. Zinoviev supported Tomsky, and observed in his speech before the congress that the trade-unions

¹ Rudzutak is president of the central board of waterways, known as the "glavvod," under the supreme council of people's economy.

² Stated in Lenin's article on the "Crisis in the party," Moscow *Pravda*, for Jan. 21, 1921.

should be left untrammelled by the state and that they were to be regarded as one of the most suitable instruments for combating bureaucracy. Lenin himself, in a speech made at the Bolshoi Teatr (Great Theater) at Moscow, openly attacked Trotski, whom he described as imagining that soviet Russia had already become a communist society, whereas, on the contrary, there still remained a great deal of cultural work to be done with a view to inculcating the communist spirit into the masses. Lenin maintained that the trade-unions must be the school which was to inculcate this spirit. Kalinin, the president of the presidium of the newly elected Eighth All-Russian Central Executive Committee, supported Lenin in a speech delivered on the same occasion.

238. In the middle of January, 1921, the trade-union commission, appointed in November, 1920, completed and signed a compromise report. The signatories pointed out that the commencement of the new period of revolution found the trade-unions weak in regard to organization compared with the immensity of the problems which presented themselves on the economic front. The present attitude of the unions was not to be regarded as showing that they were in a critical situation, but only as a symptom of growth. The present situation demanded that the trade-unions should take a more direct part in the organization of production, not only by delegating to their members the duty of gradually transforming the trade-unions into economic organs, but through the action of trade-unions as such. Only on the basis of the initiative of the working masses could results be secured on the economic front. The most important rôle of the trade-unions was as a school for communism, and only those Russian unions formed a real communist school which were able gradually to imbue the various strata of workers with the consciousness of improving national industry. The trade-unions must serve every side of the daily working life and they must inculcate the ideas of the communist program, gradually leading the workers to communism. The speedy incorporation of trade-unions into the machinery of state would be a great political mistake, because at the present stage of evolution it would hinder the trade-unions from fulfilling the above-mentioned tasks and fail to draw nonparty organizations into the service of the soviet government or retain them as organizations into which workers of varying political and religious convictions might enter. The principal methods to be pursued by the trade-unions should be not those of compulsion but conviction. This would not eliminate the necessity of proletarian compulsion in certain cases, as, for example, mobilization on various fronts. With regard to the question of the relations of the Communist Party to the trade-unions the project states that the Russian Communist Party should, as before, direct the principles which are to govern the trade-unions. The tenth congress of the party is to take place in the spring of 1921, and it should categorically warn the economic organizations of the Republic against unnecessary paternalism and unnecessary interference with the current work of the trade-unions. The report realizes the necessity for retaining the principle of priority in procuring supplies for certain primary branches of industry and the desirability of a gradual but continuous improvement of conditions in various groups of workers and their unions, thereby strengthening the All-Russian soviet of trade-unions.

THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY TO BECOME AN EFFECTIVE PART OF THE TRADE-UNIONS' WORK.

239. Finally, the statement asserts that the organization of industry has not as yet become an effective part of the work of the unions, and it should be one of the principal tasks of the unions to bring this about. With regard to the fixing of the rates of pay it was possible to secure a more equal distribution of articles of consumption; at the same time money payment on a basis approaching equality should be retained as a means of discipline and of raising the productivity of labor. For this purpose it was necessary to establish a system of supply and distribution in accordance with the workers' supply organs of the trade-unions and in harmony with the practical work of the supreme council of people's economy. It is finally stated that it is of primary importance that the masses should become acquainted with the fundamental aim and purpose of a single economic plan and provide for the organization of a national bureau of efficiency propaganda by the All-Russian soviet of trade-unions supported by the Russian Communist Party. The reduction of the number of unions at present existing is contemplated in the scheme.

240. It is interesting to note the name of Tsiperovich among the signatories of the commission's report. It was Tsiperovich, president of the Petrograd trade-union soviet, of whom Trotski writes in his book "Terrorism and Communism" as being one of those trade unionists who distinguished himself as a military organizer in the Red army and who might be expected to perform more valuable service still on his return to his trade-union activities, enriched by the military experience he had gained. It would seem apparent that Trotski must have relied on the support of Tsiperovich and this has been denied him.

TRADE-UNION CAMPAIGN PRECEDES THE TENTH CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY.

241. A great campaign in connection with the trade-union question has developed throughout Russia since January, 1921, in preparation for the tenth congress of the Russian Communist Party which meets on the 6th of March and at which it is expected that a final solution of the trade-union crisis will be reached. The following information regarding the result of some of the debates which have already taken place is taken from the Russian Press Review for the 11th of February, 1921. This review is described as "a weekly journal to provide information regarding soviet Russia for the free use of editors and journalists." No indication is given as to where or by whom it is published. We are inclined to believe, however, that the Russian Press Review is published in Moscow under the auspices of the soviet government or of the Communist International:

(1) On the 3d of January a meeting of the local organizations of the Petrograd branch of the Russian Communist Party supported by an overwhelming majority the trade-union program of Lenin and Zinoviev. This resolution was later approved at a general meeting of all members of the Petrograd organization at which only 20 persons out of 4,000 present are said to have voted against it.

(2) The executive committee of the Moscow Communist Party seem at first to have taken up a position favorable to Trotski's proposals. A series of discussions took

place in the local Moscow organizations of the party, between the 1st and 19th of January, in the course of which the views of Lenin and Zinoviev gradually began to rise in favor and those of Trotski to suffer a corresponding decline. Finally, on the 19th of January, a meeting of the Moscow committee of the party, at which Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotski, Shlyapnikov, and Sapronov were present, resulted in 62 votes being recorded for the program of Lenin and Zinoviev and 18 for those of Trotski. Two days later a general meeting of all party groups (presumably of the Moscow district) gave four-fifths of their votes for the Lenin-Zinoviev program. On the 28th of January the communist section of the All-Russian central soviet of trade-unions cast 70 votes for the program of Lenin and Zinoviev, 23 for that of Trotski, and 21 for that of Shlyapnikov. The discussion on the trade-union controversy in the Moscow Government or Province is not yet completed, but it is stated that an overwhelming majority for Lenin and Zinoviev is anticipated.

(3) The All-Russian congress of the miners' trade-union. The program of the labor opposition led by Shlyapnikov received 61 votes as against 137 which are said to have been given for Lenin and Zinoviev.

(4) The All-Russian metal workers' trade-union. Eleven members of the committee voted for the labor opposition and 7 for Trotski.

(5) The Kharkov organization of the Communist Party voted in favor of Trotski.

(6) At a Communist Party meeting at Tula, on the 25th of January, 272 votes were cast for Trotski against 537 votes for the program of Lenin and Zinoviev.

(7) At a meeting of the Communist Party in the industrial area of Ivanovo-Voznesensk 900 votes were cast for Lenin and Zinoviev and 27 votes for Trotski.

(8) A provincial party conference at Tambov gave 47 votes for Lenin and Zinoviev and 29 for Trotski.

FORMATION OF A TROTSKI BLOCK.

242. As a result of making certain concessions, principally of a verbal character, Trotski has succeeded in forming a block numbering 18 persons. Besides Trotski himself the following are members of this group: Bukharin and Dzerzhinsky, representing the extreme left of the Russian Communist Party; Krestinsky, Pyatakov, Preobrazhensky, and Rakovsky, who incline toward the Left but not so strongly; and Serebryakov, Larin, Sokolnikov, Goltsman, Ivanov, Kassior, Kohn, Averin, and Kin. The resolution which this group has prepared to submit to the tenth congress of the Communist Party proposed that a commission should be immediately established composed of representatives of the All-Russian soviet of trade-unions on the one hand, and the supreme council of people's economy and the people's commissariats for agriculture, food, ways and communications, and labor on the other, for the purpose of determining what are to be the relations between the unions and the economic departments of the State, and of regrouping both the trade-unions and the economic departments of the State on a basis of the industrial experience hitherto derived. The resolution is obviously a verbal compromise, and it is sufficient only to mention in conclusion its most important point—the extension of the rights of the disciplinary courts and of their jurisdiction over the administrative staff—a point which has apparently enabled Trotski to retain the fundamental principle of his program at a cost of merely dispensing with the offensive words, "conscription" and "militarization of labor."

243. It is difficult to believe that Trotski has not received a powerful access of strength in the formation of this new group. Preobrazhensky, who was intimately associated with propaganda work in the army during the civil war and is now director of the organization established by the Communist Party to engage in active propaganda work among the soldiers being demobilized, is an impor-

tant figure in the party. Rakovsky, who has hitherto supported Lenin on most of the great questions of controversy which have arisen since the bolsheviks seized power, is president of the council of people's commissary of the Ukraine soviet government. Dzerzhinsky has attained notoriety as the president of the All-Russian extraordinary commission. Krestinsky, the people's commissary for finance and the inspirer of the campaign for the nationalization of the Centro-Soyuz or Central Union of Cooperative Societies, is a member of the political bureau of five and the central committee of the Communist Party. Pyatakov, the former sugar millionaire of Kiev and lately commanding the labor armies in the Ural; Sokolnikov, until recently the chief political commissary of the Red army in Turkestan, and Serebryakov, who was secretary of the central labor committee during 1920 and is an old party worker of many years' service, are figures of importance, and the first two exercise considerable influence in the ranks of the Red army. We are of opinion that there will be a great shock of forces when the tenth congress of the Communist Party meets on the 6th of March, by which time it is possible that the labor opposition and the democratic centralists, so hostile both to Trotzki on the one hand and Lenin on the other, will present a united front, and we are inclined to believe that their influence, both then and in succeeding months, will be far greater, although probably exercised for some time beneath the surface than would appear likely from the sparse accounts of their activities which have recently appeared in the soviet press.

In conclusion, we believe that the trade-union crisis in Russia can not be fairly appraised unless it be realized that the crisis itself, the schism in the Communist Party and the wave of nonparty feeling behind the labor opposition and the democratic centralists are part of a great psychological revolt which is now taking place in Russia. It is a revolt against—

- (1) The oppression which the military régime and the extraordinary commissions exercised during the civil war and still exercise, although less ruthlessly.
- (2) The all-embracing State control—a State control which has become more extensive as a result of the military régime.
- (3) The continued deterioration in an economic situation already desperate.
- (4) The stern though logical appeal made by Trotzki and others to the town population, exhausted by underfeeding, to redouble their efforts if this continued deterioration is to stop.

In our opinion this revolt will inevitably exert a decisive influence on the future of Russia, whether now or later will hereafter appear.

THE PEASANTS.

244. The peasants form from 80 to 85 per cent of the population of Russia, and they are the food producers of the country. The peasant question is therefore of paramount importance to any Russian Government, and we are convinced that the permanence of any political and social order in Russia must largely depend upon how it is solved.

THE INTELLECTUALS AND THE PEASANTS.

245. A wide gulf separates the intellectuals from the peasant. The former are, as a class, strong in theory, weak in practice, inconstant in purpose, lacking in decision and prone to lose the forest

in the trees. They are often extremely unconventional, even in regard to the well-established usages of society. The peasants, on the other hand, are three-fourths illiterate, narrowly practical and exhaustingly patient. They are a strange mixture of simplicity and shrewdness, and sometimes startlingly clear on the deep-rooted essentials of things. They live by custom, show, if only crudely, a strain of inborn equity, and are often peculiarly competent in the ordering of their simple village life.

RESULTS OF THE EMANCIPATION.

246. The act of emancipation of 1861 did not result in a uniform raising of the standard of life among the peasants. Some of the holdings which they received were fertile, while others were not. Some peasants were industrious and others lazy. In many cases, modern methods of agriculture would have enabled the peasant to derive a livelihood from less fertile plots which, under primitive conditions of agriculture, yielded insufficient for his needs. There was a tendency, therefore, for the peasants to become sharply divided up into those who were well-to-do and those who were very poor. Some, indeed, grew quite wealthy and acquired a considerable acreage of land. One of the primary objects of the land policy of the soviet government is to remove these inequalities of fortune as will be seen later. In the meantime we deal with the economic effects of the revolution.

ECONOMIC RESULTS OF THE REVOLUTION ON THE PEASANTS.

247. One of the results of the progressive economic decay which followed the revolution was an increasing scarcity of clothing, boots, salt, sugar, kerosene, and other articles of common use which the peasant was accustomed to get from the town. From an early period of the revolution, when prices began to rise, the peasants accumulated large stocks of paper money, which they received in exchange for the produce they sent to the town. As time went on, and the commodities they needed became scarcer and scarcer and finally almost unobtainable, the peasants began to cease sending their corn to the towns, where they could buy little or nothing with the money they received. Large stocks remained in the hands of the peasants, and the incentive to cultivate the normal acreage of land was weakened thereby. Starvation meanwhile fastened its hold upon the towns, and there began the gradual isolation of town from country. There has been information of this tendency from several sources, which our evidence confirms.

248. The imminence of starvation in the towns made it necessary for the soviet government to induce the peasants to give up their surplus supplies of grain. They were unable to make them do this voluntarily and had recourse to requisitions. These requisitions have occasioned repeated revolts, and punitive expeditions have been sent to quell them. The following examples illustrate the carrying out of this policy:

(a) *Moscow.*—The necessity of feeding the population of the capital has led to a more than usually severe application of the

policy of requisition in this district. There is evidence that the peasants round Moscow have in many cases not been allowed to retain sufficient food for the needs of themselves and their families. One of our witnesses told us that he had spoken to a peasant in Moscow last spring, whose daughter had died of starvation a week before.

The following extract from an article published in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* (Economic Life) for Saturday, the 31st of July, 1920, shows that the Moscow area is becoming unable to satisfy at one and the same time the demands of the city and of the industrial workers of the adjacent coal basin: "The serious food shortage has greatly interfered with the work of the basin. It has become so acute that the workers in certain districts could not even be supplied with the minimum hunger rations."

(b) *The Northwestern Provinces*.—The peasants of Smolensk, Tver, and Mogilev Provinces showed their independent spirit under the autocracy, and the soviet authorities have experienced great difficulty in requisitioning food from them for the purpose of provisioning the towns and the Red army on the Polish front. The peasants have frequently risen in revolt, more especially in the northwestern part of the Smolensk Province, which is covered with marsh and forest and therefore is difficult of access. While the soviet authorities have formed punitive expeditions, the peasants have organized marauding bands of Green Guards, which on one occasion attacked and entered the shire town of Poriechsky. The bolsheviks have ultimately refrained from adopting drastic measures in view of the turbulence of the peasantry and the proximity of the Polish front, which has led them to fear a general rising in the event of a defeat of the Red army at the hands of the Poles. This area is referred to again in paragraphs 255 and 259.

(c) *The Northeastern Provinces: Vyatka*.—Before the revolution nearly all the land in the Vyatka Province was in the hands of the peasantry, many of whom owned considerable tracts of territory. For this reason, and as being one of the largest corn-bearing Provinces, it was subject to frequent requisitions by the soviet authorities. A report of the food bureau of the Vyatka Province, published in the Soviet Journal *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* (Economic Life) for the 3d of February, 1920, is instructive: "The bureau states that it is essential to show clearly the exact position in the Province with regard to food. Last autumn, on the one hand, owing to the loss of territory sustained by Soviet Russia, and, on the other, owing to the setting up of a series of organizations in the various Provinces by the commissariat of food, an increasing flood of representatives of the starving population of other Provinces began to pour into Vyatka. It was possible to supply some of these during September and October with unrations products (principally vegetables), but this did not amount to much. But in December the shortage of supplies produced a crisis. More and more purchasers arrived daily in desperation to get hold of any produce there was. However, the possibility of fulfilling the orders with which the delegates were charged had already, by December, become a matter of chance, and later sank to zero. During the last few months the Vyatka Province has been unable to supply anything to the starving population. The representatives of other Provinces who arrive here in

search of food wander from place to place, spend the funds given them by those who send them and go away with nothing. Returning empty-handed they only incur the anger of their comrades who have sent them, but the fault is not theirs. The purchase of unrationed produce has now entered on a dead season, and the endeavors of the best food organizers are fruitless. The bureau of the food cooperative society of the Vyatka Province considered it to be its duty to report this."

THE LAND POLICY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

249. We now turn to consider the theories to which the soviet government seek to give practical effect in their agrarian policy. According to communist theory, the land is held to belong to the community as a whole and not to be the individual property of those who work it and among whom it is divided up for purposes of cultivation. In their attitude toward the relations of the peasant to the State, the communists contemplate in theory a contract which was outlined in general terms, as follows, by M. Krasin in the course of a conversation with a member of the committee:

(a) The peasant is called upon to deliver without monetary payment to the State the surplus products of his land, i. e., what remains after the needs of himself and his family are satisfied.

With a view, however, to removing the inequalities which exist among the peasants, it is arranged that the rich peasant is asked to give the whole of his surplus produce, while those with lesser substance are allowed to retain a percentage of their surplus, graduated according to their wealth. The poorest peasants are not required to make any contribution, but, in certain cases, the State itself contributes to their support.

(b) In return for this surplus, the Government proposes to supply the peasants with agricultural machinery and implements, articles of common necessity, the advice of agricultural experts, opportunities of technical and general education and of political and social development.

It is also the purpose of the Government to place at the service of the peasant facilities of rail and water transport, of postal and telegraphic communication, and the benefit of other public services.

250. The Government can not give effect to this program at the present time. M. Krasin, in conversation with a member of the committee, represented that the circumstances of war and exclusion from the outer world has made it impossible for the Government to regulate exchange between town and country by giving the peasants the commodities of which they stand in need. Russia is short of agricultural machinery and implements and of the small manufactured articles of common necessity, the former of which have been largely and the latter in a lesser degree imported from abroad. In this case, therefore, the blockade has been considerably felt. In practice, therefore, the Government have been compelled to requisition supplies and leave almost worthless paper money in return for what they requisition. So acute, indeed, has the problem of exchange become between town and village that the soviet authorities are proceeding to reproduce the 100 ruble and 500 ruble notes issued by the Czarist Government, owing to the refusal of the peasants voluntarily to give up their corn in exchange for soviet currency,

and to the fact that they are less reluctant to give up their produce in exchange for notes which they believe to have been issued by the old Government.¹ And, further, the promises of the soviet government to the peasants regarding facilities in rail and water transport can not be realized until the transportation system has been restored to something approaching its prewar level.

251. In the meantime, model farms have been established for the purpose of inculcating modern methods of cattle rearing, horse breeding, and agriculture. We have made careful inquiry as to the number and working of these farms, but our information is fragmentary. The farms appear to be few in number, and, although well organized, according to the testimony of the Hon. Bertrand Russell and other members of the British labor delegation, they only serve to throw into relief the low level to which agriculture has fallen as a result of the revolution.

252. By far the most impressive feature of the agricultural policy of the Government is the powerful campaign of propaganda which has been undertaken by the peasant department of the Russian Communist Party, under the direction of Nevsky. Kalinin, the president of the All-Russian central executive committee, who is himself a peasant, has been making a series of tours throughout the country districts. The object of these tours is to awaken among the peasants a consciousness of the solidarity of interest between them and the bolshevik government, and to explain the disabilities under which that government labors in trying to relieve the necessities of the agricultural population.

ATTITUDE OF THE PEASANTS TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT.

253. Our evidence shows that the attitude of the peasants to the soviet government is usually apathetic or hostile, and that what he desires most of all is to be left in peace to till his ground and to dispose of its produce as he likes. The measure of hostility, where hostility exists, is largely proportionate to the interference of the Government in their affairs, and it has not been possible for the requisitions and punitive detachments to cover more than a small part of the vast peasant territories, and that at irregular intervals. The permanent contact of the Government with the peasant is confined chiefly to the vicinity of towns and to the villages along or near the railways and waterways of the country. In such cases, a communist official and his staff will be found in residence, but it appears that his influence is largely restricted to his administrative duties and that he has little or no following among the inhabitants. Although there are signs that the peasant is gradually awakening to political consciousness as a result of the events of the last three years, he remains dominated first and foremost by his economic interests. Mr. Roden Buxton, who passed a few weeks among certain villages in the Saratov Province, said that many of the peasants complained of the shortage of agricultural implements and small articles of daily use. So far as his observation went they did not, except in one instance, manifest any open hostility toward the soviet government.

¹ This information has been received by the committee from Dr. Sokolov, a member of the Social Revolutionary Party, who left Petrograd in September, 1920. Dr. Sokolov obtained this information in August from the typographical workers in the soviet note producing factory, which is situated at No. 119 Fontanka, Petrograd. He had lectured to these workers before the war at a time when they were in the service of the imperial mint.

ATTITUDE TO DENIKIN AND KOLCHAK.

254. Under Denikin and Kolchak, as under the soviet government, the peasants were subject to requisition, and rose in periodical revolt, and their risings in the rear of both were a decisive factor in the overthrow of the White Russian forces. In the south they feared that Denikin would take the land away from them and restore it to its former owners, whereas the Bolsheviks left them to work their land while denying it to them as their private possession and regarding it as belonging to the community. The peasant proprietors of Siberia do not seem to have entertained any larger measure of confidence in the government of Kolchak. We are informed by M. Krasin and others whom we have interviewed that the peasants in the south are far more tolerant of the soviet government than those in other parts of Russia. This is explained by the fact that the policy of Denikin completely alienated the peasantry.

PRICES IN THE COUNTRY.

255. We are led by evidence from many sources to conclude that the great political and economic changes of the revolution have, as is usual in revolutions, caused the peasant far less suffering and dislocation of his life than is the case with other classes of the population. With few exceptions, they have had plenty of food. One witness, who had occasion to travel from Smolensk to Moscow three or four times a year during 1919-20, told us that the price of a pound of veal was 200 rubles in Moscow, 40 rubles in Smolensk, and only 7 rubles in the outlying village of Klimovich, not far from the border of the Smolensk and Tver Provinces, and the price of milk in the country about the same time was 30 rubles a bottle, and of a pound of butter 200 rubles. These prices refer to the spring of 1920. Near the town the peasants have often contrived to carry on a lucrative trade in barter at speculative values, and in some cases have bought with their hoarded rubles articles which were formerly only within the grasp of the rich. One of the witnesses records having seen a peasant give 110,000 rubles for a fur coat in the neighborhood of Moscow, while another witness speaks of 5,000 rubles as being the speculative price for a pood of flour in the same area. Such a figure will explain the accumulation of money by the peasants. That there has been a constant flow of the population of the towns to the country is the testimony of all our witnesses, and this has assumed such proportions as to contribute powerfully to the paralysis of industry.

INFLUENCES OF THE WAR AND REVOLUTION ON THE MENTALITY OF THE PEASANTS.

256. During the two and a half years preceding the revolution the peasants formed the majority of the Russian Army on its 700 mile front, suffered the majority of its casualties, and provided the greater part of the 2,000,000 prisoners of war who passed into the hands of the Central Powers. It is not without importance that most of these prisoners were employed in the fields and returned to Russia with a valuable knowledge of modern agricultural methods. Compared

with these influences, however, those of the revolution have been immeasurably the more powerful. The peasants took possession of the land. They formed the soviets throughout rural Russia. They were caught in the vortex of civil war in the south, in Siberia, in northern Russia, and the Provinces of Petrograd and Pskov, according to where their lands lay. They fought, some for the bolsheviks, some for the volunteer armies, and some for both, according as the tide of military events flowed backward and forward.

257. As economic chaos began to divide the country from the town, and more especially in cases where they lived in areas remote or difficult of access, they were left more and more to themselves. One of them said to a witness, "the punitive expeditions have been more to us than a university." Indeed, if civil war and internal chaos are powerful teachers, the whole of this confused period was a great university. The experience which it gave was, however, mostly negative—how not to do things—none the less, its effects may prove of permanent value, for, although unsuccessful political experiments are costly, they may point the way to sounder principles of government in the future.

258. There is evidence that a peasant party is forming, a party opposed to communism. In the past the peasant has not seen much farther than the confines of his village. There are signs now that he is looking farther afield. The following story gives an example of greater organising power and self-reliance.

259. A witness has told us that the peasants in a village not far from Smolensk found themselves cut off from the town and, under the necessity of making some provision for the carrying on of local life, they formed a society which came to embrace several villages. But, as in the past, they had become accustomed to obtain permission—papers and documents—from the Government representative, they wished to secure some form of sanction for their society from the Government of the day. They came into Smolensk and asked the soviet authorities if they might register their society and receive a certificate to that effect. The local bolsheviks seemed to have been astonished and frightened. They said: "You have formed a counterrevolutionary society; and you are working against the soviet government; we will have nothing to do with you." So the peasants returned to their village and went on with the work of organizing their society without troubling about the workers of the town. It grew and prospered. They have a cooperative society, and they did what they could to provide for education and other needs of the community, assisted by qualified workers who had come into the villages from the town. Some time after this Lunacharsky, the people's commissary for education, paid a visit to Smolensk. The peasants who had organized their society heard of his coming. Wishing, therefore, to obtain from the Government some recognition of the work they were doing, and hoping to obtain a more sympathetic hearing from one of the heads of the Government, than they had from the local authorities, they came to see Lunacharsky at Smolensk and laid the case before him. Lunacharsky, sincere and enthusiastic, appears to have been carried away with ecstasy when they told him what they had done. He declared that they had shown themselves to be in the vanguard of the Russian peasantry, and said that he would go back and tell Lenin and exhort him to come and see what

they had achieved, that it might be made widely known throughout Russia. Lunacharsky went his way and the peasants went back well pleased to the rural commune which they had brought into being, and continued, as they had begun, developing the life of their society within the measure of their opportunity and power. As far as we know, this society has not been interfered with.

SOME RESULTS OF THE SCARCITY OF COMMODITIES IN THE VILLAGES.

260. The peasants have shown considerable resource in adapting themselves to the difficult economic situation which arose in the villages, as it became more and more difficult to obtain commodities from the towns. In these circumstances, the "kustarny" or cottage industries became more widely developed and in new ways. For example, we are informed that the peasants in some villages have begun to improvise nails and axes, which they fashion as well as they can in a primitive manner. In the northwestern Provinces, the peasants have begun extensively to work up flax into coarse material which is being utilized for making garments, and it is said that primitive attempts at dyeing such materials have been made. The setting up of electric lighting stations in the villages has taken place in some cases where engineers have left the towns and gone to live in the villages.

261. We have not seen any official soviet statistics relating to the diminution in the area of land under wheat. With regard to flax, however, which has been referred to as a possible valuable export commodity, it is stated in *Economic Life* for September 24, No. 212, that the area under flax cultivation in 1913 was 1,056,974 desyatins, in 1918, 536,275 desyatins, and that in 1920 it was 40 per cent lower than in 1918.

AREA UNDER CULTIVATION OF CEREALS.

262. With regard to the area under the cultivation of oats, it is stated in *Economic Life*, October 14, No. 229, that in the Government of Tambov, the area during 1917 was 632,000 desyatins, in 1918 it had fallen to 450,000, in 1919 it was 469,000, and 1920 only 190,000, and 70 per cent less than in 1917.

263. According to recent information, stormy scenes took place at a conference of peasants of the Moscow Province, held in the Bolshoi (the Great Theater), Moscow, in October, 1920. It is said that Lenin addressed the congress, and that his speech was interrupted on several occasions, and that the attacks made by the members of the congress against the Government were so bitter, and that feeling rose so high, that the meeting broke up in disorder. If the conditions existing in the Moscow Province at the present time are similar to those reported on page 97 above, it is not remarkable that the Government should have been bitterly attacked.

264. It will therefore be seen that the peasant question becomes a vital and an immediate one. That the soviet government understand this is shown by the attention which the peasant question received at the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December, 1920. It may also be said that it dominated the congress. It is evident that the reestablishment of exchange of commodities between

town and country is an essential condition to the reestablishment of Russian industry.

265. Lenin said in his speech to the congress that the assistance of the peasants was ten times more necessary to Russia than it had been during the war. He admitted that Russia was still a country of small farmers, and that the peasants were not socialists. He thought, however, that the hardships of the last six years had done something to change the peasants' outlook, and that they understood that it was impossible for conditions to remain as they were. He informed the members of the congress that they must place under cultivation a larger area than hitherto during the coming spring, and there was no hope of their salvation unless that economic victory was attained. The members of the congress "must, therefore, go out into the country and tell the peasants that it was impossible to go on freezing and dying by starvation indefinitely." "If this continues," he said, "we shall be smashed in the next chapter of the war." He admitted that the soviet government had taken bread from the peasants in exchange for paper money, and declared that they should be compensated as soon as industry was restored. For that purpose a surplus of agricultural production was needed, and he estimated the annual quantity of produce necessary at 300,000,000 poods; 100,000,000, according to the figures quoted, more than was available in 1920. Without such a foundation the restoration of Russian industry was impossible, and it was absurd even to think of the revival of transport. He considered that this necessity justified the taking of compulsory measures with a view to inducing the peasant to increase the area of land in tillage.

The measures indicated in this speech formed the basis of the new agrarian law, the draft of which was published by the soviet government contrary to usual practice prior to the meeting of the All-Russian Congress, and, according to Lenin's speech, has been circulated throughout Russia in order to give an opportunity for its discussion among the provincial soviets. The soviet government, therefore, having been compelled to borrow from the peasants in the past, often by force, now propose to induce the peasant, by compulsory measures, to increase the area of land under cultivation. In this way they hope to place their peasant creditors in a position to make increased advances to them, advances which are essential to the feeding of the Russian worker and therefore to the reestablishment of Russian industry.

266. It is hard to see how compulsory measures can be successfully carried into effect among a peasant population of 100,000,000. The soviet government is entering upon a hopeless task if they seriously propose to use coercion. They probably look forward to a resumption of trade with other countries and to receiving agricultural machinery and manufactured goods with which to satisfy the needs of the peasants in some, at least, of the important corn-bearing areas. But in any case they will not be able to receive such consignments in any quantity until after the season's corn has been sown. We doubt the probability of considerable armed resistance on the part of the peasants to the agrarian law. There will be, no doubt, widespread passive resistance—a weapon in the use of which the peasant showed himself a past master during the old régime—but the time for the Russian peasant to play a decisive part in the

political history of Russia has scarcely come. If and when it comes it will inevitably take the form of a great revolt against centralization. In so far as the bolsheviks continue to develop in Russia a policy of extreme centralization, in so far as in the words of Trotski, "the dictatorship of the proletariat, the form of the most merciless State imperatively grasping the lives of its citizens on every side" continues, so much the sooner will the revolt come, proceeding from the psychological forces in human nature which bolshevik determinist thought ignores.

267. There is a story told by one who had occasion to study the Russian peasant for many years of how he spoke to an old bearded peasant member of the first Duma in 1906. He asked the old peasant which party he thought would win. The old man replied, "Every party has its secret. The party which succeeds in keeping its secret longest will win, and the party in Russia which will keep its secret longest will be the peasants."

268. The peasant is the enigma and may prove to be the decisive factor in whatever may be the outcome of the Russian revolution.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TOWARD OTHER COUNTRIES.

269. Foreign policy may be said to fall within the scope of this inquiry only in so far as it affects political and economic developments in Russia.

270. The attitude of the soviet government to other countries is quite definite. The soviet government is directed by those who, before the war, were leaders of the bolshevik section of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. They made it their purpose to overthrow the autocracy and capitalism in Russia. They were, and remain, internationalists, for whom the world is divided up not into nations but into classes of oppressors and oppressed. Now, as then, they look forward to a world revolution which will overthrow capitalism in all countries. The outbreak of the European War in August, 1914, and the prolonged and widespread destruction which accompanied it encouraged them to believe that the suffering, exhaustion, and economic disorganization caused by the war might precipitate the revolution which they hoped for. These hopes were justified in Russia, where the autocracy fell as a result of the revolution of February, 1917. That revolution the bolsheviks did not make, but both the first revolution and the revolution by which the bolsheviks themselves rose to power in October, 1917, heightened their hopes that a world revolution was about to take place. The outbreak of the revolutions in Germany and Austria-Hungary inspired in them the belief that revolutions would shortly take place in Great Britain and France.

THE CIVIL WAR AND INTERVENTION.

271. The bolsheviks regarded soviet Russia as the leader in a great struggle for the final overthrow of capitalism. When the intervention of the Allies in northern Russia was continued after the German danger, which evoked it, had disappeared, and allied military assistance was given to the armies of Deniken and Kolchak in the civil

war, the soviet government began to look upon itself as the defender of the world revolution against the attacks of capitalist countries, which attacks they regarded as unprovoked.

272. With regard to the effects of intervention, the abundant and almost unanimous testimony of our witnesses shows that the military intervention of the Allies in Russia assisted to give strength and cohesion to the soviet government, and by so doing achieved exactly the opposite of what it was intended to effect.

NONBOLSHEVIK VIEWS ON INTERVENTION.

273. We are informed that the military intervention of the Allies in Russia was always regarded with misgivings by the majority of nonbolshevik Russian socialists, notwithstanding the fact that a bitter persecution was directed against the latter by the soviet government. Later, when, following the military success of the anti-bolshevik forces, the White leaders showed themselves unable to organize a democratic administration, their rule was undermined and finally overthrown by the very population which had welcomed them as deliverers from the bolsheviks. Owing to these events the soviet government rallied to itself large numbers of other classes. This event was accompanied by another change in the attitude of Russia toward the allied countries. There is evidence to show that up to the time of military intervention the majority of the Russian intellectuals were well disposed toward the Allies, and more especially to Great Britain, but that later the attitude of the Russian people toward the Allies became characterized by indifference, distrust, and antipathy.

THE THIRD OR COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL.

274. In March, 1919, the Third or Communist International was established at Moscow. The object of this organization is to advocate international revolution on communist lines and everywhere actively to encourage, support, and participate in movements directed to the overthrow of existing political and economic institutions in other countries.

275. In the decision of the majority of the Independent Socialist Party in Germany and of the majority of the French Socialist Party to join it, the Communist International has already achieved successes and in Italy, although less successful at the recent socialist congress, they have secured a considerable number of adherents.

276. It has been contended, more especially in a note, dated February 5, 1921, addressed by the soviet government to His Majesty's Government, that there is nothing in common between the Communist International and the soviet government. The course of our inquiry has shown that—

(a) The aims of the Communist International were held by the bolshevik section of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party before the war.

(b) The Communist International was founded by prominent members of the central committee of the bolshevik or Communist Party in Russia to-day.

(c) Zinoviev, the president of the Communist International, is a member of the political bureau of the central committee of the Rus-

sian Communist Party, which has hitherto directed the policy of the soviet government.

(d) According to a witness who was present at the Baku Muhammadan Congress of Eastern Peoples, organized by the Communist International in August, 1920, elaborate preparations are being made under the direction of Stasova, a female member of the central committee of the Russian Communist Party and an active associate of the Communist International, to organize a literary propaganda, to be published in several eastern languages, with a view to encouraging sedition in India and the overthrow of British rule in that country.

(e) Jan Berzin, a Lett, who was appointed the diplomatic representative of the soviet government in Helsingfors, in January, 1921, was secretary of the Communist International during 1919-20.

277. We have also noted that the soviet government have not advanced any proof of the statement which they have made that there is no connection between the Communist International and the soviet government. While bearing in mind that the Second Socialist International was maintained by the subscriptions of its members, we have been unable to ascertain whence are derived the extensive funds upon which the Communist International carries on its work. It is not clear to us whether or no the Communist International is a body distinct from the soviet government, and therefore a private organization, nor if so, how, in a country where all supplies are nominally collected and distributed by the State, the Communist International is able to obtain office accommodation, supplies of paper and printing materials, of food for its staff and of money for paying the wages of the staff and for defraying the general expenses of their activities. In these circumstances we do not feel any confidence in the repudiation by the soviet government of any connection with the Third or Communist International.

OTHER ASPECTS OF RUSSIAN LIFE.

278. There are other aspects of Russian life which impinge upon the scope of a report upon political and economic conditions in Russia. With regard to some of these aspects, notably, education, religion and law and justice, we have received both oral and documentary evidence. The information we have obtained is, however, far from complete, and we do not therefore feel justified in attempting to treat them in detail, and confine ourselves to the following brief observations upon them.

1. EDUCATION.

279. The evidence shows that:

(a) A grave undermining of discipline in the schools took place during the early months of the bolshevik revolution, and that discipline has not yet been restored.

(b) The attendance at school is irregular, and this is due partly to discipline and partly to illness and other causes.¹

(c) Owing to debility caused by malnutrition, the pupils are unable to derive adequate benefit from the instruction given.

¹ A pathetic case was reported to us of two children who regularly attended school on alternate days. The reason of this was that there was only one pair of boots between the two children.

(d) Stocks of books, slates, pencils, and other necessary material have become exhausted and the lack of them is greatly felt.

(e) With regard to adult education, great efforts have been made to teach illiterates to read and write, and with some success, especially in the case of soldiers serving in the Red army.

(f) Young children are treated with the utmost humanity, and the best provision possible in existing circumstances is made for their comfort.

(g) Child education in soviet Russia is based upon an attempt to dissolve the ties hitherto existing between parent and child, and children are removed from the care of their parents soon after birth; we have received no information on the moral and physical effects of this policy.

(h) Education, both child and adult, is not merely secular, but directly antoreligious in bias.

(i) Having regard to the effort of the soviet government to develop education on a national scale never attempted previously, the staff of teachers is quite inadequate.

(j) The existing staff of teachers was actually depleted, partly owing to the oppression directed by the bolsheviks against those whom they regarded as belonging to the bourgeoisie; but the deficiency of teachers thus created has been partly made good owing to the improved rations recently accorded to members of the teaching profession.

280. We derive from the evidence submitted to us with regard to education the impression that (1) there is no question as to the enthusiasm and sincerity shown by the soviet government in the cause of education, and that (2) this enthusiasm and sincerity in combating ignorance is directed primarily not to assist the free expression of ideas and thus to promote intellectual progress, but to develop the human mind as a machine for the reception and exposition of the soviet government's conception of communism.

2. RELIGION.

281. At the end of October, 1917, church lands and live stock and appurtenances belonging to the church were confiscated and nationalized. By a decree dated the 28th of December, 1918, the separation of church and state was formally made and "all properties of the existing church and of religious societies * * * only declared national property." On the one hand, the attitude of the church was at first marked by active agitation against the new government, and the patriarch of Moscow published a hostile encyclical, which was, by his orders, read in the churches during the winter months of 1918-19. On the other hand, the carrying out of the policy of confiscation under government desirous of eradicating religious belief and regarding religion as an institution used in support of capitalism was undoubtedly attended by wanton destruction and desecration and by active persecution of the priesthood. Many priests were shot on the charge of conspiring against the government and the clergy were also made liable to conscription to the Red army and also to compulsory labor. Many were actually called upon to perform the lowest and most menial work and were deprived of their food cards if they faltered in the discharge of the unaccustomed tasks imposed upon

them. We are informed that anger and hostility was aroused among the people by the desecration of sacred relics and the persecution of the clergy, and that this has had the effect of making the people draw nearer to the clergy and has, in the countryside, sometimes resulted in the peasants voluntarily restoring to the church land which they had seized from it.

282. The active agitation on the part of the church against the soviet government led to an increase of persecution directed against the priesthood. Both sides seem to have grown weary of the conflict during 1919 and a sort of tacit truce appears to have grown up. The hostile encyclical was withdrawn and the church has since confined herself to religious and moral teaching. Cinema shows, organized by the government and representing the desecration of sacred relics, have had to be withdrawn owing to outbursts of popular indignation. It is said that the general attendance at church has recently become larger than at any previous time, and that the general effect of the widespread misery prevailing has been to increase rather than decrease the religious fervor of the people. At the present time the soviet government has discontinued the policy of active persecution and insult to religion, and religious services are allowed to take place as long as the pulpit is not used for the purpose of antibolshevik propaganda. The freedom of religious observance guaranteed by these decrees of the 28th December is, as far as we have been able to discover, generally allowed at the present time.

3. LAW AND JUSTICE.

283. Turning to the question of law and justice, we have decided after careful consideration that no useful purpose would be served by setting out the substance of the decrees abolishing the old courts and setting up a new system of judicial and revolutionary tribunals. No information of any value has reached us as to how the new tribunals are actually working, except in a few isolated cases such as the trials of Countess Panin and Mr. Keeling referred to in our interim report. We have, indeed, no clear idea of what are the legal relations of Russian citizens among themselves either as regards personal property or conduct, nor have we seen any indication as to whether the individual can enforce against the government in the law courts a claim for food and wages to which he appears to be legally entitled. The rights of life, liberty, and property have been profoundly changed by the nationalization and confiscation of the means of production; the sale and purchase of commodities has become a crime, and many cases are reported by the extraordinary commission in their bulletins in which this crime has been punished by death; and new decrees directed to the dissolution or profound modification of what were formerly considered natural ties, and to the disruption of home life, have been issued.

284. It is not easy to grasp the social meaning of these changes, and the information at our disposal is so imperfect and fragmentary that we feel unable to form any judgment as to how far there exist just laws in Russia at the present time and how far the existing laws are administered without fear and partiality among all classes of the population.

ECONOMIC SECTION.

A SKETCH OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN RUSSIA, 1914-1919.

THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS IN RUSSIA OF THE EUROPEAN WAR.

285. The inability of the economic organization of the Russian Empire to support the burden of external war has been referred to in the political section, paragraph 37, and its political effects recorded. To pass shortly in review the economic aspects of this failure is an essential antecedent to an understanding of the economic situation in Russia to-day.

286. In the course of the period, 1914-1917, three factors emerged which contributed in varying degrees, to create a partial economic breakdown which precipitated the revolutionary outbreak of February, 1917. There were: (1) The mobilization of the army. (2) The deterioration of transport. (3) The dislocation of industry.

STRAIN OF THE WAR ON RAILWAYS.

287. The first of these factors necessarily exerted a considerable influence upon the other two. The railway system in Russia has never been proportionate to the extent of the territory of the empire, and its equipment has never been sufficient for the needs of the traffic. It was often impossible to relieve famine in one government by transporting to the distressed areas surplus stocks of grain in others. The mobilization of the army and the diversion of a considerable part of the transport material to military purposes did not immediately affect the ordinary transport services. In 1915, however, the results of mobilization became more apparent as the scope of operations widened. The increasing demands of the army were satisfied without regard to the importance of retaining the services of the highly trained administrative staff and skilled railway workers. The results of this are seen in the failure of railway administration to effect economies in running which the exigencies of the military situation necessitated and in the difficulty of keeping pace with repairs. The defeats in the field and the occupation of broad territories by the enemy occasioned a considerable loss in locomotives and rolling stock which had to be replaced at the cost of diminishing the home services. In January, 1916, the number of locomotives in running order was 16,000, showing a considerable falling off on the number available for service at the outbreak of war. Although by great endeavors the number was advanced to 16,800 by the autumn of that year, the demand far outran the supply as each succeeding month went by. From this time onward the decline in transport efficiency became progressive.

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF RUSSIA INADEQUATE TO MEET THE DEMANDS OF THE ARMY—INDUSTRY DISORGANIZED BY ERRORS IN MOBILIZATION.

288. Although Russia possessed a certain number of factories supplied with the most modern plant and machinery, industry was far less highly developed there as a whole than in the other great countries of Europe. The industrial organization working on or

capable of being adapted to war purposes was quite inadequate without outside help to meet the demands of armies operating on a front of 700 miles over a period of years. The incompetence and corruption in the government disclosed in the course of the war was revealed more especially in its industrial administration. The efficiency of the industrial fabric was further impaired by the disorganizing influence of the irrational system of mobilization whereby hundreds of thousands of men were taken indiscriminately from industry and drafted into the army, although accommodation for them was insufficient and it was in many cases impossible to provide them with the equipment necessary for their training.

IMPAIRED TRANSPORT CAUSED FOOD SHORTAGE IN PETROGRAD AND MOSCOW.

289. Toward the end of 1916 it became evident that the transport system was no longer able to maintain at one and the same time the distribution of food supplies to the armies and the civil population. In January and February, 1917, the food crisis in Petrograd and Moscow became acute, and long bread queues were to be seen daily in both cities. It was the bread riots of the Petrograd workmen which formed the prelude to the revolution of February, 1917.

FALL IN PRODUCTION ONLY PARTIAL UP TO FEBRUARY, 1917.

290. Up to the time of the first revolution, however, the food shortage, the fall in production, and the general disturbance of life caused by war conditions were greater than, but still comparable to, the conditions existing in other belligerent countries. Houses were still warmed through the rigorous Russian winter, and the fuel supplies sufficed to keep practically all the factories at work. The food shortage in January and February, 1917, to which we have alluded was far removed from starvation, the price of bread had indeed doubled during the few months immediately preceding the revolution, but it compared not unfavorably with the price in other countries. The shortage of production in the factories and the deterioration in transport had not assumed catastrophic proportions. The general life of the people went on, to all appearance, largely as before.

SOVIETS ESTABLISHED IN INDUSTRY, FEBRUARY, 1917.

291. The most important result of the first revolution from the point of view of its effects upon the economic organization of Russia was the almost universal establishment of soviets or committees in industry. The soviets sprang up spontaneously in the towns and in the countryside all over Russia. In the first months of the revolution the Petrograd Soviet found itself in the position of a central organization to which the representatives of soviets from all parts of Russia turned for counsel. It was the only body which might have exercised control over the soviets and have introduced some semblance of order into the great number of revolutionary committees. But it would in any case have been a task almost impossible of accomplishment, and any possibility there

might have been of the Petrograd Soviet controlling the soviet movement, and giving order and cohesion to it, was destroyed in virtue of the complete chaos which prevailed in the Petrograd Soviet itself.

UNDEFINED POWERS OF FACTORY SOVIETS.

292. The powers and competence of the soviets remained indefinite. It was not known whether the soviets which were set up in the factories were organizations for regulating the conditions and hours of labor or whether they had political functions as well. In point of fact the factory soviets arrogated to themselves unlimited functions, both economic and political, and the factories became in the majority of cases political battlefields upon which the class war was carried on.

ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY UNDERMINED.

293. In these circumstances it is evident that the organization of industry as it had existed in Russia up to this time was shaken to its foundation. A rapid fall of production began.

THE REVOLUTION AND THE PEASANTS.

294. From the first days of the revolution the peasants began to seize the estates of the landowners, and were later encouraged in their action by the bolshevik propagandists who made their way into the villages during the summer of 1917. This occasioned a fall in the supply of agricultural produce and a diminution in the area of land under cultivation.

DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMY—DETERIORATION OF TRANSPORT.

295. The results of the revolution in the army were to destroy what remnant of discipline had survived the demoralizing effects of enormous losses sustained against the enemy and of the general disorganization which prevailed both at the front and the rear of the army. A continuous stream of deserters began to flow from the front. The trains all over Russia were overcrowded with them and transport became further dislocated in consequence. As the summer of 1917 wore on the inability of the railways to convey existing supplies of grain from the villages to the towns was clearly demonstrated.

EFFECT OF THE REVOLUTION ON THE COST OF LIVING.

296. The general economic effect of these disruptive influences upon the life of the people was that by the time of the revolution of October, 1917, the cost of living was five times as high as it was in 1916.

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE POLICY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

297. The members of the soviet government, which was formed after the revolution of October, 1917, were placed at a greater disadvantage than their predecessors in power as regards knowledge and

experience of government. The effect of this handicap was made more apparent by their precipitate action in carrying out a drastic policy of confiscation and nationalization. It was further enhanced by the fact that they were deserted by practically all the former "governing" classes.

SOCIALIZATION OF LAND AND CERTAIN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES.

298. The "socialization" of land was promulgated by decree on the 26th of October, 1917. "Confiscation" of certain private enterprises for definite quasi-punitive reasons took place in December of 1917 and January of 1918. "Sequestration" of the Mining and Metallurgical Union (a capitalist company), for definite reasons purporting to be of a judicial nature, was ordered on the 16th of February, 1918. From January to May, 1918, nationalization of specific business enterprises was decreed from time to time, and general nationalization, with certain exceptions, was prescribed in June of the same year.

FACTORIES UNDER THE NEW RÉGIME.

299. In the factories the "collegiate" system was introduced with a view to coordinating and controlling the factory soviets, which had hitherto exercised unlimited authority. The members of these collegia were not infrequently chosen from the least instructed industrially and the most violent politically. They were responsible for the administration of the factories.

LACK OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION AND ABILITY.

300. It is evident that the soviet government, owing to the conditions of chaos existing on their advent to power and to their lack of administrative experience, were not in a position to organize quickly the supply of raw materials, fuel, and other necessities of manufacture essential to the maintenance and raising of production. In these circumstances it would have been difficult for them even to arrest the process of economic disintegration. The drastic carrying out of their program of the nationalization of all the means of production only served to accelerate it.

FOOD SHORTAGE IN THE TOWNS.

301. Reference has already been made to the shortage of food in the towns before the October revolution. The bolsheviks established a people's commissariat for food, to which in theory all provision shops were subordinated and by which all supplies were controlled. Government shops were opened at which people might purchase commodities, and thus supplement the Government rations which were issued in accordance with the plans of the commissariat of food. In practice, however, it was almost impossible to obtain anything at these shops. The general results of the food policy of the soviet government were that nobody except highly placed soviet officials, the Red army, and the children had enough food to enable them to live in comfort and health. Many literally starved. At the same time it

became a penal offense, according to the soviet law, to purchase food in the open market. As, however, the ration, when available was insufficient to support life, and the supplies of food in Government shops were generally bespoken for favored individuals,¹ no choice remained to the ordinary citizen between starvation and breaking the law. M. Farbman,² in an article in the Manchester Guardian, of the 7th of January, 1921, states that the bolshevik administration only provided 15 per cent of the food consumed in the first 18 months of rationing. Organized speculation thus arose and ultimately overcame all attempts of the soviet authorities to suppress it.

REMOVAL OF INCENTIVE TO PRODUCTION.

302. Many of our witnesses have described the effect of these changes both in their psychologic and economic bearings. The incentive to production which had been present under the old conditions of private enterprise disappeared. The property of bourgeois owners was confiscated, and managers, foremen, and experts who were allowed and willing to remain at work had no object in making their work a financial success, except in the rare cases in which they were class-conscious Communists. The town artisan was paid partly in kind and partly in paper money, a wage upon which it was impossible for him to live, and appears to have received the wage during the early period of bolshevik rule whether there was any work for him to do or none, and conditions of life became such that large numbers of artisans and workers returned to the villages with which many of them, according to Russian habit, had never lost touch.

THE SOVIET POLICY IN AGRICULTURE.

303. While making it their object to dispossess the landowners, the soviet government did not sanction the division of the landed estates among the peasants as their private property, but regarded the land in general as being the common property of the whole people and the State as having the right to deprive of his land the peasant who showed himself a bad worker. In theory they proposed to institute a system whereby the peasant gives to the government a certain percentage of his surplus stock, graduated according to his standard of prosperity. It was hoped thereby to remove those inequalities of fortune which had led to the formation of a class of wealthy peasants and of a class of poor peasants, who were either landless or whose land was so small in area or lacking in fertility as to reduce them to a starvation level of living. In return for these supplies the Government proposed to provide the peasants with agricultural machines, implements, and articles of common necessity which they needed. Stocks of these articles were in a depleted state at the time of the October revolution, and they continued to decrease until they are

¹ A report of the bureau for receiving complaints, attached to the Moscow extraordinary commission, dated October, 1920, is interesting in this connection. The following is a quotation and refers to a revision of the soviet offices in the town of Podolsk: "The members of the Ispolkom (executive committee) and the employees are the first to be supplied with furniture and the available flats and houses are placed at their disposal, but the needs of the workmen are ignored. All the members of the Ispolkom receive an extra ration. Many complaints are received from the families of the Red soldiers, as they do not receive—often for months—the pensions allowed to them."

² M. Farbman, a Russian subject, went to soviet Russia in 1920 as the representative of the Manchester Guardian.

now almost exhausted. It became, therefore, increasingly difficult for the Government to carry out their own part of the contract with the peasants by which they hoped to strengthen weakening links in the chain uniting town and country. M. Farbman states that the bolsheviks collected at the nationalized factories and workshops goods to the value of 1,000 million rubles for exchange with the peasants, but that the exchange never took place. The factory committees refused in many cases to part with the goods, and the railway committees appropriated most of what was allowed to go. The small quantities that reached the provincial food committees and the peasants were often sold to speculators. In actual practice the exigencies of the economic situation in the towns led the soviet government to requisition supplies from the peasantry, who were unwilling to sell their produce in exchange for paper money, which was rapidly depreciating in value in the towns owing to its unlimited issue and to the exhaustion of stocks of commodities. Attempts at requisition led to the armed conflicts between the authorities and the peasants, and were often followed by punitive expeditions into the villages. The soviet government at first encouraged the establishment of committees of the village poor in the country districts, and the dictatorship of these committees over the more prosperous peasants affords a parallel to the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie in the towns. The movement was short lived, for the peasants felt that its ultimate effect would tell against the interests of the peasants as a whole, and the villages became solidly united against the requisitioning designs of the bolsheviks. The dictatorship of committees of the village poor proved abortive as an instrument of the class struggle in the countryside. Trotski writes in "Terrorism and Communism" that the class struggle deals heavy blows at industry. In this case it has dealt serious blows at agricultural production at a time when the workers were beginning to go hungry in the towns.

CONCLUSIONS, DECLINE OF PRODUCTION, 1914-1919.

304. The conclusions to which this introductory survey points are—

- (1) That production, stimulated in certain branches of industry and depressed in others during the war, began perceptibly to fall after the revolution of February, 1917, and continued to do so up to the time of the bolshevik revolution in October, 1917.
- (2) That from October, 1917, to the end of 1919, the period immediately preceding the time to which we have endeavored to give particular attention in the course of the following pages, the fall in production was swift and catastrophic.
- (a) The stocks of manufactured goods in the towns became so low as to react unfavorably upon the exchange of commodities between town and country.
- (b) The peasant was no longer able to obtain for the paper money he received for his produce articles of common use of which he stood in need, and ceased to bring his goods to town.
- (3) That, having due regard to the causes of economic disorganization, antecedent to the rise of the bolsheviks to power, the attempts of the bolsheviks to realize the class war in the towns by a precipitate nationalization of industry and in the villages by the establishment of the dictatorship of the village poor were the principal contributory causes of the gradual separation of town from country.

NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY.

RYKOV'S REPORT ON NATIONALIZATION.

305. In the course of a report delivered to the Moscow congress by the supreme council of people's economy in January, 1920, A. I. Rykov, the president of the council, made the following statement:

The nationalization of industry has been carried out pretty fully. In 1918, 1,125 factories and works were nationalized, and by the end of 1919 the number was about 4,000. This means that nearly all industry had passed into the hands of the State (soviet) organs, while private industry has been destroyed, as former statistics show that there were up to 10,000 industrial undertakings, including cottage industries. These latter are not subject to nationalization, and the 4,000 nationalized factories and works include not only the larger concerns but likewise the bulk of the average industrial concerns of soviet Russia.

Of these 4,000 undertakings about 2,000 are working at present. All the rest have been closed. The number of operatives is estimated approximately at 1,000,000, which is between one-third and one-fifth of the numbers of the proletariat in 1914. Both as regards the number of hands and the number of undertakings in operation the Russian manufacturing industry is likewise undergoing a crisis.

306. We have obtained from witnesses information, both documentary and verbal, regarding nationalized industries in textiles, electro-technical, soap and oil, rubber, leather, locomotives, paper, and sugar.

(A) COTTON TEXTILES.

307. *Cotton spindles.*—The following table of the number of cotton spindles throughout Russia working during the first six months of 1920 appeared in No. 218 of the paper "Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn" (Economic Life) for the 1st of October. Economic Life is the official publication of the Supreme Council of People's Economy in Moscow:

1920:	Spindles.
January	1 526,351
February	513,101
March	1 489,769
April	1 380,449
May	265,910
June	262,129

Before the war the total number of cotton spindles throughout Russia was 9,220,000. The number of cotton spindles in soviet Russia to-day may be estimated at 7,500,000 spindles.

308. *Cotton yarn and cloth.*—According to Economic Life for the 1st of October, No. 218, the output in cotton yarn for the first half of the year 1920 was 207,000 poods as against 10,500,000 poods for the first half of 1914.

During the first half year of 1920 the number of looms working was as follows:

1920:	Looms.
January	20,000
February	15,920
March	24,200
April	15,400
May	11,700
June	5,900

¹ The figures for those months given in Economic Life of the 27th of June, 1920, No. 136, are as follows:

1920:	Spindles.
January	408,487
March	541,420
April	319,055

The number of power looms in Russia in 1910 was 213,179 (Russian Year Book, 1916, p. 144). The total number of looms in Russia at the present time may be estimated at approximately 170,000. In 1919, 1,103,870 poods of yarn were worked and 250,371,000 arzhens of coarse cloth were manufactured. This is at the rate of 20,864,250 arzhens per month for 1919. The output in January and February, 1920, was 9,431,000 arzhens and 10,550,000 respectively. So far as we can discover, the last figure represents about 2 per cent of the normal production before the war.

309. *Witnesses on cotton factories.*—The following statements were made by our witnesses regarding the production of the textile factories with which they were associated:

1. BALASHINSKY.

Mr. R. Lunn, a mill manager, whose firm did the cotton spinning for the Balashinsky Manufacturing Co., informed us that of 190,000 spindles they had only 12,000 spindles working in March, 1920. The concern was nationalized in November, 1918.

2. KONSHIN.

Mr. J. Parkinson, chief engineer to the firm of N. N. Konshin, at Serpukhov, informed us that in March, 1920, the weaving mills and dye works were shut down, but that at the time he left they were able to keep about one-quarter of the spinning machinery running and produce about one-eighth of their original production.

3. MOROZOV.

Mr. J. E. Charnock, the inside manager of Vikul Morozov, at Orekhovo Zuevo, stated that the works, which had about 150,000 spinning spindles and 22,000 doubling spindles, were nationalized in 1918, and entirely closed down by February, 1919. At the Savva Morozov's works they had 5 preparations working out of 31.

4. VYSOKOVSKY.

Mr. Herbert Fullard, the manager of the Vysokovsky mills, containing 63,000 spinning spindles, 3,500 doubling spindles, and 2,040 looms, stated that when he left in March, 1920, there were 26,000 spindles and 900 looms still working. They went over to one shift about April, 1919, when their production was about 20 per cent of the normal production.

5. HUBBARD'S PRINTING MILLS.

Mr. William Hill, the manager of Messrs. Hubbard's cotton and printing mills near Petrograd, stated that they were working up to March 8, 1919, when they shut down, as they had no fuel. They were nationalized after they had stopped producing and never got going again.

6. MOROZOV'S TVERSKAYA.

Mr. J. J. Wild, textile manager of Morozov Tverskaya factory of about 175,000 spindles and 5,000 looms, stated that when he left in the early part of 1920 they were "doing their best to get 50,000 spindles going."

7. EGORIEVSK.

Mr. Ralph Wright, textile manager of mills at Egorievsk, informed us that their mill was stopped completely about August, 1919.

8. ZUNDEL'S PRINT WORKS.

Mr. Joshua Grundy, head mechanic at Emil Zundel's, the largest print works in Russia, informed us that they stopped work in March, 1919.

310. *Number of cotton mills working and idle.*—In Economic Life, dated October 9, 1920, it is stated that 64 cotton mills were running, employing 86,068 workpeople, and that 131 mills were standing, at which 69,425 people were employed, although the mills were idle. No indication of production at the mills running is given in the article.

(B) WOOLEN TEXTILES.

311. According to Economic Life, No. 236, dated October 22, 1920, Russia used to import before the war 3,000,000 poods per annum of foreign wool. The outbreak of war led to a cessation of import of wool, but we learn from the Russian Year Book of 1916 that, "thanks to measures taken in due time for ascertaining the available stocks of wool and its distribution amongst the factories working for the Government, a wool famine was averted." On January 1, 1915, 4 per cent of the woolen mills had stopped, 27 per cent had reduced their production, and 7 per cent had increased their output. Through 1915 the factories running continued to work at high pressure. (Russian Year Book for 1916.)

312. *Woolen factories in 1920.*—Economic Life of June 24, 1920, No. 136, states that there were in 1920, 111 nationalized factories, and that only the small ones had not been nationalized. The number of workmen was 43,472, and of other employees 4,230. The mills "which ought to be working" possessed about 60 per cent of the spindles and 42.5 per cent of the looms in existence, and 26.8 per cent of the dyeing vats.

A later issue of Economic Life, dated October 9, 1920, gives the number of woolen mills running as 80 and of those idle as 34.

Thornton Mills.—Mr. Sidney Mackie, who left Russia in March, 1920, and was formerly English correspondent of the Thornton Woolen Mills Co., of Petrograd, where 4,000 to 5,000 operatives were employed, said that there were very large stocks in hand at that time. When the mill was nationalized in December, 1918, very little was being produced. The sales were almost entirely made out of stocks, and they consisted mainly of black cloth for the navy and khaki for the army.

In Economic Life, No. 226 (Oct. 10, 1920), it is stated that "the systematic and long-continued depletion of stock (of wool) makes it difficult to supply the mills, as they can not get the assortment they require."

313. *Decline in wool growing.*—The difficulties referred to in the preceding paragraph appear to arise from the universal decline throughout Russia of wool growing. In Economic Life, No. 236, dated October 22, 1920, it is stated: "Wool growing turned out to be the weakest spot in national economy, and to be the industry most severely affected by the results of the economic decay. * * * Just now the position has become almost critical." The wool requirements of the industry are stated to be 1,670,000 poods, and the allocation by the people's production committee for the year 1920-21 to have been only 1,240,000 poods. A deficit is thus shown of nearly half a million poods, even if the collections of wool prove entirely successful. The same paper states that a conference on wool growing had been summoned, that numerous invitations had been sent out, that in many cases these invitations failed to elicit a reply, and, finally, that

the Don Soviet of People's Economy, situated in the very center of the wool-growing region of the Republic, replied that it had no information on the position of local wool growing.

(c) LINEN FACTORIES.

314. Out of 85 factories working flax, 48 were running, according to Economic Life of October 9, 1920. The number of workpeople employed in the running factories appears to have been between 48,000 and 50,000 at that time. We have been unable to obtain particulars of production.

(d) HEMP FACTORIES.

315. Economic Life of October 9, 1920, No. 225, states that there were 18 hemp factories running, and that on July 1, 15 of them employed 4,667 workpeople. The numbers normally required at these factories were 9,617.

(e) SILK.

316. The silk industry before the war included more than 270 enterprises possessing 8,500 mechanical looms, 7,000 hand looms, and 271,000 twisting machines. The number of workmen employed in the industry exceeded 37,000. According to Economic Life of June 24, 1920, 90 factories containing 7,527 mechanical looms, 6,719 hand looms, and 87,326 spindles were running in January, 1919, but of the full complement only 2,467 mechanical looms and 4,646 hand looms were working. The workmen numbered 8,280. On January 1, 1920, out of 49 nationalized factories only 32 with 2,000 looms were working. The restricted output of the working factories is explained by the shortage of fuel and raw materials.

(f) ELECTROTECHNICAL.

317. In the electrotechnical industries at Petrograd a large fall in production has also taken place, as the following quotations from the Petrograd Pravda, No. 138, giving the figures for July, 1920, will show:

The Dek Electric Works have 60 men at work, being 20 per cent of the labor required. The supply of fuel is 60 per cent of that necessary; 12 per cent of the installation has been utilized. The output is only 18 per cent of the program. Ericsson's Works have 236 men. The utilization of the installation is 17 per cent. At the Siemens, Schückert Works 467 men are at work, being 75 per cent of the labor needed. The supply of fuel is 45 per cent. The utilization of the installation is 20 per cent, and the output is 23 per cent of the program. Geissler's Works have 203 men; their output is 40 per cent of the program. The Siemens Works have 210 men, their fuel supply is 25 per cent, and their output 16 per cent of the normal.

It should be noted that these are percentages of the "program" and not of prewar production. The program is calculated on a low estimate of what should be possible, taking all surrounding conditions at the present time into account, and is often a mere fraction of former output.

(g) SOAP AND OIL.

318. We were informed by Mr. Bennett, the active partner in Russia of Messrs. Wm. Miller & Co.'s stearin and soap factories, that they stopped at the beginning of 1919, with the exception of the brewery (where malt coffee was being made), and an oil mill where the pro-

duction was between 5 and 10 per cent of the normal for that mill, or about 3 per cent of the normal production of all the firm's oil mills.

According to the *Izvestiya*, No. 133—

The second State soap-boiling factory is working slowly, owing to the want of fats. The output of the factory is only 10,000 poods per month. The number of workers and specialists in the factory is only 70, and even these are called upon for several days at a time to work at unloading firewood.

(H) RUBBER.

319. The present output of the rubber industry constitutes about 5 per cent of the normal production. (Economic Life of June 24, 1920.)

(I) LEATHER.

320. According to Economic Life of October 5, 1920, the production in the tanneries for the first six months of the year 1920 was 135,000 large hides and 207,000 small hides per month, as against a normal prewar production of 785,000 large hides and 954,000 small hides.

321. *Hides and boots.*—A later issue of Economic Life, dated October 9, 1920, states that "the program" for the first six months of 1920 comprised a total of 1,200,000 large hides and 2,800,000 small ones. In the first four months (January to April) the deliveries of dressed skins amounted to 684,960 large skins and 1,056,400 small ones. The failure to complete the program is explained by shortage of fuel, labor, tanning materials, and chemicals. The article from which these figures are quoted speaks of the "catastrophic drop" in the collection of hides in 1919, but states that there has been some improvement in 1920. In prewar times there was a large import of heavy raw hides from America and India.

Particulars of the program for the manufacture of boots as compared with the actual outturn shows that only 50 per cent is likely to be realized. Only 50 per cent of the schedule of the manufacture of leather for driving belts, valves, and other technical purposes was accomplished in the first six months of 1920.

(J) OUTPUT OF NEW LOCOMOTIVES.

322. The production of the Sormovo Locomotive Works, according to Mr. W. R. Pickersgill, who had been assistant to the chief manager of the locomotive department for 24 years, fell from about 170 locomotives a year in prerevolution time to 16 for the year 1919, and he thought that the output of new engines would shortly cease entirely. We learn from Economic Life, No. 283, dated December 16, 1920, that the program of production of new railway engines at these works for the second half of 1920 was eight, but that none had been delivered up to that date.

(K) PAPER AND SUGAR.

323. According to Dr. Ballod,¹ who was in Moscow from May 2 to July 12, 1920, the production of paper in Russia has decreased from 19,000,000 poods to 2,200,000 in 1919; and in the same year only one-seventh of the peace-time output of sugar was obtained. Access to the Ukraine has greatly increased the opportunity of obtaining sugar for soviet Russia in 1920.

¹ Ballod was formerly professor of economics at the University of Berlin.

(L) RAILWAYS.

324. Before leaving the question of nationalization of industry, it is necessary to refer to the question of railways, in regard to which we have inserted a memorandum in Appendix IV. The number of locomotives in running order available for the purposes of soviet Russia decreased from 16,800 in January, 1917, to under 4,000 in January, 1920. In June, July, and August of 1920 the number of locomotives in sound condition was claimed to be between 6,500 and 7,000. This recovery was due in part to the recovery of railway lines and material by the soviet government and in part to an intensive effort to deal with repairs in the spring and summer of last year. We are unable to say whether the recovery is likely to be permanent.

THE BUDGET.

325. There is no subject of importance on which information is so scanty as that of soviet finance. The only figures we have seen published during the last 18 months were set out in the British Economic Review, and were taken by it from a German newspaper which obtained them from the soviet government publication Economic Life of November 12, 1920. We have been unable to procure a copy of this issue of the Russian paper. The figures are as follows, viz:

	Expenditure.	Revenue.	Deficit.
	R. milliards.	R. milliards.	R. milliards.
1918.....	46.7	15.8	30.9
1919.....	125.8	50.6	75.2
1920.....	1,150.0	150.0	1,000.0
Total.....	1,322.5	216.4	1,106.1

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE.

326. The figures of revenue are probably an overestimate and greatly exaggerated. We have no reason to suppose the figures of expenditure are overestimated. Certain details are given, but not of the main objects on which the bulk of the money was to be spent. We have reason to suppose that the principal source of expenditure was for the provision of deficits for nationalized industries and for other new responsibilities assumed by the State. The actual figures of expenditure are not so startling if converted into sterling at present rates of exchange, or if expressed in terms of commodities formerly exported from Russia to other countries, and assumed to be sold there at present world prices, the proceeds being reconverted from their currency into soviet rubles.¹

¹ If exchange be taken at 10,000 rubles to the 1*l.* sterling (it is said to run as high as 20,000 rubles) 1,000 milliard rubles are only equivalent to 100,000,000*l.*, one-fourteenth of our expenditure in 1920-21. Russia exported in 1910 and 1911 over 800,000,000 pounds of cereals in each year. If this 800,000,000 pounds had been all wheat it would represent 60,000,000 quarters. At 3*l.* a quarter, and this is much lower than to-day's price, the value would be 180,000,000*l.*, and this sum at an exchange of 10,000 rubles to the 1*l.* amounts to 1,800 milliard rubles.

RAPIDLY INCREASING DEFICIT.

327. The most striking feature of the accounts is the rapid increase of expenditure over receipts and the impossibility in present circumstances of meeting the deficit. There are, of course, no wealthy people left in Russia on whom taxation can be levied to make up the adverse balance. There is no stock of commodities of any great value or importance which can be exported. It is impossible to conceive of tariffs on imports which could raise any large proportion of a thousand milliard rubles. It must be remembered that no interest is being paid on the debts contracted by the Government of Russia during the war or on the properties confiscated from former proprietors and now being worked for the nominal benefit of the nation as a whole. In spite, therefore, of wholesale confiscation of property and repudiation of debt, the three years of soviet rule has resulted in deficits of enormous size and of rapidly increasing magnitude. These deficits are being met by issues of paper money which month by month become of less value. That the present state of things can not continue is certain.

KRASIN ON SOVIET FINANCE—COMPARISON WITH GERMANY.

328. In the not inconsiderable contributions to polemical economic literature which Lenin and Trotski have recently made the question of finance has not been dealt with by them so far as we have observed, although they have treated other matters in dispute between themselves and their political opponents. In conversation with Krasin one of the members of the committee asked him (1) whether the figures above were correct, and (2) what would in his opinion be the ultimate outcome of a financial position which must quickly end in an impasse? M. Krasin replied that he had not seen the figures, but had no reason to doubt their being substantially correct. In answer to the second question, he said that financial deficits in a socialist country were a matter of no particular moment. In Germany there were similar deficits met by the printing of paper money, and they were a matter of serious menace to her, because her industries were founded on a capitalistic basis and profit was a necessity to capitalism. He seemed to expect revolution to be precipitated in Germany by the state of her finances, but in Russia they meant soon to do without money altogether, and they did not care how much it was depreciated in the meantime. The impasse suggested did not, therefore, frighten them. We record this view as an indication of the spirit in which a communist well acquainted with bourgeois finance meets criticism of present Russian financial methods. The real weakness of the answer lies in the fact that bolshevik control of industry has led to a great fall in production and that deficits in the finance of industry which have led to excessive issues of paper money are really a measure of the paralysis of industry brought about under the rule of the soviet government. The main underlying cause of the parlous state of Russian finance is insufficient production, and insufficient production is the factor forced on our notice in every branch of our inquiry into economic conditions in that country.

NONNATIONALIZED INDUSTRY.

PETTY INDUSTRY RESTORES THE BOURGEOISIE.

329. A certain number of smaller factories have not been nationalized, and we have, therefore, endeavored to ascertain the relative position of these factories when compared with those which have been nationalized, but statistical information on nonnationalized industry is almost nonexistent. The following quotations from Lenin's recent book, "Childish Ailments of Progressivism in Communism," published in May, 1920, appear to show, however, that some of the nonnationalized factories are far from being extinguished by their nationalized rivals:

For of petty industry there still remains unfortunately very, very much in the world, and petty industry is perpetually breeding capitalism and the bourgeoisie, perpetually, daily, hourly, psychologically, and on a mass scale.

To destroy classes means not only to banish the landowners and capitalists—this we did comparatively easily—it means also to destroy the small manufacturers, but it is impossible to banish them, it is impossible to suppress them, it is necessary to tolerate them, they can (and must) be reformed, reeducated only by a very long, slow, careful process of organizing work. They surround the proletariat on all sides with petty bourgeois influences, they imbue these influences, corrupt them with it, calling forth continually among the proletariat manifestations of petty bourgeois lack of backbone, individualism, relapse into despondency, breaking it up.

It is a thousand times easier to conquer the powerful centralized bourgeoisie than to conquer millions and millions of petty proprietors, who by their daily humdrum, unseen, intangible, destructive activity achieve those very results which are necessary for the bourgeoisie, which are restoring the bourgeoisie.

The emphasis of these extracts and the fact that Lenin returns to the subject again and again in his book show how deeply he resents the continued existence of nonnationalized industries.

THE NUMBER OF WORKERS IN THE FACTORIES.

WITNESSES' EVIDENCE ON DECREASE OF WORKERS.

330. Our witnesses gave the following evidence showing the decline in the number of workers at the various factories at which they were employed:

SORMOVO.

(1) Mr. William Pickersgill, who had been associated with the Sormovo Engineering Works for over 20 years, stated that the working population in the district round the works was about 45,000 before the revolution, but had melted away to 30,000 before he left Russia in the spring of 1920.

BEKOS.

(2) Mr. A. G. Marshall, of the British Engineering Co. of Russia and Siberia (Ltd.), stated that the company had about 2,000 men employed before the revolution and 700 in the early part of 1920.

KONSHIN.

(3) Mr. James Parkinson said that the Konshin Mill at Serpukhov near Moscow, where he was employed as manager for many years, had 10,000 to 12,000 workers before the revolution. This figure had fallen to 5,000 in March, 1920.

MOROZOV.

(4) Mr. J. J. Wild stated that the Morozov Textile Works at Tver, where he was manager, formerly employed 17,000 workpeople, and that this figure fell to 2,660. The reason was that "the people who had some connection with the villages left because they could not get sufficient food at the mill."

EGORIEVSK.

(5) Mr. R. Wright said that the town of Egorievsk depended entirely on its textile-mills. In one mill the number of workpeople fell from 5,000 to 1,700.

ZUNDEL'S.

(6) Mr. J. Grundy stated that of the 4,000 hands employed at Zundel's Works in Moscow 3,000 were paid off and left for the villages.

DR. SOKOLOV'S INFORMATION.

331. In addition to the evidence of British witnesses with regard to the fall in the number of workers in industry, we are informed by Dr. Boris Sokolov, who left Russia in September, 1920—

(1) That the demand for workmen in Petrograd far exceeds the available supply and that in some trades the number employed was only from 5 per cent to 20 per cent of former numbers.

(2) That the number of workers in the rubber factories in Petrograd in August, 1920, was 6,000 as against 30,000 employed in the same factories in 1916.

(3) That in the china and glass industries there were 21,750 employed in August, 1920, as against 123,000 in 1917.

(4) That in the cotton industry 18,500 workmen were employed in 1920 as against 172,000 in 1916.

(5) That the number of workers in the metallurgical trades in Petrograd had fallen to from 5 per cent to 7 per cent of the numbers normally employed.

COMPARISON OF 1918 AND 1920.

332. Dr. Sokolov attributed the shortage of workmen in Petrograd to the fact that a steady stream of workers has been leaving the city for the country in the course of the last two years. The same tendency is noted in the extracts made from the evidence of Mr. J. J. Wild and Mr. J. Grundy given above. Our evidence as to the shortage of labor and the decline in the numbers of industrial workers is supported by the following quotations made from *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* (Economic Life).

PETROGRAD STATISTICS.

(1) The following table showing deficiencies in the different branches of Petrograd industry (October, 1920):

[“Economic Life,” Oct. 9, 1920, No. 225.]

Branch of industry.	Laborers required according to program for second half year.	Actual number of laborers.	Deficit.	Per cent of deficit.
Metal	35,227	26,467	8,760	25
Food supply	9,635	9,290	345	4
Leather	8,610	6,622	1,988	23
Textile	7,682	5,682	2,000	26
Chemical	7,028	5,406	1,622	23
Electro-technical	6,724	3,399	3,325	49
Tailoring and seamstressy	6,366	5,770	596	9
Polygraphic	4,765	4,765
Paper mills	3,130	2,435	695	22
Woodworking	2,701	1,380	1,321	49
Mineral	1,502	1,032	470	31
Utility	745	390	355	47
Spirit distillation	236	236

SOUTH RUSSIAN STATISTICS.

(2) Extract from article on Manual Labor in the Works of Southern Russia, taken from Economic Life of October 9, 1920:

In the group of specially important works, which includes the Mariupol, Debaltsev, Kramatorsk, Drushkov, Nikolaev, and Donetsk-Urievsk works, the number of workmen in May was 9,883, in June 11,196, in July 12,806, and in August 12,676. At the Mariupol works in August there were 3,145 men and at the Nikolaev works 3,941.

At the remaining seven works (Uzov, Konstantinov, Dnieprov, South Bryansk, Sulinsk, and others) the number of workmen employed decreased from month to month: the number was in May 22,694, in June 12,198, July 12,481, August 11,904.

This acute decrease occurred on account of the decrease of number of workmen employed at the Eslampat (cartridge case stamping) works. The total number of workmen at 21 southern works was in May 54,618, June 45,725, July 49,734, and in August 49,436.

COMPARISON OF 1918 CENSUS WITH THAT OF 1920.

(3) Extract from Economic Life, No. 242, dated the 29th of October, 1920:

During the last few years the number of industrial workers has fallen unceasingly. The industrial census of 1918 covered 35 Russian Provinces, and, according to the data of the census for the 31st of August, 1918, 1,253,900 workers were employed in 6,090 industrial enterprises. The estimate of the 1st of June, 1920, embraced an even larger number of industrial enterprises (in many Provinces the workshops of the railway and water transport services were included) and a larger number of Provinces, and it appeared that information was received from 7,560 industrial enterprises, employing in all 1,061,900 workers. * * * If only those Provinces are taken which were embraced by the census of 1918, it appears from the estimate of the 1st of June, 1920, that 867,000 workers were found to be employed in 5,877 industrial enterprises in these Provinces, i. e., from August, 1918, to June, 1920, the number of factories had decreased by 3.5 per cent and the number of the workers employed in them by 31 per cent.

STATISTICS RELATING TO PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIAL AREAS.

(4) The same article gives the following figures illustrating the decrease in the numbers of the workers in various Provinces according to the census of 1918 and the estimate of the Statistical Bureau in June, 1920, showing the percentage of decrease from 1918 to 1920:

Province.	Number of workers according to census of 1918.	Estimate, 1920.	Decrease.	Per cent.
Vladimir.....	103,000	21,200		79.8
Ivanovo-Voznesensk.....	146,300	30,600		75.4
Kostroma.....	17,600	8,100		53.9
Moscow.....	378,100	218,400		42.0

In certain Provinces increases were recorded in the number of workers employed:

(a) Kazan, from 18,500 to 37,000; (b) Samara, from 18,500 to 22,600; (c) Simbirsk, from 15,600 to 19,500; (d) Penza, from 9,400 to 10,700.

MOSCOW AND PETROGRAD.

The article concludes: It is interesting to note the numbers of the industrial proletariat in the two principal centers of Moscow and Petrograd:

	According to census of 1918.	Estimate of June 1920.	Decreases. Per cent.
Moscow.....	155,000	89,100	42.5
Petrograd.....	140,000	102,400	26.6

ABSENTEEISM OF WORKERS.

333. We offer the following statements from soviet sources with regard to absenteeism among the workers in industry:

(1) An extract from an article on Manual Labor in the Works of Southern Russia appearing in Economic Life for the 9th of October, 1920, from which a quotation has already been made above:

With regard to percentage of absentees, the percentage in the shock¹ works was, in relation to the total number of men employed:

	May.	June.	July.	August.
Kharkov.....		18	20	27
Lugansk.....	28	28	24	21
Makeev.....	26	26	7	18
Tagansk.....	23	27	24	21
Petrovsk.....	8	7	39	14
Schodaner.....	23	28	18	16
Nizhny-Dnieprov.....	13	13	12	12

Even in the shock works the percentage of absentees is still very great, and if in most cases it shows a tendency to decrease, in the other works the percentage either increased (Kharkov Works) or remained stationary. In the works of the special importance group the percentage of absentees fluctuated considerably, especially in two works, Mariupol and Dnieprov, the percentage of absentees was as follows:

	May.	June.	July.	August.
Mariupol.....	16	16	27
Dnieprov.....	34	34	39	38

At all the works more than 50 per cent of the absentees are included in the group of "absent for unknown reasons."

(2) An extract from the Metallist, the journal of the central committee of the All-Russian Union of the Metal Workers, dated the 31st of March, 1920:

¹ Shock (or udarny) works are those which are placed in a special category as being of primary importance in the economic life of the State. Every effort is made to keep them working at the highest possible pressure.

A good third of the workers never turned up to work, thus, according to the time sheet for the 3d of February of the assembly shops, where the finishing touches are put to locomotives, 234 skilled and 53 ordinary workers reported for work; 72 (20 per cent) skilled and 9 ordinary workers were ill; 47 skilled (13 per cent) and 19 ordinary workers did not turn up at all. In general, from 30 to 45 per cent of the workers absented themselves from the factory, while on Mondays and Saturdays the figures reached anything from 45 to 55 per cent.

REASONS FOR DECREASE OF INDUSTRIAL WORKERS.

334. It will be seen from the succeeding paragraphs, with regard to food, that the very considerable decrease in the number of the industrial proletariat, recorded above, is due principally to a serious breakdown in the food supply of the towns and the consequent inability of the soviet government to assure to the population as a whole, and the industrial worker in particular, a daily ration upon which it was possible to live. In these circumstances, therefore, those who were able to do so left the town for the country.¹ Many of those who remained, owing to malnutrition, fell a prey to disease, and more especially to the epidemics of typhus, which began to rage in 1918 and continued throughout the following year. The percentage of mortality among the town population therefore began greatly to increase (see par. 357).

FOOD.

BREAD CONTROL, 1916-17.

335. It has already been mentioned that the shortage of food in Moscow and Petrograd began to be apparent during the time of the provisional government. In the autumn of 1916, a few months before the first revolution and the formation of the provisional government, bread prices were fixed. The Tsar's Government were soon forced as a corollary to resort to requisitioning grain. State monopoly of grain was one of the earliest measures of the provisional government. This measure created the strongest opposition from all the classes interested in agriculture and in the purchase and sale of cereals. Prices of manufactured commodities were then uncontrolled and went up by leaps and bounds, but the agriculturist could only obtain the price fixed by government for what he had to sell. Thus arose in the early months of the provisional government a demand for fixing the price of industrial products also, and this demand was no doubt one of the causes which made it comparatively easy for the Bolsheviks when they came into power to proceed to the nationalization of the larger manufacturing enterprises.

336. In paragraph 303 we have shown how the endeavor to supply the peasants with manufactured goods broke down. Exchange between town and country became more and more difficult, and the Government food supplies were wholly inadequate to support the population of the towns. In these circumstances the soviet government proceeded to introduce a rationing system according to which the population was divided into four categories.

¹ A. Anikst, a member of the people's commissariat of labor, states, in the course of an article on the labor situation during the period 1917-1919 (published in *Two Years of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, issued by the supreme council of people's economy at Moscow) that "the decree of the council of people's commissaries regarding the transfer of persons, drafted to labor by the departments of labor attached to local soviets does much to improve the possibility of drawing the workers out of the villages." He then proceeds to describe the compulsory transfer of workers to the army at the request of the military authorities and to various factories where labor was short.

THE DAILY RATION CATEGORIES.

337. The highest category, category (1), embraced workers performing physical labor and soldiers in the army; category (2) provided a lesser ration for all those performing labor other than physical in commissariats and other institutions in the soviet government; category (3) provided a still smaller ration for members of the bourgeoisie who were employed in one occupation or another; and category (4), which provided an almost negligible ration, was given to those members of the bourgeoisie who were not engaged in any form of occupation. Later the number of categories was reduced to three by the suppression of the fourth category.

COMPOSITION OF THE FIRST CATEGORY IN PETROGRAD.

338. Dr. Yakovlev, who left Russia in the spring of this year after some months' service in the Red army, and subsequently under the Petrograd department of public health, states that 70 per cent of the recognized workers in Petrograd belonged to the first category.

BASIC RATION.

339. Food conditions varied in the different towns, and were affected by the amount of supplies available in the different areas and by the degree of efficiency or inefficiency of the local food administration. Dr. Sokolov informed us that in Petrograd a general ration of one-half pound of bread a day was issued nominally to everyone without exception. In reality, however, this basic ration was issued during the summer, but generally failed during the winter months and was replaced by one-half pound of oats.

SUPPLEMENTARY RATION.

340. In addition to the basic ration there was a supplementary ration divided into three categories of (a), (b), and (c):

(a) Was for workmen performing physical labor who got three-fourths pound of bread in the summer, and in the winter not more than one-fourth pound, supplemented by quantities of oats varying from one-fourth to one-half pound.

(b) Was for soviet officials who got one-half pound in the summer, and sometimes bread and sometimes oats in the winter.

(c) Was for the bourgeoisie, and was negligible in quantity.

Workmen receiving rations according to card (a) received certain extras in the form of maize, fish, sugar, and tobacco. The nutritive value of these extras is, however, inconsiderable when compared with that of the 1-pound of bread to which the two cards entitled them nominally. From time to time small quantities of clothing were also issued to the workmen. Category (c) appears to have received almost nothing in the way of extras.

CHANGES IN RATIONING POLICY—FIRST PERIOD.

341. The rations described above are only part of the story of a rather confused situation. Differing principles of rationing have, in fact, been adopted from time to time by the soviet government.

Three periods, marking three varying policies, are to be observed. In the first the class principle of distribution was adopted. The Red army came first, the workers and soviet officials second, and the rest of the population, including the bourgeoisie, third. This system worked badly and led to the rapid growth of speculation. The workers were themselves insufficiently fed, and they were frequently allowed leave of absence to go to the villages and procure the additional food necessary to maintain life.

SECOND PERIOD—THIRD PERIOD.

The bolsheviks, realizing by experience the disadvantages of a purely class distribution, began to adopt during the second period the principle of food for work. Equality of rationing among the workers gave way to a system based on a recognition of the usefulness of the individual as a factor in production. Certain categories of workers (e. g., woodcutters), the produce of whose labor was temporarily of supreme importance to the community, received a guaranteed or "armored" ration on a relatively ample scale and obtained it regularly, whoever else went short. The stimulus to work produced by the "armored" ration led to the adoption of the general principle marking the third period. This may be described as rations based on the achievement of a certain standard of production in a given work. Food premiums are given both for attendance and productivity. The result is that the food ration for a particular class of work in Russia to-day is of far more importance to the worker than the monetary wages that attach to it. This new principle appears to involve a departure from the original conceptions of the bolsheviks with regard to the equality of remuneration in a socialist State. If regard be had to the effort now being made to retain experts in industry by the payment of increased remuneration in food and money, and the return to individual control of industry, the departure becomes more marked.

THE ACADEMIC RATION.

342. There is a special "academic ration" now being given to inmates of the houses of science and university professors, which may be quoted as an example of the tendency to which we have alluded. The ration in question is given as follows by M. Farbman in an article, in the Manchester Guardian of the 24th of December, 1920, as follows, viz:

	Pounds per month.		Pounds per month.
Vegetable oil.....	3	Salt.....	2
Flour.....	35	Soap.....	1
Cereals.....	18	Coffee.....	1
Sugar.....	2½	Tobacco.....	1
Meat.....	20	Cigarette tubes.....	750
Butter.....	3		

It is calculated that the value of this ration at "speculation" prices is equivalent to 141,000 rubles a month. Prof. Wilson, who left Petrograd on the 30th of November last, generally confirmed the figures given. He stated that while the ration he received on taking up his professional work after his release from prison in August, 1920, differed in some details, its nutritive value corresponded, in his opinion, to the scale given above.

THE RELATIVE VALUE OF THE WORKERS' WAGES.

MONETARY WAGE.

343. The Russian worker at the present time receives, in addition to the ration already mentioned, wages in paper currency. This monetary portion of the wage is made up by a basic wage, premiums, and overtime.

Dr. Sokolov stated that there are 35 categories of labor in Russia, and he gives the following examples:

LITHOGRAPHERS.

(a) The lithographers employed at the State factory for printing paper currency in Petrograd belong to the twenty-third category. They receive 4,000 rubles a month basic wage, a premium of 3,000 rubles for exceptionally good work, and a further 4,000 rubles for overtime. This factory, which is said to be engaged in reproducing facsimiles of Czarist 100 and 500 ruble notes, works at high pressure, and the employees are required to work 12 hours a day. In addition to these monetary earnings they receive 1 pound of bread a day, 3 pounds of maize a month, 1 pound of sugar a month, 2 pounds of coarse meal a month, and they have the right to take one meal a day at the central communal kitchen in addition to the usual rations.

METAL WORKERS.

(b) First-class metal workers at the Kolpino metal factory, situated outside Petrograd, receive 3,700 rubles basic wages a month and 9,000 rubles premium. The rations issued at this factory are not so valuable as in Petrograd, but workers are able to supplement them, owing to the fact of their being situated in a country district.

LOCKSMITHS.

(c) A skilled locksmith belonging to category 21 to 23 can earn, as a result of 12 hours' work by his basic wage, premiums and overtime from 10,000 to 11,000 rubles a month.

ESTIMATE OF TOTAL MONETARY VALUE OF WAGES.

344. Dr. Sokolov estimated the average value of the rations received by workers at the speculative prices obtaining in the open market at from 13,000 to 15,000 rubles a month. In these circumstances the lithographers may be said to be in receipt of from 24,000 to 26,000 rubles a month, although in this case a somewhat higher estimate may be allowed in view of the specially favored position enjoyed by these workers in regard to rations.

The wages of the Kolpino metal workers and of skilled locksmiths, assessed on the same basis, amount, respectively, to 25,700 to 27,700 rubles and 23,000 to 26,000 rubles a month.

COMPARISON WITH WAGES BEFORE THE WAR.

345. Dr. Sokolov made a comparison of the wages of a skilled workman before the war, and their purchasing power, with wages and their purchasing power at the present time. He stated that the same workman before the soviet government came into power received from 60 to 100 rubles a month, and that the price of bread in 1916 was 2 kopecks and of meat 20 kopecks. If 60 rubles were all spent in bread, the workman's wage at the old rate would have purchased 100 pounds of bread a day; his wage to-day would purchase 3 pounds. His former wage would have purchased 4 pounds of butter a day, if it had all been spent in purchase of that commodity; to-day his total wage would only purchase 3 ounces. The wages of the skilled workman are of course above the average individual income of the remainder of the population.

THE SOVIET FOOD ADMINISTRATION.

ADMINISTRATIVE INCOMPETENCE IN DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD.

346. The process of disintegration following the revolution, the deterioration of railway transport and the decline of industry leading to the separation of town from country are largely responsible for the shortage of food supplies in the towns. The suffering thus caused has been considerably augmented by administrative incompetence on the part of the soviet food organizations, as will be seen below from quotations from an official report prepared by A. G. Mashkovich, of the people's commissariat of State control, based upon data collected by the extraordinary revisionary commission of the council of defense. The report is divided into two parts.

Part I is a trenchant criticism of the food administration, and is an interesting commentary upon soviet administration as a whole.

Part II gives a series of striking examples of some results of the food administration's activity, brought to light by the extraordinary revisionary commission in the course of its investigations. Extracts (a), (b), (c), and (d) are taken from Part I, a complete translation of which has been placed in Appendix X.

(a) A series of revisions of the work of the food administration, and, even more so, the actual results of its activities point to its being nowhere of any use at all. The organization is cumbrous, there is lack of initiative, and it is costly in working.

(b) *The local food organizations.*—If regard be had to the results achieved, it will be seen that the efforts of the workers and peasants to organize end in failure, owing to their astonishing incompetence and inertia. There is no coordinating and supervising control, either central or local, to which the proletarian food detachments and the committees of the village poor may look for guidance, and as a result their efforts are widely diffused and scattered and often distort the instructions of the soviet republic for the carrying out of economic policy.

According to the reports of competent persons, the food administrations possess no experienced staff, no clear and speedy methods of accountancy, and no reliable statistics. The question arises, What are they doing, and what end do they serve?

(c) *The central food organizations.*—If we turn to the center and study the working of the endless sections, subsections, and offices of the people's commissariat of food, the same picture presents itself: Floods of papers, responsible officials overwhelmed with correspondence, hundreds of clerks, bored, without initiative, looking upon their work as a burden, displaying extraordinary indifference toward visitors—this is the external side. Within there is no such thing as a single plan of action, assimilated by all directors of departments, permitting of the efficient disposal of everyday work,

and based on a clear comprehension of the end in view and the methods necessary to attain it in all parts of the republic.

(d) Certain responsible members of the organization are unacquainted with the technique and organization of the institution in which they work. The fact that this circumstance was, by order of the people's commissaries, to be the subject of special investigation on the part of the State control bears witness to this. It is a very characteristic phenomenon. The question of supplying textile and engineering factories with food was discussed in the council of the people's commissaries. The representatives of the Komprod¹ present proposed immediately to ascertain from the Komprod to what factories supplies were being sent, their amount, and where they were. When this proposal had been accepted, it appeared, to the astonishment of the directors of Komprod, that the information could not by any means be found, the reasons being purely those of organization, of the actual state of affairs in the various departments. Not to speak of the disgraceful lack of communication of information from the provinces, one department is isolated from another, each follows its own ends, collects the information which is necessary to it; coordination of activity there is none, and therefore the question of the council of the people's commissaries had to remain unanswered. The absence of any such coordination indicates the shortcomings of the collegium. The impression is given that the collegia attempt to meet one or another set of questions as they come in, but they make no effort to possess themselves of the knowledge of the technical organization demanding coordination, which is just where collective work ought to give the greatest results.

RATIONING IN THE DONETZ BASIN.

347. This report relates to a period from 1918 to 1919. The following quotation from an article in No. 4 of the *Izvestiya Rabochekrestyanskoi Inspeksi* (Bulletin of the Workers' and Peasants' Council),² April, 1920, shows the position in the Donetz coal basin during the first quarter of 1920. The Donetz basin is the most important coal area in Russia:

In reality, we observe a complete lack of organization in the supply of the workers of this district.

According to the data collected by the workers' and peasants' control, the issue of food products for the workers is so insignificant that it does not satisfy their minimum demands, as a result of which strong tendencies are observed for workers to go away into the corn districts of the Ukraine. With a view to substantiating this we attach the following tables, which clearly show how completely unsatisfactory the situation is:

Product.	Total rations due to workers and families January-February, in poods.	Actually issued.	Issue due for period Mar. 1-15.	Actually issued.
Bread.....	720,000	133,719	193,213	34,917
Krino (meal).....	66,000	87,995	27,890	36,261
Butter.....	33,000	8,291	9,844	1,861
Meat and fish.....	220,000	1,709	82,032	794
Sugar.....	36,500	10,085	12,032	2,000
Tobacco.....	9,130	(a)	2,844	(a)
Matches.....	1,610	(a)	730	(a)
Soap.....	43,500	(a)	8,204	(a)
Sugar preparation.....	22,000	(a)	4,375	(a)
Tallow.....	33,000	(a)	6,563	(a)
Herrings.....	22,000	(a)	10,938	(a)
Vegetables.....	70,000	(a)	17,500	(a)

¹ Commissariat of food.

² The workers' and peasants' control was formerly known as the people's commissariat of State control.

^a None.

These figures speak for themselves. During two and a half months only 16 per cent of bread, 22 per cent of butter, 17 per cent of meat and fish, and 25 per cent of sugar has been issued. With the exception of krupa, which has been issued in quantities above the prescribed ration, products like makhorka (tobacco), matches, soap, sugar products, tallow, herrings, and vegetables are never available for issue in the cooperative shops in the Don Basin Union. If we take into account that, for more than a year, the workers have not received a single arshin of textile material, thanks to which they are in great want of clothing, and the children walk about naked and barefooted, then it becomes clear that it is absurd to think of keeping the workers in the Don Basin under such conditions, and above all, of increasing production.

The food situation in April did not improve; it is evident that there is no hope of an improvement even during the summer months, for supplies usually decrease everywhere at this time and in the Ukraine, more than elsewhere, will be insignificant.

FUEL.

RESULTS OF FUEL SHORTAGE.

348. Shortage of food was accompanied by shortage of fuel. Many of our witnesses described to us the terrible conditions of cold in which they lived through the winter of 1919. A large number of houses were not heated. Pipes froze, the sanitary arrangements were completely out of order, and the inmates suffered great misery in consequence. The shortage of wood for fuel is emphasized by the large number of wooden houses which have been demolished in Moscow and Petrograd in order that the wood might be used for fuel. The price of wood in Petrograd in the winter of 1919 was 15,000 to 20,000 rubles a sazhen. Those of the upper and middle classes who had been accustomed to live in comfort and with an ample staff of servants had to carry the wood for themselves when they were fortunate enough to obtain any.

The fuel question is dealt with in Appendixes I, II, and III.

OTHER NECESSARIES OF LIFE.

SUPPLY OF CLOTHING TO THE WORKERS.

349. The Russian workman is not only suffering from shortage of food and fuel. According to *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, No. 223, of the 7th of October, 1920:

For the last two months, September and October, we could not provide more than 30,000 pairs of boots for the whole of the workers and peasants of the Republic.

As a result of the shortage of the primary necessities of life the committee of ways and means recommend that the following issues should be made to the workers during the coming winter:

[*Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, No. 242, Oct. 29, 1920.]

Clogs.....	20,000
Goloshes.....	50,000
Valenki (felt boots).....	200,000
Bast shoes.....	500,000
Women's shoes.....	50,000
Warm caps.....	400,000
Warm coats.....	19,000
Collars.....	50,000
Various fur-lined short coats.....	45,000
Workers' high boots.....	26,000
Cardigans and pairs of drawers.....	100,000
Pairs of socks.....	400,000
Handkerchiefs.....	150,000
Scarfs.....	150,000
Petticoats.....	25,000

As the numbers of the industrial workers are estimated by the soviet authorities at about a million, this is manifestly insufficient to protect the workers against the rigors of a Russian winter. The article, however, proceeds:

In reality, not more than 50 per cent of the appointed quantity will be received by the workers, and at the present time distribution only reaches 25 per cent of the established standard, with the exception of material and soap, the supply of which is more or less satisfactory.

THE PRODUCTIVITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL WORKER.

FALL IN THE WORKERS' PRODUCTIVITY.

350. The nominal rations, even in the case of the highest category, were insufficient to maintain normal health and strength, but they were often issued in quantities less than those prescribed in official decrees, and sometimes were not issued at all. The general result has been to impair the productivity of the average worker's labor. For example, it is stated in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* for the 24th of June, 1920, that the average amount of coal produced per man a month in 1913 was 760 poods, in 1919, 250 to 280, and in March, 1920, 240 poods. An extract from another article in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* of the 31st of July, 1920, shows that "the serious food shortage has greatly interfered with the work of the (Moscow coal) basin. It has become so acute that the workers could not even be supplied with the minimum hunger rations."

CAUSES OF ABSENTEEISM.

351. Evidence from bolshevik sources, confirmed by our witnesses, regarding the inability of the Russian workman owing to malnutrition to work well, when he could come to work, could be multiplied indefinitely. The productivity of labor suffered still further, however, owing to the number of days during which workmen were absent from work by reason of sickness and the necessity for leaving their work to search for food.

NUMBER OF DAYS WORKED PER MONTH.

352. The following table, taken from *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, No. 231, of the 16th of October, 1920, shows the average number of days worked per month by Moscow factory operatives in the last three months of 1919 and the first six months of 1920:

Average for all factories.

	1919			1920					
	Octo- ber.	Novem- ber.	Decem- ber.	Janu- ary.	Febru- ary.	March.	April.	May.	June.
Number of days worked per month.....	18.8	16.4	17.8	14.6	15.5	17.4	15.2	17.6	12.0
Number of hands employed in factory:									
Under 50.....	22.4	19.4	20.9	15.1	17.6	19.8	17.2	20.0	20.9
50 to 599.....	19.3	17.6	19.7	14.6	16.9	18.9	14.9	18.3	20.2
500 and over.....	17.7	15.3	16.5	14.6	14.8	16.3	15.4	16.0	10.4

NUMBER OF DAYS ON WHICH THE FACTORIES WERE CLOSED.

353. The following table taken from the same number of *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* shows the number of days a month during which factories were closed:

Industry.	1919			1920					
	Octo- ber.	Novem- ber.	Decem- ber.	Janu- ary.	Febru- ary.	March.	April.	May.	June.
Textile.....	8.5	8.1	5.9	4.3	5.9	5.6	0.9	4.8	1.6
Metallurgical.....	.4	.4	.1	.5
Other industries.....	.1	.5	.3	.7	1.9	.4	.4	.4	.4

The number of days a month worked by each operative on the average is therefore far smaller than the number on which the factories were open for work.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORKER'S YEAR.

354. In *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* for the 9th of October, 1920, a table is given showing the distribution of the worker's year during the post-revolutionary period compared with a pre-revolutionary year. The table is based on returns of the people's commissariat for food at the beginning of 1920.

Working year of the industrial workmen in days.

	Pre-revolution.	Post-revolution.	Increase since revolution.	Percentage of increase.
Stoppages.....	53	53.0
Sickness.....	7.4	19	11.6	157
Absence for other causes.....	16.6	52	35.4	214
Total of days absent.....	24.0	124	100.0	416
Rest.....	93.0	55	38.0	41
Work.....	248.0	180
Total.....	365.0	365

The article proceeds:

It is shown that, notwithstanding the large decrease in the number of holidays after the revolution, the working year of the workman, owing to the increase of sickness, absence from work, and stoppages, it decreased by 68 days or 25 per cent; and if, further, the length of the working day be taken into account, in 1916, including overtime 10.1 hours, and at the beginning of 1920, 8.6 hours, then the decrease of the working year amounts to 900 hours or 30 per cent.

PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR, PAST AND PRESENT.

355. The hourly production of the workman has everywhere decreased very considerably. The writer of the above-mentioned article refers to a report of the Petrograd statistical department of labor at the end of 1916, in which the hourly production of the workman was said to be 64 per cent of the normal prewar production, and

he observes that during 1919, 67 per cent was obtained in a large number of Petrograd works, and that similar figures were received for works in Moscow and some other districts. If it were desired to bring production up to the level of 1913, the following number of workmen would be required:

Number of workmen required by soviet Russia.

	According to standards of—	
	1913	1920
For manufacturing industries.....	1,700,000	4,250,000
For railways.....	700,000	4,000,000

The following is the explanation in the same article of the fall in the production of the workers' labor offered in the article:

Of course, there are in the proletarian family both idlers and time wasters. But in relation to them suitable measures can be taken. The essence of the matter does not rest with them. The following fact must be remembered: The normal daily nourishment of an adult town workman, according to the budget investigations of 1908-1916, was in Russia equal to 3,820 calories. Toward the beginning of 1919, according to the investigations of the commissariat, this standard had fallen to 2,680 calories daily, or by 30 per cent. It is true that in the beginning of the year 1920 new investigations by the central directorate of statistics found considerable improvement in the nourishment of the workpeople. Now, 1920, according to calculations by A. E. Lositsky, the workman in 23 towns receives on an average 2,980 calories daily. Nevertheless, this can not be considered sufficient for normal work.¹

356. The same article continues:

The physiological standard for supporting the life of an adult man, according to the calculation of Prof. Slovtsov, is 2,000 calories. So that after the deduction of this amount the workman was able to expend on productive labor—

	Calories.	Per cent.
Before the revolution.....	1,820	100
In 1919-1920.....	830	46

From these figures it will be seen that the Russian workman, in consequence of insufficient nourishment alone, is obliged to reduce his production by 54 per cent, to say nothing of other causes, the wearing out of appliances, defects in raw material and other matters beyond the control of the workman. At the same time this workman has, in fact, although confronted by a combination of all these causes, reduced his hourly production by only 33-36 per cent, and his daily production, taking into account the decrease of working days, at the outside by 50 per cent. This means that the workman works even better than his nourishment allows, works on his reserve of health, gradually starving his organism. The scarcity of food is the cause of the low productivity of labor and of the deficiency of labor. The increase of sickness, absence from work and other forms of neglect is due to the same cause—insufficient food.

¹ M. Farbman, in an article in the English Review of January, 1921, entitled "How Russia is Fed," gives the average calories of the food consumed in Russia as 2,558 per individual for March and April, 1919, and 2,761 for December, 1919, and January, 1920. The average consumption of the workers in the latter period, he states, as giving 2,570 calories. This he compares with the prewar consumption of the worst-fed Moscow workers of 3,458 calories and the general town consumption before the war of 3,891 calories.

MORTALITY AMONG THE WORKERS.

MORTALITY.

357. (1) *Sormovo*.—The underfeeding of the population must be regarded as one of the causes of the greatly increased mortality in Russia, and as having exposed people more rapidly to the ravages of disease. The following quotations from the evidence of three of our witnesses gives some idea of the increase in mortality among the industrial proletariat:

(1) Evidence of Mr. William Pickersgill, of the Sormovo Works, Nizhni Novgorod:

The people there are starving and dying away * * * from 10 to 12 coffins a day were built at our works, only for our workmen and their families—for the population of the works, which was about 45,000 before the revolution, but it melted away to about 30,000. I should think * * *. Almost in every house there was typhus fever; and there was smallpox, of course, but not to any extent.

(2) *Morozov Textile Mills*.—Evidence of Mr. James Charnock, of the Morozov Textile Mills, Orekhovo Zuevo, about 60 miles from Moscow:

The death rate reaches 70 a day. I am told (for the district of Orekhovo Zuevo, with a population of 105,000). * * * I have seen 30 funerals at one church, myself, on two consecutive days.

(3) *Serpukhov*.—Evidence of Mr. James Parkinson, of the Serpukhov Mills, near Moscow:

The local undertakers could not deal with the number of bodies, and so the local soviet issued a decree whereby the different works had to manufacture, as far as possible, coffins for its own people at cost price. Well, for about 5,000 workpeople with their families they were making an average of 20 coffins and a maximum of 30 coffins a day.

THE VOICE OF THE WORKER.

STATEMENTS BY WORKERS.

358. The following extracts relating to the malnutrition of the workers and the effect of malnutrition upon the productivity of their labor are made from a report of Dr. Sokolov:

(1) The Communist Novikov stated at the Moscow district meeting of the workers in the chemical laboratories, held on July 7, 1920:

Never before have the laboratory workers had to cope with such difficulties with regard to food supplies as at present; they are starving, as they have neither an adequate ration card nor a sufficient wage to enable them to purchase the necessities of life.

(2) A workman at the Putilov Works, where the workers are said to have fallen from 40,000 before the war to 7,000 at the present time, states:

In the full sense of the word we are starving, as we exist on bread and soviet soup. We are completely exhausted owing to excessive overtime and insufficient nourishment, and we can not afford to buy food.

(3) The Communist Khronin wrote in No. 3 of the journal Metallist for June, 1920:

The conditions of work at the Kostromskoi Works are so bad owing to excessive overtime and bad food, that many of the workmen have collapsed and deserted for the villages. * * * It must be recognized that the workmen's food is quite inadequate. * * * This is leading to the extinction of the proletariat.

(4) A workman from the Kolpinsky Works¹ announced:

It is sad and shameful to think that the Russian workman is doomed to extinction owing to the foolish economic policy of the bolsheviks. Half of them have already perished.

QUOTATION FROM THE METAL WORKERS' JOURNAL.

359. The following quotation from the Metallist, the publication of the All-Russian Union of Metal Workers, for March 31, 1920, offers a reflection upon the conditions of cold and hunger existing in Russia at the present time as they have been revealed to us in the course of our inquiry, and as we have endeavored to describe them above:

Cold and hunger have taught us much. The most important thing is that we have learned to understand why it is we are starving, and how we must fight against these misfortunes. It is now becoming sufficiently clear that we are getting bread with difficulty because we don't give the peasant manufactured articles; that we can not transport the grain lying ready in the corn-bearing governments, because there is no transport to move it; that in a country of forests we sit without fuel and can not keep our factory furnaces going because we can't supply the bread to the timber workers in the forests; that production in the factories and the repairing of locomotives has fallen to limits which beggar criticism, and the fault is one and the same—hunger, the absence of fuel, materials, etc.

THE HARVEST OF 1920.

SOVIET COMMENTS.

360. The description of the food situation set out above stands out more sharply in relief when it is remembered that the harvest for 1919 was exceptionally good, whereas the harvest for 1920 is stated to have been a failure. The following extract is taken from instructions to the peasantry issued by Muralov,² a well-known communist agricultural expert, and printed in the paper Derevenskaya Kommuna, for August 14, 1920. The paper is published at Petrograd. The instructions are entitled "An Immediate Task."

As a result of the drought during the spring and summer of 1920, there has been a great failure in the harvesting of corn, hay, and roots. It is essential without delaying a single day to supplement the bad harvest of corn and fodder.

With regard to corn, nothing can be done during this season, and the only means of salvation from starving is to grind up the old stocks of corn in Siberia and the Ural.

Muralov also states that:

A second immediate task is to increase the supplies of fodder. The results of the drought have been to decrease the harvest of hay by 60 to 90 per cent. The meadows have yielded almost nothing. The harvest of clover and other fodder is bad. The season is past and there is no changing a ruined harvest.

The instructions given by Muralov relate entirely to the taking of measures to assure a good harvest in 1921 and to making the most economical use of available supplies.

THE STRUGGLE WITH FAMINE.

361. A series of paragraphs under the heading "The Struggle with Famine" have appeared in the Moscow Pravda during the autumn months. They give information regarding the results of the activ-

¹ In July, 1920, Dr. Sokolov was elected as a social revolutionary to represent the workers of the Kolpinsky Factory on the Petrograd Soviet.

² First bolshevik commandant of the Moscow military district after the revolution of October, 1917.

ties of the food committees in the various provinces in their efforts to organize the collection and distribution of agricultural produce. The paragraphs do not, however, provide any data which would enable us to judge as to the transport of these supplies which are said to be available, and their distribution among the population.

PARTICULARS OF 1920 HARVEST.

362. An account of the 1920 harvest is given in an article in *Economic Life*, No. 230, of October 15, 1920. An index table of the condition of the crops in different provinces is set out in the article. The following is an extract from the table:

Number of provinces.

Quality.	Rye.	Wheat.	Barley.	Oats.	Pota-toes.	Hay.
Good.....						
Above average.....	1	1	3	1	1
Average.....	17	10	13	12	4
Below average.....	21	22	26	31	28	6
Bad.....	13	14	4	5	13	30
						8

It will be seen that the position of cereals is menacing, whilst the hay and fodder crops were almost a complete failure. The result has been that many peasants have slaughtered cattle they were unable to feed and thus further reduced the stock which had already been seriously depleted.

HOPES OF SUPPLIES FROM SIBERIA AND THE CAUCASUS.

363. In spite of these discouraging figures, the food administration of the soviet government professed confidence in their ability to obtain larger supplies of food for distribution in the winter of 1920-21 than in 1918-19 or in 1919-20. Their optimism was founded on the expectation that Siberia and the northern Caucasus would provide more than half the quantity set out in their program and that the claims on the rest of soviet territory would be less than last year. There seems grave reason to doubt whether these hopes are likely to be fulfilled. On October 16, 1920, the food administration sent a circular telegram to all its branches signed by Lenin himself, in which it was stated that "in view of the scanty supplies from Siberia and from northern Caucasus, all provincial food organizations are to send special trains of grain to Moscow." The amount collected in the early autumn appears to have been much below what was expected, and to have shown a decreasing tendency at a time when it might have been expected to increase.

WIRELESS NEWS IN JANUARY, 1921.

364. In the Wireless News of January 13, 1921, it is stated that the presidents of the provincial food supply conferences in the great corn-bearing provinces of Central Russia—Samara, Kazan, Saratov, Tambov, Simbirsk, etc.—have received telegrams signed by Lenin and the people's commissaries for food supplies and ways and communica-

tions containing proposals to increase the export of grain from those provinces. The telegrams point out that owing to the lack of fuel it is impossible to obtain more than one-half of the food supplies ordered from the Caucasus. In regard to Siberia, so far from exporting grain, the telegram states that grain must be sent there in exchange for meat. The latest information regarding the situation in Siberia confirms the inability of the corn-bearing districts of western Siberia to export grain. A considerable quantity of this grain was exported formerly to eastern Siberia, where great privation is now being caused owing to the cessation of these exports. The separation of town from country, of which there had been signs under the Kolchak régime, has become far more apparent since the soviet administration was established in Siberia. The peasants, who were bitterly opposed to the Kolchak régime, are now equally opposed to the soviet administration, and refuse to supply the towns with grain. The bolsheviks have, therefore, been obliged to resort to requisitions by force, as in western Russia. The Moscow wireless telegram, in stating that it is necessary to import grain from western Russia into Siberia in exchange for meat, indicates the gravity of the economic situation in what was an important corn-bearing area. It seems impossible to believe that western Russia, in view of the failure of the harvest, is able to do more than supply with difficulty the needs of its own population at the present time. In regard to supplies for the industrial population of western Russia, another wireless message, dated January 16, states that the danger of a shortage of grain in the towns is not yet over, since the grain collected is in distant parts of the country and must be transported to the center of soviet Russia. The following is a quotation from the message:

Our hope now rests with the transport. All efforts must be exerted to bring the collected grain to the center of soviet Russia. Transport work is daily becoming more difficult and complicated.

In these circumstances the supply of Siberia with grain from western Russia would appear to be out of the question, and the position in western Russia is in itself likely to become worse in the immediate future, owing to the fact that the climatic conditions prevailing during January, February, and March are often adverse to transport.

REALIZATION OF THE POSITION BY SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

365. In conclusion it may be stated that the terrible conditions of cold and hunger, which make spiritually and materially desolate the lives of so many millions of the Russian people, are the subject of ceaseless comment in the utterances of the responsible heads of the soviet government and endless writings in the official reports and periodical publications of the people's commissariats and in the bolshevik press. The conditions are such that they can not be hidden.

HOW THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROPOSES TO MEET THE SITUATION.

TROTSKI ACKNOWLEDGES THE DESPERATE SITUATION OF RUSSIA.

366. The prominent members of the soviet government have acknowledged the seriousness of the situation as it has arisen during 1919 and 1920. Trotski, in his "Terrorism and Communism," published in June, 1920, states that Russia is "a starving country and suffering from terrible collapse of transport and the food administration." He acknowledges the diminished productivity of labor and admits that socialism must stand or fall by its capacity for the production of commodities necessary to civilization. He observes that—

(1) The growth of civilization is measured by the productivity of human labor, and every new form of social relationship must pass the test on this donkey.¹

(2) It is impossible to build up socialism on decreased production. Every social organization is at bottom an organization of labor. And if our new organization of labor leads to its decreased productivity, then, by this very fact, the socialist society which is being built up is inevitably on the way to ruin, however we may twist and turn, and whatever means of salvation we try to improvise.

THE EFFECTS OF THE EUROPEAN WAR, 1914-1917, AND OF THE CIVIL WAR.

367. It is interesting to note the reasons advanced by prominent members of the soviet government for present conditions, and in particular the remedies with which they propose to rectify the industrial collapse which they admit. In chapter VIII of "Terrorism and Communism" Trotski outlines the effects of the "imperialist" war and of the civil war which followed it. In particular, he mentions the temporary loss of the Donetz coal basin and of the Caucasus oil, the destruction caused by the alternate taking and retaking of large stretches of Russian territory by the White and Red armies, respectively, the "swallowing up" of many thousands of the best workmen by conscription for the army and the adaptation to war purposes of Russia's remaining industrial organizations. He writes of the "gigantic devastation" caused partly by the Anglo-American blockade and partly by the "predatory" campaigns of Kolchak and Denikin.

AN APPRAISAL OF TROTSKI'S ARGUMENTS.

368. It is clear the war of 1914-1917 disorganized the economic life of Russia; that the revolution of February, 1917, was the result of a gradual undermining of the political and economic fabric of the State in the course of the war, and that the revolution itself and the disruptive forces which it released still further extended and hastened the process of economic disorganization. We are prepared to agree that the effects of the war were calamitous. Our evidence shows, however, that the effects of the civil war upon the decline of Russian industry were preceded by the inauguration of an indiscriminate policy of nationalization, to which certain of the more moderate communists were opposed; and that this policy occasioned a further serious decline of Russian industry, the measure of which it is impossible accurately to determine.

¹ A literal translation.

TROTSKI AND THE BLOCKADE—THE BLOCKADE REACTS ADVERSELY UPON THE EXCHANGE BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRY—THE PROPRIETARY INSTINCTS OF THE RUSSIAN PEASANT—THE IRRECONCILABLE LAND POLICY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

369. Trotski does not explain what was the nature and extent of the "gigantic devastation caused by the Anglo-American blockade." The effects of the evidence given before us is to show that the blockade reacted principally upon the exchange of commodities between town and country. Agricultural machinery and implements and manufactured articles in universal use had chiefly been imported into Russia from abroad. The peasant was no longer able to obtain these articles in exchange for the paper currency he received for his agricultural produce. It is therefore claimed that the incentive to maintain in cultivation the former area of land under corn and crops and to bring to the towns the surplus fruits of this cultivation has been largely removed from the peasants. The evidence in our possession, and notably that of a witness, who has worked for many years in the cooperative societies in the northwestern Provinces, and has come into direct contact with the life of the villages, inclines us to conclude that the influence of the blockade was chiefly felt in this direction. We agree, therefore, that the blockade accentuated the difficulties of the soviet government in relation to the peasantry, and we are prepared fully to take into account the effect of these difficulties upon the life of the towns, which are entirely dependent upon the villages for corn and other agricultural produce. We are, however, convinced by other evidence, both oral and documentary, which has been brought before us, that the elementary proprietary instincts innate in the majority of the Russian peasantry, more especially with regard to the land and the narrow devotion of the responsible heads of the bolshevik government to communist theories on the socialization of land, are also factors powerfully contributing to the deadlock between the soviet government and the peasants, which has led Lenin to say "the village is conquering us."

METHODS PROPOSED FOR THE RESTORATION OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION.

370. The remedies proposed by the bolsheviks for the admitted industrial collapse appear to involve a threefold policy of inducement to the Russian worker to use every effort for the restoration of industry: (1) Moral suasion of the worker by propaganda. (2) Payment of the worker according to work done. (3) Conscription and militarization of labor.

BOLSHEVIK DIFFERENCES.

It has been made clear in the course of our inquiry that leading bolsheviks differ among themselves as to the relative importance of the three remedies proposed. Some of them are inclined to believe in the principle of payment in accordance with work done as an incentive to the intensification of the industrial effort. Others place more reliance on the ultima ratio of force, and Trotski is the leader of these.

TROTSKI AS THE PROTAGONIST OF COMPELSION.

In Appendix VIII we give a full translation of Chapter VIII of Trotski's "Terrorism and Communism." The whole of it is worthy of study. It contains the most illuminating exposition we have met of the views of a convinced communist who by temperament and experience is inclined to rely chiefly on force, and whose ideas of moral suasion appear to be centered in educating the masses in the necessity of discipline and of the compulsion which it necessarily entails.

In reference to moral suasion by propaganda Trotski writes:

We say straight and openly to the masses, that it is theirs to save, to raise and set in order a socialist country, only by means of stern labor, unconditional discipline, the most accurate execution of orders by every worker.

We must tell them openly that our economic plan, even with the maximum of intensive effort on the part of the workers, will not give us either to-morrow, or after to-morrow, a land flowing with milk and honey, for during the immediate future we shall be devoting all our labors to preparing the conditions necessary to production. Only if we are successful in guaranteeing in minimum measure the possibility of reestablishing the means of transport, shall we be in a position to proceed to the manufacture of our articles of general necessity.

The masses, who will continue to support the burden of trial and privations for a considerable period to come, must understand in all its breadth of meaning the inevitable inner logic of this economic plan in order that they may be able to bear it upon their shoulders.

COMMENT ON TROTSKI'S APPEAL.

371. It is a stern and lofty appeal. But it is doubtful how far under the most favorable conditions it would prove an effective spur to sustained corporate effort—even in a free community where broad and enlightened governance over long periods of time has slowly tempered men's passions and advanced their minds—leading them toward the distant goal of an ultimate ideal, and remolding, without impairing the economic foundations upon which civilization rests. The picture of the state of Russia to-day, which we have endeavored faithfully to draw within the limits of our opportunity and power, is the opposite of this. Russia has fallen into a state of economic dissolution which has, we think, few parallels in history; and those parallels show that, when the foundations of old societies are swept away and economic chaos supervenes, the moral fiber of man snaps under the strain of hunger and want, he becomes incapable of corporate action, and the intense individuality of suffering shatters society into thousands of human fragments. It is of this, we believe, that Mr. Bertrand Russell is thinking when he writes of "the material disaster" which has overtaken Russia, bringing "spiritual collapse." It appears, therefore, that there is little to be hoped from a moral appeal directed to men whose material desolation has left a spiritual void which makes it impossible for them to respond.

TROTSKI ON PAYMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH WORK DONE.

372. The following extract illustrates Trotski's argument in favor of payment in accordance to work done:

We have maintained, and shall have to continue for a considerable period, wage payment. The further we go the greater will the significance of the wage consist in the guaranteeing of all members of society with everything of which they stand in need, by this very fact it will cease to be a wage. But at the present time we are not yet sufficiently rich for this. Our fundamental task is to increase the quantity of

goods produced, and everything must be subordinated to this. Therefore the wage, both monetary and in kind, must be made as far as possible accurately to correspond with the productivity of individual labor.

Payment according to work done is admittedly a departure from communist principles. Such a scheme tends to maintain classes for an indefinite time, and it is in itself, as is admitted by Trotski, an essentially bourgeois industrial method.

TROTSKI ON COMPULSION AND MILITARIZATION OF LABOR.

373. Trotski bases his long and detailed argument in favor of compulsion and militarization of labor on the socialist view that every society in the past has been an organization of labor in the interest of a minority, whilst Russia is making the first attempt in the world's history to organize labor in the interests of the working majority itself. By militarization of labor is meant the "arbitrary disposition of the economic forces and resources of the country." * * *

The workers' State considers it has a right to send every worker to the place where his labor is necessary. And not a single serious socialist will deny to the workers' State the right to lay hands on the worker who refuses to carry out his labor orders.

It does not, therefore—

exclude the element of compulsion in all its forms, in its most mild and harshest forms. The elementary obligations of State compulsion not only does not pass from the scene of history, but, on the contrary, will continue to play an extraordinary rôle for a considerable time to come.

THE TRADE-UNIONS AS THE STAFF OF MILITARIZED LABOR.

He invokes the assistance of the trade-unions¹—

to train, discipline, distribute, group, and fasten to their posts for definite periods the various categories of workers and individual workers,

and adds—

To stand out for the "freedom of labor," under these conditions, means to stand out for a fruitless, helpless, unsystematic searching after better conditions, disorderly, chaotic migrations from one factory to another, in a starving country, suffering from a terrible collapse of transport and the food administration. What will be the result of such an inept attempt to combine bourgeois freedom of labor with the proletarian socialization of the means of production save the complete dissolution of the working class and complete anarchy?

TROTSKI ON THE COLLEGIALE SYSTEM.

374. In the same chapter of "Terrorism and Communism," Trotski defends the replacement of the collegiate system of factory management by a return to individual administration. In reply to the taunts thrown at the bolsheviks by Kautsky in Germany, and by the social revolutionaries in Russia, that the return of individual administration is a departure from communist principles, he makes the defense that the soviet organs through the congresses of soviets represent tens of millions of working people, and continues—

If the working class on a basis of its experience comes to the conclusion through its congresses, partly soviet and trade-union, that it is better to have one man standing at the head of a factory and not a collegium, then this is a decision dictated by the self-action of the working class. It may be right or wrong from the point of view of administrative technique, but it is not a thing imposed upon the proletariat, but is dictated at its discretion and by its will.

¹See the section on "Trade-Unions in Soviet Russia," p. 84.

It can not be said, however, that the congress of soviets is a democratically elected body having a free will of its own. It is, on the contrary, an organization carefully adapted to register the will of the central committee of the Russian Communist Party.

HIS ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF INDIVIDUAL CONTROL.

375. The arguments of Trotski in favor of individual control do not differ from the views held in the bourgeois society, which it is the purpose of the bolsheviks to destroy:

No collegium formed out of persons who don't know the job is capable of superseding one man who does know the job. A collegium of jurists can not take the place of a signalman. A collegiate of invalids can not take the place of a doctor. The whole idea is wrong. The collegium itself can not give knowledge to the ignorant. It can only serve to conceal the ignorance of the ignorant. If you appoint a person to a responsible post, then it is soon clear not only to others, but also to himself, how much he knows and how much he does not know. But there is nothing worse than a collegium of ignoramuses, of workers ill prepared to fill a purely practical post which demands special knowledge. The members of a collegium are in a state of perpetually losing their heads, of mutual dissatisfaction, and chaos enters into the whole work by reason of their very helplessness.

He adds that in Russia the numbers of those among the working class who are capable of administration is very small, and indicates that those who (like himself and Lenin) have known—

“the underground,” who have fought the revolutionary struggle, who have lived abroad, who have read much in prison and exile, and who have acquired political experience, a wide horizon—this is the most valuable element of the working class.

The last observation is unintelligible until one substitutes “Communist Party” for “working class.”

CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE REPORT HAS BEEN COMPILED—UNRELIABILITY OF STATISTICS.

376. We have above given as faithful a picture as we could of the economic conditions existing in Russia preceding the bolshevik revolution of October, 1917, and from that time onward up to recent months. The difficulties of our task have been great and they have been enhanced by the fact that we have only been able to obtain copies of the soviet journal, *Economic Life*, at irregular intervals. The witnesses whom we have examined, and the many travelers—Russian, English, and French—with whom we have had interviews, have given us many details, as well as their general views, on the situation; but these usually related to only a small part of the country, and were naturally colored by their own political views. In the circumstances we have carefully checked such information as we have received from individuals by official reports, by the speeches or writings of leading bolsheviks, and by the statistics issued in *Economic Life* and other publications of the soviet government, for the supply of which we have been chiefly indebted to private sources. It should be stated that the statistics thus officially published are often inconsistent, and lead us to doubt their accuracy. That caution is necessary is proved by an article in *Economic Life* of the 13th of August, 1920, headed “Why we have no industrial statistics.” The reasons are stated to be that, although there are many statistical organizations and a perfect “rain of calculations,” there is a complete lack of coordination and a shortage of competent statisticians in these organizations.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS.

377. These are the conditions under which our inquiry has been conducted, and it only remains for us to summarize the results as follows:

(A) THE EFFECTS OF THE EUROPEAN WAR.

The evidence produced before us shows that—

- (1) The economic reorganization of Russia was already, from 1915 onward, partially dislocated as a result of the war.
- (2) The organization of the Russian Army became seriously impaired and its discipline undermined in the course of the war.
- (3) A food crisis in Petrograd in February, 1917, led to bread riots among the workmen of the city.
- (4) The revolt of the Petrograd garrison, who joined the workmen, was a decisive factor in the overthrow of the Imperial Government, and was a result of the revolutionary events of February, 1917.

B. THE EFFECTS OF THE REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY, 1917.

- (1) The establishment of soviets of workmen in the factories adversely affected industrial administration, and was largely responsible for a rapid fall of production in the manufacturing industries.
- (2) The establishment of soviets among the troops, who were war weary and desired peace, contributed further to destroy the Russian Army as a fighting machine. Wholesale desertion began, and the army became a powerful factor in the process of disintegration throughout Russia after the February revolution, 1917.
- (3) The peasants from the moment of the revolution, 1917, began to seize the estates of the landowners, and were encouraged in this course by the bolsheviks during the summer of 1917.
- (4) The area of land under cultivation began to decrease as a result of the disturbed state of the countryside.
- (5) The peasants ceased bringing their grain to the towns as a result of the fall in production and the great rise in the prices of manufactured goods. Such food as the peasants did bring to the towns was commandeered by the Government at fixed prices, but the price given was such that it did not enable them to purchase the articles of common necessity which they needed.
- (6) The disturbance of the balance of exchange between town and country was a general result of the events accompanying and following the February revolution.

C. THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION AND ITS RESULTS UP TO THE END OF 1919.

- (1) The soviet government proceeded to inaugurate a policy of nationalization of industry and to institute an organization for the State collection and distribution of food.

(2) The soviet government established the collegiate system of administration in industry, with a view to controlling the hitherto unrestrained actions of the factory soviets.

(3) The soviet government in a situation calling for the exercise of the utmost discrimination and care, carried out the policy of nationalization in haste, without taking account of the disorder already prevailing in Russia, of the complex structure of modern industry, of the absence of expert technical assistance, and of the disabilities resulting from the lack of knowledge and experience under which they themselves labored.

(4) As a result of nationalization, carried out in the above conditions, production continued to fall, and with ever-increasing rapidity.

(5) In the summer of 1918 the outbreak of civil war, accompanied by foreign intervention, caused the soviet government to divert military purposes all its energy and the residue of Russia's industrial capacity. In these circumstances the collapse of all other than war industry became complete.

(6) The uninterrupted fall of production in the towns was accompanied by a further decline in the supplies of food received by the towns from the villages, which were able to obtain less and less in exchange for their produce. The disorganization of transport also made it impossible to move with speed and regularity to the towns with supplies available in the country districts.

(7) The reluctance of the peasants to supply the towns with food placed the soviet government under the necessity of requisitioning agricultural produce. This requisitioning in many cases evoked peasant revolts, which the soviet government endeavored to suppress by sending punitive expeditions to quell them.

(8) The shortage of food in the towns, owing to the cessation of exchange between town and country, was further accentuated by incompetence and corruption on the part of the soviet food administration.

(9) The industrial worker was paid partly in paper money, which fell in purchasing power with each succeeding month, and partly in a food ration, upon which it was impossible to support life, and partly in small and irregular issues of other commodities.

(10) The worker was thus compelled to devote much of his working time in trying to supplement by illegal purchase the insufficient rations which he and those dependent upon him received and to which by law he was limited. Government shops nominally existed where the worker might make supplementary purchases at moderate prices; but little or nothing could be purchased at these shops, partly owing to the meager supplies available in them and partly to the fact that such commodities as might be available were mostly reserved for favored clients.

(11) An organized system of speculation, which the bolshevik authorities endeavored unsuccessfully to suppress and in which they ultimately came to participate, grew up side by side with the soviet administration and made it possible for those who possessed the means of purchase and exchange to keep body and soul together.

(12) Since the revolution of October, 1917, disease has been widespread, particularly among the poorer classes, owing to malnutrition and neglected sanitation. The annual mortality of Russia is said to be 6 per cent of the population at the present time.

(13) From the summer of 1918 the strength and directing energy of the bolshevik leaders were concentrated on the successful campaign against Yudenich, Denikin, and Kolchak, and the needs of the civil population were of necessity sacrificed to those of the army. The successes of the campaign are to be attributed to the fact that unity of aim and method and the enthusiasm of a new ideal were to be found on the side of the bolsheviks, while on the other side there was every kind of disorganization and lack of unity, with a growing disinclination for strenuous fighting.

SOVIET PROPOSALS TO COMBAT ECONOMIC COLLAPSE.

378. Such was the position at the end of 1919. The success of the bolsheviks in the civil war brought them face to face with the seriousness of the economic collapse which had taken place, and it is clear from the speeches of Lenin and Trotski, and from innumerable articles in the bolshevik press, that the soviet government from that time onward fully realized the gravity of the situation. They proceeded:

- (1) To establish a system of individual control in industry in place of the collegiate system, which had proved a failure.
- (2) To inaugurate a special campaign for the repair of locomotives and rolling stock as an essential preliminary step to the restoration of transport.

(3) To introduce a policy of conscription and the militarization of labor as the only means of carrying on the industry of the country—an industry practically ruined owing to the demoralization prevailing among the industrial proletariat as a result of malnutrition and the absence of many of the primary necessities of life.

(4) To conduct an energetic propaganda against bureaucracy and red tape which have threatened to paralyze the soviet administration.

(5) To contemplate the possibility of receiving economic assistance from abroad on a resumption of trade relations with western countries.

With regard to these measures:

(1) We have seen no figures which would allow us to judge as to how far the restoration of the system of individual control in industry has contributed to increase production.

(2) The measures taken to restore transport have resulted in a considerable increase in the number of locomotives repaired and in the improvement of railway services in the central Provinces of Russia; but the majority of the locomotives available for running purposes are so worn out that, after repairs have been completed upon them, they often return to the workshops in a few weeks to undergo further repairs. We are, therefore, of opinion that the soviet government will experience increasing difficulty in maintaining the railway services at the higher level to which they have been raised in the course of 1920, and we are convinced that only the importation of locomotives and of the spare parts of locomotives from abroad will enable the soviet government to maintain transport at its present level and to achieve any further improvement. In this connection attention may be drawn to Trotski's statement in his speech before the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, that it was hoped 1,000 locomotives would be imported into Russia by the end of 1921.

(3) Also we have not been able to obtain such information as would allow us to judge how far the policy of labor conscription and militarization of labor have been successful, or otherwise, in solving the problem of the shortage of labor, and to what extent conscripted labor has been utilized in industry, and how far—where used—it has been productive.

(4) The question of bureaucracy and red tape in the soviet administration was discussed at the Eighth All-Russian Congress, but there are no indications as to practical measures which the soviet government propose to take against it.

THE FUTURE.

379. In regard to the future we can only speak with great reserve. No parallel is to be found in the history of the world for such conditions as exist now in Russia. The French Revolution toward the end of the eighteenth century was political rather than economic, and no outstanding leader in it was a communist. "Liberty, equality, fraternity," were the watchwords of that revolution, and although the land of the nobles was confiscated, no attempt was made to reorganize the means of production on a socialistic basis. In Russia, on the other hand, the fundamental tenets of bolshevism are economic and include the violent suppression of the bourgeoisie, the confiscation and nationalization of the means of production, and the dictatorship of the proletariat as a necessary step toward a realization of the communist ideal. The practical efforts of bolshevism up to the present time, so far as they affect production, have been a disastrous failure. The magnitude of the industrial collapse in Russia and the consequent cessation of exchange of products between town and country are the factors that have forced themselves particularly on our attention. We know of no similar instance of a collapse so complete, so sudden, and so far-reaching, although a similar tendency is to be observed in central Europe, and more especially in those countries which formerly composed the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Want existed in Paris during the Revolutionary period, but it was submitted to for the sake of the political liberty sought by the people, and there was no general economic debacle such as has occurred in Russia.

INCREASED PRODUCTION THE CONDITION OF THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

380. In these circumstances it is clear, if bolshevism is to have any chance of permanent success, there must be a rapid return to something approaching the old standards of productivity. This is acknowledged by the leaders of the movement; by Trotski not once only but many times in his *Terrorism and Communism*; for example (see par. §2), "It is impossible to build up socialism on decreased production * * *; if our new organization of labor leads to its decreased productivity, then * * * the socialist society which is being built up is inevitably on the way to ruin," etc.

381. It is maintained by the bolsheviks that the soviet government has existed too short a time for considered judgment to be passed upon its success or failure, and that during the greater part of this period they have been prevented from laying the foundations of economic reconstruction owing to the civil war and the foreign inter-

vention which accompanied it. We are prepared to agree that their time has been short and their opportunities restricted. We doubt, however, whether so much human misery as has existed in Russia during the last three years has ever been the lot of any people within so short a time in the history of the modern world. While we are prepared to admit that the European war, the events following the first revolution, the civil war, and intervention are contributing factors in causing this misery, it is impossible to dissociate the soviet government from a large measure of responsibility for the recent sufferings of the Russian people.

HAS THE FIRST STAGE TOWARD COMMUNISM BEEN COMPLETED?

382. It is claimed by some that the first stage toward the ultimate realization of a communist society has been accomplished in Russia, viz, the overthrow and suppression of bourgeois society and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that the second stage, that of economic reconstruction on communist lines, has been begun. Our evidence shows that the bolsheviks have succeeded in completing the first stage only in so far as they may be said to have destroyed the freedom of trade and competition upon which capitalistic enterprise is based. Lenin in his recent book, *The Childish Ailments of Progressivism in Communism*, indicates that "petty industry" continues to flourish, and that it breeds capitalism. The foundations upon which bourgeois society has been built up still, therefore, exists, and the first stage toward the realization of a communist society is in consequence incomplete.

MODIFICATION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S POLICY.

383. If, however, it be assumed that the first stage has been completed, the policy of the soviet government at the beginning of the second stage differs widely from the policy which was adopted by the bolsheviks on their advent to power. The collegiate system, which was established to control the soviet system in industry, has given place in the majority of cases to individual control, a return to principles of industrial administration which have received their fullest development under capitalism.

384. At the same time, the power of officialdom in Russia has developed on a scale to which there is no parallel, and represents an attempt to control completely the conditions of work and leisure, of food and drink, of education and amusement, of travel, and even of the home life of every individual in a nation whose population even now exceeds 120,000,000. According to recent evidence, the tendency toward State control is increasing rather than diminishing, and this at a time when many communists are of opinion that the withering away of the State—accepted by all believers as the second stage on the road to a communistic utopia—has already been reached.

DIVIDED COUNSELS IN COMMUNIST PARTY.

385. There is reason to believe that the difficulties confronting the soviet government will be enhanced in the work of economic reconstruction owing to the increasingly divided counsels in the Russian Communist Party and to the failure of the harvest, the results of which may be reflected upon the harvests of succeeding years.

CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE RESUMPTION OF TRADE.

386. With regard to the resumption of trade between Russia and other countries, we have formed the following conclusions:

(1) We are convinced that for the economic equilibrium of the world exports from Russia are a most important factor to the European market.

(2) We do not, however, consider that Russia will be in a position to make its contribution toward the relief of Europe for a considerable time to come.

(3) There can be no question of the export of cereals in the immediate future, owing to—

(a) The primary necessity of restoring to the Russian people a sufficiency of food to maintain health and strength.

(b) The lack of agricultural machinery and fertilizers.

(c) The diminution in the area of the land under cultivation, which is given by M. Farbman in his articles in the Manchester Guardian as 40 per cent.

(d) The necessity for restoring to the peasant an adequate incentive if the land which has fallen out of cultivation is to be reclaimed.

(e) The impossibility of restoring to the peasant an adequate incentive to agricultural production until industrial production has been restored and the peasant is in a position to receive from the town the manufactured goods and articles of common necessity which he needs.

FOREIGN CAPITAL ESSENTIAL TO SPEEDY ECONOMIC REGENERATION OF RUSSIA.

387. It is our conviction that there is no possibility of the economic regeneration of Russia in the near future without the assistance of capitalist countries. Our conclusions with regard to the rendering of such assistance are guided by the following considerations:

(1) That the destruction of capitalism by violence not only in Russia but in other countries is the deliberate aim and purpose of the Russian Communist Party, which forms the government of soviet Russia at the present time.

(2) That to this end the Third or Communist International has been established at Moscow, and we believe this has been done under the auspices of the soviet government and with its financial and material support.

(3) That the Russian Communist Party and the Third International are actively endeavoring to compass the destruction by violence of capitalism in countries to which the soviet government has addressed overtures for trade.

(4) That the soviet government, in destroying capitalism in Russia, has assisted to bring about a complete collapse of industry in that country.

(5) That in face of this collapse the soviet government invites capitalists to help to restore Russian industry.

(6) That the soviet government has carried on, up to the present time, an active and widespread international propaganda, and that, had that propaganda achieved its object international capital, to which the soviet government now turns for aid in restoring economic prosperity to Russia, would have disappeared.

(7) That the credit and capital required for Russia's urgent needs are large; that no Government can give this credit and capital on the

scale required; and that such aid can only be furnished by individual capitalists or financial groups who are willing to provide the necessary supplies in money or goods.

(8) That it is inconceivable that the credit and capital required in Russia should be provided by foreign capitalists as long as the destruction of capitalism and the violent overthrow of so-called bourgeois Governments remains the main object of the Russian Government or of the political forces by which it is controlled.

(9) That if the soviet government renounce and abstain from propaganda directed to the destruction of capitalism and the established order in other countries, it still remains to be seen how far in the near future they will be able to arrest the process of economic disintegration and to lay a foundation upon which it will be possible for Russian industry and agriculture once more to develop and expand.

FINAL CONCLUSIONS.

388. The conclusions to which we have come are:

(1) That the complete renunciation by the soviet government, by the Russian Communist Party, and by the Third or Communist International of propaganda directed toward the destruction of the political and economic order existing in other countries is the fundamental premise, without the acceptance of which there can be no question of capitalist aid in the economic reconstruction of Russia.

(2) That the possibility of extending credit to Russia on a scale in any way commensurate with her minimum needs will be dependent on the faithful observation of the above condition.

(3) That the cooperation of the peasantry is indispensable to the economic reconstruction of Russia.

(4) That the settlement of the agrarian question on a basis which will provide inducements for agricultural production, now lacking, is essential to the provision of adequate supplies of food for the industrial worker in the towns.

(5) That the restoration of rail and river transport is necessary if such food supplies are to be conveyed with speed and regularity to the industrial areas of Russia.

(6) That the state of administrative incompetence and corruption into which the departments of the soviet government have fallen militates against the proper distribution of available supplies among the population and must be remedied if the Russian worker is to be restored to the standard of health and strength necessary to reestablish the diminished productivity of his labor.

(7) That if the extraordinary commissions continue to exercise their present irresponsible powers, foreigners, whose services in Russia may be necessary to execute contracts between the soviet government and foreign capitalists, will be deprived of those guarantees of freedom and protection which are accorded to foreigners in other civilized countries, and this will destroy the possibility of any benefits accruing to the soviet government from such agreements.

THE CHOICE BEFORE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

389. It would appear, therefore, that the soviet government must decide whether they are going to maintain a policy of political repression at home and aggressive bolshevik propaganda abroad, which will inevitably, whatever international treaties they may make, lead

in practice to a continuance of their present economic isolation, or whether they will accept and honestly carry out the fundamental condition which can alone obtain for them the outside aid they so urgently need.

390. If they decide to maintain the campaign for the violent destruction of capitalism in other countries and the policy of ruthless repression which makes it impossible for foreigners to live and to do business in Russia, then Russia will of necessity be left to her own resources. Then will the future show whether or not the combined effect upon the worker of persuasion as to the merits of communism and of persuasion by payment for work done with the shadow of imprisonment and the bayonet ever present can restore the old productive power of Russia within the short time available for the experiment. If it does not, Trotski himself admits that the Russian socialist society is on the way to ruin, however it may twist and turn, and with the conclusion of Trotski we agree.

CONCLUSION.

We now conclude the report, which we have endeavored to draw up in accordance with our terms of reference. Our difficulties have been great owing to the remoteness of the country where the events forming the subject of our inquiry have taken place; by the fact that Russia has been cut off from other countries for three years, and that even now normal intercourse has not been reestablished; and they have been increased by the complexity of the subject matter, dealing, as it does, with the extensive and far-reaching character of a rapid sequence of revolutionary changes which have taken and are now taking place. Our information, while extensive, has been inadequate to the nature and magnitude of our subject. It has also often been conflicting and has not been easily susceptible of arrangement in a form lending itself to the expression of considered opinions. Imperfect, therefore, as they have inevitably been, we hope that our inquiries may be of some assistance to your Lordship, to His Majesty's Government, and to the British public.

We desire to express our acknowledgment of the valuable services rendered by Mr. Garle, who has acted as our secretary until his health broke down, and of the great assistance rendered by Mr. Gall, who was appointed secretary when Mr. Garle resigned. Mr. Gall's knowledge of Russia, and of the Russian language, and of many Russians, has been invaluable in the prosecution of our inquiry, and he has worked with an intellectual grip and assiduity which are beyond all praise.

We have, etc.,

EMMOTT, *Chairman.*

ELLIS HUME WILLIAMS,

W. RYLAND D. ADKINS,

D. WATTS MORGAN,

Members.

L. G. M. GALL, *Secretary,*

22 *Carlisle Place, Westminster, S. W. 1.*

FEBRUARY 25, 1921.

APPENDIXES.

APPENDIX I.

COAL.

The output of coal from the Russian coal mines, both European and Asiatic, in the year 1913 was 2,192,220,000 poods. It fell in 1914 to 2,167,309,000 because in the latter half of the year the Dombrovsky Basin, which had produced 424,452,000 poods in 1913, came within the zone of war and only produced 230,144,000 poods. In 1915 the Dombrovsky Basin fell completely into the hands of the Germans and produced no coal whatsoever for Russia, with the result that the total output of European and Asiatic coal for the year 1915 fell to 1,898,387,000 poods.

All the coal-mining districts showed a better output for 1914 than they did in 1913, with the exception of the Dombrovsky district, and this improvement was maintained in 1915 except in the Caucasus district, where there was a small fall of about half a million poods as compared with 1913. According to a report of the Ukraine coal committee, which appears in Economic Life of the 22d of June, 1920, the total amount of coal obtained from all the coal mines of European and Asiatic Russia for the month of May, 1920, was 24,954,256 poods. Assuming that the output for the whole year 1920 remained at or about twelve times the amount obtained in May, this would give a total of 299,451,000 poods of coal for the year 1920, or about one-seventh of the 1913 production and one-sixth of the 1915 production.

The principal coal fields in European Russia, in order of importance, are the Donetz, the Dombrovsky, the Urals, the Moscow, and the Caucasus regions, of which the Donetz is by far the most important as regards its size, the quality of the coal, and the ease of working. The mines in Asiatic Russia only produced 163,000,000 poods in 1915, nearly the whole of which was consumed locally.

THE DONETZ BASIN.

As regards the Donetz region the position has been complicated by these coal fields having been within the zone of hostilities in the course of the civil war. It changed hands five times in all, the last change being in December, 1919, when the Red army recaptured it. A great decrease in production took place after the bolshewik revolution in 1917 and the output in January, 1920, was reduced to 14,000,000 poods. It will be seen later that this output has improved and in the month of September stood at 26,000,000 poods, as compared with 139,836,000 poods, which was the average monthly output for the year 1915.

The following table appeared in Economic Life of the 24th of June, 1920:

Production of coal in the Donetz Basin for the first four months of 1913, 1919, and 1920.

[In thousands of poods.]

Months.	1913	1919	1920
January.....	143,000	36,600	14,000
February.....	117,000	34,800	19,300
March.....	156,000	33,300	24,300
April.....	84,000	12,500	13,800
Total.....	500,000	117,200	71,400

Very early in 1920 the soviet authorities began seriously to address themselves to improving the position, and the question of the coal supply from the Donetz Basin is mentioned in Economic Life for the 13th of February, 1920, where it is stated that the "constant passing of the army front across the Donetz Basin, with all its resulting difficulties, has seriously hampered the organization of output and distribution of coal. With the beginning of January 400,000 poods of coal * * * were ordered for delivery, but even this small quantity could not be managed. The small figures for January show in what condition we received our transport facilities from the Whites."

Nineteen million three hundred thousand poods of coal were apparently mined in February.

The next step appears to have been to militarize the industry of the Donetz Basin and to make provision to bring any workmen who might fail to do their work before the revolutionary tribunals. The Ukraine soviet of the labor army on the 20th of February, 1920, resolved as follows:

"1. All stocks of coal in the Donetz Basin and all coal freights are declared military stores, robbery of which will be punished with the utmost rigor up to death sentence.

"2. To concentrate in the Donetz Basin not less than one brigade of the labor army to do the loading and escorting of freights.

"3. To propose to the mining committee to prepare within three days a scheme for the daily employment of the rolling stock.

"4. Categorically to forbid any army, district, or other fuel organization to interfere in any way with the distribution of coal. The only distributor of coal is the Southern Fuel Department."

The effect of the measures taken became apparent in the following month (March) when according to Economic Life of the 15th of June, 1920, a total of 24,261,000 poods of coal and anthracite were brought to the surface, or about one-sixth of the prerevolutionary amount. This output of coal and anthracite, however, was not maintained, for the combined output of coal and anthracite for April fell to only 13,480,000 poods. In May it rose again to 18,248,000 poods. These disappointing results are attributed to "the failure to establish the victualing question, and the lack of clothes and boots and the many authorities, and further neglect of fundamental repairs."

In Economic Life of the 24th of June, 1920, quoting from the *Pravda*, No. 130, the supreme council of national economy is stated to have reported in regard to this coal field that "disorder reigns everywhere, scarcely any coal mining is to be observed. * * * The majority of the pits are flooded and a great deal of power is devoted to pumping them dry. At best it may be hoped to obtain an output of 25,000,000 poods per month. The chief fuel service has not made itself master of the organization and is obliged to have recourse to the requisition of fuel belonging to various organizations and factories. The supply of the workers with food is very badly organized."

From Economic Life, No. 235, of the 21st of October, No. 236, of the 22d of October, No. 239, of the 3d of November, and No. 284, of the 17th of December, 1920, we have obtained the following additional particulars:

The output for January to June (inclusive) of 1920 was 130,000,000 poods, for July to September (also inclusive) 66,000,000 poods (September alone 26,000,000 poods). In the first half of October, when fear of Wrangel's advance disturbed production, the output was 10,300,000 poods. For the first half of November it increased to over 14,000,000 poods.

A wireless message gave the total output for November as 30,000,000 poods against an expected total of 32,000,000. These figures may be compared with the average output per month before the war of 125,000,000 poods.

That the poor output is due in the main to the fall in the productivity of labor is apparent from the comparative table showing the number of workmen employed in the Donetz Basin during the first four months of the years 1913, 1919, and 1920.

Month.	1913	1919	1920
January	169.0	133.2	80.0
February	165.0	126.0	90.5
March	168.4	107.5	101.9
April	145.7	78.3	105.3
Monthly average	162.0	111.2	94.3

NOTE.—Amounts are given in thousands.

The number of workers was 129,610 on the 1st of November, 1920, and 126,000 on the 16th of November. The principal decrease occurred in the surface workers who deserted in large numbers when the cold weather set in because they had no warm clothes. Output per worker in the first half of November was at the rate of 230 to 235 poods per month, one-third of the prewar average (Economic Life of the 17th of December, 1920).

In Economic Life of the 22d of October, 1920, the output for 1919 is stated to have been 305,000,000 to 310,000,000 poods and the expected output for 1920 is given as 25,000,000 poods less. These figures show that the productivity of labor has fallen very greatly when compared with 1913.

A later number of Economic Life dated the 27th of January, 1921, gives the output in metric tons as follows, viz., 1913, 25,600,000; 1918, 9,195,000; 1919, 5,330,000; and 1920, 4,567,000. The last figure represents 279,000,000 poods approximately.

THE MOSCOW BASIN.

The importance of the coal industry to Russia is obvious and it must be remembered that the soviet government had every reason, military and economic, to keep the output of coal in any region under their control at the highest possible level. Although the number of workmen employed in the Moscow coal basin actually increased to between three and four times the number employed in 1916, the coal output in that region has not in spite of Russia's urgent needs increased at all in the same proportion.

We append a table which is taken from Economic Life of the 24th of June, 1920, giving the comparative monthly output of coal in the Moscow region during the first four months of 1916, 1919, and 1920.

The Moscow Basin.

[Output in thousands of poods.]

Month.	1916	1919	1920
January.....	2,226	2,202	2,245
February.....	2,537	2,703	2,861
March.....	2,669	3,211	3,515
April.....	1,640	1,719	1,989
Total.....	9,072	9,835	10,610

If the figures for the first three months of 1917 instead of those for 1916 had been taken, the position would be shown to be more unfavorable; for, owing to the intensive coal getting which was undertaken in the early part of 1917, the average output had reached an average per month of 4,160,000 poods during that period.

Economic Life, No. 236, of the 22d of October, 1920, gives the output for the first six months of 1920 as 15,500,000 poods and for the third quarter as 9,000,000 poods. The same paper states that the program scheduled for 1921 is 50,000,000 to 60,000,000 poods or almost double the actual output for 1920.¹

The number of workmen employed in the Moscow Basin during the first four months of the years 1916, 1919, and 1920 was as follows:

Month.	1916	1919	1920
January.....	3,670	12,060	14,090
February.....	3,600	12,040	14,170
March.....	3,850	13,590	13,900
April.....	1,730	12,700	13,830
Monthly average.....	3,210	12,600	14,000

NOTE.—Amounts are given in thousands.

We have no exact record of the number of workmen employed in the first three months of 1917, but the number at the end of 1916 is stated in Economic Life, No. 233, of the 19th of October, 1920, to have been 10,000.

In the report of the supreme coal committee for May, 1920, which appeared in Economic Life of the 22d of June, 1920, reference is made to the causes of the general decline in the coal mining industry and the unsatisfactory result is attributed (1) to the mobilization of workmen born in 1901, (2) to the lack of horses, (3) to lack of food, especially salt, tobacco, clothes, and boots, and (4) to "interference of all sorts of departments in the management of the mines."

In Economic Life of the 24th of February, 1920, the supreme soviet of the national economy and the supreme coal soviet state that there was a very great lack of pit props, and discussing the fall in output, say "the reasons for the reduced output are

¹ Economic Life of Jan. 27, 1921, gives the total output for 1920 as 660,830 metric tons. If this figure is correct, the output of the last quarter must have been 15,500,000 poods, or as much as was produced in the first two quarters of the year. We are unable to check the statement.

² Economic Life of Jan. 27, 1921, gives the output for 1920 as 660,839 metric tons, or approximately 15,700,000 poods.

snow storms, holidays, victualing difficulties, and also the alteration in the style" [sic].

In Economic Life of the 24th of June, 1920, it is stated that the average amount of coal in poods produced per hand per month was, in 1913, 760; in 1919, 250 to 280 poods; in March, 1920, 240 poods; and in April, 1920, 130 poods.

M. Ksandrov at a meeting of the supreme soviet of national economy held on the 30th of June, 1920, presented a report which appears in Economic Life of the 2d of July, 1920. According to this report the production of the nationalized collieries during May, 1920, per collier was 350 poods and in June 300 poods, and he states that the chief reason for the improvement is due to the better provision of food and to the great need of pit props having been met. In face of a wireless message of the 29th of November, 1920, stating that the output per collier was 197 poods in that month, we are not inclined to attach any importance to M. Ksandrov's figures.

THE URAL DISTRICT.

We append the output figures for the Ural district for the first four months of 1920.

The Kizelov Region.

[In thousand poods.]

Month.	1916	1919	1920
January.....	(1)	2,167	1,116
February.....	(1)	966	1,024
March.....	(1)	1,611	1,569
April.....	(1)	2,224	1,692
May.....			1,102

¹ Average monthly output, 5,000.

Economic Life of the 22d of October, 1920, states that the scheduled output of 20,000,000 poods will not be realized; that there is a serious shortage of experienced miners, and that difficulties have arisen in the supply of provisions for the workers.

Cheliabinsk.

[In thousands of poods.]

Months.	1916	1919	1920
January.....	(1)	(2)	2,622
February.....	(1)	(2)	2,373
March.....	(1)	(2)	2,147
April.....	540		2,693
May.....			2,450

¹ Average monthly output for the first half year, 540.

² There are no data available for the first months.

The output for December, 1920, is given in a wireless message as 3,550,000 poods. The output for the year 1920 is stated in Economic Life of January 27, 1921, to have amounted to 485,300 metric tons, or about 29,600,000 poods.

The output for the Yegorshinsky district for 1920 is given in Economic Life of January 27, 1921, as 51,870 metric tons, and that of the Bogoslovsky mines in the Ural district for 1920, at 140,000 metric tons. The output of the Borovichi district for May was 141,764 poods, that of the Anzherka district 1,835,000 poods, that of the Rudzhenka 836,000 for the month of April, and that of the Kuznetzky Basin for the first half of April is given at 847,000 poods. For the last-named district the output for eight months of 1920 is stated (Economic Life, Oct. 22, 1920) to have been 36,000,000 poods.¹

As we have already stated the coal from the Siberia mines is almost entirely used locally, and the state of transport is such that the coal got otherwise than in the Donets, Moscow, and Ural regions is of little use to Russian industry.

¹ Economic Life, of Jan. 27, 1921, the output for 1920 is given as 895,000 metric tons (approximately 54,600,000 poods). The output in 1913 is stated to have been 830,000, for 1918, 1,006,000, and for 1919, 1,077,570 metric tons.

APPENDIX II.

WOOD FUEL.

About one-third of European Russia is covered with forests, and in the first half of 1913 Russia exported through her European frontier 159,365,000 poods of timber. In spite of her vast resources, the position of internal supplies of wood fuel in the autumn of 1919 was very serious. This was due to a considerable extent to the shortage of oil and coal supplies in 1919, giving a quite unusual importance to the supply and distribution of wood fuel. The supply, however, remained quite insufficient, largely owing to faulty organization. So grave was the crisis that the following decree was published by the council of the workers' and peasants' defense in the *Izvestia* of November 20, 1919:

"In view of the necessity of concentrating all the efforts of the country on the task of overcoming the fuel crisis, the council of workers' and peasants' defense has decided—

"1. To introduce in the localities mentioned below the following forms of obligatory public labor: (a) Wood cutting; (b) collecting, loading, and unloading of all kinds of fuel; (c) transport by road of all fuel, military supplies, and other consignments to the towns, railways, and other destinations.

"2. The order summoning the population to execute the duties above mentioned is promulgated by the people's commissariat of the interior.

"3. The control over obligatory public labor is intrusted to a member of the collegium of the commissariat of the interior who may send deputies to act for him.

"4. To the labor above mentioned are summoned all male citizens from 18 to 40 years, who are not yet mobilized, those who are exempted from military service, and women between 18 and 40 years."

The decree does not appear to have been very effective in its results. A. I. Rykov, president of the supreme council of people's economy, presented a report to a congress of that body held in Moscow in January, 1920, in which the following passage occurs:

"The shortage of fuel is such that during the current winter in Moscow there was not enough for heating even the hospitals. The council of people's commissaries ordered 12,000,000 to 14,000,000 cubic sazhens of wood fuel to be prepared in 1919, but the fuel supply organizations were only able to prepare 6,000,000 cubic sazhens. Of these, less than 2,000,000 cubic sazhens were brought out of the forests, 1,250,000 were delivered at the railheads, and 1,000,000 to the waterways. Therefore it will be seen that the deliveries are in arrears, and that less than one-third of the 6,000,000 cubic sazhens has been transported. As regards the transport of fuel to the place of consumption, we have so far been unsuccessful, and therefore the minimum program of fuel supply to the chief Moscow factories could not be carried out."

Abundant confirmation of the lack of wood fuel has reached us from many quarters. Our own witnesses described the great privations which they suffered owing to the lack of fuel in the winter of 1919-20.

Dr. Yakovlev in a note that he made upon the situation states:

"Notwithstanding the wholesale destruction of forests, the fuel crisis was so great that in the winter of 1919-20 the rank and file of the urban population could get no fuel whatever and was left to its fate (some parts of Petrograd excepted), whilst most of the industrial undertakings in Petrograd and Moscow had to close down last winter. The Government offices were no better off as regards fuel, the rooms being so cold that the employees were only able to work three hours a day instead of six, and in some cases only every other day."

An engineer, recently in the service of the soviet government, stated in an article in *New Russia* of May 6, 1920:

"The home demand for timber is so great that the labor armies will hardly be able to prepare a sufficient quantity of timber for the requirements of the railways, not to mention those of industries and towns."

From other sources we learn that the need of fuel was so great that capitalist companies were employed by the timber commissariat to augment the supply of wood fuel. *New Russia*, relying on the *Pravda* of April 21, 1920, states that the soviet organizations of the Novgorod when in want of fuel obtain it through their contractors, former capitalists. We append a quotation:

"Last year the provincial timber commissariat managed its timber supplies itself. This year it has given the job to a group of capitalists forming the Bragorsk Co. This company, utilizing the timber commissariat staff, will make a profit of at least 30 per cent, to say nothing of the fact that they have been able to buy their cordage, etc., at speculative prices. Competing with one another, these companies make it impos-

sible to introduce obligatory labor in the villages. To-day the peasants work for the local commissariat, to-morrow they desert to some company which promises to pay them in salt, calico, nails, etc."

The *Pravda* describes these modifications of communist policy as "disgraceful abuses." Dr. Yakovlev stated that "although the Government press was constantly printing indignant articles on the reappearance of profiteers and speculators in history, their existence was practically sanctioned by a series of decrees, thereby merely confirming the impotence of Government institutions and the crying necessity for retaining private enterprises. It should be observed, moreover, that notwithstanding the exceptional difficulties and dangers which encompass private enterprise at present, wherever it has proved possible to use the latter, it has everywhere managed to deliver the goods promptly and at a comparatively moderate price. As regards fuel, it is necessary to note the highly melancholy fact (for Russia) that at the present the wholesale and barbarous destruction of timber for fuel is going on all over the country."

Owing to the increased supplies of coal and oil fuel, which the recovery of territory by the soviet government has placed in their hands there has been some amelioration of the position in recent months. Unfortunately we have no detailed information on the subject which enables us to state how far the situation has improved. In an article on the "Autumn Fuel Supply Crisis" in *Economic Life* of October 20, 1920, the central belt (between Moscow and Kharkov) is stated to be "as always creating apprehension" in regard to fuel supply. It is stated also that diversion of wood fuel from the northern belt to the central belt can not be considered "because to do so would cause irreparable harm to Moscow and would inflict great hardships on the latter during the coming winter." The article, which deals with coal, oil and wood fuel, shows that the situation still causes great anxiety.

The Moscow wireless, on November 11, 1920, stated "this year we have double supply of fuel we had last year," but a general claim of this kind does not help materially to an exact appreciation of the present position.

In the British Economic Review of February 25, 1921, the following figures are taken from the issue of *Economic Life*, dated January 1, 1921. The output of sawn timber in 43 Provinces of European Russia was 443,000,000 cubic feet in 1912. Of this quantity 200,000,000 cubic feet were exported abroad and the remaining 243,000,000 consumed at home. The output of sawn timber in 1920 is stated to have been only 70,000,000 cubic feet; whilst the requirements for all purposes were 350,000,000 and for the commissary of transport and communications alone 132,000,000 cubic feet.

APPENDIX III.

OIL.

Bolshervik Revolution in Azerbaijan, April, 1920.—After the establishment of a soviet form of government in Azerbaijan the supply of petroleum products was once more at the disposal of Russia, and the central petroleum committee of the soviet government therefore proceeded to form the Azerbaijan petroleum committee which was charged with arranging for the transport of existing supplies of oil from Baku to Astrakhan and from Astrakhan to central Russia.

Plans for export of oil and their fulfillment.—It was proposed by the central petroleum committee that 170,000,000 poods of oil should be transported from Baku to Astrakhan during the navigation season of the year 1920, and, according to *Economic Life* for October 13, 1920, No. 228, 116,200,000 poods of petroleum products, comprising 70 per cent of the total estimate, had reached Astrakhan by October 1, 1920.

The same article in *Economic Life* assumed that navigation would be practicable for another 45 days after October 1, and that 900,000 poods of oil might be expected to arrive daily at Astrakhan during this period, and that this would give a total of 156,700,000 poods transported to Astrakhan during the whole period of navigation. In *Economic Life* dated December 16, 1920, No. 283, it is stated that 158,700,000 poods of oil were transported during the whole navigating season, and, therefore, approximately 91 per cent of the estimated transport of 170,000,000 poods of oil was attained. It is said that the port of Astrakhan was not in a position to receive more than was actually transported.

Transport of oil up the Volga.—According to *Economic Life* for October 13, 1920, No. 228, it would appear that unprecedented lowness of the water in the Volga and the shortage of tugs accounted for the failure to transport up the Volga from Astrakhan

more than 120,000,000 poods, whereas it had been anticipated that 147,000,000 poods would be sent from Astrakhan to Central Russia. Moreover, owing to the low state of the water the middle and upper reaches suffered most and received cargoes of oil in small quantities and only after considerable delay. This is shown by reference to the following table published in the issue of Economic Life mentioned above. The table shows the deliveries made according to plan, at the more important river ports along the Volga, and the actual shipment to, and arrival at these ports up to September 15, 1920:

Arrival of oil at Volga River ports.

[In millions of poods.]

Points of destination.	Shipments planned from Astrakhan during the navigation.	Shipments made from Astrakhan up to Sept. 15.	Arrival at destination by Sept. 15.
Rybinsk.....	12.7	11.4	4.2
Constantinovka.....	6.0	1.4	0.1
Yaroslavl.....	7.5	5.5	3.0
Nizhni-Novgorod.....	37.9	12.5	14.5
Samara.....	11.3	7.9	2.3
Batraki-Syzran.....	9.2	3.0	.9
Saratov.....	24.9	7.7	2.0
Tzaritsn.....	10.0	6.5	3.4

The article continues:

"Altogether, out of 70,400,000 poods shipped from Astrakhan to all the Volga River ports, only some 38,300,000 poods had actually arrived from September 16, and the remaining 32,100,000 poods were still on the way."

In these circumstances it was decided in the period immediately preceding the close of the navigating season not to utilize the available tonnage for transporting oil above Nizhny-Novgorod, but to concentrate all barges on transporting as much oil as possible up to that point. As far as supplies to towns to the west of Nizhny-Novgorod are concerned, it will be necessary to make use of rail transport for the purpose of conveying supplies to Moscow, Petrograd, and other large towns. As is stated in the article from which quotations have already been made, this necessarily exposes the tank cars available to greater wear and tear, owing to the longer runs they have to make by reason of the fact that it has not been possible to convey oil supplies farther by water.

Serious shortage of kerosene for central Russia.—It is stated that the position as regards kerosene is very bad, and this is the more unfortunate because a liberal supply of kerosene, which is in great demand in the villages, would have made it possible for the soviet government to improve somewhat the exchange of commodities between town and country. Here again it is hoped that tank cars and engines in good condition and in adequate numbers may be provided in order that the supplies of kerosene available on the Volga may be conveyed to the centers where demand is greatest.

State of Caspian oil fleet.—With regard to the transport of oil from Baku to Astrakhan Economic Life for December 16, 1920, No. 283, states that there were during the present year 93 vessels available, of a gross capacity of about 7,800,000 poods. During previous years the majority of these vessels appear to have become totally unfit for work and even the residue were only able to work indifferently. They had either not been overhauled at all for a considerable period or, at all events, only very superficially. As a result of this, in the majority of cases those ships which had completed the journey to and from Astrakhan from Baku were obliged to lie up for refitting on their return to the latter port. This work of repairs was delayed owing to the shortage of skilled workers in Baku. The equinoctial gales during September and October and the early appearance of unbroken ice in the Astrakhan roads, exercised an additional adverse effect upon the transport of oil from Baku to Astrakhan. It was under these unfavorable conditions that the total export from Baku of 158,700,000 poods was effected as mentioned above. According to the same article the stocks of petroleum in the Baku region on November 21, 1920, aggregated 214,800,000 poods. It is, however, stated that production has been adversely affected during the period of nationalization by—

Effects of nationalization of the oil fields.—1. The decrease in the number of skilled workmen. 2. The extreme shortage of transport facilities and also technical equipment. 3. The decrease in the productivity of labor.

With regard to (1) owing to the wholesale departure from the Baku districts of balers and drillers, 700 wells in actual exploitation and over 40 wells in course of being drilled have had to be abandoned, and, owing to the shortage of carpenters and locksmiths, 10 wells already completed in the Surakhany district can not be put into operation.

Production of oil at Baku, May to September, 1920.—In Economic Life for October 13, No. 228, it is stated that the production in the Baku oil fields since the establishment of a soviet form of government in Baku from May to September 15, 1920, was as follows:

Month in 1920: ¹	Output in 1,000 poods.
May ..	16,536
June ..	14,948
July ..	13,201
August ..	12,163
September (for the first 15 days) ..	5,367

However, in Economic Life of December 16, 1920, No. 283, it is stated that the total output of the Baku oil fields during the period of nationalization—given as from May 28, to November 20—was 73,300,000 poods, compared with an output of 87,400,000 poods from the beginning of 1920 to May 27, but it is claimed that the decrease in output has been arrested, and that a rise from 362,000 poods a day during the month of September, to 381,000 poods in the month of October, and to 406,000 for the first 20 days of November has been recorded.

The position of the Grozny oil fields.—According to an article in Economic Life of October 14, 1920, No. 229, the oil fields in the Grozny petroliferous area in the northern Caucasus have suffered greatly during the occupation of this territory by Deniken's forces. Several wells were flooded and buildings and machinery are said to have been demolished by Deniken's troops prior to their evacuation of the Caucasus.

Output of the Grozny oil fields past and present.—According to a table set out in the article, the output of the Grozny oil fields during 1917 was 107,816,000 poods during 1917. In 1918 the output had fallen to 25,217,000 poods and rose in 1919 to 37,738,000 poods. It is claimed that the monthly output which was 2,184,000 in January, 1920, fell to 1,239,000 poods in May, rose to 5,919,000 poods in August—a figure which is not far short of the average monthly production of the wells in 1913. It is difficult to believe that the soviet government have been able so quickly to repair the damage to the wells, buildings, and plant as to restore production to a level which compares favorably with the production of a normal year before the war.

Export of Grozny oil.—The amount of oil exported from Grozny is given in the table as being 73,893,000 poods for the year 1917, and in 1918 it appears to have fallen to 4,939,000 poods and to have risen again to 28,524,000 poods in 1919. The export for January, 1920, was as low as 554,000 poods, and is given as 5,398,000 for August. The oil is transported partly by rail, and was until September, 1920, partly sent by pipeline to Petrovsk and thence by sea to Astrakhan. No explanation is given why the export by pipe line has ceased, and it is difficult to see how the export figure of 5,398,000 poods, recorded for August, can be possibly maintained if the burden of transport has henceforward to be borne entirely by the railway services, and it is equally difficult to accept the statement made in the article that the monthly transport of oil on the railways during 1920 was greater than in 1916 and 1917.

Labor in the Grozny fields—Number of wells—Drilling.—According to the table, the number of workmen employed in the Grozny oil fields during 1917 was 10,265, and had fallen to 1,724 in February, 1920, and risen again to 3,050 by August. With regard to the number of wells, it is stated in the beginning of the article that when Deniken's forces left the Grozny area there were 709 wells, of which 585 were idle. Reference, however, to the table supplied in the article shows that the greatest number of wells ever exploited at Grozny appears to have been 393 in 1917, and that this figure fell to 41 and 43 during 1918 and 1919, respectively. The number of wells at work was estimated at 121 for July, 1920, and no drilling appears to have taken place at all during August.

RESTORATION OF BUILDINGS.

While it is maintained that a considerable amount of work has been accomplished during the summer of 1920 in restoring the buildings destroyed by Deniken, it is stated that there is no cement or nails, and that the workers have to be lodged in

¹ In the first half of 1914 the output per month was over 27,000,000 poods and for the same period of 1915 over 29,000,000 poods.

houses without window panes owing to the absence of glass. That the whole of this report on the present position of the Grozny wells should be regarded with reserve is suggested by the fact that admissions are made in it that the soviet organization for state control¹—which is responsible for supervising and criticizing the activities of all departments of the soviet government—is on very strained terms with the Grozny oil administration.

APPENDIX IV.

RAILWAY TRANSPORT.

Railways play a vital part in modern economy. Their breakdown in Russia has naturally attracted much attention and the apportionment of blame for the catastrophe has been the cause of much controversy. There is no subject in regard to which we have found it more difficult to obtain reliable statistics, and there is none on which statements of defenders and critics vary more widely.

M. Y. Sverdlov, assistant commissary of the people for railways, issued a report in April, 1920, in which he complains of organic defects in their original construction, and says that they suffered from disorganization owing to mobilization and demobilization, and from the diversion of railway workshops to the manufacture of shells and munitions. He lays much stress on their deterioration before the bolsheviks came into power, but claims that railway transport was maintained, although to a restricted degree, by the "tremendous enthusiasm of the working masses after the October revolution."

In contrast with these views we give an extract from a report, dated the 22d of June, 1920, of a delegation of the Russian railway board,² in which emphasis is laid on the great deterioration having occurred under bolshevik management. This report states as follows, viz:

"The decrease in traffic on the Russian railway system may be better appreciated if, for example, we take the figure 100 as representing the position at the commencement of the year 1916; at the beginning of 1917 this figure would be 70, in the middle of that year (Nekrassov ministry) it would be 50, at the beginning of 1918 (soviet government) it would be 30, during the year 1919-20 and to-day it would be 5."

Both views are perhaps extreme. One is by a high official who wants at one and the same time to put the best face on things, and to stimulate workers to do their best in face of a crisis. The other view is advanced by observers in a foreign country who are bitterly hostile to the bolsheviks. As throwing light on Sverdlov's claim of the "tremendous enthusiasm of the working masses" we note that an order, No. 691, was issued in the *Izvestia* of the 10th of May, 1920, directing all former workers on the railways to report themselves for immediate return to their former work; whilst in the *Izvestia* of the 12th of June, 1920, it is stated that there has been a very small return to work in compliance with the order aforesaid, and that those who do not return will henceforward be considered deserters and be proceeded against accordingly.

In face of these conflicting opinions and the absence of comparative statistics of train-miles and freights and passengers carried, we set out, as the best criterion we can find, certain figures in regard to locomotives on which there seems to be something approaching agreement, although we can not feel sure they are really correct. It is unnecessary to deal with trucks, because locomotives are the key of the position, and there is not the same shortage of trucks as there is of engines. It may be noted that the stock of locomotives at the commencement of 1914 is given in the Russian Year-book as 20,057.

The fairest method of comparison for 1914 and subsequent years seems to be the number of sound locomotives per 100 versts of the lines in the possession of the Government for the time being, and the number of engines in running order as compared with those waiting for repair. We append a table giving these particulars. The enormous increase in the proportion of damaged locomotives speaks for itself.

¹ Known as the workers' and peasants' control, whose reports form the most reliable material for the study of the economic position in soviet Russia.

² The Russian railway board managed the railways before the bolsheviks came into power, and the delegation in question consisted of the former presidents of the Moscow-Voromiezh-Kiev and the Transcaucasian Railways and the former vice presidents of the Moscow-Kazan and South Russian Rys.

	Length of lines in versts.	Number of sound locomotives.	Percentage of locomotives out of order.	Number of sound locomotives per 100 versts of line.
1914.	64,000	17,000	15.0-16.0	127.0-28.0
1916.	65,000	16,000-16,800	16.0-17.0	26.0-27.0
1917—January	64,526	17,012	16.5	26.0
June	62,952	15,930	24.2	25.0
December	50,131	15,810	29.4	32.0
1918—June	25,422	5,676	39.5	22.0
December	23,665	4,679	47.8	21.0
1919—June	24,688	4,739	49.0	19.0
December	36,551	4,141	55.4	11.0
1920—January	48,410	3,969	58.1	8.0
February	² 50,242	4,019	59.2	7.0
March	² 52,629	³ 4,542	³ 60.1	³ 8.0
April	² 53,257	⁴ 4,584	60.7	9.0
May	² 59,852	⁴ 5,219	59.9	8.8
June	² 59,196	⁴ 6,254	58.9	10.5
July	² 63,698	⁵ 56.4		
August	² 63,725	⁵ 6,956	⁵ 59.0	11.0

¹ Figures from the Russian Yearbook.

² From Pravda of Sept. 17, 1920.

³ The figures after 1914 down to this point excepting those marked ⁽²⁾ are taken from the Russian Economist, but they are so near those published from time to time by bolshevik sources of information that we make use of them.

⁴ From Economic Life of June 20, 1920. The April figures agree with those of Sverdlov. Pravda of Sept. 17, 1920, gives 5,695 for May, 6,692 for July, and 6,677 for August. The June figures in this issue are obviously incorrect, so we do not quote them.

⁵ From Economic Life of Oct. 17, 1920, No. 232. The increased percentage of defective engines in August is said to be accounted for by the inclusion of the southwestern line in which, taken alone, the percentage of defective engines was 73.7.

We also append a table showing three sets of figures for different months of 1920, all emanating from official papers of the soviet government, and showing great discrepancies. They illustrate the difficulties we have met with in trying to obtain approximately reliable figures.

	Economic Life.						Pravda, Sept. 17, 1920.		
	June 20, 1920.			July 27, 1920.					
	Out of order.	Running.	Total.	Out of order.	Running.	Total.	Out of order.	Running.	Total.
1920.									
January	5,533	3,992	9,525	—	3,926	—	6,499	3,582	10,081
February	5,705	3,934	9,639	—	3,798	—	5,339	3,712	9,049
March	6,031	3,922	9,953	—	4,542	—	5,299	4,031	9,330
April	17,571	¹ 4,584	12,155	—	5,102	—	7,722	4,884	12,606
May	8,145	5,219	13,464	—	6,612	—	8,626	5,695	14,331
June	8,998	6,254	15,252	—	7,313	—	—	—	—
July	—	—	—	—	—	—	9,610	6,692	16,302
August	—	—	—	—	—	—	9,685	6,677	16,362

¹ These figures are identical with those given in Sverdlov's report in 1920.

The increase in the total number of engines since March, 1920, as also in the number of those in running order, appears to be due chiefly to the territory containing railway lines brought under soviet sway at the end of 1919 and in the early months of 1920. It may be due in part to a different method of counting, for we notice references to an accumulation of locomotives "evacuated," which may mean that engines once treated as derelicts have been again brought into count.

Another reason that has affected the latter months was the Decree No. 1042, issued in the spring of 1920. It prescribed a plan for repairs covering a period of four and one-half years from the 1st of July, 1920, and by its terms a definite number of locomotives and wagons was apportioned for repairs on each railway during each month.

The two great reasons for the railway breakdown, besides the fuel difficulty which must have been very serious in 1919, are the almost complete cessation of new building of locomotives and the disorganization of the repairing shops. From 1917 to May of

this year Russia received no new locomotives from abroad. She was dependent on her own production. In goods train locomotives alone as many as 1,282 were built in 1906. The demand appears to have been more than met in that year, and in the years 1907-1914 the numbers varied from a minimum of 363 in 1912 to a maximum of 816 in 1914. In the years following 1914 the number of new goods trains locomotives made in Russia was 903 in 1915, 576 in 1916 (plus 400 from America), 405 in 1917 (plus 375 from America), 191 in 1918, and only 68 in 1919. The total potential productivity in Russian locomotive works was estimated by a commission of the people's commissariat of ways and communications to be 1,802 engines in 1919; the actual output only 68. The program for 1920 was 105, but it is certain that this figure has not been nearly reached.

Our own witnesses gave interesting information on the question of the fall in production of new engines. Mr. Pickersgill, assistant manager in the Sormovo Locomotive Works informed us that before the war they turned out 13 to 15 new locomotives a month, but that in 1919 they only made 16 in the whole year. We are able to add later information, from an article from *Economic Life* printed in *The Russian Economist*, No. 1, in which we find that at the Sormovo, Briansky, and Kolomna works only 3 new locomotives in all were built in January and February of 1920. In *Economic Life*, No. 283, of the 16th of December, 1920, it appears that the schedule of new engines for the Sormovo Works for the latter half of the year was 8, but that none were completed in the five months July to November.

Quite as important as new building is the question of repairs. There is a great shortage of metal and of spare parts for repairs. The number of employees at many of the chief workshops is halved. They are badly fed and can not do their normal amount of work. In many cases they are short not only of metal, but also the fuel so indispensable for engineering works.

In spite of these drawbacks it is claimed that the proportion of engines requiring repair is less than the 58 per cent to 60 per cent shown in our table for January to June. *Economic Life*, No. 226, states that it learns "from private sources" that on the 20th of September the number of damaged locomotives had decreased to 57.1 per cent and a list is given showing that on many railways the number repaired exceeded expectation. What the value of the "private sources" may be we do not know. We believe some improvement has taken place, but we notice complaints following these optimistic conclusions which lay stress on the absenteeism, the lack of skilled labor, the shortage of food, the waiting for material, and the general slackness of workers at individual workshops.

It is impossible for us to give detailed figures about the comparative speed of trains now as compared with before the war. We must confine ourselves to a few instances.

One of our witnesses told us that in former days it took her 28 hours to get from Moscow to Simbirsk, but she was nearly 9 days doing the journey on the last occasion.

Another witness said that "it took 3 days to do a journey which in the ordinary time would have been done in between 12 to 15 hours. The train kept stopping, the engines were only fed with wood, and they kept changing and putting on fresh engines."

Mrs. Sheridan, a more recent traveler, mentioned how often the special train she was in had to stop on the journey to Reval.

On the other hand, members of the British labor delegation who visited Russia in the summer of 1920 said trains were running better and Mr. H. G. Wells traveled from Petrograd to Moscow in 14 hours against the prewar 11. On the return journey his train took 22 hours.

The evidence shows generally that the number of engines available as compared with the prewar figure of 20,000 is not a measure of the mileage run or the traffic carried, but we have no material which would enable us to state even approximately how far proportionately the deterioration in Russian railways has gone when compared with 1914 or 1916. It is, however, certain that they can not be doing more than a comparatively small fraction of their former work.

An interesting side light on the confusion caused by bad management and changes of policy in regard to labor on the railways was given to us by Mr. Richard Lunn. We give an extract from his evidence:

"The experienced engine drivers took up situations in the cooperative stores, or in anything less responsible, and let inexperienced people drive the engines, with the result that they were crocked up in no time. A man would leave his engine outside and not let the water off, or anything like that, so cylinders burst. Then he would not oil it up in time and the bearings were gone, and so on. Latterly in the repair shops they paid them a fixed wage, which was not very high, and they got congestion in the lines in the Moscow district. They did not unload there fast enough, so some clever man said he could soon cure that by putting them on piecework. The piece-work meant that the people were earning nearly 1,000 rubles a day for inexperienced

labor not doing hard work, while these men in the repair shops, the specialists, were getting about 100 rubles a day. Then they said in the repair shops, "We can do that unloading," and out they went out of the repair shops, and of course no one was left there, as they had already got a very reduced staff. As a heroic measure they gave all the mills that had repair shops, a certain amount of rolling stock and engines to repair. We got down at our place. I think it was, about 20 trucks and a locomotive. They had to repair these, and then they would be allowed to make two journeys to an appointed place in the south, I think it was to the government of Tambov, and bring back corn for the people and fodder for the cattle. They would be allowed to do that twice, and then they would hand this rolling stock back to the government. Most of the repairs consisted of worn bearings and split and broken springs on the carriages, and of course just carpenters' repairs. There was also very bad management on the railways in this way: The derelict engines were put without any order on a side line, the ones with the least repairs to be done perhaps being put right at the back, and the ones with the heavy repairs to be done right in front. Then they introduced the bonus system I mentioned, which meant that if the gang did certain repairs they would get the day wage, and if they did more they would get double wages. In consequence they hauled out one of these really bad ones and stripped about 10 or 15 practically good locomotives at the back which required very little repair, in order to do this heavy repair on this one. They put this engine out, having spoilt about 10 other engines at the back. But that did not concern them; they got their pay, and that is all they bothered about."

Coming down to a later date an article in *Economic Life* of the 27th of July, 1920, deals at great length with the difficulties that the Government have met with in their attempts to obtain labor for the improvement of railway conditions. This article lays stress on the lack of workmen and states that "there are sufficient numbers of workmen only in highly populated districts where food conditions are bad, while on the other hand there are very few workmen in remote and forest areas which are well off as regards food." It adds that the approaching harvest has drawn workmen away from their employment, that the June decree on the mobilization of workers referred to above has not only had no beneficial effect, but has resulted in the various Provinces refusing to release workers hired for employment in their Provinces and prepared to settle down there. It states further that the hire of workers in the spring was not successful as the activities of the hiring organizations were interfered with in the various localities to which they penetrated, and that sometimes the members of these organizations were arrested. It adds "the authorized representatives sent from the Central Government could only hire a single man." The lack of labor was, however, apparently made up to a certain extent by extensive use of machinery and by adopting a policy of short contract with premiums paid in kind. The article adds that in the previous winter (1919-20) food supplies which reached the workers were quite insufficient, and in one case a staff of workers numbering some thousands who had been got together with great trouble had to be disbanded owing to the non-delivery of rations.

It is impossible for us, with the information at our disposal, to attempt to judge how far on the one hand railway transport was affected by the serious difficulties caused by war conditions and particularly by the civil wars in which soviet Russia was temporarily deprived of great stretches of territory containing railways, locomotives, and rolling stock, and how far, on the other, it suffered from the effects of the economic policy pursued by the bolsheviks.

Next spring another critical period will come. Unless many more new engines can be built in Russia or imported from abroad,¹ and unless the necessary spare parts for repairs can be provided for repairs, it is difficult to see that much advance is likely to be made in 1921, and it is possible that there may even be retrogression on 1920. The latest figures which we have seen quoted in *Economic Life* of the 17th of October, 1920, No. 232, claim that the engines repaired in July and August last exceeded those sent in for repairs by 68. Tables of spare parts given in the same paper show in every case a serious shortage on the estimates, while the output of new engines is very small indeed and infinitesimal compared with the number urgently needed. There is also much complaint of the inferior quality of repairs executed.

In a speech of Lenin's at the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December, 1920, he stated that the five years' program of repairs of locomotives was likely to be completed in three and a half years. We have no information as to the foundation of the statement and have seen no statistics which appear to confirm this sanguine view.

¹ Trotzki has stated recently that 1,000 new locomotives would be imported from abroad in the latter half of 1921.

APPENDIX V.

WATER TRANSPORT.

Although for six months in the year the canals and waterways of Russia are closed to traffic by ice, they form an important part of the transport organization of the country, and in view of the collapse of the railways their importance is immensely increased.

The total length of the navigation system for vessels is about 102,230 miles, of which 49,625 miles are in European Russia and 52,605 in Asiatic Russia. Besides this there are 31,310 miles in Siberia suitable for floating lumber. Each mile in European Russia serves a territory with an average population of 1,450 and each mile in Asiatic Russia a territory with 160 inhabitants.

In northern Russia navigation is open from May to October, in central Russia from April to November, and in southern Russia from March to November. In Siberia while the southern rivers are navigable from May to October in their southern courses and from May to September in their middle courses, in the northern parts the waterways are ice-free from June to August only.

The fact that the rivers of European Russia have their sources so close to each other and no great difficulty presented itself in linking them up, led chiefly in the first half of the nineteenth century to the construction of eight artificial systems of canals for this purpose. These systems with the rivers they connect give facilities for water transport from the Baltic to the Black Sea, from the White Sea to Lake Onega, to the Kara Sea and to Turkestan.

The longest canal in the world is in Russia. It extends from Petrograd to the frontier of China and its total length is close upon 4,500 miles.

In the year 1913 the amount of tonnage available on the Volga-Neva-Dvina northern system in the form of barges, lighters, and other craft was 710,000,000 poods, and the tonnage transported 2,226,657,000 poods of merchandise being 313.6 per cent of the available tonnage.

Although the tonnage remained constant the amount carried in 1916 fell to 1,747,496,000 poods, or a decrease of 479,161,000 poods, representing a relation to the tonnage available of 246 per cent as against 313.6 for 1913.

In the year 1918 the amount carried fell from 1,747,496,000 poods to 419,468,000 poods, a diminution of no less than 1,807,189,000 poods from the figures of 1913.

It is true that the amount of tonnage available fell from 710,000,000 poods to 700,000,000 poods over the same period, but this does not account for much of the decrease, for the amount carried represents in relation to tonnage available a fall from 246 per cent to 59 per cent.

In other words, while in 1913 the amount transported represented over three times the tonnage available, and in 1916 the amount transported represented two and one-half times the tonnage available, the amount transported in 1918 represents only a little over one-half of the tonnage available, showing that during the navigational period in question nearly one-half of the barges and lighters were lying idle.

We have no figures available to show the general position of the navigable period of 1919, but in Economic Life of the 29th of February, 1920, when the necessary preparations for the approaching season of river navigation was in contemplation a statement is made regarding the position of water transport in the Volga-Kama Basin during 1919.

From this statement it appears that 2,495 vessels giving a total tonnage of 152,640,000 poods was available, with which it was hoped to transport goods weighing 27,580,000 poods. Not a very extravagant estimate, for it does not even represent the use of one-fifth of the available tonnage. The actual result for the year was that only 10,216,517 were loaded and only 4,870,687 poods were actually delivered. Of the 1,247 barges available 248 were loaded, but only 145 reached their destination, and these were not loaded to even one-half of their full carrying capacity.

This very grave position coupled with the breakdown in railway transport led the Bolshevik government to take the question of river and water transport into serious consideration, and a congress of water transport workers was convened and sat in Moscow during February, 1920.

At this congress it was, according to Economic Life of the 7th of February, 1920, stated as follows:

"It is worthy of note that in normal times plans for the season's navigation are made in the preceding autumn. For this purpose vessels are usually disposed of by their owners in the autumn so as to be ready the following May and June to receive the cargoes which are accumulated during the winter, and thus to avoid leaving such cargoes to lie too long or any unproductive voyages on their own part. This preparatory work of sending the ships to the various stations where goods will accumulate is the first essential to the success of a fleet's work."

Later on the same paper states:

"The following facts speak for the irregularities of transport and preparation of cargoes in 1919. The chief river transport authority was called upon to satisfy in great number the most varied demands for tonnage. Ships were continually dispatched to the most varied points, but on arriving there they either found no cargoes at all or cargoes in a considerably less quantity than they had been allowed to suppose. Therefore ships either lost weeks without result or went away loaded with less than 50 per cent of their carrying capacity."

As regards the navigable season of 1920 it was stated as follows:

"Notwithstanding the fact that during the autumn of 1919 no instructions were given to the fleet by the forwarding agents of cargoes, the water transport organization itself nevertheless managed to effect a distribution of ships at the required points, and at the present time for the first period of May-June a sufficient number of ships will have been stationed by the spring of 1920 at or near the wharves where most of the corn cargoes are."

"The organs of the people's commissariat must immediately get ready cargoes. Besides these organs other organizations should forthwith notify the points whither their cargoes are to be shipped, and should also begin in the near future to transport them to the wharves."

Economic Life of the 12th of February, 1920, after explaining that the unsuccessful results of the navigation period of 1919 were to be explained above all by the food difficulties and military events, states that the building of 498 vessels and the repairing of 590 had been begun, and that the number of vessels ready for use did not exceed 1,000. These figures apply to the northern area.

In Economic Life of the 29th of February, 1920, it is stated that in all there were 1,434 ships available on the Volga-Kama system with which it was proposed to transport approximately 319,000,000 poods of goods during the navigable period then approaching, of which 227,100,000 were to be transported before the end of August.

From information supplied to us by Dr. Haden Guest it would seem that with the liberation of Baku a considerable revival took place in water transport which is accounted for by the fact that 76 per cent of the fleet worked upon naphtha. It was claimed on the 14th of September, 1920, by the Moscow Wireless News that 137,000,000 poods had actually been carried up to the 1st of August on all the inland waterways. If this figure is correct it can only represent a very small fraction of the merchandise carried on the same waterways before the war.

According to witnesses the deterioration is in a measure due to the barges being left out in the winter. Under private ownership barges were protected against the ice when it came down in the spring. Under nationalization no one attended to them and "a whole fleet of barges was simply cut by the ice and sank," according to one of our witnesses, Mr. Bennett, partner in the firm of Messrs. William Miller & Co.

Economic Life for the 29th of February, 1920, states as follows:

"The great lack of materials and skilled workmen and the lack of method and forethought in getting ready the vessels of the water transport authority has influenced the success of the work of repairing ships."

It is interesting to note that 84 per cent of the steamships were completely repaired, but only 52 per cent of the barges. This is explained by the fact that steamships are mostly repaired by their own crews, whilst a separate class of experienced workmen, an extraordinary scarcity of whom was experienced last year, are necessary for repairing barges.

The general impression left upon our minds by a study of these figures, the whole of which are derived or purport to emanate from bolshevik sources, is that water transport has suffered from lack of organization and cohesion from loss of tonnage combined with lack of fuel and also, until 1920, from civil war having deprived the soviet government of command of some of the important rivers and canals.

At the Congress of Water Transport Workers at Moscow, to which reference has already been made, the people's commissary, Rykov, as reported in the Moscow Wireless News, of the 20th of March, 1920, made the following statements in his opening speech:

"I must point out that owing to the spirit of decision of workmen's organizations we have been able to obtain in this field a success infinitely superior to that which we obtained on the railways.

"The reason for this is that we have applied the revolutionary bolshevik energy of the masses of the workpeople to the organizations of the national service of water transport. We have in our hands a unique apparatus. The success obtained is so considerable that it may serve as a model and as an example for the other branches of industry."

It is interesting to note that Trotski made a statement in exactly the opposite sense at the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December, 1920. This flat contradiction between two men wielding such high authority illustrates the difficulties we have met with in trying to arrive at the facts.

From the following summary of the total water transport on the Volga, Marinsk, and northern territorial waterways given in Economic Life of the 17th of October, 1920, it will be seen that details are given regarding the amount of commodities forwarded and the actual amount which arrived at their destination:

Summary of water transport up to the 1st of October, 1920.

[In thousands of poods.]

	Territorial administration of—			
	Volga.	Marinsk.	Northern.	Total.
Cereals:				
Forwarded.....	15,362	1,423	1,528	18,313
Arrived.....	13,630	944	1,528	16,102
Salt:				
Forwarded.....	15,999	415	156	16,570
Arrived.....	13,056	186	156	13,398
Firewood and logs:				
Forwarded.....	44,652	98,083	29,532	172,267
Arrived.....	41,806	95,932	29,532	167,270
Building materials of timber:				
Forwarded.....	13,442	20,311	25,599	59,352
Arrived.....	10,808	19,808	25,599	56,215
Crude oil and mazout:				
Forwarded.....	60,414	1,161	.8	61,583
Arrived.....	47,149	795	8	47,952
Kerosene and other petroleum products:				
Forwarded.....	19,673	594	16	20,283
Arrived.....	14,003	450	16	14,469
Other freights:				
Forwarded.....	36,622	2,313	2,892	41,827
Arrived.....	33,289	2,445	2,892	38,626
Total:				
Forwarded.....	206,164	124,300	59,731	390,195
Arrived.....	173,741	120,560	55,731	354,032

The total amount therefore transported was 354,032,000 poods.

The total amount transported on the European waterways during the whole of the navigating season, 1910, was 2,663,000,000 poods. We have been unable to obtain information as to the actual amount transported during 1920 on the Volga, Marinsk, and northern territorial waterways, but it is clear that the figure of 354,032,000 given above as the amount transported upon them during 1920 is a very small percentage of the total figure for 1910 having regard to the fact that these waterways are the most important in European Russia.

SIBERIA.

According to Economic Life of the 17th of October, 1920, No. 232, the aggregate length of the waterways of Siberia at the present time is 122,199 versts, of which 73,818 versts are navigable by vessels and 47,234 versts fit for floating lumber. The figure 122,199 probably refers to the same waterways as those stated in the Russian Yearbook to have a length of 130,374 versts. According to the same article, it was proposed during the navigating season of 1920 to convey 40,435,502 poods on the Ob-Irtysh section, and up to the 1st of August, that is, covering a period of three months of water transport from the time of the opening of the navigation about the 1st of May, 18,427,303 poods had been transported on this section, i. e., about 6,000,000 poods a month. It may be estimated that it would only be possible to continue to transport by water during the months of August and September, and estimating that 6,000,000 poods were transported during each of these months, it is to be assumed that about 30,000,000 poods were transported during the whole navigating season on this section. The amount of goods conveyed on the Ob-Irtysh section was 69,188,000 poods in 1909, and the amount transported on the waterways of the Ob-Irtysh Basin increased in amount during more recent years, and was approximately 70 per cent of the total cargoes conveyed on the waterways of Siberia. We estimate that the amount transported on the Ob-Irtysh in 1920 was not more than 30 per cent of the amount conveyed during the years immediately preceding the war.

The steam vessels available on the section during 1920 are said to have numbered 198 and nonsteam vessels 498. This compares with 231 steam vessels in 1916 and 671 nonsteam vessels. In the year 1909 there were 136 steam and 531 nonsteam vessels.

According to Economic Life for the 17th of October, it was proposed to transport 4,600,000 poods on the Yenesei section during 1920, and up to the 1st of August 2,296,651 had been transported. If an average of 700,000 is taken as the amount transported monthly during May, June, and July, and it be assumed that this rate was kept up during August and September, the total transported on the Yenesei for the whole of the navigating season would be about 3,700,000 to 3,800,000. In 1912 11,000,000 poods were transported during the whole season. During 1920 there were 27 steam and 64 nonsteam vessels on the Yenesei, and this compares with 42 steam and 65 nonsteam vessels in 1916.

APPENDIX VI.

[Extracts from "Materials on the History of the Social and Revolutionary Movement in Russia."]

VOLUME I.—THE BOLSHEVIKS.

[Translation from Russian.]

Chapter IV. The revolution accomplished by Lenin in the summer of 1911 among the foreign centers of the party. Dissolution of the menshevik "foreign bureau of the central committee" and the formation of bolshevik centers. The "Leninites" prepare for an All-Russian conference. Party groupings in 1911. The Lenin school of propagandists at Longumeaux (near Paris). The mensheviks on Lenin's coup d'état. Activity of Lenin's agents in Russia in the work of convoking the conference. Smuggling of illegal literature into Russia from abroad.

In the spring of 1911 Lenin desired to summon a meeting of the central committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party on the initiative of the foreign bureau. He was, however, prevented from doing so by the energetic opposition of Boris Isaakovich Goldman, the representative of the "Golosovtsi" and by the position of neutrality adopted by Ber, the representative of the Jewish "bund," and Shvarts, the Lettish representative, on the foreign bureau. Lenin then summoned to Paris Alexander Rykov,¹ who had just fled abroad from his place of exile in Russia. They organized a private conference of bolsheviks with a view to discussing the position which had arisen. Among those who attended the conference were Semashko, Kamenev, Zinoviev,² and Tishko, whose real name was Lev Jogikhes, a Jew, born in Poland.

At the meeting Lenin pointed out the inability of the foreign bureau of the central committee to supervise efficiently the secret activities of the party in Russia itself. He also dwelt upon his failure to convvoke a plenary session of the central committee. He therefore proposed that the bolshevik representatives and the Polish representative, Tishko, should leave the foreign bureau of the central committee and, ignoring it, request Rykov, as the only member of the Russian section of the central committee remaining at liberty, to take upon himself the task of summoning a plenary session of the central committee. Lenin's proposal was accepted by those present. In accordance with this decision, unquestionably revolutionary from the point of view of party discipline, Semashko left the foreign bureau, in doing which he appears to have appropriated the funds in his possession as its secretary and treasurer. Rykov, on his part, immediately sent invitations for the proposed plenary conference to all the members of the central committee who were available.

It should be noted that Tishko, who participated in the conference and subscribed to its resolutions, did not leave the foreign bureau, advancing as his reasons for not doing so that juridically the foreign bureau of the central committee could not be dissolved by the decision of a private conference, nor indeed until a congress or plenary session of the central committee had been convoked. He also stated that it was necessary for some one to remain in the bureau for intelligence purposes and to counteract the influences of the hostile camp. The invitations of Rykov were answered by Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Tishko, Ber,³ representing the "bund," Goldman, representative of the "Golosovtsi," the Lett Shvarts, and Rykov himself joined them. Four mensheviks returned no answer whatever to the invitation.

¹ Rykov is the present president of the supreme council of people's economy.

² Semashko is the present people's commissary for public health, Kamenev is the president of the Moscow soviet who visited England during 1920, and left soon after in connection with revelations concerning the disposal of bolshevik jewels, Zinoviev is the present president of the Petrograd soviet and president of the Third or communist international.

³ Ber is believed to be identical with the menshevik Ber, who was exiled on account of his political activities from the Ukraine to the Russo-Georgian frontier in November, 1920, by order of Rakovsky, the president of the council of people's commissaries of the Ukraine soviet government. The "Golosovtsi" were a menshevik group.

Goldman informed the meeting that he could only take part in a discussion on condition that it was understood that the meeting was an informal one and that the resolutions which it might make would not be of a binding character. Ber and Shvarts also stated that they would take part in the meeting only with a consultative voice, as they had neither of them received any mandates from their central committee (the representatives of national organizations for a general meeting of the central committee of the party are delegated thereto by their national central committee and are not elected by the congress itself). Five persons, therefore, only remained with a decisive voice. It was therefore impossible to contemplate a "plenary session," not only then, but at any future time, under these conditions. In view of this it was decided to regard the meeting as a private conference of members of the central committee. The bolsheviks, the Polish representative Tishko, and the "Golosoviets," Goldman, therefore, took part in it with the right of a deciding voice, while the representative of the "bund" and the Lett only did so with a consultative voice, when later, however, during one of the subsequent sessions, Lenin proceeded to attack the "bund," and its absent representative Dan, Ber left the meeting and appeared no more. The first few meetings were almost exclusively devoted to Lenin's attacks on what he described as "the characteristic liquidating tendencies of the mensheviks" (he refers to their tendency to close down all the illegal or semilegal social democratic organizations in Russia). He pointed out that for a long time to come the existence in Russia both of an illegal revolutionary party, as also of organizations, able to exert influence upon the political life of the State, and able to guide mass movements, was out of the question, for all such party institutions had sunk into a state of dissolution. The convening of a plenary session and of a conference was therefore unnecessary, and the reestablishment of the organizations in Russia would be a work of Sisyphus. In his opinion, therefore, it would be far more expedient to utilize the remnant of the party strength and means on the formation of a special concentrated unit out of professional party workers, who would show themselves the guardians of the party thought, and who would, by means of broadcast legal and illegal propaganda and agitation, inculcate the masses with the necessary principles for developing revolutionary action. This form of cultural leadership would prepare a sympathetic atmosphere, in which, under favorable circumstances, a numerous and influential party could be quickly formed.

This scheme of Lenin's worked out in practice, as follows: It was, of course, necessary that legal and illegal organizations should exist if any fruitful party work was to be carried on. There would have to be a press, which would be the organ of the cultural leadership of which he spoke and the instrument of propaganda among the working masses. Side by side with this press there should exist a staff of special party correspondents and agents in all the important centers of Russia. These would keep the literary propagandists informed upon the situation in Russia, would receive instructions from abroad and carry them out with regard to local legal and, in so far as they existed, illegal groups. These agents, together with the workers abroad, would form the desired secret nucleus, the foreign organization of which would combat all tendencies opposed to the party, carry on its literary work and, on a basis of the information received from Russia, define the necessities of the moment. In general, the question of organizing this secret nucleus and of dissolving the Russian secret party institutions carried with it in Lenin's report the ulterior motive of reestablishing in a modified form, an independent faction. When this proposal was not accepted, Lenin suggested that, although the present meeting was only attended by five persons having a right to cast votes, it should none the less be considered a plenary session of the central committee on the ground that the five members present represented themselves the only part of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party which displayed true loyalty to the party program and exemplary energy in action.

When this proposal was rejected, Lenin and Kamenev declared that they were no longer able to cooperate on the editorial staff of the central organ together with Martov and Dan, in view of the fact that the former had published a pamphlet, which contradicted the party program, and contrary to political ethics, having as its object to inform the departments of the secret police regarding the secret activities of the party and affording valuable material for the prosecution of individual party workers; the latter had insisted on the formation in Russia itself of a collegium of the central committee, although he was perfectly aware that such a project was doomed to failure. A discussion ensued upon these points, and only after they had been satisfactorily dealt with, did Lenin and Kamenev withdraw their declaration. The meeting then proceeded to discuss the practical questions of convoking a plenary session of the central committee and of the general conference of the party. The idea of summoning a plenary session of the central committee composed of the members suggested above was abandoned entirely. It was decided to make a final attempt to resume work in

the party organization within Russia—to convoke as soon as possible a conference of representatives of those organizations, being guided in this by the decision of the Paris plenum of the central committee, which had met in January, 1910. This decision meant summoning the delegates of illegal and legal groups and organizations, on condition of a recognition by the legal organizations of the necessity for the existence of the secret units of the party. It was decided to give effect to this decision by forming abroad a special organizing commission, to which should be accorded the right of coopting upon its staff the representatives of all literary groups of the party abroad (the *Pravda*, the *Vpered*, *Golos Social Demokrata*, of the Plekhanovtsy and national organizations). It was decided also to form if possible a similar commission within Russia itself, charging it with organizing the elections for the proposed conference. In this case the foreign commission would confine itself to the technical work of arranging for the delegates elected in Russia to cross the frontier, to seeking the necessary financial support for the conference, and to conducting pourparlers with the representatives of the literary groups. It was agreed that the personnel of the Russian commission, with the exception of the representative of the party center abroad, should be elected and reinforced by delegates from the most important party organizations within the Empire. As the members of the Russian organizing commission were more or less decided upon at this conference, it was secretly proposed that these persons should at all costs obtain mandates for themselves from one organization or another. Should the representatives of the above-mentioned literary groups desire to become members of the foreign organizing commission, a special secret arrangement was agreed upon at the conference providing for the invitation of two more bolsheviks to supplement the personnel of the organizing commission, with a view to maintaining the predominance of the bolsheviks and Poles upon it.

The following persons were appointed as members of the commission: Kamenev, Semashko, Rykov, A. I. Liubimov, and Tishko. It was also decided that Rykov should undertake pourparlers with Plekhanov with regard to the activity of the commission, and should also maintain contact with the representatives of the foreign literary groups with regard to its activities. Although Plekhanov approved of the revolutionary coup d'état which had been carried through by the conference, he abstained from any participation in the labors of the organizing commission until the attitude toward it of the other sections of the party became clear. He appears to have feared that the conference summoned by the commission would be attended only by bolsheviks, that other points of view of the party would not be represented, and that he, Plekhanov, would find himself in the position of an honored guest, and not of leader of one of the most influential party groups.

The followers of Trotzki and the "Vperedovtsy" or "Forwards" returned no positive answer with regard to attending the conference, as they were not sure that they would not together be able to hold a conference of their own in concert with the "Golosovtsy." The "Golosovtsy," in answer to the invitation to participate in the work of the organizing commission, declared that they would enter it only if all party views were represented equally at it. This declaration indicated that there was hardly any hope of the "Golosovtsy" taking part in the conference. Then followed decisive steps directed toward the immediate organization of the election of delegates to the proposed conference from the party organizations within the Empire. For this purpose specially authorized agents of the organizing commission were sent to Baku, Ekaterinoslav, and Kiev. The Kiev committee, represented almost entirely by mensheviks, succeeded actually in passing a resolution in favor of the action of the conference and also of the organizing commission which the conference had set up, and they set to work to elect a delegate to the conference and appointed their representatives on the organizing commission in Russia.

Alexander Rykov was intrusted with the organization and direction of the Russian branch of the organizing commission. He proposed to invite the cooperation of Nikolai Nikolaevich Mandelshtam (an artisan from the Moscow area) in the work of the Russian organizing commission, as well as of the persons who it was proposed should be elected by the local organization. Joseph Petrovich Goldberg, who was living at this time, together with Mandelshtam, in Nizhny Novgorod, and Nikolai Vasilievich Romanov, an experienced party worker, who had great influence in the Smolensk district, were also coopted upon the Russian organizing commission, the personnel of which it was proposed should number eight. It was suggested that the proposed conference should take place in September or October, 1911, and the delegates would, it was hoped, assemble at Cracow, near which it was intended to hire a country house for the purpose of accommodating them and holding the conference. It was anticipated that about 30 delegates from Russia would attend it, of whom 10 to 15 would leave the country legally, while the rest would cross the Prussian frontier with the help of special agents. Vladimirskey (now assistant commissary for internal affairs) took the place of Rykov on the foreign organizing commission.

A so-called technical commission was formed of Rykov, Zinoviev, and Tishko for the purpose of obtaining the necessary financial assistance to cover the expenses of the conference. As for some time past the party had existed exclusively on the funds of the bolsheviks, it was essential at all costs to obtain the consent of Kautsky, Mering, and Klara Tsetkin, the trustees of the bolshevik funds, to advance certain sums, not to the foreign bureau of the central committee, as they had done formerly, but to the technical commission which had replaced it. Tishko, who was in touch through Rosa Luxemburg, with her friend Klara Tsetkin, undertook to arrange this and to remove the possible misunderstanding which might arise in the course of it. He succeeded in obtaining the agreement of the trustees to place 40,000 francs at the disposal of the technical commission for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the conference. After this a fight took place due to the dictatorial tendencies of Lenin himself.

The money was deposited in the bank in his name and on every occasion his sanction was necessary in order to draw upon it. When the technical commission asked leave to draw the first monthly instalment, Lenin declared that he would not give the money unless the members of the technical commission would agree to revise the party budget. In other words, Lenin demanded the right of actual control over the actions of the technical commission, which had assumed the function of the foreign bureau of the central committee. In view of the impossibility of arriving at any agreement on this point, Tishko again repaired to Berlin, and, as a result of his journey, the trustees addressed a special letter to Lenin and to the members of the technical commission. In this letter Klara Tsetkin and the others declared that they had agreed to release the money to the organizing and technical commissions only because they recognized them as organs of the revolutionary wing of the party and were in agreement with their activity. If therefore, Lenin in future continued to distrust the activities of institutions, which had been created by himself, and to impede the execution of the tasks which had been imposed on these institutions, they, the trustees, would be compelled to bring his action to the knowledge of the international socialist bureau. The threat took effect. Lenin climbed down and withdrew the demands he had put forward. A revision of the party budget then took place, and certain economies were effected with regard to expenditure on the central organ, the smuggling of literature into Russia, etc.

His deep conviction that extensive organizing work within Russia was impossible at that time, compelled Lenin to approach the forthcoming conference from two different points of view. In the first place, he considered it too risky openly to declare himself in favor of the liquidation of the illegal organizations within the Empire as, in that case, he would not only deprive himself of a point of attack against the legalist liquidators but quite possibly alienate the bolsheviks working in Russia who did not agree with him. Therefore, although he considered a general conference of the party as inexpedient and in no way desired it, Lenin nevertheless declared that officially he had nothing against the conference and would even take an active part in the preparatory work of organizing it.

On the other hand, Lenin knew quite well that, by guaranteeing a majority of votes and mandates to the bolsheviks at the forthcoming conference, it would be possible to indentify the party once and for all with the bolshevik section, and, if he were successful in carrying his proposal at the conference in one or another form, he would thus secure for them the party sanction which he so much desired. He therefore insisted categorically in the organizing commission that the representatives of the latter should, in securing the election of delegates of the party organizations within the Empire to the conference, whatever these organizations or groups might be as regards their party tendencies, secure the election only of bolsheviks. "If, in any organization," said he, "there are a hundred mensheviks, or a hundred followers of Trotzki, and only five bolsheviks, then the representative to the conference must be sent from these five, and not from the remaining hundred."

For the more successful carrying into effect of this view, Lenin sent two of his agents to Russia. (1) Y. A. Breslav, who had lived, not counting short visits to Russia, for three years in Paris. Breslav journeyed specially to Petrograd to conduct a campaign in the Vasiliostrov district against the "Vperedovtsy" or "forwards." He was told that he must succeed in maintaining the mandate to the conference from that district. It was arranged that he should pass under the name of "Khazarov" in Petrograd. Correspondence would be maintained with him through the following address: "Kudny, Province of Mogiliev," and the inner envelop would bear the mark "for Boris." It was stated that this information was of a highly confidential character and was under no circumstances to be revealed.

(2) I. S. Shvarts, who went under the names of "Semen" and "Ignaty" and also "Afanasay," had been living in Geneva in 1904. He was an active worker of the

party in the Ural and in Odessa. He proceeded to the Ural on this occasion with similar instructions to those of Breslav, i. e., to recruit as many bolshevik delegates as possible for the forthcoming conference. Max Saveliev, the son of a member of the Duma, also proceeded to Russia about this time upon the same mission, and first proceeded to Nizhny Novgorod.

At the same time Lenin actively endeavored to ensure that party workers who were at that time attending the propaganda school in Paris should be sent mandates for the conference from the local organizations in Russia. It is necessary to remark that these pupils were under the direct and uncontrolled influence of the Leninites. Thus if the conference took place under the circumstances desired by Lenin, the bolshevik section would finally assume complete control over the party. A secret bolshevik center, composed of Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Rykov, came into being, and one of the results of its activity was the printing of the above-mentioned resolution of the Kiev committee, approving the coup d'état which had been carried out abroad. Copies of this resolution were scattered among the party organizations and supplied with commentaries by the members of the secret bolshevik center recommending other organizations to follow the example of the Kiev committee. In addition to this, no effort was spared in order to discredit the supporters of non-bolshevik tendencies in the party and, by calling forth in this way an outburst of indignation, to incite the nonbolsheviks to abandon all thought of participating in the conference and so to facilitate the realization of Lenin's scheme.

In contradistinction to Lenin and his intimate supporters, who were looked upon as essentially irreconcilable sectionalists, regarding their own bolshevik views as the only true party program, there existed a section of the bolsheviks who were not opposed to Lenin upon questions of general policy and tactics, but who in questions of organization had not abandoned the hope of restoring the illegal organizations within the Empire and who were endeavoring to carry into effect the intentions of the plenary session of the central committee of January, 1910, regarding the unification of the bolsheviks and mensheviks. These bolsheviks were striving to conclude a definite agreement for the further cooperation on a common basis of the representatives of all party views, all groups agreeing on the necessity of working in the provinces in Russia and of recognizing those who were engaged in fostering the existence of illegal organizations.

This group was led by Dubrovinsky, Victor Nogin,¹ Rykov, and Liubimov, and had a considerable number of supporters, chiefly among party workers within the Empire, and it was thought that the group would play a prominent part in the further history of the party, especially if the proposed conference took place. If it did not take place it was thought that the above leaders would throw in their lot unreservedly with the Leninites.

The work of preparing for the proposed conference was considerably interfered with by the arrest of Alexander Rykov in Moscow in August, 1911. The task of organizing the Russian section of the organizing commission, therefore, fell entirely upon the shoulders of Breslav, Shvarts, and Saviliev. Shvarts seems to have succeeded in touring the Ural, visiting Ekaterinburg, Ufa, Ekaterinoslav, and also Baku and Tiflis, in the Caucasus, organizing meetings and addressing the local organizations of the party, whom he persuaded to elect members to the Russian organizing commission which, in its turn, was to elect the delegates for the conference. If, therefore, he succeeded in securing the majority of bolsheviks upon the organizing commission, there was little doubt that the bolsheviks would have a majority among those actually chosen as representatives of the party at the conference. Shvarts succeeded in getting himself elected as the representative of the Ekaterinburg organization on the organizing commission, while G. K. Orzhonikidze,² a pupil at the propaganda school at Lonjumeaux (now a member of the All-Russian central executive committee), was elected to the commission from Ekaterinoslav. Breslav succeeded in getting himself nominated by the organizations at Baku, and also took upon himself the temporary representation of the Moscow organization, with whom he had not yet succeeded in getting into touch owing to the dangers presented by the vigilance of the police in the Moscow area. I. S. Bielostotsky, a Little Russian, and also a pupil of the propaganda school at Lonjumeaux, was elected by the Petrograd organization.

A meeting of the above-mentioned persons (excepting Breslav, who had at last succeeded in getting into touch with the party organizations in the central industrial

¹ Victor Nogin is to-day president of the Glav-Texile, or central board of administration of the textile industries. He visited England in May, 1920, as a member of the soviet Russian trade delegation.

² Orzhonikidze, who is a Georgian, was elected a member of the presidium of the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which met at Moscow in December, 1920. He was a member of the Seventh All-Russian central executive committee during 1920, and has been elected a member of the Eighth for 1921, and in March, 1921, became a member of the Georgian soviet, established at Tiflis after the fall of the Georgian menshevik government.

district around Moscow) took place in Baku in September. The meeting constituted itself a session of the "Russian organizing commission," and prepared an address to the various illegal organizations within the Empire, declaring itself not only the technical organ, charged with the preparation of the elections for the conference, but also the provisional executive center, aiming at reestablishing and strengthening the Social Democratic secret organizations, and at exercising general control over the work of the party as a whole.

Orzhonikidze was appointed to proceed abroad as the representative of the Russian organizing and technical commission upon the organizing and technical commission which had been formed there. He was directed to inform these organizations abroad that they should regard the instructions of the organizing and technical commission in Russia as binding upon themselves. In other words it was supposed that the foreign organization should become the mouthpiece of the newly formed institution in Russia.

It is not unnatural that a dispute should have arisen upon this question, and that the organization and technical commissions abroad objected to the demands presented to them by Orzhonikidze on behalf of the organizations in Russia, and they intimated that they were only prepared to take knowledge of the decisions of the "Russian Organizing Committee," and to act regarding them as circumstances might dictate.

Meanwhile the representatives of the various organizations of the party abroad began to realize that the elections carried out under the direction of the Leninite delegates would inevitably result in creating a very high feeling at the conference itself, which, as regards the personnel of those participating in it, would undoubtedly side with the "Russian Organizing Commission," which had been created in accordance with Lenin's desire. They therefore began to take measures toward delaying the summoning of the conference, in the hope that they might be able to change the unfavorable atmosphere which was being formed as far as concerned the opponents of Lenin's policy. They had proposed to the Leninites that Dan and Martov should again be admitted as members of the editorial staff of the Central Organ. This request was refused and the "Technical Commission" declined to provide the funds for publishing the twenty-fourth number of the paper "Social Democrat," which subsequently appeared later than usual, having been published on funds privately provided. Considerable astonishment was then caused by the arbitrary action of the "Technical Commission" in confiscating, without cause shown, a pamphlet of Zinoviev "On the Elections to the Fourth Duma," published by the staff of the Central Organ. This called forth a series of protests on the part of a considerable number of prominent party workers of all tendencies, and removed any possibility there might have been of restoring the unity of the party as desired by the moderate bolshevik group.

Meanwhile the "Russian Organizing Commission," completely ignoring the attitude of the foreign organizations of the party toward it, concluded their session and its representatives dispersed to the districts which had elected them and proceeded to arrange the election to the conference of those whom they desired, strictly holding to the decisions of Lenin with regard to their mission—that in all cases they should endeavor to secure the election only of bolsheviks of his way of thinking. As a result of their activity bolshevik representatives were elected by the party organizations in Petrograd, Tiflis, Nikolaev, Baku, Saratov and Kazan. Mensheviks were returned from Ekaterinoslav and Kiev.

Meanwhile Breslav had found it difficult to establish contact with the party organizations in Moscow. These organizations were of great importance from the point of view of the party, and he therefore realized how essential it was to assure their representation at the conference. At the same time he was pressed for time and obstructed by the police; he therefore overcame the difficulty in the following manner. He invited two or three persons belonging to the leather workers' trade union and, without regard to their measure of education or political views, proceeded to acquaint them with the resolution which had been prepared beforehand by the technical commission, and asked whether they agreed with it. They agreed. He then proceeded to note the fact that the organization of this particular Moscow district, on being asked, had accepted the resolution promising their cooperation with and support of the work of the "Russian Organizing Commission." He repeated these methods in the case of other districts of Moscow. As an example of the haste which he showed in doing this, attention may be drawn to the resolutions which he said were passed by the organizations of the "Preobrazhensky" district. No such district exists. This mistake was afterwards noticed by the editorial staff of the Central Party Organ, in which these resolutions were printed, and a correction inserted showing that the resolutions referred to were carried by the organizations of the "Preobrazhensky" subdistrict and not by those of the nonexistent "Preobrazhensky" district. Breslav succeeded in arming himself with proofs that he had "reestablished" the activities of the secret party organizations in Moscow, and proceeded to crown his work by

organizing the election of the delegates for the projected conference. Up to then Breslav had not attempted in actuality to work among the secret circles of the party. When, however, he and his assistant Prisyagin (member of the leather workers' union, and recently a pupil at the propagandist school at Lonjumeaux) arranged to meet N. S. Mamontov, a trusted party worker, and certain representatives of the secret organizations, they were suddenly arrested by the police, who had for some time been keeping Mamontov under close observation. The meeting at which they were arrested took place at Baranov's Inn in the Sukharev Square.

The arrest of Breslav, following on that of Rykov, cut off the "Russian Organizing Commission" from Moscow and the central industrial district. In the month of November the question of holding the conference so ardently prepared for by the Leninites, in the absence of representatives of the central industrial district, began to be discussed. On the 2d December an enthusiastic follower of Lenin, Goloschekin, arrived in Moscow, having escaped from exile in Siberia. The "Russian Technical Commission" being deprived of all possibility of communicating with Moscow, authorized Goloschekin to do all he could to secure delegates from Moscow for the conference, and to send them abroad as soon as possible. He was specially instructed to see that bolsheviks only were delegated. The Moscow organizations of the party were, however, almost entirely destroyed. For a considerable time they had been without literature and leaderless. Goloschekin was therefore unable to do anything with the illegal organizations. He was therefore forced to have recourse to the legal organizations. With the exception of the weavers and the leather makers' unions there was only a social club (founded by local mensheviks, standing aloof from the party) which could be regarded as having any influence in Moscow. These organizations, again, were in no better case than the secret organizations so far as concerned the receiving of party literature and the organizing activities of party leaders. Their members were, therefore, glad to welcome Goloschekin as bringing them some news of party events in the outside world, and they soon enabled him to form a so-called Moscow Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, which began to get into touch with various factories and commercial enterprises in Moscow. In this organizing work, Goloshchekin was helped by a Saratov artisan girl, Valentina Lobova. Both of them were ultimately elected by the "Moscow Committee" as their representatives for the conference. Goloshchekin left Russia on the 21st of December, 1911. Lobova's husband fell ill and this prevented her from going. A meeting of the "Moscow Committee" which took place in a private room at the Rozhdestvensky restaurant on New Year's Eve, 1912, was broken up by the police, who took the names of all present.

Lenin's hopes of calling a conference abroad with an overwhelming preponderence of his own followers were disappointed. By the beginning of the New Year only seven delegates (five bolsheviks and two mensheviks) had arrived in Paris from Russia. Even the most optimistically disposed could hardly bring themselves to regard these seven as representing and expressing the opinions of all the Social Democratic groups within the Empire.

About this time there appeared in No. 23 of the "Pravda," a decision of the central committee of the Lettish Social Democratic Party, proposing that a new organizing commission should be formed and that representatives of the Letts, the Poles, the "Bund," the followers of Plekhanov and representatives of the "Russian organizing commission" should compose it. This "United organizing committee," should immediately summon a general party conference, having as its object the reestablishment of a united Russian Social Democratic Labor Party.

Wishing to forestall events and desiring at the same time to secure the attendance of new delegates at the conference which he had arranged for his personal aims, Lenin began sending a second batch of his representatives to Russia.

It would seem that these emissaries were more successful. The arrangements for sending delegates to the conference were soon completed, and it was decided that it should take place at Prague in January, 1912. I. S. Tarshis, an artisan from the town of Vilkomir in the Kovno Province, was intrusted with supplying the delegates with the funds necessary for making the journey and with passports. He was the trusted agent of the party for distributing literature in European Russia, and in 1907 he acted as secretary of the Moscow committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. He was assisted in his work by M. I. Bryandinsky, formerly a teacher in Kazan, an exile on two occasions in Siberia and finally throughout the period which is being described one of the principal agents of the Russian secret police. A report of the conference will be found in the following chapter.

Chapter V. The "Lenin" general party conference at Prague in January, 1912. The mensheviks prepare for their own general party conference. Position of the "Conciliators" (those who desired to effect a unification of the party by bringing the bolsheviks and mensheviks together). Lenin's report on the 9th May, 1912, with regard to party tactics at a session of the Paris section of the Foreign Organ of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. Lenin leaves Paris for Austria. The conference of the mensheviks and the national socialists at Vienna in August, 1912.

The so-called "General Party Conference," sometimes referred to as the "Lenin" conference, sat in Prague from the 19th January, 1912, until the 30th January. In all there were 23 sessions, two a day. In all, 18 members of the party attended the conference, 14 delegated by party organizations within the empire, and four representing the leaders of the party abroad. All the delegates, with the exception of two mensheviks, were representatives of the bolshevik section and ardent supporters of Lenin. The Poles, the Letts, and the members of the "Bund" declined to attend the conference. The mensheviks, led by Plekhanov, had no desire to do so as they felt that every effort had been made to close the conference to all except bolshevik members of the party. The group of the "Vperedovtsy," or the "Forwards," who stood on the extreme left, had broken up and were not represented at the conference. The "Golosovtsy," who were strongly of opinion that the activities of the party should be confined within the limits of legality, were also not invited.

The leaders of the party abroad were represented by Lenin, Kamenev, Rykov, and the Lithuanian, Tarshis. The following were representatives of the party organizations within the empire:

Andrei Sergeich Romanov, known as "Georgy," at that time between 25 and 27 years of age, a Russian by nationality, a cobbler by profession, and an agent of the Russian secret service.

Alexander Ivanovich Dogalov, at that time about 24 years of age, a workman of no definite profession, who had already served a term of exile at Solvychegodsk, in the Vologda Province. As a delegate from Baku, he had attended lectures at the school of party propagandists at Lonjumeaux. He had at first lived at Kazan, and later went to Baku. He had returned to Kazan about three months before he left Russia to attend the Prague Conference.

Suren Spandarian, otherwise known as "Timofei," at that time about 29 years old, an Armenian of some education and ardent Leninite views, formerly a student of Moscow University, was a representative of the party organizations in Baku, where he had worked with great energy among the secret group during 1908 and 1909. He possessed an extensive typographical works for printing party literature. He had been a member of the "Russian organizing commission" which had been intrusted with the election of delegates to the conference.

Grigory Konstantinovich Orzhonikidze, a Georgian from Tiflis, known under the name of "Sergo," of some education, a student at the propagandist school at Lonjumeaux, represented Tiflis at the conference. He, too, it will be remembered, had been a member of the "Russian organizing commission," and had visited Riga in connection with the election of delegates for the conference.

M. I. Gurovich, known as "Matvei," a boy in his teens, of Jewish origin, apprenticed to a hatter, represented Vilna. He had already been in prison at Grodno, and managed to fly abroad, and had mixed with the pupils of the propagandist school at Lonjumeaux, although he had not attended it.

Leonid Petrovich Serebryakov,¹ a workman of about 25 years of age at the time, a Russian, a metal worker by profession, represented the party organizations at Nikolaev. He was known under the name of "Erema." He had lived for some time in Tula, and had been exiled later to Solvychegodsk, in the Vologda Province. In 1911 he proceeded abroad and became a pupil at the propagandist school at Lonjumeaux. (NOTE.—He is now, 1920, a member of the Moscow soviet and of the central committee of the Communist Party and has recently been active as secretary of the chief labor committee.)

A. K. Voronsky, known as "Valentin," represented Saratov. He was a man of conciliatory tendency in the party, a bolshevik who desires union with the mensheviks. He was about 27 years old at this time, a Jew, occupying himself with journalism. He had been exiled on one occasion to the Vologda Province.

One, known as "Savva," whose real name has not been identified, represented Ekaterinoslav, as a menshevik. He was 23 years old, of the working class, and had been a pupil at the propagandist school at Lonjumeaux. He had already a reputation as a skilful writer, and was an ardent supporter of Plekhanov, with whom he used to keep up a regular correspondence.

Roman Vatslavovich Malinovsky,² a workman from a locomotive factory, at that time about 33 years of age. A pure Russian, well acquainted with the trade-union

¹ Serebryakov was secretary of the central labor committee appointed in soviet Russia during 1920, and also a member of the seventh all-Russian central executive committee. According to recent information he has joined Trotsky's trade-union group, which advocates conscription and militarization of labor.

² Malinovsky fought in the Russian army during the war and was taken prisoner by the Germans. After the outbreak of the bolshevik revolution in 1917 he contrived to make his way back to Russia, and gave himself up to the bolshevik authorities. He was tried and shot for treachery to the party in acting as a spy of the Russian secret police before the war.

movement. He declared at the conference that he represented the secret party organizations in Moscow. As these organizations were already represented by two persons at the conference, it was suggested that he should represent the trade-unions. (NOTE.—Shortly after this he was elected as a social democratic member of the Fourth Duma, with the help of the Russian secret service, whose agent he was at the conference.)

Grigory Zinoviev, otherwise known as "Radomyslsky," was invited to the conference by Goloshchekin "Philip," it being suggested that he should attend as a second delegate of the secret organization of the party in Moscow. (NOTE.—He had not been in Russia for some years and therefore can have had no personal contact with the secret organizations, whose representation he assumed. He is now president of the Petrograd soviet and of the executive committee of the Third International.)

Victor Alexeievich Orlynsky, known also as "David Meerovich," "Shvartsman," and as "Victor" represented the mensheviks. He was a Jew and somewhat under 30 years of age, well acquainted with the trade-union movement. He was delegated to the conference by the Kiev organizations, and was the only representative at the conference whose credentials can be said to have been of an unimpeachable character.

Boris Ivanovich Goloshchekin, known as "Philip," as has been shown above, had taken upon himself the representation of the Moscow secret organizations of the party. He had formerly been a member of the Moscow committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party.

Peter Anisim, otherwise known as "Pavlovsky-Zalutsky," and "Foma," is a Russian by nationality, a metal worker by trade, and represented the Petrograd committee at the conference.

P. Onufriev, also known as "Stepan," about 27 years old, from the Smolensk Province, a metal worker in the Obukhov factory, near Petrograd, was the second representative of the Petrograd organizations at the conference. He is said to have been closely connected with Lenin and made special reports to the conference with regard to conditions in the Petrograd factories.

The conference opened with a report of Orzhonikidze on the result of the work of the "Russian organizing commission" in preparing the elections for the conference. He drew attention to the eagerness with which the delegates of the commission had been received by the members of the local organization. He stated the complete absence of intellectual leadership among the local organization. He informed the conference that the Caucasus district committee, and all the "Bund" organizations, were in the hands of "liquidators," who desired to abandon all illegal work and to dissolve conspirative associations. He further stated that efforts had been made in the district round the Vistula to establish legal organizations without success. There existed in this area only separated groups, embodying a fairly numerous membership, under the influence of Tishko (alias Jogikhes, murdered in prison in Berlin at the time of the assassination of Rosa Luxemburg, his life-long associate in revolutionary activity among the Poles—translator's note), who was opposed to the present conference. He alluded to the strong democratic organization, which had been observed by Spandarian, in the course of his visit to the Baltic Provinces. This movement seemed to rest upon the support of the peasants. A unanimous decision to participate in the conference had been taken at a general meeting of the party in Riga, at which one of the members of the central committee of the Lettish Social Democratic Party had been present. This decision was, however, overruled by the Lettish central committee subsequently, on the ground that the proposed conference would not be a general party conference, but a private conference of the bolshevik faction, inasmuch as it had not been summoned by the foreign bureau of the central committee—the central executive organ of the party. The central committee of the Lettish Social Democratic Party considered that this conference had been called for the purpose of registering the personal policy of Lenin as the general policy of the party and could only have as its result the disorganization of the work of the parties at home. Orzhonikidze went on to say that in the majority of the Provinces within the Empire the members of the "Russian organizing commission" had been unable to get into touch with the secret organizations, in view of the fact that these had fallen into general disorganization. They had, therefore, been compelled to confine their efforts to individual party workers. With a view to avoiding any future criticism, they had invited all the national organizations, as well as the sectional groups of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, to send their representatives to the conference. The only exception made was in the case of the menshevik "liquidators," who were purposely not invited in view of their refusal to take part in the secret activities of the party. He finally drew attention to the difficult conditions in which the "Russian organizing commission" had to work, in view of the exceptional activity of the police, which had resulted in the arrest of some of its prominent members.

A resolution was passed thanking the "Russian organizing commission" for the work which it had accomplished. The conference then proceeded to pass a unanimous resolution constituting itself a general party conference of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, and as the supreme organ in the party at that moment. The resolution was carried in view of the following circumstances:

1. The dissolution of the party organizations within the Empire owing to the absence of a controlling center and to the repressive measures of the police.
2. The interest shown in the labor movement in the reestablishment of the work of the Social Democratic Party, which called forth the immediate necessity for establishing a powerful central authority closely linked with the provincial organizations in Russia.
3. The necessity for such an organ in view of the forthcoming electoral campaign for the Fourth Duma.

It is not unworthy of attention that, in passing the above resolution, the conference took for granted the agreement of those party groups which had only expressed their sympathy with the work of the conference and whose representatives had been unable to attend for various reasons.

There then followed a series of statements from representatives of the local organizations, supporting what Orzhonikidze had said regarding the disorganization into which the party groups had fallen. Onufriev alone attempted to show that in Petrograd the work of the secret organization was still established on a satisfactory basis.

Lenin then proceeded to make an attempt to test the measure of revolutionary feeling existing among the delegates of the working masses present at the conference. He therefore proposed that, in view of the disorganization referred to, it would be best to liquidate completely existing secret organizations, and concentrate all energy exclusively on work within the limits of legality, electing for the purpose a special supreme party organ, which should delegate special representatives only for provincial work, to be undertaken strictly in accordance with the policy laid down by the Center. A burst of protest greeted this proposal and the members of the conference categorically declared that they were prepared to continue their secret activity at all costs, notwithstanding the obstacles which they might meet and the sacrifices which might be imposed upon them. In connection with the resolution which was passed regarding the preservation of secret organizations, it was decided to make extensive use of the workers' institutions legitimately established, and to form among them secret organizations as a basis for the further strengthening of the secret groups, and also to form, as far as might be possible, in accordance with local conditions, organizations on a territorial basis, together with groups formed according to particular industries and special forms of employment.

The resolutions of the conference of 1908, regarding the urgent necessity of cultural work among the masses, the immediate participation of the secret groups in the growing economic struggle, and in the strike movement and for the purpose of promoting the class consciousness beginning to develop among proletarian masses were approved.

The conference then proceeded to discuss the attitude which it should assume toward the national party organizations which had refused to attend the conference, although three times invited to do so. A letter was read from the Poles, in which the history of the dissolution of the "central committee," and of the "foreign bureau of the central committee," was described and attributed to the bolshevik section, and, chiefly, to Rykov. They declined to regard the conference as a general conference of the party, not only in view of the fact that the national party organizations were not represented at it, but also in view of the fact that the "Russian organizing commission," consisting exclusively of Leninites, had made arrangements for summoning a conference, although they had no right to take upon themselves the representation of the party. In conclusion, the Poles proposed to elect two of those assembled at Prague, and to charge them with proposing to the national party organizations, the mensheviks' delegates of the "foreign bureau of the central committee" (dissolved by Lenin) that they should cooperate for the purpose of convening a real general party conference, in which they, the Poles, would be prepared to participate. The Letts sent a letter of similar purport. The Bund wrote stating that they would only consent to take part in the conference providing that all shades of opinion, including the "liquidators," were represented. The "Vperedovtsy" wrote, refusing to recognize the conference, and Plekhanov, who was at San Remo, informed them that he was not convinced that all shades of the Social Democratic Labor Party were in agreement with the representatives assembled at Prague, and he therefore did not consider that it would be right for him to attend the conference. Maxim Gorky sent a letter regretting that the lack of means prevented him from accepting the invitation to attend the conference, and that he could not participate in editing a cheap social democratic journal, as had been proposed, in view of his conviction that the publication of a purely Marxist paper corresponded more nearly, in his opinion, with the exigencies of the moment.

Lenin had long desired to settle his accounts with Trotsky, who had opposed him earlier by proposing to call a general conference in which all party tendencies would be represented. Furthermore, Trotsky had made speeches in a menshevik club in Vienna and had suggested the convening of a conference over the heads of the "leaders" of the party in Paris. At the Prague conference Lenin was successful in convincing the assembly of the uselessness of devoting funds to a journal which, like the "Pravda," was run parallel with the "Rabochaya Gazeta," and urged, moreover, that the "Pravda" had shown itself to be a supporter of the liquidating tendencies of the menshevik Golosovtsy. The conference therefore decided to deprive the "Pravda" of the subsidy which they had been giving to it and to regard the "Rabochaya Gazeta" as the official journal of the party.

With regard to the forthcoming elections to the Duma, Zinoviev read a paper emphasizing the necessity of pursuing a concrete and properly coordinated policy, with a view to securing the election to the Duma of the candidates nominated by the party. This report was greeted with favor by the conference, but a resolution by the menshevik Savva, proposing that the party should form a block with other revolutionary and opposition parties during the first phase of the election, was rejected, as having no practical significance, and as inevitably leading to concessions by the party in the event of the social democrats polling a minority of votes at the first ballots. It was, therefore, decided to adopt an entirely independent attitude during the first phase of the elections and alliance with parties not more right than the cadets was declared admissible only in the case of a reelection becoming necessary. In cases where there was no hope of electing a social democrat candidate from a given constituency, it was agreed that there was no objection to cooperation with other opposition parties, with a view to electing a liberal candidate. The conference then proceeded to elect what was described as the central committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party—Lenin, Zinoviev, Orzhonikidze, Spandarian, "Viktor," Malinovsky, and Goldenberg.

It was decided that Lenin and Zinoviev should remain permanently abroad and form a nucleus of the central committee, such as could not be broken up by the police. Orzhonikidze, Spandarian, "Viktor," Malinovsky, and Goldenberg would reside in Russia and form the Russian collegium of the central committee.

As it was generally acknowledged that it would be impossible to keep the collegium together in view of the activity of the secret police it was resolved that each of the members of the central committee should have the right of coopting supplementary members on the committee so that its activities would not be interrupted by the arrest of any of its members. In view of the resolution, recognizing the conference as a general conference of the party, it was decided to demand back from the trustees the sums of money, which had previously been entrusted to them by the bolshevik center. This decision strengthened the endeavors of Lenin to reestablish an independent bolshevik section, as the surrender of the money by the trustees would place it under the complete control of the central committee, the most influential members of which were his supporters.

Savva unexpectedly informed the conference four or five days after it had opened and after he had voted for all the resolutions proposed during that time, that he could not regard the conference as a general party conference, and refused to take upon himself responsibility for the character and results of its work. He declared, therefore, that he intended to continue to attend the meetings only as being the authorized delegate of the organization which had appointed him, so that he might be in a position to make a report to it upon the proceedings of the conference. Having made his statement, Savva subsequently proceeded to ask leave to address the conference. Lenin, however, asked whether the conference proposed to allow this, and whether it recognized such declarations as Savva had made as being in order. The conference resolved that Savva would not be allowed the right of addressing it on any further subject, and declared the statement which he had made as out of order. Savva, who did not expect such a decision, broke down and wept at this point. This incident having been closed, Lenin, as president of the conference, pronounced a concluding speech in the course of which he declared the unstrained measure of joy which he experienced in having lived to see the day when the workers, hitherto relying on the leadership of the Intellectuals, now showed themselves able to take into their own hands the conduct of party affairs, and had shown themselves able to appear independently at a conference like the present, and themselves to solve questions of the first magnitude. After this speech Lenin declared the conference closed.

While the conference was still in session, the newly elected members of the central committee succeeded in holding two meetings with the following results:

1. Lenin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev were instructed immediately to publish an address, in the name of the central committee, to the party organizations calling upon

them to work in unison and informing them of the conclusion of the conference, and of the results of its activities.

2. Lenin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev were appointed as the editorial staff of the Central Party organ, the "Rabochaya Gazeta," with a salary of 200 fr. a month.

3. Lenin was elected representative of the party on the international socialist bureau, and it was decided to ask Plekhanov also to become a representative.

4. A traveling commission was formed of Orzhonikidze, Malinovsky, and Goldenberg to proceed to Russia and direct the activities of those who had participated in the conference.

The following were commissioned to present reports upon party organizations within the Empire from time to time.

1. Spandarian; on the Caucasus and the Letts.
2. Orzhonikidze and Prisiagin; on Petrograd.
3. Goloshchekin; on Moscow, on the Ural, and on the central industrial district.
4. Viktor; on Kiev, Ekaterinoslav, and other places.
5. Spandarian, Tarshis, and Poletaev, a Duma deputy, were appointed to conduct pourparlers with the trustees of the bolshevik money.

6. In connection with the right of cooptation, the following were elected additional members of the central committee: (a) Joseph Vissarionov Dzhugashvili, a Georgian (NOTE.—Now people's commissary for state control and also for nationalities under the soviet government), and (b), "Vladimir," formerly a workman in the Putilov factory and a pupil of the propaganda school at Lonjumeaux (real name, Belostatsky). In the event of members of the central committee being arrested,¹ S. A. Bubnov, A. P. Smirnov, and Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin.²

7. Spandarian, Orzhonikidze, and Dzhugashvili were elected members of the so-called bureau of the central committee, at a salary of 50 roubles a month, and they were to be assisted by Goloshchekin as a traveling agent.

Lenin was instructed to form a special committee for investigating charges brought by one member of the party against another, as in the case of Nogin, who had brought accusations against one of the members of the central committee, a representative of the Bund.

In February, 1912, a conference took place between Poletaev, a social democrat member of the Duma, and Lenin, Malinovsky, and Spandarian regarding the activities of the social democrat members of the Duma. Simultaneously, conferences were taking place in Russia of representatives of the Bund, the Lettish social democrats, and of the district committee of the Caucasus social democrat organization, all expressing the menshevik point of view, and the necessity of combining to reestablish the unity of the party, which they proposed to further by calling a general party conference. They invited the members of the Leninite "Russian organizing commission" to attend the conference, but no reply was received. A representative of the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania was invited and actually attended the conference, but soon left as a result of a disagreement on the question of supplementing the members of the "organizing committee" with representatives of the party organizations in Russia. The practical result of the conference was a unanimous decision to summon a conference of all groups and shades of opinion, and a provisional bureau was established as an organizing committee, and instructed as to summoning the conference.

While these meetings were taking place in Russia, the representatives of the Lettish Social Democratic Party and of the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania left the foreign bureau of the central committee. As a result of this only representatives of the mensheviks and the Bund remained as members of the foreign bureau. These, therefore, proceeded to constitute themselves as a so-called "foreign commission" and announced that they desired to make this "foreign commission" representative of all party groups and tendencies existing abroad. A meeting of protest took place in March at Paris of representatives of the foreign committee of the Bund of the Plekhanovtsy, the "forwards," the bolshevik conciliators, of the editorial staffs of the "Golos Social-Demokrata" and "Pravda," with regard to the so-called "All-Russian Conference of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party" held by the Leninites at Prague in the preceding January. Other protests were received from party organizations in Russia and abroad. But it was clear that Lenin could not be overcome by words or resolutions. It was quite evident that there was only one means of uniting the party, and that was by acquiescence in the coup d'état which Lenin

¹ S. A. Bubnov and A. P. Smirnov were members of the all-Russian central Executive committee in 1920, and the latter is a member of the collegium of the people's commissariat for food.

² M. I. Kalinin, president of the newly-elected eighth all-Russian central executive committee, 1921.

had accomplished. It was hopeless to think of any united effort on the part of the organization opposed by Lenin. No practical cooperation could be expected between such widely divergent groups as the menshevik "liquidators" on the one hand and the "Vperedovtsy" or "forwards" on the other. Even Trotski, working in the Centre, could not reconcile these fundamentally incompatible forces.

Meanwhile, Lenin went on with the work which he had begun at the Prague conference. In May, 1912, he addressed a meeting of the Paris section of the foreign organizing committee which had been called into being at Prague. He dwelt upon the wave of labor unrest which was passing over Russia at that time, and emphasized its importance as coinciding with the electoral campaign for the Fourth Duma. The conservatives were frightened. Menshikov, in the reactionary "Novoe Vremya," had attacked Witte for not hastening the passage of the workers' insurance legislation, which would exercise a tranquilizing effect upon labor. Lenin pointed to past revolutionary experience as showing the value of an active representation of revolutionaries in a parliamentary body. It was, therefore, important that as many candidates of the party as possible should be elected at the forthcoming Duma. There it would be their task to hasten the course of events as far as they could by losing no opportunity of aggravating the difficulties of the government, and of showing up the opportunism of the liberal parties, who were ever ready to betray the workers. If conditions at the elections were as favorable as at the elections to the Third Duma, it was possible that they might achieve some success. If, however, the police boycotted the party, as was suggested by the recent arrest of Skyortsov (NOTE.—At present an official in the publishing department of the soviet government), it was difficult to say what the issue of the present election would be and whether they would succeed in securing the election of even one of their candidates.

In August, 1912, Lenin again left Paris for Prague, it is suggested with a view to being nearer the Russian frontier, which would enable him the more easily to receive information and supervise the dispatch of party literature into Russia. He was anxious at this time to converse with one of the prominent party workers among the local organizations of the party, and it was hoped that one of them would succeed in crossing the frontier and of visiting him at Prague. His wife, who acted as his secretary, corresponded upon this matter with Andrei Sergeivich Romanov, formerly a pupil at Gorky's school at Capri. (NOTE.—The success of this correspondence was hardly likely to be promoted by the fact that Romanov was an agent of the Russian secret service.)

In August, 1912, the mensheviks succeeded in holding at Vienna, under the presidency of Trotski, a conference of members of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party such as had been contemplated at the meetings which took place in Petrograd in the preceding January. The conference was a failure. It was impossible to persuade the bolshevik "conciliators," the Plekhanovtsy, social democrats of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, not to speak of the Leninites, to attend. Grigory Alexeievich Alexinsky, representing the "Vperedovtsy;" Martov, the leader of the mensheviks; Abramovich and Goldman, representing the Bund; Mgeladze and Urotadze, members of the Caucasian organization; and Peterson, Medem, and Janson, members of the Lettish Social Democratic Party were there. (NOTE.—Martov and Abramovich are to-day in Berlin working for the mensheviks. Abramovich took a leading part in putting the town of Tula into a state of defense when Denikin's army was advancing. Mgeladze is now a member of the all-Russian central executive committee.) Another member of the conference was Uritsky, who was for some time president of the Petrograd soviet and was assassinated in 1918.

It was quite impossible to reconcile the conflicting interests which asserted themselves at the conference. As a result of the attack made by Martov and Abramovich, Alexinsky left the conference and Trotski failed to carry a resolution declaring the conference to be a general conference of the party. In view of the fact that the conference had been attended by some 30 delegates representing areas such as Petrograd, Moscow, Odessa, Sevastopol, Krasnoyarsk, Baku, etc., its failure to achieve any measure of comprehensive agreement marked the final failure of the various efforts made by the mensheviks to reunite the party. Tactlessness, on the one hand, and the fundamental differences, on the other, were, above all, the causes of this failure.

APPENDIX VII.

[Extract from booklet entitled "The Revolutionary Movement in Russia," by A. E. Spiridovitch.]

[Translation from Russian.]

Program of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, as elaborated at the conference of the party in London in 1909, prior to Lenin's "coup d'état," described in Appendix VI.

The growth of exchange (intercourse) has established such a close tie between all nations of the civilized world that the great liberation movement of the proletariat was bound to become, and has already long ago become, an international one.

Considering itself one of the detachments of the universal army of the proletariat, Russian social democracy aims at the same final object to which the social democrats of all other countries are aspiring.

This final aim is determined by the characteristics of contemporary middle-class society and by the progress of its development.

The main feature of such a society is the production of goods on the basis of capitalistic industrial relations, under which the most important and considerable portion of the means of production and circulation of the goods belongs to a numerically small class of people, while the enormous majority of the population consists of proletarians and semiproletarians, forced by their economic position to sell their labor permanently or periodically—that is to say, to join, as hired men, the service of the capitalists and to create by their labor the revenues of the upper classes of society.

The sphere of the rule of capitalistic industrial relations is widening out more and more, as and when the continuous improvements in technological engineering, increasing the economic value of the huge enterprises, leads to the elimination of the small independent producers, turning a part of them into proletarians, limiting the scope of the remainder in the communal economic life, and here and there placing them into more or less complete, more or less obvious, more or less onerous dependence on capital.

The same technical progress enables the exploiter to utilize at an always increasing rate the labor of women and children in the process of production and handling of goods. And as, on the other part, it leads to a relative reduction in the human labor requirements of the exploiters, the demand for labor must necessarily fall short of the supply of the same, in consequence of which the dependence of labor on capital increases, and the level of its exploitation rises.

And such a condition of affairs in bourgeois countries, with their mutual rivalry on the universal market steadily coming to a head, makes more and more difficult the sale of the goods, produced in steadily increasing quantity. Overproduction finding expression in more or less acute crises, which are succeeded by more or less prolonged periods of industrial stagnation, represents the inevitable result of the development of the industrial forces in bourgeois society. Crises and periods of industrial stagnation in their turn ruin still more the small producers, increase still more the dependence of hired labor on capital, lead still more rapidly to a relative, and occasionally also to an absolute, setback in the position of the working class.

In this manner technical improvements, signifying an increase in the productive efficiency of labor and a growth of public wealth, mean, in middle-class society, an increase in public inequality, a widening of the division between the "haves" and the "have nots," and a growth of the insecurity of existence, unemployment, and various deprivations to wider circles of the toiling masses.

However, in proportion to the rate at which these contradictions, peculiar to middle-class society, grow and develop there also grows the dissatisfaction of the toiling and exploited masses with the existing order of things, grows the number and cohesion of the proletarians, and grows the fierceness of their struggle against their exploiters. At the same time technical improvements, concentrating the means of production and circulation and generalizing the process of labor in capitalistic enterprises, create more and more rapidly the material possibilities for a replacement of capitalistic industrial relationships by socialistic ones, that is to say, by that social revolution which represents the final aim of the entire activity of international social democracy as the conscious exponent of the class movement.

Replacing private ownership of the means of production and circulation by public ownership and introducing a coordinated organization of the public industrial process for securing the welfare and all-round development of all members of society, the social revolution of the proletariat will abolish the division of society into classes and will thereby liberate all oppressed humanity, as it will put a stop to all kinds of exploitation of one section of society by another.

An indispensable condition of this social revolution is the dictatorship of the proletariat, i. e., the conquest by the proletariat of such political power as would enable it to suppress any resistance on the part of the exploiters.

Setting up as its aim the making of the proletariat fit to carry out its great historical mission, international social democracy is welding it into an independent political party, opposed to all bourgeois parties, directing all the manifestations of its class struggle, revealing to it the irreconcilable contrast between the interests of the exploiters and those of the exploited, and explaining to it the historical importance of, and the conditions necessary to, the impending social revolution. At the same time, it discloses to all the toiling and exploited masses the hopelessness of their position in capitalistic society and the need of the social revolution in the interests of their own liberation from the yoke of capital. The party of the working class—social democracy—invites into its ranks all sections of the toiling and exploited population provided they accept the views of the proletariat.

On the way toward their common final goal, which is dependent on the domination of the capitalistic method of production in the whole of the civilized world, the social democrats of the different countries are compelled to adopt different objects for immediate attention, and that because this method is not everywhere developed in an equal degree and also because its development in the different countries proceeds in different social and political surroundings.

In Russia, where capitalism has already become the dominating method of production, there still survive a good many odds and ends of our old capitalistic order, which was based on the binding of the toiling masses to the landlords, to the state or to the head of the state. Interfering most seriously with economic progress, these survivals prevent the all-round development of the class struggle of the proletariat, assist in the maintenance and strengthening of the most barbaric forms of exploitation of the peasantry of many millions by the state and possessing classes, and keep the whole nation in darkness and without rights.

The most important of all these survivals and the most powerful bulwark of all this barbarity is the Tsarist autocracy. It is by its very nature hostile to any public movement, and can not but be the most embittered enemy of all emancipatory aspirations of the proletariat.

Therefore the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party adopts as its most immediate political aim the overthrow of the Tsarist autocracy and its replacement by a democratic republic, the constitution of which would secure:

1. The sovereignty of the people, that is to say, centralization of all supreme state power in the hands of a legislative assembly, consisting of the representatives of the people and forming one chamber.

2. Universal, equal, and direct electoral rights at elections to the legislative assembly, as well as to all local organs of self-government, for all citizens of either sex who have reached the age of 20; secret ballot at elections; the right to every elector to be elected to all representative bodies; parliaments of two years' duration; salaries to the people's representatives.

3. Wide local self-government; territorial self-government for those localities which are distinguished by peculiar conditions of life and the composition of the population.

4. Inviolability of the subject and home.

5. Unrestricted liberty of conscience and freedom of speech, press, meetings, strikes, and unions.

6. Freedom of movement and trades.

7. Abolition of class distinctions and full equality of all citizens, irrespective of sex, religion, race, and nationality.

8. Right of the people to receive instruction in the native tongue, provided for by the establishment, at the expense of the state and self-government bodies, of the schools required therefor; the right of every citizen to express himself in the native tongue at the assemblies; the introduction of the native tongue on an equal footing with the state language in all local, public, and state establishments.

9. The right to self-determination for all nations entering into the composition of the state.

10. The right of every person to prosecute any state official in a court of jurymen.

11. The appointment of the judges by the people.

12. Replacement of the standing army by the universal arming of the people.

13. Separation of the church from the state and of the school from the church.

14. Free and obligatory general and professional education for all children of either sex up to the age of 16 years; the supply of poor children with food, clothing, and school requisites at the expense of the state.

As a fundamental condition of the democratization of our state economics, the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party demands the abrogation of all indirect taxes and the institution of a progressive tax on incomes and inheritances.

In the interests of the protection of the working class against physical and moral degeneration, and also in the interests of the development of its capacity for the emancipatory struggle, the party demands:

1. The limitation of the working day to 8 hours per 24 hours for all hired labor.
2. The fixing of a weekly period of rest, continuing without a break over not less than 42 hours, for hired labor of either sex in all branches of national economics.
3. The complete prohibition of overtime work.
4. The prohibition of night work (from 9 p. m. to 6 a. m.) in all branches of national economics, except in those in which it is absolutely necessary for technical considerations approved of by the labor organizations.
5. That employers be prohibited from making use of the labor of children of school age (up to 16 years); and the limitation of the working time of adults (16 to 18 years) to six hours.
6. The prohibition of female labor in those trades in which it is injurious to the female organism; the release of women from work for a period of from four to six weeks after childbirth, the payment of wages at the usual rate to continue all this time.
7. The provision of creches for nurslings and children of tender age at all works, factories, and other establishments at which women are employed; women with nurslings to be released from work not less frequently than every three hours for a period of not less than half an hour at a time.
8. The State insurance of workers against old age and complete or partial loss of working capacity at the expense of a special fund, created by means of a special tax on the capitalists.
9. Prohibition of the payment of wages in goods; the fixing of a weekly day of settlement in cash in all contracts, without exception, relating to the engagement of workmen and payment of their earnings to be made to them in working hours.
10. That employers be prohibited from making deductions from wages, irrespective of the grounds on or objects for which they may be made (fines, rejections, etc.).
11. The appointment of an adequate number of factory inspectors in all branches of national economics and the extension of supervision by the factory inspectors to all enterprises employing hired labor, Government establishments included (the work of domestic servants also to come within the sphere of this supervision); the appointment of women inspectors in those trades in which female labor is employed; participation of state-paid representatives, elected by the workmen, in the supervision over the execution of the factory laws, and also over the drawing up of the rates of pay, the acceptance and rejection of materials, and results of the work.
12. Supervision by the organs of local self-government, assisted by delegates of the workers, over the sanitary condition of the living accommodation allocated to the workers by the employers, as well as over the internal arrangement of such quarters and over the conditions of their letting, in order to protect the hired men against interference on the part of the employers into their life and activities as private persons and citizens.
13. The establishment of properly organized sanitary supervision in all enterprises employing hired labor, subject to the whole medical and sanitary organization being completely independent of the employers; free medical assistance to the workmen at the expense of the employers and continuation of maintenance during illness.
14. The establishment of criminal liability on the part of employers for infractions of the labor protection laws.
15. The establishment in all branches of national economics of industrial courts, composed in equal numbers of representatives of the workmen and of the employers.
16. Charging the local self-government bodies with the duty of establishing offices of mediation in connection with the hire of local and incoming labor (labor exchanges) in all branches of industry, subject to participation of representatives of labor organizations in their management.

In order to eliminate the vestiges of serfdom, which impose a direct heavy burden on the peasants, and in the interests of the unfettered development of the class struggle in the village, the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party demands:

1. Abrogation of all class restrictions with reference to the person and property of peasants.
2. Abolition of all payments and dues connected with the class individualism of the peasants and the annulment of engagements of an onerous description.
3. Confiscation of church, monastery, appanage, and state lands and the handing over of these and also of fiscal lands to the main local government bodies which unify the urban and rural districts, subject to lands required on behalf of the emigration fund and also forests and waters, which are of general state importance, being transferred to the democratic state.
4. The confiscation of privately owned lands, excepting small holdings, the same to be placed at the disposal of the main local government bodies, elected on demo-

cratic principles, the minimum area of plots of land subject to confiscation to be fixed by the main self-government bodies.

While supporting the revolutionary acts of the peasantry up to the confiscation of the estates of landowners, the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party will always and unalterably oppose all attempts to retard the course of economic development. Striving, in the event of the victorious development of the revolution, to hand over the confiscated lands into the possession of the democratic establishments of the local organs of self-government, the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, in the event of conditions being unfavorable to such a course, will express itself in favor of a division between the peasants of such landowners' lands on which farming on a small scale is actually being carried on or which comprise additions indispensable to the rounding off of the same. In connection therewith the object of the party, on all occasions and in any state of the democratic agrarian changes, will be to strive without deviation for the independent class organization of the rural proletariat, to explain to it the irreconcilability of its interests with those of the rural middle-class, to caution it against seduction by the allurements of the system of small holding farming, which, in the presence of industrialism, will never succeed in doing away with the poverty of the masses, and, finally, to point out the need of a complete socialistic change, as being the sole means for abolishing all poverty and all exploitation.

While striving to secure its immediate objects, the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party supports all opposition and revolutionary movements directed against the general political order existing in Russia, at the same time positively rejecting all those schemes of reform which are connected with any extension or simplification of the police and bureaucratic tutelage over the toiling classes.

On its part, the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party is firmly convinced that the full, consecutive, and permanent realization of the above political and social changes is only attainable by way of the downthrow of autocracy and convocation of a constituent assembly, freely elected by the whole nation.

SUPPLEMENT 3 (CHAPTER IX).

Statute of organization¹ of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party adopted at the London conference.

1. As a member of the party is considered, everyone who accepts the program of the party, financially supports the party, and joins any organization of the party.

2. All organizations of the party are based on the principles of democratic centralization.

3. All organizations of the party are autonomous as regards their internal activities. Every approved organization of the party is free to publish in its own name the literature of the party.

4. New organizations of the party are approved by the territorial conferences or by two of the nearest organizations. Control of ratification is vested in the central committee. Information on all newly approved organizations is published, in due course, by the central committee in the party press.

5. The organizations of one region may combine in territorial associations. The territorial center is elected at the territorial conferences or meetings.

6. All organizations of the party must support the central committee financially at the rate of 10 per cent of all receipts.

7. The central committee is elected at a meeting. The central committee represents the party in negotiations with other parties, organizes the various establishments of the party and directs their operations, appoints the editorial staff of the central organization which operates under its control, organizes and conducts the enterprises of general party interests, allocates the forces and funds of the party, and has charge of the central cash department of the party, settles disputes between different establishments of the party and also within these, and, generally, unifies all the work of the party. In the case of the retirement of members of the central committee, its complement is made up from amongst the delegates elected by the meeting in the order fixed by the meeting.

8. For the discussion of more important questions in the life of the party, the central committee convokes periodically, but not less than once in every three to four months, conferences of representatives of the territorial associations of the individual organizations of the Bund, S. D. P. and L. & S. D. L. K.,² in proportion to the num-

¹ See London Conference of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. Full text of proceedings. Published by the central committee, 1909.

² The Labor and Social Democracy of Latvia.

bers of the organized workers taking part in the elections to the last party meeting, on the basis of one delegate in every 5,000. All organizations not combined in territorial associations elect delegates at their conferences on the same lines. The resolutions of the conferences become operative only in case of their ratification by the central committee.

9. The meeting acts as the supreme authority of the party. The ordinary meetings are called together by the central committee annually. At the request of not less than half the number of all the members of the party an extraordinary meeting must be called within two months.

In the event of the central committee refusing, under these conditions, to call a meeting, the moiety of the party which demanded its convocation is entitled to constitute an organization committee, the same enjoying all the rights of the central committee with reference to the convocation of a meeting.

The organizations which have been approved three months prior to the date of the convocation of the meeting have the right to be represented at the meeting at the rate of one delegate for every half of 1,000 members taking part in the election of the delegates.

Organizations not possessing the adequate number of members may unite with neighboring organizations for the purpose of sending a joint delegate, provided they have together not less than 1,000 electors. The election of delegates to a meeting is conducted on democratic lines.

A meeting is considered as being duly constituted if more than half of all the members of the party be represented at it.

The convocation of every meeting and the agenda are notified by the central committee, or, in the respective instances, by the organization committee, not less than one and a half months prior to the meeting.

APPENDIX VIII.

[Extract from "Terrorism and Communism," by L. Trotzki.]

[Translation from Russian.]

CHAPTER VIII. "QUESTIONS REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION OF LABOR."

The Soviet Government and Industry.—"If during the period of the soviet revolution the principal criticisms of the bourgeois world were directed against our brutality and bloodthirstiness, then later, when this argument had become somewhat worn from constant use, and had lost its force, they began to hold us as chiefly responsible for the economic disorganization of the country. In accordance with the purpose of his present mission, Kautsky methodically reduces to pseudo-Marxist language all the bourgeois allegations as to the soviet government having destroyed the industrial life of Russia—the bolsheviks proceeded to the socialization of industry without plan. they socialized what was as yet unripe for socialization; finally, the Russian working class were, in general, unprepared to assume the administration of industry, etc.

Repeating and combining these accusations, Kautsky passes over with dull obstinacy the fundamental reasons of our economic disorganization—the imperialist slaughter, the civil war, and the blockade.

Soviet Russia, from the first months of her existence, has been deprived of coal, naphtha, metal, and cotton. At first Austro-German and later entente imperialism, with the cooperation of Russian White Guards, cut off from soviet Russia the coal and metalliferous regions, the Caucasus naphtha district, Turkestan, with its cotton, the Ural with its rich resources in metal, Siberia with its supplies of corn and meat. The Donetz Basin usually supplied our industry with 94 per cent of its coal and 74 per cent of its heavy metal. The Ural yielded another 24 per cent of metal and 4 per cent of coal. We lost both these areas in the course of the civil war. We found ourselves deprived of half a milliard poods of coal, which was formerly imported from abroad. We were simultaneously deprived of naphtha oil; the whole industry passed into the hands of our foes. One must really possess leaden wits if, in face of these facts, one talks about the destructive influence of "untimely," "barbarous," etc., socialization of an industry which has been completely deprived of fuel and raw material. Whether a factory belongs to a capitalist trust or to a worker's state, whether or not it is socialized, its chimneys none the less will not smoke without coal or oil. It might be possible to learn something about this in Austria and besides in Germany herself. The textile factory, administered on the very best lines by Kautsky—if one allows that it would be possible to administrate anything on the lines of Kautsky, besides one's own inkpot—will not give clothing if it is not supplied with cotton. We have also been deprived both of Turkistan and American fiber at the same time. Besides this, as has been said, we had no fuel.

Of course, the blockade and the civil war were the results of the proletarian revolution in Russia. But it does not follow from this that the gigantic devastation, caused by the Anglo-American blockade and the predatory campaigns of Kolchak and Denikin, should be credited to the account of the worthlessness of soviet economic methods.

The imperialist war, which preceded the revolution with its enormous demands in material and technical appliances, laid upon our young industry a far greater burden than was laid upon the industry of the more powerful capitalist states. Our transport suffered exceptionally severely. The exploitation of the railways was carried on with greatly increased intensity, the necessity for repairs grew proportionately, while the actual accomplishment of repairs was reduced to a strict minimum.

The inevitable hour of reckoning drew near with the fuel crisis. The almost simultaneous loss of the Donetz and foreign coal and of Caucasus oil necessitated the adaptation of transport to wood fuel. And as the available supplies of wood were not calculated to meet this demand, locomotives had to be fired with fresh-cut damp wood, which exerted an extremely destructive effect on the already dilapidated machinery of locomotives. We see, therefore, that the chief causes for the disorganization of transport preceded in their operation the revolution of November, 1917. But even those causes which are directly or indirectly associated with the November revolution are to be attributed to the political consequences of the revolution, and in no way to socialist methods of economic administration. The influence of the political upheavals was not, of course, confined to questions of transport and fuel. If world industry has shown a tendency during the last decade to become transformed in one unified organism, then so much the more intensely does this process of unification apply to national industry. Meanwhile, the war and the revolution automatically dismembered Russian industry in all directions. The destruction of industry in Poland, the Baltic Provinces, and after that in Petrograd began under Tsarism, and continued under Kerensky, spreading more and more into new areas. Endless evacuations, accompanied simultaneously with the destruction of industry, occasioned the destruction of transport. Evacuations, during the civil war, with its moving fronts assumed an increasingly feverish development and consequently a more and more destructive character. Each side, temporarily or permanently evacuating one industrial area or another, took all possible measures to render factories useless to the enemy—the most valuable machinery was removed, or, at any rate, the most vital parts, together with the technical staff and other workmen. After an evacuation would follow a reevacuation, which often completed the destruction both of movable equipment and the railways. Certain important industrial areas—especially in the Ukraine and the Ural—were transferred from one side to the other more than once.

To this it is necessary to add that at the time when the destruction of technical equipment was going on and assuming unparalleled proportions, the import of machinery from abroad, which used to play such a decisive rôle in our industrial life, completely ceased.

But not only the material elements of production, buildings, machinery, fuel, and raw material suffered a terrible falling off under the united blows of war and the revolution, but the principal factor in industry—its human, creative force, the proletariat—suffered no less, if not more. It carried out the November revolution, it built up and defended the organization of the soviet government, and conducted an uninterrupted struggle with the White Guards. Skilled workers are, at the same time, as a general rule, in the front rank politically. The civil war for a long time tore away from productive effort many thousands of the best workmen, and swallowed up many thousands of them without possibility of their return.

For the two and a half years of its existence the whole attention of the soviet government has been directed to military defense; the best strength and the principal resources have been given to the front.

The class struggle in general deals blows at industry. All the philosophers who preach social harmony up to Kautsky have long accused it on that score. During simple economic strikes the workers consume but do not produce. So much the heavier then are the blows which the class struggle in its bitterest form deals at economic organization—the form of armed struggles. But it is clear that you can not connect the civil war with socialist economic methods.

The reasons enumerated above do more than explain the grievous economic position of soviet Russia. There is no fuel, no metal, no cotton, transport is disorganized, technical equipment is disorganized, labor is dispersed about the face of the country with a high percentage of it lost on the fronts. Is it necessary to search for additional reasons—for example, in the economic utopianism of the bolsheviks—to explain the decline of our industry? On the contrary, each one of the above-enumerated reasons is in itself sufficient to raise the question, How under such conditions has it been possible to maintain the activity of the factories at all?

They do exist, however, principally in the form of war industry, which is now carried on at the expense of all other forms of industry. The soviet government has been compelled to recreate it, like the army, out of shattered remnants. Military industry, reestablished, under these serious conditions, has and is fulfilling the tasks which are being imposed upon it; the Red army is clothed, shod, armed with rifles, machine guns and artillery, cartridges, shells, airplanes, and all that it needs.

As soon as a glimmer of peace showed itself—after the destruction of Kolchak, Yudenich, and Denikin—we began to meet the question of organizing the economic life of the country. Already in the course of three or four months of intensive effort in this department it is clear beyond all doubt that, thanks to our most intimate ties with the popular masses, the elasticity of our State organization and our revolutionary initiative, the soviet government has at its disposal such resources and methods for the regeneration of the country as no other state ever enjoyed.

It is true that quite new questions and new difficulties have risen up before us in the sphere of organizing labor. Socialist theory has not had answers ready for these questions and could not be expected to have had. Solutions have to be sought by experience and to be tested by it. "Kautskianstvo" lies a whole epoch behind the gigantic economic problems which the soviet government is having to decide. In the leanness of menshevism, it stumbles along, opposing to the practical measures of our economic construction petty bourgeois prejudice and the bureaucratic skepticism of the intellectuals.

[In order to introduce the reader into the very essence of those questions connected with the organization of labor, as they present themselves before us now, we attach below a report made by the author of this book at the Third All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions (April, 1920, translator's note). With the object of more fully illuminating the question, the text of the speech is supplemented with important extracts from the author's reports before the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of People's Economy and at the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party.]

Report on the organization of labor.—Comrades: Internal civil war is at an end. On the western front the position is as yet undecided. It is possible that the Polish bourgeoisie is challenging its own fate: but even in this case—we do not seek it—the war will not call for that enormous intensity of effort from us which simultaneous fighting on four fronts called for. The terrible pressure of war is beginning to relax. Economic demands and problems push themselves to the front the more readily. History leads us straight to our fundamental problem—the organization of labor on social principles. The organization of labor is in essence the organization of a new society; every historical society is fundamentally an organization of labor. If every society in the past has been an organization of labor in the interests of the minority, whereby this minority organized its own state compulsion over the vast majority of the workers, then we are making the first attempt in the world's history to organize labor in the interests of the working majority itself. This, however, does not exclude the element of compulsion in all its forms, in its most mild and harshest forms. The elementary obligation of state compulsion not only does not pass from the scene of history, but, on the contrary, will continue to play an extraordinarily great rôle for a considerable period of time.

As a general rule, a man strives to avoid labor. Industry is not at all innate in man; it is created by economic pressure and social education. It may be said that man is a fairly idle animal. On this quality in him human progress is in reality based to a considerable degree, because if a man did not endeavor to expend his energy as economically as possible, if he did not strive to secure the maximum productive result for the minimum expenditure of effort, there would have been no development of technical science and social culture. Therefore, from this point of view, the idleness of man is a progressive force. The old Italian Marxist, Antonio Labriola, even went so far as to describe the future of man "as a happy and genial idleness." There is no need, however, for us to draw the conclusion here that the party and the trade-unions should preach this quality as a moral duty in the course of their agitation. No! No! We have enough of it and to spare. The task of social organization consists just in this—that "idleness" should be introduced within definite limits, that it should be disciplined, that it should spur man on by the help of means and measures invented by himself.

Labor conscription.—The key to economic organization is labor—skilled, semi-skilled, raw, or unskilled. To work out methods for its correct registration, mobilization, distribution, productive application—means practically to solve the problem of economic construction. This is the problem for a whole epoch—a grandiose task. Its difficulty is increased by the necessity under which we labor of reconstructing labor on socialist principles under conditions of unparalleled shortage and terrible want.

The more worn out our machinery, the greater the disorganization of our railway equipment, the less our hope of receiving any considerable quantity of machinery from abroad within a short time—so much the more importance attaches to the question of labor. It would seem we have plenty of it. But where lies the way toward its employment? How is it to be got at? How is it to be organized for manufacturing purposes? We have already met with great difficulties in the work of clearing the railway track from snow.¹ There is no possibility of solving the problem by way of acquiring labor in the open market, having regard to the present negligible purchasing power of money, in circumstances of the almost complete absence of manufactured products. The demand for fuel can not be satisfied, even in part, without a mass utilization, as yet unparalleled, of labor for work in securing wood, peat, and shale fuel. The civil war has severely impaired the permanent way of our railways, our bridges, station buildings. Tens and hundreds of thousands of workers' hands are needed in order to put all this in order. For the carrying on, on a large scale, of timber felling, peat working, and other work, quarters are wanted for workers, even of a temporary character. Hence, again, we arrive at the necessity for a considerable amount of labor for building purposes. A large number of workers are wanted for the organization of lumber floating. And so on, and so on.

Capitalist industry made use of auxiliary labor on a large scale, in the form of the peasant seasonal industries. The village, prompted by the pressure of insufficient land, always placed a certain surplus of labor on the market. The state compelled it to this by the dues it exacted. The market offered the peasant goods. Now there is none of this. The villages have received additional land, but there is a shortage of agricultural machinery, labor is wanted on the land, industry has nothing to give to the country at the present time, the market is no longer a source of attraction for labor.

Meanwhile labor is more in demand than it ever was. Not only the worker but the peasant must give the soviet state all his energy, in order that labor Russia and with her the workers themselves may not be crushed. The only means of securing the labor essential for our economic tasks is the carrying into effect of labor conscription.

The actual principle of labor conscription is, for a communist, a quite indisputable one: "He who works not, neither shall he eat," and as everyone must eat, so all must work. Labor conscription is outlined in our constitution and in the code of labor laws. Up to the present, however, it has remained a principle, and its application has borne a casual, partial, sporadic, character. Only now, when we come straight up against the questions of the economic regeneration of the country, the question of labor conscription rises before us in all its concreteness. The only solution, theoretically and practically correct, of our economic difficulties at the present time is that the population of the whole country should be regarded as a reservoir of the necessary labor—an almost inexhaustible reservoir—and that strict order be introduced into its registration, mobilization, and utilization.

How are we in practice to proceed to the acquisition of labor on a basis of labor conscription?

Up to the present time only the war department has had experience in the sphere of registering, mobilizing, forming, and transporting large masses of men. Our war department has inherited this technical knowledge and experience principally from the past. It possesses no such inheritance in the economic sphere, where the principle of private contract operated, and labor went from the market to individual factories. Naturally we are compelled, at all events at first, to utilize the organization of the war department for labor mobilization.

We have created special organs for carrying into effect labor conscription, both in the center and in the Provinces. Committees on labor conscription have been appointed in the governments² uiezds, and volosts. They lean for support chiefly on the central and local organizations of the war department. Our central economic departments—for example, the supreme council of people's economy, the people's commissariat of agriculture, the people's commissariat for ways and communications, the people's commissariat for food—are working out these demands for the necessary labor. The chief committee on labor conscription receives these demands, coordinates them, and endeavors to meet them according as the local sources of labor will allow, gives the necessary orders to its local organizations and through them carries the mobilization into effect. There are local organizations in the various provinces and uiezds which carry out this work independently, with a view to satisfying local economic demands.

¹ Heavy falls of snow are usually experienced in Russia during the months of January, February, and March, and interfere with railway transport. Toward the end of January, 1921, heavy snowstorms began to interfere with the movements of trains carrying food supplies to central Russia.

² Government or Province of Russia; uiezd or county of Russia; volost or rural district council.

The whole of this organization is only as yet in the rough. It is very incomplete as yet. But undoubtedly the right course has been taken. If the organization of society on new lines leads to a new organization of labor, then the organization of labor involves, in its turn, the efficient realization of universal labor service. This task is in no way exhausted by the taking of merely administrative measures. It embraces the very fundamentals of economics and of life itself. It comes into contact with powerful factors, deriving their force from custom and prejudice and permeating the psychology of people. The carrying out of labor conscription presupposes, on the one hand, a colossal educative work, and, on the other, the greatest caution in approaching it in practice.

Labor should be utilized as economically as possible. In carrying out local labor organizations it is necessary to take into consideration the economic conditions obtaining in each particular area, the demands arising out of the principal occupations of the local population, for example, agriculture, etc. As far as possible, plans should take into account the former side-line and seasonal occupation of the local population. Mobilized labor should be transferred as far as possible to the nearest sections of the labor front. The number of mobilized workers should correspond to the extent of the work to be done. They should be supplied in proper time with rations and the implements necessary to their labor. Experienced and intelligent instructors should be appointed to lead them. They should be able to convince themselves on the spot that their labor is being utilized economically, effectively, and not expended in vain. Where possible, direct mobilization should be replaced by appointing local tasks to be accomplished, for example, imposing on a volost the duties of hewing a certain number of cubic sazhens of wood within a certain period of time, or transposing a certain number of poods of iron to such and such a station, etc. It is essential in this department to study with special care the gradually accumulating experience of those engaged on the work of infusing as much elasticity as possible into the economic apparatus, and to show greater attention to local interests and peculiarities. In a word, the methods and organs utilized for effecting labor mobilization should be rendered more precise in application, better and more perfected to achieve the end in view. But at the same time it is essential once and for all to understand that the principle of labor conscription has just as radically and irrevocably replaced the principle of hired labor as the socialization of the means of production has replaced capitalist property.

The militarization of labor.—The realization of labor conscription is unthinkable without applying—in one or another degree—the methods associated with the militarization of labor. This phrase ushers us at once into a realm of the greatest superstitions and opposition howls.

To understand what militarization of labor means in a workers' state and what are its methods, one must make clear to one's self the manner in which militarization was carried out in the army itself, which, as we all remember, during the first period of its existence, possessed none of the necessary "military" qualities at all. We have mobilized for the Red army during these two years somewhat fewer soldiers than we had members in our trade-unions. But the members of the trade-unions are workers, while in the army the workers form only 15 per cent—the rest are peasants. Nevertheless, we can entertain no doubt that the front-rank worker, recommended for service by the party, and the trade-union organizations was the real builder and "militarizer" of the Red army. When things were difficult on the fronts, when the freshly mobilized mass of peasants failed to show the necessary stability, we turned to the central committee of the Communist Party on the one hand and to the presidium of the All-Russian Soviet of Trade Unions on the other. From these two sources front rank workers were dispatched to the fronts and there built up the Red army in their own form and likeness—they trained, hardened, and militarized the peasant mass.

It is essential to remember this fact very clearly, because it at once throws a proper light on our conception of militarization under the conditions obtaining in a workers' and peasants' state. The militarization of labor has more than once been proclaimed as a watchword and carried into effect in various branches of industry in bourgeois countries, both in the west and with us under Tsarism. But our militarization is to be distinguished in its aim and methods from these experiments, just as a conscious proletariat organized for effecting its own liberation is to be distinguished from the conscious exploitation of the bourgeoisie.

The majority of the prejudices, errors, complaints, and protests upon this question proceed from the confusion, half conscious, half malicious, of the historical forms of proletarian, socialist militarization with bourgeois militarization. The attitude of the mensheviks—our Russian Kautskians—as expressed in the resolution submitted by them to the present trade-union congress, is entirely based on confusions of this character.

The mensheviks are opposed, not only to militarization, but also to labor conscription. They repudiate such methods as involving "compulsion." They preach that labor conscription is synonymous with low production, and that militarization promises an aimless waste of labor.

"Compulsory labor has proved to be unproductive"—this is exactly how the mensheviks put it in their resolution. It is an assertion which brings us to the very heart of the question. For it is not a question, as we see, of whether it is wise or unwise to place one factory or another under martial law; as to whether it is expedient or inexpedient to invest the war revolutionary tribunal with the right to punish dissolute workers, who steal materials and instruments which are of such value to us, or who sabotage in their work. No; the question raised by the mensheviks goes far deeper. Asserting that compulsory labor is in all circumstances unproductive, they try thereby to take the ground from under our policy of economic construction during the present transitional period. For there is no question but that a transition from bourgeois anarchy to a socialist economic structure can not be achieved without a revolutionary dictatorship and compulsory forms of organization.

The mensheviks state in the first clause of their resolution that we are living through the period of transition from capitalist to socialist methods of production. What does it mean? And, above all, since when this admission by our Kautskians? They accused us—it formed the basis of our disagreement with them—of socialist utopianism; they affirmed—which is the essence of their political teaching—that there can be no question of the transition to socialism during the epoch in which we live and that our revolution is a bourgeois revolution, and that we communists are only destroying the economic organization of capitalism; not leading the country forward, but throwing it back. In this lay our fundamental disagreement, our deepest and most irreconcilable divergence of views, from which proceeded all the rest. In the introductory passages of their resolution, the mensheviks now say, as something which asks no proof, that we now find ourselves in a state of transition from capitalism to socialism. This entirely unexpected admission which smacks remarkably like a capitulation, is the more frail and fleeting in that it does not impose, as the whole resolution indicates, any revolutionary obligations upon the mensheviks. They remain wholly captivated by bourgeois thought. While admitting that we are at the half-way house on the way to socialism, the mensheviks do but with the greatest bitterness assail those methods without which the transition to socialism is impossible under the critical conditions of the present time.

Compulsory labor they tell us is always unproductive. We ask: What do you mean by compulsory labor? That is, to what other form of labor do you wish to compare it? Evidently to free labor. What are we then to understand by free labor? The phrase "free labor" was formulated by progressive bourgeois thought as opposed to unfree labor; i. e., the corvée labor of the peasants and the regulated labor of the artisan guilds. By free labor they meant labor which could be bought "freely" on the open market—freedom reduced to a juridical fiction on a basis of free-hire slavery. We know no other form of free labor in history. Let the few mensheviks' representatives attending this congress explain to us—what do they mean by free, noncompulsory labor if not the labor market?

History has known slave labor. History has known the corvée. History has known labor as regulated by the guilds in the Middle Ages. Throughout the world there now predominates hired labor, which the yellow press of all countries opposes as being the highest form of freedom to soviet "slavery." We, on the other hand, place in antithesis to capitalist slavery, labor subject to social regulation based on an enormous plan, obligatory for the whole people, and consequently compulsory for every worker in the country. The element of actual physical compulsion may be more or less, depending on many conditions—on the degree of a country's wealth or impoverishment, on the legacy of the past, on the level of culture, on the condition of transport, and the state of the administration, etc.—but obligation, and therefore compulsion, is the essential premise for shackling the anarchy brought about by the bourgeoisie for specializing the means of production and labor and reconstructing the economic organization of the country upon a single unified plan.

Freedom, for a liberal, ultimately means the market. A capitalist measures freedom of labor solely by whether he can or can not buy labor at the current price. It is a measure false not only in relation to the future but also to the past.

It would be absurd to think that labor under the corvée operated entirely under the rod of physical compulsion; that the foreman stood with a knout over every muzhik's back. The forms of economic organization in the Middle Ages developed out of certain factors conditioning production and created certain forms of life, to which the muzhik became accustomed and which, at certain epochs, he considered just, or at least accepted as immutable. When he revolted, influenced by changes

in his material condition, the state coerced him with its material force, and by this very fact revealed the compulsory character of the organization of labor.

The question as to the life or death of soviet Russia is now being decided on the front of labor. Our economic and, with them, our trade-union manufacturing organizations, have a right to demand of their members the same measure of self-sacrifice, discipline, and execution as only the army alone has hitherto demanded.

On the other hand, the relationships of the capitalist to the worker are in no wise exhausted by "freedom" of contract only but include a powerful apparatus of State regulation and material compulsion.

The competition of one capitalist with another has attached a certain, a very partial, measure of reality to the fiction of freedom of labor; but this competition, reduced to a minimum by syndicates and trusts, we have finally abolished by destroying private ownership of the means of production. The transition to socialism, verbally admitted by the mensheviks, denotes a transition from the psychological distribution of labor, from a game of buy and sell, from movements of market prices and rates of wages, to a systematic distribution of labor by the economic organizations of the provinces, the uiezds, and the country as a whole. This is the essence of labor conscription, which invariably falls into the program of the socialist organization of labor as its fundamental condition.

If systematic economic organization is impossible without labor conscription, then labor conscription is incapable of realization without the abolition of the fiction of freedom of labor, which must be superseded by obligation, reinforced by the reality of compulsion.

That free labor is more productive than compulsory is entirely true with regard to the period of transition from feudalism to bourgeois society. But it is necessary to be a liberal, or—in our day—a Kautskian, in order to perpetuate this truth and apply it to the transitional period from the bourgeois to the socialist order. If it is true that compulsory labor is unproductive, as the menshevik resolution states, then our whole constructive program is doomed to failure. For there can be for us no way to socialism other than the arbitrary disposition of the economic forces and resources of the country, other than the centralized distribution of labor in accordance with a unified State plan. The workers' state considers it has a right to send every worker to the place where his labor is necessary. And not a single serious socialist will deny to the workers' state the right to lay hands on the worker who refuses to carry out his labor orders. But the essence of it all is that the menshevik way of transition to "socialism" is a milky way—without a bread monopoly, without destroying the market, without a revolutionary dictatorship, and without the militarization of labor.

Without labor discipline, without the right to order and demand the execution of orders, the trade-unions will become mere form without substance, because they are necessary to the constructive socialist state, not for the purpose of fighting for better conditions of labor—this is a task for the social and State organization as a whole—but to organize the working class for the purpose of production, to train, discipline, distribute, group, and fasten to their posts for definite periods the various categories of workers and individual workers—hand in hand with the state—arbitrarily to bring the workers within the limits of a single economic plan. To stand out for the "freedom" of labor under these conditions means to stand out for a fruitless, helpless, unsystematic searching after better conditions, disorderly chaotic migrations from one factory to another in a starving country, suffering from a terrible collapse of transport and the food administration. What will be the result of such an inept attempt to combine bourgeois freedom of labor with the proletarian socialization of the means of production—save the complete dissolution of the working class and complete economic anarchy?

Therefore, comrades, the militarization of labor in this fundamental sense, which I have described, is not the invention of individual politicians or of our war department but is the inevitable method to be adopted for organizing and disciplining labor during the transitional epoch from capitalism to socialism. If the compulsory distribution of labor, its attachment for short or long term periods to particular branches of industry and to particular factories, its regulation in accordance with the general economic program of the State—if all these forms of compulsion always and everywhere lead, as the menshevik resolution states, to a decrease in production, then place a cross on socialism. For it is impossible to build up socialism on decreased production. Every social organization is at bottom an organization of labor. And, if our new organization of labor leads to its decreased productivity, then, by this very fact, the socialist society which is being built up is inevitably on the way to ruin, however we may twist and turn, and whatever measure of salvation we try to improvise.

I therefore said from the very beginning that the menshevik conclusions against militarization lead us to the fundamental question of labor conscription and its influence upon the productivity of labor. Is it true to say that compulsory labor is always unproductive? Our reply is that this is a most sorry and empty liberal prejudice. The whole question is, Who applies compulsion over whom and for what purpose? What state, what class, in what circumstances, by what methods? The corvée was in a certain set of circumstances a step forward, and led to increased productivity of labor. Production grew enormously under capitalism, i. e., during the period of free buying and selling of labor on the market. But free labor, together with all capitalism, in entering on the imperialist stage, burst itself in the course of the imperialist war. The whole economic organization of the world has entered on a period of bloody anarchy, monstrous upheavals, of the impoverishment and ruin of the popular masses. Can one speak at the present time of the productivity of free labor, when the fruits of this labor are being destroyed ten times more quickly than they are being created? The imperialist war and what followed it revealed the impossibility of society's further existence on the basis of free labor. Or, perhaps, some one possesses the secret of how to separate free labor from red-hot imperialism, i. e., to turn solid development half a century or a century back. It appeared that the systematic, and therefore the compulsory, organization of labor, which is coming to supersede imperialism, would lead to a lower economic level, then this would mean the perishing of our culture, the retrogression of humanity to barbarism and savagery.

Happily, not only for soviet Russia but also for the whole of humanity, the philosophy of "under every and any conditions" is only a tardy chant of worn-out liberal melodies. The productivity of labor is the product of the most complex combination of social conditions and is not to be measured or predetermined by the judicial form of labor.

The whole history of humanity is the history of the collective organization and training of man for labor for the purpose of attaining a higher measure of production. Man, as I have already permitted myself to say, is lazy—i. e., he instinctively strives to obtain as much as possible with the less expenditure of effort. The growth of civilization is measured by the productivity of human labor, and every new form of social relationship must pass the test on this donkey.

"Free"—i. e., hired—labor by no means immediately revealed itself to the world in the full panoply of productivity. It only gradually acquired a high measure of productivity as a result of a long application of methods of labor organization and labor training. The most varied methods, changing from one epoch to another, entered into this educative process. The bourgeoisie first drove the muzhik out of the village with a club on to the high road, having robbed him beforehand of his land; but when he did not wish to work in the factories it branded his forehead with a red-hot iron, hanged him, or sent him to the galleys, and, finally, accustomed the broken vagabond from the village to the factory bench. At this stage we see that "free" labor is even less distinguishable from hard labor as regards its material conditions and legal aspect. At different epochs the bourgeoisie in varying degrees combined certain methods of moral suasion with torture by red-hot irons; above all, the priests and their sermons. Already in the sixteenth century it reformed the old Catholic religion, which had defended the feudal system, and adapted to its own purposes a new religion in the form of the Reformation, which combined freedom of thought with free trade and free labor. It found itself new priests, who became spiritual clerks, honorary accountants of the bourgeoisie. The school, the press, the town hall, and parliament were adapted by the bourgeoisie for the moral preparation of the working class. Various forms of wages—daily, piece wage, contract, collective bargaining—all these were only varying methods in the hands of the bourgeoisie for the labor drilling of the proletariat. To this was added every sort of inducement to labor and incitement to "careerism." Finally, the bourgeoisie were even able to secure possession of the trade-unions—i. e., the organizations of the working class—and to make use of them on a wide scale, especially in England, for the purpose of disciplining the workers. It won over the leaders, and with their help imbued the workers with the conviction that the peaceful organic development of labor was essential, an irreproachable attitude to their duties and a strict observance of the laws of the bourgeois state. Taylorism came to crown all this labor, in which the elements of the scientific organization of production went hand in hand with the most concentrated methods.

It seems clear from what has been said that the productivity of hired labor is something dished up ready and served out by history. No; it is the result of the long and stubborn repressive, educative, well-organized and seductive policy of the bourgeoisie with regard to the working class. Step by step it has learnt to squeeze out of the workers an ever greater amount of production, and one of the most powerful weapons

in its hands has been the proclamation of hired labor as the only free, normal, healthy, productive, and economical form of labor.

Such a juridical form of labor which would (in itself) guarantee production has never been and can not be in history. The juridical ideal of labor corresponds to the conditions and conceptions of a certain epoch. Production increases proportionately to the development of technical science, the training of labor, the gradual adaptation of the workers to changing means of production and to new forms of social relationships.

The creation of socialist society means the organization of the workers on new principles, their adaptation to these principles, their reeducation as workers with the immutable object of increasing production. The working class, under the guidance of its vanguard, must reeducate itself on a basis of socialism. He who has not understood this is unacquainted with the alphabet of socialist construction.

What are our methods for retraining the workers? They are incomparably wider in their compass than those of the bourgeoisie—and are also honorable, straight, open, unsullied either by hypocrisy or lies. The bourgeoisie has been compelled to deceive, calling its labor free, whereas in actuality it is not only a social imposition but also slave labor. We are now organizing labor in the interests of the workers, and that is why we have no need to hide any of the motives which impel us to state the socially compulsory character of labor organization. We have no need of pious liberals, or Kautskian fables. We say straight and openly to the masses that it is theirs to save, to raise and set in order a socialist country only by means of stern labor, unconditional discipline, the most accurate execution of orders by every worker.

The chief of the means at our disposal is moral suasion, propaganda, not only in word but deed. Labor conscription has a compulsory character, but this does not mean that it is a form of violation over the working class. If labor conscription met with hostility from the majority of the workers, it would be broken and with it the soviet régime. The militarization of labor against the will of the workers themselves is an "arakcheevshchina." The militarization of labor by the consent of the workers themselves is the socialist dictatorship. That labor conscription and the militarization of labor do not violate the will of the workers, as "free" labor did, the flourishing of voluntary labor—unprecedented in history—in the form of labor Saturdays¹ (subbotniki) bears witness best of all. Nowhere and at no time has been such a phenomenon. By their voluntary, disinterested labor—once a week or more frequently—the workers clearly demonstrate not only their readiness to support the burden of "compulsory" labor, but their tendency to give the state certain additional labor over and above this. The labor Saturdays are not only a magnificent example of communist solidarity but the surest guaranty of the successful realization of labor conscription. These truly communist tendencies should be investigated, extended, and intensified with the help of propaganda.

The principal spiritual weapon of the bourgeoisie is religion; with us it is the frank explanation to the masses of the real state of affairs, the dissemination of historical and technical knowledge, the initiation of the masses into the general economic plans of the state, in accordance with which all the labor at the disposal of the soviet government must be utilized.

Political economy formed the principal subject of our agitation during the past—the capitalist order of society was a riddle and we revealed to the masses the answer to this riddle. Now, social riddles are revealed to the masses by the very mechanism of the soviet régime, which attracts workers into all branches of administration. The further political economy goes the more historical importance will it derive. The sciences, investigating nature, and the means of her subjection to man are placed in the foreground.

The trade-unions must organize technical courses on the most extensive scale possible, in order that every workman may find in his own work opportunities for exercising his theoretical knowledge, which should become reflected in his work, making it more productive. The press must be adapted to the economic problems of the country—not only in the sense in which it operates now, i. e., not in the sense of a particular or general agitation for the purpose of rousing labor enthusiasm, but in the sense of promoting discussions and appreciations of concrete economic problems and plans of ways and means of execution, and, above all, of verifying and appraising the results which have been attained. The papers ought day by day to follow the working of the most important factories and other enterprises, registering their success and failure, encouraging and censuring them.

Russian capitalism, in virtue of its backwardness, lack of independence, and the parasitic features which proceed from this, succeeded in a far less degree than Euro-

¹ In view of the serious economic situation in Russia, communist organizations began during 1920 to engage in various forms of voluntary work on Saturdays, which are usually, as in this country, set apart as a day of rest for workers. The Russian word for Saturday is "Subбота," and these days of voluntary work, therefore, became known as "subbotniki."

pean capitalism in instructing and disciplining the working masses for the purpose of production. This task now devolves wholly on the trade-union organizations of the proletariat. A good engineer, a good machinist, a good smith, must enjoy such a reputation in soviet Russia as formerly was enjoyed by the most prominent agitators, revolutionary heroes and, recently, by the most courageous and able commanders and commissaries in the army. Leaders of technical science, small and great, must occupy a central position in the attention of the public. Bad workers must be made ashamed because they are ill acquainted with their work.

We have maintained, and shall have to continue for a considerable period, wage payment. The further we go the more will the significance of the wage consist in the guaranteeing of all members of society with everything of which they stand in need; by this very fact it will cease to be a wage. But at the present time we are not yet sufficiently rich for this. Our fundamental task is to increase the quantity of goods produced, and everything must be subordinated to this. During the present critical period the wage is for us first and foremost not a means for guaranteeing the personal existence of an individual worker, but a means of estimating what an individual worker brings by his labor to the workers' republic.

Therefore the wage, both monetary and in kind, must be made as far as possible accurately to correspond with the productivity of individual labor. Under the capitalistic system, payment was made under the piecework system, and also according to the number of hours worked, the application of Taylor's methods, etc. These systems had as their object the increased exploitation of the workers by squeezing out surplus profits. With the specialization of industry, piecework payment, premiums, etc., have as their object the increase of mass production and consequently the raising of the standard of general welfare. Those workers who did more than others to promote the common interest received the right to a greater share of production than the idle, careless, and disorganizing workers.

Finally, while rewarding some, the workers' state can not abstain from punishing others; that is, those who obviously destroy the solidarity of labor, who undermine the work as a whole, to the detriment of the social regeneration of the country. Repression for the attainment of our economic aims is an essential weapon of the socialist dictatorship.

All the measures enumerated above—and, together with them, a series of others—will guarantee the development of competition in the field of production. Without this we can never rise above a middling, mediocre level of production, entirely incommensurate with our needs. The instinct of life—the struggle for existence—which assumes the character of competition under the bourgeois régime, lies at the basis of this mutual rivalry. Mutual rivalry will not disappear in developed socialist society but, with society becoming more and more guaranteed as regards those things which are essential for the support of life, this rivalry will acquire a more and more disinterested, a purely spiritual character. It will find expression in the striving to render the greatest possible service to one's village, uiezed, town, or society as a whole, and the receiving in return of reputation, gratitude, sympathy, or lastly, simply the eternal satisfaction derived from the consciousness of work well done. But at this critical time of transition, under conditions of extreme poverty in material wealth, and of our insufficiently developed (as yet) sense of social solidarity, competition must inevitably be, in one or another form, bound up with the striving to guarantee to one's self articles of personal consumption.

Here, comrades, you have a summary of the means which lie at the disposal of the workers' state for raising production. There is, as we see, no ready-made solution. It is nowhere written in any book. Such a book there could not be. We are now only beginning with you to write that book in the sweat and blood of the toilers. We say: Workers, men and women, who have entered on the path of systematized labor, only thus will you build up socialist society. Before you stands a problem which no one will decide for you, the problem of raising production on new social principles. If you fail to solve this problem, you will perish. If you solve it, you will raise up humanity to a higher plane.

The labor armies.—We have approached the question of adapting the army to labor tasks (which derives with us a vast significance from the point of view of principle) as it were empirically and without regard to theoretical considerations. On certain frontiers of soviet Russia, a situation has arisen in which considerable military forces have been released for indefinite periods from their activities in the field. It would be a matter of some difficulty, especially in winter, to throw them on to other active sections of the front, in view of the disorganization of railway transport. Such, for example, was the position of the Third army, occupying the Ural and Cis-Ural Provinces. The foremost workers in this army, understanding that we were not as yet in a position to demobilize the army, themselves raised the question of transferring it

to the labor front. They sent into headquarters a more or less detailed scheme on the possibility of establishing a labor army. It was a new problem and far from easy. Would the soldiers of the Red army work? Would their work be of a sufficiently productive character? Would it make itself pay? There were doubts on these questions, even among ourselves. It goes without saying that the mensheviks beat the opposition drums. The same Abramovich,¹ at the congress of councils of people's economy, in January or at the beginning of February, i. e., at a time when the scheme was only in draft, prophesied that we courted an inevitable failure, because the whole enterprise was downright nonsense, an "Arakcheevshchian" utopia, etc. We thought otherwise. Of course, the difficulties were great, but they were no more difficult in principle than any other of the problems of soviet construction.

Let us look actually at what the organism of the Third army presents in itself. Few actual fighting units remained in this army—in all, one rifle division and one cavalry corps—in all, fifteen regiments, and special detachments besides. The remaining fighting units had been previously transferred to other armies and fronts. The apparatus of army administration has, however, remained untouched, and we thought that we should have to throw it in the spring along the Volga, on to the Caucasus front against Denikin, if by that time he had not been entirely broken. On the whole, there remained in the Third army about 120,000 Red army soldiers in administrative units, fighting units, hospitals, etc. In this general total, principally composed of peasants, there were calculated to be 16,000 communists, and members of sympathetic organizations, including a considerable number of Ural workmen.

Thus, in composition and organization, the Third army represented a mass of peasants, united in a military organization under the leadership of the foremost workers. There was also a considerable number of military specialists, fulfilling important military functions, and under the general political control of the communists. If the Third army is looked at from this general standpoint, it presents in itself a reflection of all soviet Russia. Take the Red army as a whole, take the organization of the soviet government in the province, the uiezd, or throughout the republic, including its economic organizations, we will everywhere find the same scheme of organization—millions of peasants, who are being introduced into new forms of political, economic, and social life by the organized workers, who occupy a leading executive position in all branches of soviet construction. Specialists of the bourgeois school are appointed to posts demanding special knowledge; they are afforded the necessary independence, but the control over their work is retained in the hands of the working class, in the person of the communist party. The carrying into effect of labor conscription is also only thinkable if, similarly, the mobilization of the predominantly peasant mass is carried out under the direction of the foremost workers. Thus there were not, and could not be, any difficulties of principle in the way of adapting the army to labor objectives. In other words, the objections of principle raised by the mensheviks against the labor armies were essentially objections to compulsory labor in general and, consequently, to labor conscription, and against soviet methods of constructive economics as a whole. We overrode these objections without difficulty.

Of course, the military machine, as such, is not adapted to direct labor processes. But we have not attempted to do this. Control must be left in the hands of the corresponding economic organizations; the army supplies the necessary labor in the form of organized, compact, units, adaptable en masse for carrying out simple direct tasks, such as the cleaning of railway track from snow, the felling of wood, building work, organizing haulage, etc.

We have now acquired a considerable experience in adapting the army to labor objectives, and are now in a position to advance beyond mere conjectures to consider the actual possibilities which it presents. What are the conclusions we base on this experience? The mensheviks have already hastened to conclusions: Abramovich declared at the miners' congress that we were bankrupt, that the labor armies were parasite formations, where every 10 workers need 2 people to serve them. Is this true? No! This is the irresponsible and malicious criticism of people who look on from a distance, who don't know the facts, who pick up rubbishing fragments and everywhere either declare us bankrupt or prophesy it. In actual fact, the labor armies are not only not bankrupt, but, on the other hand, have achieved no small measure of success, have proved their vitality, are continuing to evolve and becoming more and more stable. It is those prophets, foretelling that nothing would come of the whole idea, who said that no one would work, that the soldiers of the Red army would refuse to go to the labor front, and would simply disperse to their homes, who have gone bankrupt.

¹ Abramovich is the member of the central committee of the Menshevik Party who left Russia with Martov, the leader of the mensheviks, in the autumn of 1920, and is now in Berlin, assisting Martov to edit a menshevik journal, "The Socialist News."

These objections were dictated by petty bourgeois skepticism, distrust of the mass,¹ distrust of daring, organizing initiative. But were we not assailed with the same objections when we proceeded to tackle the task of mass mobilization for military purposes? They then frightened us with mass desertions, which they regarded as inevitable after the imperialist war. Desertion, of course, there was, but experience showed it to be not at all of the wholesale character with which they tried to frighten us; it did not destroy the army; the binding force of morale and organization, communist voluntary effort and State compulsion, together guaranteed the mobilization of millions, the organization of numerous formations, and the execution of the most difficult military tasks. The army ultimately conquered. On a basis of our military experience, we expected the same results with regard to the labor tasks which face us. We have not been mistaken. The soldiers of the Red army did not disperse to their homes on being transferred from military to civil employment as the skeptics prophesied. Thanks to a well-organized propaganda, the actual transfer was accomplished with a display of enthusiasm. It is true that a certain number of soldiers tried to leave the army, but this is always so when it comes to transferring a large military force from one front to another, or from the rear to the front—the army inevitably gets shaken up and the potential desertion becomes actual. But here the "Politoldiely" (political departments),² the press, the organizations for combating desertion, etc., entered on their duties, and the percentage of deserters in the labor armies is now no higher than in our armies on the war fronts.

The contention that the army, by virtue of its internal structure, can only make available an insignificant percentage of workers is only partly true. As regards the Third army, I have already pointed out that it has maintained its administrative organization completely intact, while possessing a very small number of fighting units. As long as we maintained the army intact, from purely military and not economic considerations, the staff and administrative units were, indeed, extremely small, but of a grand total of 110,000 men 21 per cent were employed in administrative posts; the number of those on daily orderly duties (guards, etc.), owing to the large number of army institutions and stores, was about 16 per cent; the number of sick, chiefly down with typhus, together with the army medical units in attendance, was about 13 per cent; those absent for various reasons (detailed for special purposes, on leave, absent without leave) formed about 25 per cent. There were thus available for labor 23 per cent in all; this is the maximum from the given army at that time. In actual fact, only 14 per cent worked during the first period, chiefly drawn from the two divisions—the rifles and the cavalry corps—which still remained with the army. But as soon as it appeared that Denikin was broken, and that we should not have to come to the help of the troops on the Caucasian front, and send the Third army down the Volga, we immediately proceeded to liquidate the cumbersome military apparatus and to adapt the organizations of the army more nearly to the labor tasks confronting it. Although this work has not yet been completed, it has already given important results. At the present moment³ the former Third army is supplying as workers about 38 per cent of its total complement. The combatant units of the Ural military district, which are working together with it, are already making available for labor 49 per cent of their total complement. These results are not so bad, if compared with the statistics on factory attendance, where at many factories, not long since, and at some even to-day, absenteeism, for legal and illegal causes, attains to 50 per cent and higher. It should be added that the workers in the factories are often served by adult members of their families, while the soldiers of the Red army perform all their own services.

If we take the 19-year-olds, mobilized principally for lumber purposes in the Ural with the help of the military machine, it appears that, out of the total number of them, over 30,000, more than 75 per cent, present themselves for work. This is already a big step forward. It shows that, in applying the military machine for purposes of mobilizing and forming units, we make such changes in the organization of a purely labor unit as will guarantee a vast increase in the percentage of those taking part in the material process of production.

Finally, we can now judge from experience with reference to the productivity of military labor. At first the productivity of labor in the principal branches of labor, notwithstanding great enthusiasm, was in reality extremely low, and would appear to have been entirely discouraging, judging from the first labor reports. Thus, at first 15 working-days were taken to hew a cubic sazhen of wood, whereas the

¹ It will be seen by reference to paragraph 232 (section on trade unions) that Trotzki was himself accused of distrusting the masses at a meeting of the transport workers' union in December, 1920.

² The "Politoldiely" were organizations established by the Communist Party for undertaking propaganda work throughout the army.

³ It must be remembered that this refers to the early summer of 1920.

normal time for a similar amount of production is 3 days, although rarely attained at the present time. It must be added that an expert lumberman is capable, under favorable conditions, of hewing a cubic sazhen in a day. What were the facts in this case? The military units were stationed at some distance from the fellings. In many instances 6-8 versts had to be traversed to and from work, which consumed a considerable part of the working-day. There were not enough axes and saws available on the spot. Many soldiers who had been brought up in the steppe country were unacquainted with forest areas, and had never rolled logs, nor cut and sawed them. The provincial and *nizvod* forest committees were far from being able to find out at once how best to utilize military units, how to detach them to the necessary posts, and to equip them properly. It is not astonishing, therefore, that all this should have had as its result an extremely low standard of production. But after the most crying shortcomings of organization had been overcome, far more satisfactory results were achieved. Thus, according to the latest figures, it now takes a man four working-days to hew a cubic sazhen of wood in this same first labor army, which is not much more than the normal time. The most consolatory feature is, however, the fact that productivity of labor is systematically rising proportionately to the improved circumstances under which work is carried on. What can be done in this sense is shown by the short but very rich experience derived from the Moscow regiment of engineers. The central department of military engineering, guided by this experience, began by establishing as the normal standard of work one cubic sazhen of wood per man every three working-days. This standard was soon passed—in January—and a cubic sazhen was hewn in $2\frac{1}{2}$ working days; in February in 2.1 days; in March, 1.5 days, which is a particularly high standard of production. This result has been achieved by moral suasion, by accurate appraisal of individual work, by awakening ambition in the worker, granting premiums to those workmen who surpass the average standard of production, or, to adopt the language of the trade-unions, by an elastic tariff, adapted to all the individual aspects in production. This experience, almost of a laboratory character, clearly points the way along which we must travel in the future.

We now have a series of labor armies operating—the First, the Petrograd, the Ukrainian, the South Volga, and the Reserve. The last named has cooperated, as is well known, in securing a considerable increase in the locomotive power of the Kazan-Ekaterinburg railway, and everywhere, where the application of military units to labor objectives was in anyway reasonably carried out, the results have shown that this method is indisputably sound and practical. The prejudice regarding the inevitable parasitic growths of military organization, under any and every condition, is dispelled. The soviet army will reproduce within itself the same tendencies which have characterized the soviet social order. We must not think the lukewarm thoughts of an epoch which is past about "militarism," "military organization," "the unproductiveness of compulsory labor;" we must approach without prejudice, open-mindedly, the phenomena of the new epoch, and remember that the Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath, that all forms of organization, among them military organization, are only weapons at the disposal of the working class, which has the right and the possibility of applying, modifying, and reconstructing these weapons until the desired result is attained.

A single economic plan.—The introduction of labor conscription on a wide scale, in addition to measures for the militarization of labor, will only be enabled to play a decisive rôle if they are carried out in accordance with a single program of economic activity. This plan should be calculated to operate over a term of years and to cover the immediate future. It will naturally split up into separate periods in accordance with the inevitable stages in the economic regeneration of the country. We have to begin with the simplest and at the same time the most fundamental tasks.

The first thing we have to do is to guarantee to the working class—even though it be under the most onerous conditions—the actual possibility of living, and thus to preserve the centers of industry, and save the towns. This is the starting point. If we want to avoid the dissolving the towns in the villages, industry into agriculture, making peasants of the whole community, we must maintain our transport, even though on a minimum basis, and so guarantee bread to the towns, fuel and raw material for industry, and forage for the cattle. Without this we will not make a step forward. The most immediate part of the program is therefore to improve transport, at the very least to avert its further decline, and to make available the essential supplies of food, raw materials, and fuel. The immediately ensuing period will be entirely taken up with the concentration and intensification of labor for the solution of these fundamental problems—which alone will create the premise upon which the whole of the future is to be based. This task, in particular, we have intrusted to our labor armies. Whether the first period and those which follow it are to be measured in months or years can not be foretold—this depends on many

factors, beginning with the international situation, and ending with the degree of unanimity and endurance of the working class.

The second period is that of engineering construction in the interests of transport, the obtaining of raw material and food. Here the question of locomotives comes first and foremost.

At the present time the repairing of locomotives is being carried on in far too primitive a fashion, swallowing up an inordinate amount of physical effort and material resources. The repairing of rolling stock can only be placed on a proper footing by the mass production of spare parts. Now at a time when all the railways and factories are in the hands of one master, the workers' state, we can and must supply the whole country with standard types of locomotives and rolling stock; we must standardize their component parts, we must place all the necessary factories on the mass production of spare parts and approximate repairs to the simple replacing of worn-out parts by new ones, and thus guarantee the assembling of new locomotives en masse out of spares. Now that the sources of fuel and raw material are once more open to us, we shall have to concentrate attention exclusively on locomotive construction.

The third period is that of engineering construction in the interests of manufacturing articles which are universally in demand.

Finally, we come to the fourth period, which, resting on the conquests of the three previous periods, will make it possible for us to proceed to the manufacture of articles of personal consumption on the most extensive scale.

This plan derives great importance, not only because it affords a general guiding line for the practical work of our economic organizations, but also because it affords a guiding line for propaganda among the working masses with regard to our economic problems. Your labor mobilizations will be of no practical value, they will not take root if we do not seize on all that which is honorable, conscious, animate in the working class. We must explain to the masses the whole truth of our position and of our views upon the future. We must tell them openly that our economic plan, even with the maximum of intensive effort on the part of the workers, will not give us either to-morrow, or after to-morrow, a land flowing with milk and honey, because we shall be devoting all our labors to preparing the conditions necessary to production during the immediate future. Only if we are successful in guaranteeing in minimum measure the possibility of reestablishing the means of transport, shall we be in a position to proceed to the manufacture of articles of general necessity. Thus the fruit of our labors, in the form of articles of present consumption, which have direct personal importance for the workers, will be received only in the course of the fourth and final stage of the economic plan, and not until then shall we begin to experience a sensible improvement of our conditions of life.

The masses, who will continue to support the burden of trial and privation for a considerable period to come, must understand in all its breadth of meaning the inevitable inner logic of this economic plan, in order that they may be able to bear it upon their shoulders.

The alternation of the four economic periods enumerated above must not be understood too literally. We, of course, do not propose to stop, for example, our textile industry immediately and completely; we can not do this for military considerations alone. But, in order that our attention and energies may not be diverted under the pressure of demands which are crying out for satisfaction on all sides, it is essential, being guided by our economic plan as our fundamental criterion, to separate what is fundamental from what is of secondary importance. It goes without saying that we are, under no circumstances, striving toward a circumscribed "national" form of communism. The raising of the blockade and far more, the European revolution, will introduce important modifications into our economic plan, shortening the stages of its development and drawing them closer together. But we do not know when these events will take place, and we must act in such a manner as to stand fast and strengthen ourselves under the most inevitable; that is to say, the most slow conditions of progress. In the event of an actual establishment of trading relations with capitalist countries, we shall continue to be guided by the economic plan, which has been outlined above.

We will offer a part of our raw material in exchange for locomotives or for any other essential machinery, but in no sense in exchange for clothing, foot-wear, or colonial wares. First and foremost, we need no articles for consumption, but machinery for transport and production.

We would be shortsighted skeptics of a petty bourgeois type if we imagined that the regeneration of our economic life will take the form of a gradual transition from the present complete economic chaos to the position as it was before the breakdown occurred; that is, that we are going to advance up the same path by which we have descended, and that only in the course of a certain, fairly prolonged period, shall

succeed in bringing our socialist economy to the level at which the economic position of the country stood on the eve of the imperialist war. To imagine that such will be the case will not only prove an empty consolation, but would be completely incorrect. The chaos, which has destroyed and broken up untold wealth, has also destroyed much that was outworn, senseless and mere red tape in economic organization, and has thus cleared the way for new constructive efforts in accordance with those technical data which are now in the possession of economic organizations throughout the world.

If Russian capitalism developed without passing gradually from step to step, but by jumping over a whole series of steps and began to build factories in the virgin steps, then so much the more forced and artificial will be the path open to socialist economy. After we have overcome poverty and after we have stored up raw material and food, after we have improved our transport, we can then gallop over a whole series of intervening steps, availing ourselves of the fact that we are no longer barred by the fetters of private property, and are, therefore, able to subordinate all the enterprises and elements of economic organizations to a unified state program.

Thus, for example, we shall undoubtedly proceed to the electrification of all the fundamental branches of industry, and also to electrification in the sphere of personal consumption, without passing afresh through the "age of steam." A program of electrification¹ has been prepared by us to be carried out in a series of consecutive stages, in accordance with the fundamental divisions of the general economic plan.

A new war would hinder the realization of our economic plans; our energy and endurance can and must hasten the process of economic regeneration.

However fast or slow events may move, it is clear that our unified economic plan must be placed as the basis of all our work, of labor mobilizations, of the militarization of labor, of labor Saturdays and other forms of communist voluntary labor service; and that the immediate future demands from us the most complete concentration of all our energy on the primary problems—food, fuel, raw material and transport. Do not let your attention wander, do not let your strength be dissipated. This is the only road to salvation.

The collegiate system and individual control.—The mensheviks are trying to put their money on another horse, which seems to them to afford a favorable chance for their endeavors to rehabilitate themselves with the working classes. This is the question regarding the administration of industrial enterprises, the question of the collegiate system and individual control. We are told that to hand over factories to the control of individuals, instead of intrusting their administration to a collegium, is a crime against the working class and the socialist revolution. It is remarkable that the most ardent defenders of the socialist revolution against individual control should be these same mensheviks, who, not so very long ago, considered that to raise the very cry of the socialist revolution was a mockery of history and a crime against the working class.

Our party congress appears to be most guilty before the socialist revolution, in that it declared in favor of a gradual modification of factory administration in the direction of individual control, and above all, in the smaller links in the chain—in the factories and workshops. It would, however, be the greatest mistake to regard this decision as in any way interfering with the independence of action (self-action literally) of the working class. The independence of action of the working class is not to be defined and measured by whether three workers or one are placed at the head of a factory, but by consideration of a more fundamental character; by the construction of economic organs with the active participation of the trade unions, by the building of all the soviet organs through the congresses of soviets, representing tens of millions of working people; by attracting to the task of administration and control those who are themselves serving under the various administrations—this is where the initiative of the working classes finds expression. And if the working class, on a basis of its experience, comes to the conclusion through its congresses—party, soviet, and trade union—that it is better to have one man at the head of a factory and not a collegium, then this is a decision dictated by the self-action of the working class. It may be right or wrong from the point of view of administrative technique, but it is not a thing imposed upon the proletariat, but is dictated at its discretion and by its will. It would be a gross mistake to confuse the question of the domination of the proletariat with that of the workers' collegia at the head of the factories. The dictatorship of the proletariat finds expression in the abolition of private ownership over the means of production, in the supremacy of the collective will of the workers over the soviet machine, but in no wise over the form of administration of individual economic organizations.

¹ Trotzki refers to the program elaborated by the engineer Krzhanovsky, which formed the subject of a report by him before the eighth All-Russian congress of soviets.

It is necessary here to answer another criticism, directed against the advocates of individual control. Our opponents say: "These soviet militarists are trying to transfer their experience gained in the military sphere to the economic sphere. The principle of individual control may be excellent in the army, but it is no good in industry." This is entirely incorrect. It is not true to say that we began with individual control in the army; even now, we are far from having wholly adopted it. It is untrue to say that, in defense of the individualist form of administration—utilizing specialists—we have begun to act only on the basis of our military experience. Indeed, on this question we have, and are proceeding from a purely Marxist understanding of the revolutionary objectives and constructive tasks of the proletariat, who have taken power into their own hands. The necessity for utilizing the technical knowledge and experience which has been accumulated in the past, the necessity of attracting specialists and utilizing their services extensively, in order that the technical side of industrial enterprise should not fall to pieces, but develop—all this we understood and recognized, not only from the beginning of the revolution, but long before October, 1917. In my opinion, if civil war had not come to dislocate our economic organizations, draining them of all that was most robust, resolute and independent in them, then undoubtedly we should have long before and with far less difficulty entered on the path of individual control in the sphere of industrial administration.

Some of our comrades look upon the apparatus of industrial administration, above all, as a school. This is, of course, fundamentally wrong. The task of administrative organs is to administer. He who wants to learn how to administer, let him go to a training school let him attend instructional courses, let him be apprenticed to experienced administrators, let him see how things are done and acquire experience; but the man who is appointed to administer a factory is not going into a school, but to a responsible administrative post. But even if we regard the question from the limited and perverted point of view of a "school," then I say that a school is ten times better under individual control because if you replace one good worker by three inexperienced ones, then, having established a collegium of three inexperienced persons for a responsible administrative post, you deprive them of any possibility of knowing what is necessary for the work. Each looks to the other when it comes to taking decisions, and accuses the others when failure results.

The opponents of individual control clearly show that this is no mere question of principle, because they do not demand the establishment of the collegiate system in the workshops and the mines. They even indignantly assert that only madmen would demand that collegia of threes and fives should be charged with the running of a workshop; there must only be one, and only one in charge. Why? If the collegiate system is a "school," why shouldn't we need a school of a lower type? Why shouldn't we establish a collegium in the workshop? But if the collegiate system is not to be regarded as a Holy Testament for the workshop, why should it be obligatory for the factory?

On this point Abramovich has said that, as we are so short of specialists—the fault of the bolsheviks, according to Kautsky—we ought to replace them with collegia of workers. This is nonsense. No collegium, formed out of persons who don't know the job, is capable of superseding one man who does know the job. A collegium of jurists can't take the place of a signalman. A collegium of invalids can not take the place of a doctor. The whole idea is wrong. The collegium itself can not give knowledge to the ignorant. It can only serve to conceal the ignorance of the ignorant. If you appoint a person to a responsible post, then it is soon clear, not only to others, but also to himself, how much he knows and how much he doesn't know. But there is nothing worse than a collegium of ignoramuses, of workers ill-prepared to fill a purely practical post, which demands special knowledge. The members of a collegium are in a state of perpetually losing their heads, of mutual dissatisfaction, and introduce indecision and chaos into the whole work by their very helplessness. The working class is vitally interested in raising its ability to administer; i. e., in training itself, but in the sphere of industry this is attained by the factory directorate periodically making reports before the workers of the factory, and discussing with them the plan of action which has been decided on for the year, or the current month, and all the workers who display a serious interest in the task of industrial organization will be registered by the directorate of the undertaking, or by special registration commissions, will be passed through suitable courses intimately connected with the practical work of the factory itself. After this, they will be appointed at first to less responsible posts and later to more responsible ones. In this way we shall secure many thousands, and, in the future, tens of thousands. As for the question of collegia of threes and fives, it interests not the working masses, but the more backward and weaker members, less adaptable to independent work, of the soviet working class bureaucracy. The front rank, conscious, stable administrator naturally strives to

take the factory wholly into his own hands, to prove to himself and others that he can administer. But if this administrator is weak and not firmly seated in the saddle he will show a desire to attach others to his person, because in company with them his own shortcomings will be the less obvious. In this collegiate system there is a great danger, the danger of personal responsibility being extinguished. If the worker is able, but inexperienced, he needs, of course, to be directed; at the hands of a director he will learn, and to-morrow we will appoint him a director of a small factory. But in the loose organization of a collegium, where the strength and weakness of each one is not clearly revealed, the sense of responsibility is inevitably extinguished.

Our revolution speaks of a systematic approach toward individual control, not, of course, of a realization of individual control with a stroke of the pen. Several variations and combinations are possible. Where the worker is capable of carrying on alone, we will put him at the head of a factory, and give him a specialist to help him. Where a specialist is good, we will place him at the head of a factory, and give him an assistant, perhaps two or three, chosen from the workers. Finally, in cases where a collegium has proved its efficiency, we will retain it. This is the only serious way of approaching the question, and only thus will we come to a satisfactory organization of industry.

There is one other consideration connected with the question of training which appeals to me as important. (1) With us the numbers of those among the working class who are capable of administration is very small. They are those who have known the "underground," who have fought the revolutionary struggle, who have lived abroad, who have read much in prison and exile, who have acquired political experience, a wide horizon—this is the most valuable element of the working class. (2) After them come the younger generation, who consciously carried on our revolution from 1917. This also is a very valuable element of the working class. Wherever we turn our eyes—to the structure of the soviets, to the trade-unions, to party work, to the front of civil war—everywhere this upper strata of the proletariat is seen to be playing a leading part. The principal administrative work of the soviet government during the past two and a half years has been so to maneuver that this upper strata of the workers has been constantly moved from one front to another. The lower strata of the working class, who have come up out of the peasant mass, although filled with the revolutionary spirit, are too lacking in initiative. What our Russian *muzhik* suffers from is the psychology of the herd, absence of personality that is, just what our reactionary "populists" used to praise, just what Leo Tolstoy made famous in the character of Platon Karataev;¹ the peasant confined within the commune is bound to the soil. It is quite evident that socialist economics are not to be based on Platon Karataev but on workmen full of thought, initiative, and a sense of responsibility. It is essential to cultivate this initiative in the worker. Individuality among the bourgeoisie is the individuality of self-interest, of competition. Individuality among the working class contradicts neither solidarity of interest nor fraternal cooperation. Socialist solidarity can not rest upon the effacement of individuality, upon the psychology of the herd. Meanwhile the effacement of personality is often found concealed behind the collegiate system.

There is much force, ability, and talent in the working class. Individual control in the sphere of administration will assist to develop this. That is why it is a higher and more fruitful method of administration than the collegiate system.

Concluding words of the report.—Comrades, the arguments of the menshevik speakers, especially Abramovich, betray above all complete alienation from practical life and its problems. A person stands on the bank of a river which he has to swim across and discusses the properties of water and the strength of the current; to swim across—that is the task. But our disciples of Kautsky shift from one leg to the other. "We do not deny," he says, "that it is necessary to swim across, but in addition to this, being realists, we see the dangers which are not one but several—the current is swift, there are submerged rocks, people are tired, etc. But they tell you that we deny the very necessity of swimming across, then that it is not so—not at all. Even 23 years ago we did not deny the necessity of swimming across."

It's all based on this sort of thing from beginning to end. Firstly, the mensheviks say, "we do not deny and have never denied the necessity of defense, therefore we do not deny the necessity for the existence of the army. Secondly, we do not deny obligatory national service in principle." Well, but where, save among a few religious sects, are there people in the world who would deny the necessity of defending oneself, as a general rule? However, the fact of your abstract admission does not help matters forward at all. When it comes to a real struggle and to the creation of a real

¹ In Tolstoy's "War and Peace," Platon Karataev is one of the fellow prisoners of the wealthy, liberal-minded Russian nobleman, Count Peter Bezukhov, in the concentration camp established by the French military authorities during the occupation of Moscow by Napoleon in 1812.

army against the real foe of the working class, what did you do then? You went into opposition, you sabotaged, while not denying the necessity for defense as a general rule. You spoke and wrote in your papers: "Down with civil war." At the same time you supported the White Guards and thrust your knee on our throat. You now, approving, as an afterthought, our victorious defense, turn your criticism to new ends, and inform us: "In general, we do not deny the necessity for labor conscription," you say, "but without compulsion by law." There is, however, in these words a monstrous internal contradiction. The conception of "conscription" in itself comprehends the element of compulsion. A man who is conscripted is obliged to do something. If he fails to do it, it is clear that he will be compelled and suffer punishment. We then come to the question: "What is compulsion?" Abramovich says: "Economic pressure, but not compulsion by law." Goltsman, the representative of the metal workers' trade-union, has excellently shown up the scholasticism of this statement. Already under capitalism—that is, under the régime of "free" labor, economic pressure is inseparable from juridical compulsion. So much the more so now.

I tried to make clear in my report that the instruction of the workers in new forms of labor on new social principles and the attainment of higher productivity are only possible by means of the simultaneous application of several methods—economic interest, legal compulsion, the influence of an internally coordinated economic organization, the force of repression—above all, moral suasion, propaganda, agitation, finally a general raising of the cultural level—that only by a combination of all these means is it possible to attain a high level of socialist economic organization.

If, under the capitalist régime, economic interest went hand in hand with legal compulsion, at the back of which there stands the material power of the state, so also in the soviet state—i. e., in the transitional stage on the way to socialism, it is impossible to make any dividing line between economic and juridical compulsion. With us, all the more important enterprises are in the hands of the state. When we say to the joiner, Ivanov: "You will now have to work at the Sormovo factory; if you refuse, then you'll get no rations." What is this, economic or juridical compulsion?

He can't go to another factory because all the other factories are in the hands of the state, which won't allow him to transfer. Therefore economic pressure merges here with the repressive action of the state. Abramovich evidently wishes that we, as the regulators of the distribution of labor, should only make use of increased wages, premiums, etc., in order to attract the necessary workers to the most important factories. Clearly this is his idea. But if it is so, then every practical trade-union worker will realize that it is pure utopianism. We can not hope for a free flow of workers from the labor market, because for this it would be necessary for the state to have in its hands sufficiently mobile resources in food, lodgings, and transport—i. e., those very conditions which we have to create. Without a massive transference of workers systematically organized by the state according to the estimates of the economic organizations we can do nothing. Here we have the need for compulsion revealing itself to us in all its economic cogency. I have read you a telegram from Ekaterinburg about progress in the work of the First Labor Army. There it is stated that more than 4,000 qualified workers have passed through the hands of the Ural Committee on Labor Conscription. Whence have they come? They have not been dispersed to their homes but sent according to definite orders. From the army they were handed over to the committee on labor conscription, which divided them up into categories and sent them to the various factories. This is, from the liberal point of view, "a violation" of personal liberty. The vast majority of the workers, however, willingly transferred to the labor front, just as before they had gone to the war front, understanding that the highest interest of the state demanded this. Some of them went against their will. They were compelled. It is clear that the state must place the best workers, by means of the premium system, under better conditions of life. But this in no way excludes but on the contrary presupposes that the state and the trade-unions, without which the soviet state can not build up industry, acquires certain new rights over the workers. The worker does not simply proceed to make a deal with the soviet government; no, he is under obligation to obey the state because it is his state.

"If," says Abramovich, "we were simply speaking of trade-union discipline, there would be no need to shiver lances over this": but besides this there is "militarization." Of course we are touching largely upon trade-union discipline, but also of a new discipline of new manufacturing trade-unions. We live in a country of soviets where the working class rules—a fact which our Kautskians don't seem to understand. When the menshevik, Rubstov, said that judging from my report there remained of the trade-unions nothing but the horns and hoofs, there was a grain of truth in it. It is true that little remains of the trade-unions, if by this is understood associations of the old trade type; there are, however, producing trade-union organizations of the

working class, which, as conditions are in soviet Russia, have the greatest tasks before them. What tasks? Of course, not the task of fighting the state in the interests of labor but the task of building up socialist economy, hand in hand with the state. Such a type of union is in principle a new form of organization, to be distinguished not only from the old trade-union but also from the revolutionary trade-unions in bourgeois society, just as the rule of the proletariat is to be distinguished from the rule of the bourgeoisie. The producing union of the ruling working class has neither the same tasks before it, nor does it adopt the same methods or the same discipline as the unions whose object it is to promote the struggle of the oppressed class. With us it is obligatory upon all workers to belong to the unions. The mensheviks are against this. This is quite understandable, because they are actually against the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is what it really comes to. The disciples of Kautsky are against the dictatorship of the proletariat, and are by this very fact opposed to all its results. Economic compulsion and political compulsion are only forms of the manifestation of the dictatorship of the working class in two closely allied departments. It is true that Abramovich has impressively informed us that there will be no compulsion under socialism: that socialism will operate by the sense of duty, the custom of work, its attractiveness, etc. This is indisputable. It is only necessary to extend the application of this indisputable truth. The crux of the whole business is that under socialism there will be no necessity for the apparatus of compulsion—the state—which will have become entirely merged in the producing and consuming commune. Nevertheless, the path toward socialism lies through the highest and most intensive development of the state. And both you are and we are passing through this period. Just as a lamp before going out splutters brightly forth into a flame, so the state before disappearing assumes the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat—i. e., the form of the most merciless state, which imperatively grasps the lives of its citizens on every side. Abramovich and all the mensheviks together have not noticed this detail, this historical stepping-stone—the state dictatorship—and they have stumbled over it.

There is no other organization, except the army, which has gripped men in the past with such severe compulsion, as the state organization of the working class during this most onerous period of transition. This is why we speak of the militarization of labor. The fate of the mensheviks is to cling to the skirts of events and accept those parts of the revolutionary program which have already lost all practical significance. Menshevism now—although with reservations—has ceased to dispute the legality of punishing the White Guards and the deserters of the Red army—it has been compelled to recognize this after its own unfortunate experiences with “democracy.” It has, it appears, understood—as an afterthought—that it is impossible to confine oneself to fine phrases about socialism having no need of Red terror, when face to face with counter-revolutionary forces. But in the realm of economics, the mensheviks still try to make us think of the days of our sons, and especially our grandsons. However, it is obligatory upon us to proceed immediately now to economic reconstruction, without dallying, in circumstances conditioned by our grievous heritage from bourgeois society and the civil war which has not yet come to an end.

Menshevism, just as “Kautskianstvo” in general, is sunk in democratic banalities and socialist abstractions. Again and again it becomes clear that for the mensheviks there exist no objectives for the transitory period—i. e., the period of the proletarian revolution. Hence proceeds the barrenness of their criticism, guidance, plans, and recipes. It is not a matter of what will be in 20 or 30 years time—then, of course, it will be far better—but how to emancipate ourselves from chaos to-day; how to-day best to distribute our resources in labor; how to-day to increase production, what in particular to do with the 4,000 qualified workers, whom we have dispatched to the front from the army. Are we to set them free to wander to the four quarters of heaven, saying: “Go seek, where it is best, comrades?” No; we can not do this. We have placed them in military échelons, and dispatched them to works and factories. “In what is your socialism different—exclaims Abramovich—from the slavery of Egypt? In much the same manner did the Pharaohs construct the pyramids, by compelling the masses to toil.” What an inevitable analogy for a “socialist.” Here again the same little detail is neglected—the class nature of authority. Abramovich sees no difference between the Egyptian régime and ours. He has forgotten that in Egypt there were the Pharaohs, there were slave owners and slaves. It was not the peasants of Egypt who decided through their soviets to build the pyramids—there you had a hierarchical and caste social order—and the workers were compelled to toil by a class hostile to them. With us compulsion is carried into effect by the workers’ and peasants’ government, in the name of the interests of the working class. This is what Abramovich has failed to notice. We have been taught in the school of socialism that all social development is based on classes and the class struggle, and that the

whole course of life is conditioned by what class stands in power and by the character of the objectives toward which its policy is directed. This is what Abramovich does not understand. He may be well enough acquainted with the Old Testament, but socialism is for him a sealed book.

Pursuing the path of superficial liberal analogies, unheedful of the class nature of the state, Abramovich would be capable of identifying the Red with the White (which the mensheviks have done in the past more than once). Both here and there, there have been mobilizations of predominantly peasant masses. Both here and there, there were not a few officers who graduated in one and the same school of Tsarism. The same rifles, the same cartridges in both camps—where lies the difference? There is a difference, gentlemen, and it is conditioned by the fundamental token—who stands in power? The working classes or the nobility, the Pharaohs or the Muzhiks, the White Guard or the proletariat of Petrograd? There is a difference, and to it the fate of Yudenich, Kolchak, and Denikin bear witness—they have crumbled into dust. No, there is a difference between the soviet régime and the régime of the Pharaohs—and not in vain did the Petrograd proletariat begin their revolution by shooting the “Pharaohs” in the belfries of Petrograd. (So-called Tsarist police, whom the minister of the interior, Protopopov, posted in the last days of February, 1917, on the roofs of the houses and in the belfries of churches, armed with machine guns. Translator's note.)

One of the menshevik orators endeavored to depict me as the advocate of militarism in general. According to him, it appears, you see, that I defend nothing more nor less than German militarism. I was endeavoring to prove, it would appear, that a German N. C. O. is a marvel of nature, and that all he creates is above imitation. What did I actually say? Only this, that militarism in which all the characteristics of social development find the most finished, bevelled, and acute expression may be looked at from two standpoints, firstly, from the political or socialist standpoint—and here it wholly depends on what class holds the reins of power—and, secondly, from the standpoint of organization, as a system where duties are strictly defined and allocated, precise interrelationships, unconditional responsibility for stern executive action. The bourgeois army is an apparatus for the brutal repression of the workers; the socialist army is a weapon for the liberation and defense of the working classes. But the unconditional subjection of a part to the whole is a feature common to every army. A harsh internal régime is inseparable from military organization. In war any slovenliness, unconscientious attitude to duty, and even simple inaccuracy will often bring in their train the heaviest losses. Hence the tendency of military organization to bring clearness, form, accuracy, and responsibility to the highest possible limit. Military qualities of this character are to be valued in every branch of activity. In this sense I said that every class values the services of those of its members who, other things being equal, have accomplished military service. The German—let us say—“fist” (rich peasant), leaving the barracks as an N. C. O., was dearer to the German monarchy, and is dearer to-day to Ebert's republic than the “fist” who has not accomplished military service. The organization of the German railroads was placed on a high level of efficiency largely owing to the appointment of N. C. O.'s and officers to administrative posts in the department of ways and communications. In this sense we have something to learn from militarism. Comrade Tsiperovich, one of our most prominent trade-union workers, has testified to us here that a trade-unionist who has undergone a course of military training, who has occupied, let us say, the post of commissary of a regiment for the period of a year has in no wise become the less fitted to pursue successfully his trade-union duties. He returns to his union the same proletarian from the crown of his head to the sole of his boots, for he has fought for the cause of the proletariat; but he returns tempered like steel, made a man of, more independent, more decisive, for he has become accustomed to find himself in highly responsible positions. He has had to lead several thousand Red army soldiers, of various levels of consciousness, the majority of them peasants. He has shared with them victory, and defeat; he has been with them in the attack and on the retreat. There have been instances of treachery among the officers. During “fist” revolts and panics he has stood fast by his post, has held in hand the less conscious mass, guided it, inspired it by his example, and meted out punishment to traitors and slackers. This is a great and valuable experience. And when the former regimental commissary returns to his trade-union he becomes no mean organizer.

On the question of the collegiate system, the arguments of Abramovich are just as hopeless as on other questions—these are the arguments of one who looks on from aside, standing on the bank of a river.

Abramovich has explained to us that a good collegium is better than bad individual control, and that a good specialist must enter a good collegium. All this is excellent—only why don't the mensheviks offer us a few hundreds of such collegia? I am sure

that the supreme council of people's economy would find a sufficient use for them. But we, who are not onlookers, but workers, must build from the material which lies to our hand. We have specialists, of whom, let us say, one-third are conscientious and efficient, another third semiconscientious and semiefficient, and the remaining third—good for nothing. Among the working classes there are many talented, self-sacrificing, and energetic people. Some—alas few—have already acquired the essential knowledge and experience. Others possess the character and ability, but lack the experience and knowledge. Others have neither the one nor the other. Out of this material we have to create factory and other administrations, and it is impossible to confine ourselves to general phrases. First and foremost, we must take all workers who have already proved in practice that they are capable of administration and give them the possibility of standing on their own feet—these men want individual control, because the factory administration is not a school for laggards. A resolute, competent workman wants to administer. If he comes to a decision and gives an order, that order must be carried out. He can be superseded, but that is another matter altogether, and while he is master—a soviet proletarian—he possesses complete direction and control over the organization. If you include him in a collegium of the weaker brethren, who meddle in the administration, you will achieve nothing. Such a workman-administrator should be given a specialist-assistant—one or two—according to the nature of the enterprise. If no such worker-administrator exists, but there does happen to be an honest and competent specialist, we will put him at the head of that enterprise, we will give up two or three of the most prominent workers to help him, so that every decision of the specialist will be known to his assistants; but they should have no right to change it; they will do their work step by step according to the specialist's orders, and learn, so that in six months or a year they will be qualified to occupy posts of responsibility.

Abramovich has quoted me as giving the example of a hairdresser, who commanded a division in the army. True. What, however, Abramovich does not know, is that if we have communist comrades, who have begun to command regiments, divisions, and armies, it is because they have formerly been commissaries attached to military specialists. The specialist, who knows that he will have to answer in full if he makes a mistake, bears the responsibility. He can not say that he is only an "adviser," or a "member of collegium." At the present time the majority of army commands, especially in the lower grades of the service, i. e., politically, the most important posts are occupied by workers and the foremost peasants. But what did we begin with? We placed officers in command, and workers as commissaries, and thus they learned, and learned with success, and taught themselves to defeat the enemy.

Comrades, we are in the midst of a difficult period, perhaps the most difficult period of all. Harsh measures correspond to harsh times in the lives of peoples and classes. The further we go the easier it will be, the freer will every citizen feel himself to be, the less noticeable will be the compulsion exercised by the proletarian state. Perhaps we shall then allow the mensheviks to publish papers, if only they succeed in surviving till then. But we now are living through a period of dictatorship—political and economic. The mensheviks continue trying to undermine this dictatorship. When we are fighting on the civil front defending the revolution from its foes, and a menshevik paper writes: "Down with civil war." This we can't allow. Dictatorship is dictatorship, and war, war. And now, when we prepare to turn the highest possible concentration of energy into the field of economic regeneration, the Russian Kautskians, the mensheviks, remain true to their counter revolutionary calling. Their voice sounds as of voice of doubts and dissolution, of disruption and undermining, distrust, and downfall.

Does it not appear monstrous and absurd when, at this congress, where one and a half thousand representatives, representing the Russian working class, are gathered together, a congress in which the mensheviks form less than 5 per cent and the communists about 90 per cent Abramovich tells us: "Do not be carried away by such methods, when a particular gang of persons takes the place of the people."

"Everything through the people"—says the representative of the mensheviks—"Let there be no wardship over the working masses!" And further: "It is impossible to convince a class by argument." Do but glance at this hall—there is the class—the working class is here before us, and with us, and you, miserable handful of mensheviks, are trying to convince it with petty bourgeois arguments. You desire to be the guardians of this class. But they have their own high standard of independence, and have shown it in jostling you aside and leaving you to go your own way.

APPENDIX IX.

RUSSIAN TRADE-UNIONS.

[Translation from Russian.]

[Extract from article entitled "The Problems of the Trade-Union Movement," by Tukhanov, secretary of the central committee of the All-Russian Union of Workers in the Polygraphical Trade. "Vserossijsky Pechatnik" (the All-Russian Printer), March, 1920.]

"The most vexed question in the trade-union movement to-day is that of the tariffs. The actual conditions of life deprive all schemes and decrees almost of any force whatever. The complete devaluation of money reduces to nothing the paper money which forms the wages of the workers. The impossibility of existing on the officially established wage compels the workers to seek other ways of supplementing their earnings. The workers neglect their job, occupying themselves during working hours with trade, transporting commodities from one place to another and with working on cottage industries. The thieving of public property in the factories—the workers resorting to it—attains unheard-of limits. All this, taken together, does incalculable harm to the economic position of the state, and places great obstacles in the way of reestablishing it.

"The only solution of the problem is the naturalization of wages (payment in kind). The steps so far taken in this direction are not sufficiently decisive. Greater energy must be put into them. The naturalization of wages will create the fundamental premises for organizing production. This is one of the principal tasks of the trade-unions.

"Our enemies, the mensheviks and other supposed socialists, when they speak of the labor armies and labor discipline, cry out in helpless malignancy that the soviet government is introducing an 'Arakcheevshchina' in Russia, restoring the 'Krepostnoe pravo,' that it is going to reimpose upon the working class the old capitalist yoke, etc. Many ignorant, suburban-minded comrades fall into this lure, and profess themselves unable to understand why the communists fought for the 8-hour day under the old régime and now don't protest when a 10 to 12 hour day is worked at one factory or another, and even encourage such a working day. They (the communists) always pointed out that there should be no army, that compulsory labor never attains its end, etc., while now they support the Red army in the field or devote it to the so-called labor front. What is the meaning of this? There is here at first sight a contradiction, but it will only seem so to unenlightened comrades. To those who understand, who read the papers, books, attend lectures and meetings, it is clear that the communists in those days were fighting the capitalists, and strove to give them as little opportunity as possible of sucking vast profits out of the workers, profits devoted either entirely to satisfy their own needs, on squandering and debauch, or put away on deposit for the future exploitation of the luckless slaves of capitalism—the workers. And then, quite naturally, the communists stood for the shortening of the working day, striving to deprive the capitalist of so large a part of his profit as possible. Now the picture is very different.

"The working class in Russia has become the owner of all the factories and works. All that is done in them will be for his benefit and no one else's. And as more is produced in the factories the position of the workers will, so far from deteriorating or remaining at the same level, as under the capitalist régime, improve considerably, and it will be possible to proceed not only to an 8-hour but a 6-hour working day. But at the moment the communists are pointing out to the workers that, as the accursed war has destroyed the economic life of the country, and the workers are on the brink of perishing and beggared, the railways destroyed, no locomotives to transport millions of poods of corn, produced in one government, to the starving districts of another, now that the machinery of the factories has been greatly knocked up during the war, and there is no hope yet awhile of getting new supplies from abroad, only keen working effort can save the situation. To increase production, reestablish industry, banish disorganization, the horny palm and nothing else is necessary.

"It would be the greatest crime to speak of the shortening of the working day, of the disbanding of the Red army, the military tasks of which have not yet been entirely completed, the centralized force of which is essential both for labor and the execution of every other task. We must talk, not of rest, but of iron, labor discipline. This must be our exhortation; of this we must shout everywhere; and the soviet government was a thousand times right when it transferred our Red army comrades to the labor front.

"Labor for us, Russian workers, has become a holiday and not a yoke * * *."

V. CHIBISOV.

APPENDIX X.

FOOD.

[Translation from Russian.]

[Extract from People's Commissariat of State Control: A report of the commissariat, prepared by A. G. Mashkovich, based upon data collected by the extraordinary revisionary commission of the council of defense, Moscow, 1919.]

Organization of the food administration.—“A series of revisions of the work of the food administration, and even more so, the actual results of its activities, point to its being nowhere of any use at all. The organization is cumbrous, there is lack of initiative, and it is costly in working. If regard be had to the results achieved, it will be seen that the efforts of the workers and peasants to organize end in failure owing to their astonishing incompetence and inertia. There is no coordinating and supervising control, either central or local, to which the proletarian food detachments and the committees of the village poor may look for guidance, whose (i. e., the proletarian food detachments and the committees aforesaid) efforts are widely diffused and scattered and often distort the instructions of the soviet republic for the carrying out of economic policy.

“According to the reports of competent persons, the food administrations possess no experienced staff, no clear and speedy methods of accountancy, and no reliable statistics. The question arises, What are they doing and what end do they serve?

“If we turn to the center and study the working of the endless sections, subsections, and offices of the people's commissariat of food, the same picture presents itself—floods of paper, responsible officials overwhelmed with correspondence, hundreds of clerks, bored, without initiative, looking upon their work as a burden, displaying extraordinary indifference toward visitors—this is the external side. Within there is no such thing as a single plan of action, assimilated by all directors of departments, permitting of the efficient disposal of everyday work and based on a clear comprehension of the end in view and the methods necessary to attain it in all parts of the republic.

“Such is the general picture and description of the activities of the people's commissariat for food and its local organization given by a comrade who is closely associated with the work of the food organization.

“The extraordinary revisionary commission completely confirmed this report and established the absence of any united food administration, and the fact that there exist only branches and sections operating each in their own way, almost entirely on their own responsibility and risk and at their own discretion.

“First and foremost, is it possible to speak of any stable structure among the organs of the komprod, at all events, as far as concerns its central department? Hardly so. At the head of the komprod stands a collegium; at the head of certain of its departments stand other collegias, while there are none in connection with other branches of the administration. Further, the collegium, after working for a considerable time, comes to the conclusion one fine day that its activities bear an opportunist character; that they have no sound foundation; that it is necessary to lay one down, and that quickly—in three days. Thus the collegium of the komprod decided to elaborate instructions for the existing collegium of the zagotosel (department for controlling village produce).

“The various administrations and departments and the purposes which they are devised to fulfill are in a state of fluidity, with a clearly defined tendency to exaggerated inflation and endless subdivision of departments. A department is transformed into an administration, which gives it an opportunity of splitting up into other departments and of dividing the departments into sections and the sections into subsections. This process of “inflation” and splitting up of functions is by no means always calculated to accord with necessity, and often has its origin in the desire to establish corresponding staffs. Mushroom departments are formed, little ‘Principalities of Monaco,’ with a few persons as staff, one of whom is the director, another his substitute, and after him come those in charge of sections, subsections, etc., and so no one's nose is put out of joint.

“A month ago a decree was published prescribing the transformation of the transport section into an administration. If the motive mentioned above is not responsible for this decree then we are led to believe that a certain ‘superstitious belief’ in the efficacy of high-sounding names can alone be said to account for it. The komprod, which was in no hurry to carry out the recommendations of the December food conference regarding transport, will not vary the quality of the goods by merely changing the name of the firm. The tendency to jump from one thing to another is even more interesting and remarkable. In November the department for exchange of products was transformed into the department for redistribution of products, which signified

a tacit confession of the failure of exchange. In the process of carrying the decree of November 21 into effect the department for the distribution of products began to extend and diffuse itself. Its subordinate departments sprang up like mushrooms and revisionary inspectors daily brought to light some new section organized on the old lines, which began its work in isolation from other sections, for all the world like Robinson Crusoe on the desert island. One reorganization follows after another. A continual reshuffling of departments, peregrination from one building to another and a new increase of staff, for not one of the reforms prescribed effects economies. This can be seen if the formation of the department for general distribution be taken as an example. The glavs and centers are charged with the preparation of manufactured goods, with ascertaining supplies and forming them, while the glav produkt is occupied with their distribution. It would seem that the rôle of the glav produkt would be almost annulled on the formation of the department of general distribution, but with a view to precluding such a happening a note is introduced into the scheme, approved in principle, to the effect that the glav produkt is charged with ascertaining the amount and nature of available supplies, which in itself creates parallelism with the glavs and is an instance of supererogation. Apart from this or that personal motive this illustrates the general tendency of the komprod—to maintain a mass of workers even when there is nothing for them to do. The same thing took place as a result of the abolition of the revisionary inspection department. In place of this department there arose a special section, with functions so ill defined that even the heads of it are unable to give a clear account of themselves. The abolished department has reestablished itself, as one risen from the dead, having changed only its name. And it should be mentioned that the special section has inherited from the revisionary inspection department a staff almost identical in proportion (number?). In the organization of the new department there is another curious feature. Its initiator, who had been appointed a member of the collegium of the department of general distribution, soon after the confirmation of the scheme ceased to serve in the komprod. This, we may remark, among others, is an extraordinarily characteristic phenomenon—people come and go; changes in the department are extremely frequent. Another of the responsible directors of the komprod numbers after his name a multitude of departments and sections over which he has gradually acquired control. All this is very much in the nature of a gymnastic feat.

"The number of members in the collegium of the komprod is not fixed by law; the collegium has recently increased so that it consists of fourteen to fifteen members; this is a large collegium, out of which a small collegium is formed for deciding, principally, questions of staff. The questions which are placed for consideration before the large collegium—drafts of decrees, reorganization of departments, the appointment of members of collegia, representatives, liaison with other departments, regarding fixed prices, etc.—may be said for the most part to be 'parade' questions arising in a more or less haphazard order, and the collegium will often decide analogous questions differently. In order to judge whether the collegial system in the komprod and certain of its departments has justified itself, in order to judge of its advantages or otherwise over individual control, it would be necessary to observe some equality of conditions. On the one hand the personnel, on the other the character of the work and the conditions under which it is done, present such inconsistencies that comparison is made difficult. There is, however, no doubt that the activities of the existing collegia in the komprod call for much criticism. Apart from the casual character of the questions which come before them, it is necessary to mention that, in actuality, the business life of the collegia is not properly regulated. It would seem that the collegia, upon which serve persons responsible for one or another branch of the komprod, ought to have coordinated the scattered sections of the komprod, establishing unity of form, removing parallelism, facilitating mutual relations, decreasing correspondence, and speeding up executive action. Work of this kind would show that the collegium forms an indivisible part of the organization which it unites; that it had entered, so to speak, into the very heart of the work. This does not exist, unfortunately. Certain responsible members of the collegium are unacquainted with the technique and organization of the institution in which they work. The fact that this circumstance was, by order of the council of people's commissaries, to be the subject of special investigation on the part of the state control, bears witness to this. It is a very characteristic phenomenon. The question of supplying engineering and textile factories with food was discussed in the council of people's commissaries. The representatives of the komprod present proposed immediately to ascertain from the komprod to what factories supplies were being sent, their amount, and where they were; when this proposal had been accepted, it appeared, to the astonishment of the directors of the komprod, that the information could not by any means be found, the reasons being

purely those of organization, of the actual state of affairs in the various departments. Not to speak of the disgraceful (lack of?) communication of information from the provinces; one department is isolated from another, each follows its own ends, collects the information which is necessary to it; coordination of activity there is none, and therefore the question of the council of people's commissaries had to remain unanswered. The absence of any such coordination indicates the shortcomings of the collegium. The impression is received that the collegia attempt to meet one or another set of questions as they come, but they make no effort to possess themselves of a knowledge of the technical organization demanding coordination, which is just where the work of a collegium ought to give the greatest results."

[Extracts from "Returns of the Council of Labor and Defense," by A. G. Mashkovich.]

INTRODUCTION.

This revision was ordered on the 10th December, 1918, commenced at the beginning of January, 1919, and finished at the beginning of May.

I.

Is a minutely detailed description of the machinery of the revision, and of the utter confusion existing in the various government statistical departments which were the subject of the revision.

Thus in Tambov seven different subdivisions of the statistical department used seven different figures of the total population of the Province, differing by as much as 20 per cent.

The waste in personnel and salaries proved to be inconceivably great, and the ignorance and resulting chaos appalling.

One great defect was the impossibility of anyone finding employment in these departments who was not a communist and even a local communist—and these, needless to say, did not include experts in management.

Stocks of foodstuffs were found everywhere, forgotten and rotting; thus the following were found in Petrograd:

Product.	Spoilt.	Per cent of total.
	<i>Goods.</i>	
Fish.....	50,033	3
Herrings.....	109,094	11
Caviare.....	975	60
Preserves.....	444	50
Tallow.....	407	45

Thefts have also been very extensive, reaching such figures as 30 to 50 per cent.

Finance was also in absolute chaos. It was almost impossible to get accounts from the various local departments and advances had been made to incredible amounts, far exceeding those authorized. How much money was thus circulating, "God only knows," and the amount of fraud was quite impossible to establish.

II.

PREPARATION OF FOODSTUFFS.

The central authority does not pretend to manage the actual production of commodities. It only provides the plan of and orders for production and the necessary finance.

Breadstuffs and forage naturally stand in the first place, and here the local authorities not only produce badly, but hide stocks in order that their own district may profit by the accumulations.

The producing organizations have shown no initiative whatever (except in one direction, the ignoring of the price limits fixed by the central authority). The local authorities have never drawn attention to the ineffective methods of collecting breadstuffs, potatoes, vegetables, and fruit. The collection of fats and eggs scarcely exists. The collection of cattle is unorganized, and the purchase of fish is a woeful waste.

The apparatus of production, as an apparatus, is practically nonexistent.

The central authority, with small exceptions, has no returns of the harvest or of stocks, and therefore it fails to gather or sufficiently to estimate the reasons for the resistance shown.

The producing operations are badly arranged—there is not a sufficiency of distributing centers, such centers as there are are not always well placed, distribution does not always follow the lines laid down by the central authority, and the very methods of work (of which mention will be made later) often do more harm than good.

We are not in possession of complete figures, but all that we have goes to confirm the above. Thus, in the Saratoff government the audit established a want of distributing centers. Such were opened, and the distribution was improved.

Often these centers are too far away, making it necessary for the peasant to surmount, not only his natural inclination to provide big stocks for himself, but also the difficulties of transport.

We may mention, parenthetically, that the cost of such transport is sometimes paid and sometimes not, according to the interpretation of the different places of the fixed price laid down by the authorities.

Thus, in the Tambov government, 5 copecks per pood-verst is paid; in the Vologda government nothing.

The distributing centers, again, might in some cases be sufficient if the means of unloading were normal, but these are hampered by various causes, some quite beyond the control of the distributing centers.

As is well known, the figures of the harvests, populations, and even of production were not before the audit, and therefore we can only establish the above facts from the figures of certain Provinces or districts.

Lebedyansky District, Tambov Province.

Product.	Amount which should have been exportable ¹ after satisfaction of local needs according to government statistics.	Amount returned as at distributing centers.	Received exportable.
Rye.....	1,515,920	1,233,605	224,321
Oats.....	1,048,352	696,239	414,986
Millet.....	531,230	318,000	3,576

¹ The word "exportable" means available for distribution.

Figures for 1918 to the 23d March, 1919.

For the Ryazan Province no returns of "exportable" were made on the plea that this Province was a "consumer" and not a "producer."

At the same time the supreme authority gave orders for the export of 267,000 poods of rye, of which 993 poods in all were dispatched.

From the Samara Province 50,000,000 poods were expected; 35,000,000 poods should have been collected by the 1st of March. By the 1st of January, 17,000,000 had been collected. Consequently 600,000 poods should have been distributed daily, whereas the daily distribution was only 300,000 for lack of distributing centers.

Lipetsky District.

Product.	Estimated surplus.	Delivered at distributing centers.
Rye.....	559,641	30,998
Oats.....	425,216	159,418
Millet.....	588,586	45,740

Further evidence is afforded by the extent to which the plans of the central authority have been carried out, for this depends not only on whether the plan has been carried out in good time, not only whether the railways have been able to deal with the freight, but also whether the production has failed to reach the figure of the plan, i. e., the speed with which the "orders" are executed is in direct proportion to the speed of production.

Product.	Ordered for export.	Ex- ported.	Per cent.
In August (the minimum per cent):			
Breadstuffs.....	23,805,000	714,050	2.9
Groats.....	1,208,500	16,291	1.3
Forage.....	8,489,000	172,174	2.02
In October (maximum):			
Breadstuffs.....	10,756,000	6,600,082	61.3
Groats.....	287,000	304,275	113.04
Forage.....	7,116,000	2,927,498	41.1
In December:			
Breadstuffs.....	9,312,000	2,350,990	25.2
Groats.....	487,000	249,000	52.2
Forage.....	6,071,000	2,115,692	33.5

In comparing these figures, it should be remembered that the "plan" or "orders" were largely reduced after August, which shows how far the original plan differed from facts.

These figures show, further, that the plans are based not so much on facts or reasonable probabilities as on the figures of the last month or two. August was a bad month, therefore the plan was reduced. October was a good month, therefore the December plan was increased.

So far, with regard to articles of prime necessity; with regard to other products matters are much worse.

The production of meat distributed over the Provinces on the strength of statistics prepared during the time of the temporary government has been cut down mechanically by half. The plan thus prepared has proved to have little life; the amount executed does not exceed 30 per cent, e. g., Kursk Province:

	Ordered.	Delivered.
In June.....	Head. 269	9.
In July.....	269	1 cow.

The plan is not only half dead but in some cases is most mischievous. It deals with such large figures, so hopelessly beyond possibility, that in certain cases, as in the Volga government, the attempt to carry it out threatens to kill the local dairies.

Vegetable oil may be considered more or less satisfactory.

As to butter, we have not sufficient figures, but those we have show that the attempts of the supreme authority have not produced particularly satisfactory results.

The Cherepovetsky Province department preferred to ignore the orders of the central authority and sell 17,000 poods in various directions at 70 to 80 per cent increase over the fixed price.

In the Vologda Province the production suffers partly from the excessive slaughter of cattle, partly from the excessive prices fixed for butter, milk, and cheese. The milk goes to a neighboring government to be made into cheese, and paid for above the fixed price.

In Ryazan matters are also unsatisfactory, chiefly for want of organization.

Of potatoes, 22.6 per cent of the orders of the central authority were fulfilled, of which a considerable part rotted, either from delay in transport or ignorance of collection and dispatch. The consumer got very few. The State bore considerable expense.

Further general trouble was caused by the individual Provinces, such as Petrograd and Moscow, by leave of the central authorities, sending agents into the producing districts to buy breadstuffs at any cost for the starving populations, an action which caused terrible confusion and often led, not to contact between the producer and consumer, but strife.

Thus it was in the Samara and in other Provinces.

Of course, it was not only a question of organization, but largely one of to what extent the economic needs of the peasant could be met.

If these could not be satisfied, the whole question resolved itself into one of force.

And it must be confessed that sufficient attention has never been paid to this point, and the "production commission" has always seen the "mailed fist" (koolak), and used force to overcome it.

A recourse to this method has been forced, not only by blindness to the real facts of the situation but by the impossibility of using other methods.

Thus, for instance, barter has remained nothing but a name.

The central authority simply gave orders for barter, and the local authorities, carried these orders out without system and without result.

Thus, in the Ryazan Province the matter is only in course of settlement; in Tambov there is no barter; in Saratov it is quite negligible; in Orlov, Kursk, and Voroniezh, barter as contemplated by the decree scarcely exists. It remains to decide whether next year's policy will be one of "barter" or of "supply." If of the former, means must be taken to translate word into action.

It must be added that where, even in a very small way, barter has been introduced the results have been quite good.

The question of fixed prices for breadstuffs and other agricultural commodities is a most serious question. We have no time to go into this matter in full detail and can, therefore, only present the opinion of certain members of the audit.

The existing fixed prices of the most important articles are not in accord with the present economic situation; such is the decision of the members of the audit.

"The second fundamental decision resulting from our labors is," says Comrade Terziev in his report, "the wish to approximate the policy of the supreme authority to an economic basis. Hand-to-mouth measures in the end, as has been proved, cost dearer. I refer to the coming rise in the fixed price. In working this out it is essential to take into consideration the normal rate of pay for agricultural labor. Otherwise the laborer will only work if forced to do so, and will prefer to migrate to the towns, where his work will be better paid." It is impossible to dispute this opinion; it only remains to work it out.

For the moment we have to establish only this: The prices for breadstuffs, etc., do not correspond to realities.

In estimating how far they do so, it is necessary to remember one most important fact—the village receives next to nothing from the town. All that the town produces is consumed by it and the army, while, according to the State distribution, a mere trifle is assigned to the village.

According to the December plan there were to be distributed—

	Poods.
1. Flour:	
(a) To the army.....	1,323,000
(b) To the people.....	6,497,000
(c) To the railways.....	1,956,000
(?d)	413,000
(?e)	941,000
(?f)	198,000
2. Forage:	
(a) To the army.....	4,132,000
(b) To the capitals and Kronstadt.....	555,000
(c) To the railways.....	850,000
(?d)	584,000

The supreme authority restricts itself to the drawing up of the plan, the issue of the necessary orders, and the issue of stocks (of articles of prime importance). All details are left to the local authorities.

Owing to the lack of statistics, the whole system of distribution stands on very shaky foundations.

The plan remains a dead letter, interfered with by a whole string of disturbing factors.

From the plan sketched out above, it is clear that of forage the only districts to be supplied are the two capitals and Kronstadt, while the army gets more than two-thirds of the whole.

Such is the plan, but as a matter of fact the actual distribution has no relation to it and is governed principally by mere chance.

By the plan each consuming center should receive its bread from a definite producing Province, and the making up of this plan is of first importance for the plan of transport.

The distribution plan, however, remains nothing but a plan, owing to the fact that as shown above, there is available for distribution on the average less than a third

of the plan amounts, which of course upsets the whole scheme of distribution and transport.

Below are some further figures of production:

Butter.

	August.		September.		October.	
	Planned.	Delivered.	Planned.	Delivered.	Planned.	Delivered.
Army and navy.....	<i>Poods.</i> 22,800	<i>Poods.</i> 1,904	<i>Poods.</i> 29,400	<i>Poods.</i> 2,302	<i>Poods.</i> 14,200	<i>Poods.</i> 900
Railways.....	25,800	14,400	2,000
People.....	85,200	71,500	1,135	30,000	333
Waterways.....	13,817	8,570	100	5,200
(?).....	4,013	1,702	25
(?).....	36,200
Total.....	151,630	1,904	125,572	3,537	87,625	1,233

The delivery of vegetable oils was decidedly better, but in the distribution the whole people were only to get 20 per cent, of which 6 per cent was to go to the towns.

		Per cent.
Army and navy.....	79	30.7
Rail and waterways.....	38	14.7
(?).....	54	20.9
(?).....	5	1.9
Capitals.....	22.5	8.7
Other towns.....	16.4	6.4
Country.....	43.1	16.7
In thousand poods.....	258	100

Of fish the deliveries were 59 to 64 per cent of the plan; of meat, 30 per cent; and it should be added that a great part of the deliveries went to the army.

Speed in production, correct planning of distribution, and satisfactory provision of all necessary, or at least fundamental, articles of food is the criterion of the working of the whole apparatus.

The following figures are significant:

In Moscow, besides bread, of which there was issued more or less regularly every two to four days—

Category I..... 1 lb.
Category II..... $\frac{3}{4}$ lb.
Category III..... $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. } Counting this as normal for two days.

From the 1st to the 21st January there was also issued on consumers' cards:

	Category I.	Category II.	Category III.
Old products: Preserves.....	lb..	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{4}$
New products:			$\frac{1}{8}$
x Herring.....	do..	2	$1\frac{1}{2}$
Vegetable oil.....	do..	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
Tinned soap.....	piece..	1	1
Common soap.....	lb..	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
Salt.....	do..	$\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$
Kerosene.....	do..	1	$\frac{1}{2}$
Children:		A.	B.
Kerosene.....	lb..	3	2
Sugar.....	do..	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
"Manna"	do..	2
Cheese or sour cream or curds.....	do..	$\frac{1}{2}$
Black caviare.....	do..	$\frac{1}{2}$
Kerosene.....	do..	2
Potato flour.....	do..	$\frac{1}{2}$
Cranberries.....	do..	1
Kerosene.....	do..	3
Apples.....	5
X(?):		Black.	Red.
New.....	lb..	2	$\frac{1}{2}$
Old.....	do..	$2\frac{1}{2}$

And that is all.

From the 1st January to the 16th April the totals announced (this does not mean issued) on the new cards were as follows (for what was issued on the old cards, see above; these figures remain unchanged):

		Category I.	Category II.	Category III.
Herrings	pounds	2	1½	½
Vegetable oil	do	½	½	½
Toilet soap	piece	1	1	1
Common soap	pound	½	½	½
Salt	do	2	1½	1
Soft sugar	do	3	2	1
Vegetable oil	do	3	2	1
Coffee	do	1	½	½
Herrings and fish	do	2	1½	1
Vegetable oil	do	3	2	1
Soft sugar	do	3	2	1
Common soap	do	3	2	1
Salt	do	2	1½	1
Soft sugar	do	2	1½	1
Coffee	do	1	½	½
Caviare	do	1	1	½
Herrings	do	4	3	2
Matches	boxes	2	2	2
Do.	do	2	2	2
Herrings	pounds	4	3	2
Toilet soap	piece	½	½	½

NOTE.—The above tables are literal translations from Russian. In the second table it is presumed that the sections refer to the periods the 1st/31st January, the 1st/28th February, and the 1st March/16th April.

Bad enough. Moscow and Petrograd received some $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of bread in the first category (and that not always), a little vegetable oil, a herring, and, at the very last, a little sugar.

But if you compare Moscow with the Moscow Province, it appears that the citizens of Podolsk, e. g., received during the two months of October and November 1½ lbs. of bread in all per person.

Each citizen of Zvenigorod received on his card from the 1st September, 1918, to the 1st January, 1919:

0.12 lb. of sugar.	2.4 lb. of potatoes.	4.1 lb. of salt.
2.6 lb. of rye.	0.17 lb. of wheat flour.	0.0014 lb. of tea.

To live on what is required by the victualing apparatus is manifestly impossible. They live by fraud.

The auditor of the Bogorodsky district writes: "Ninety per cent of his needs the consumer satisfies by private means, without regard to the public organization"; and this is probably true, with slight exceptions, of a large part of the consuming governments.

Where, then, is the "monopoly," the "dictatorship," and the "fixed price"? They do not, and can not, exist under such circumstances.

IV.

Such a system only opens the door to wholesale lawlessness.

Favored persons get well supplied at the expense of the ordinary mass. Thus, in the Podolsk district, where the ration was 1½ lbs. of bread a head for the two months of October and November, those favored persons who got extra rations received 30 lbs.

The members of the Zvenigorodsky governing committee received rationed commodities by the pood. On being ordered by the auditors to stop this, they at once replied that local conditions rendered such stoppage impossible.

To sum up, the local administrators are evidently governed by the principle, "one can not provide for one's relations."

Further, even the small remnants with which the Republic itself deals are not fairly divided. The towns receive preference over the villages and the capitals over the towns.

V.

By decree of the 27th/14th May, 1918, all goods of prime necessity were to be nationalized.

The supreme authority prepared no plan of action, leaving this to the local authorities. The result was utter chaos. In many cases the product was not nationalized

but municipalized. In practically every instance there was malpractice, maladministration, and ignorance. In Moscow, where the municipality refused to acknowledge the claims of the supreme authority, the former, taking over 12 haberdashers' businesses, spent 2,074,058 roubles on salaries (not counting rent, heating and other charges) in three months, against sales amounting to 2,600,000 roubles.

APPENDIX XI.

THE RATION IN THE DONETZ BASIN.

[Translation from Russian.]

[The *Izvestiya Raboche-Krestyanskoi Inspeksii* ("Bulletin of Workers' and Peasants' Control"), April, 1920.]

"By a decree of the Council of the Labor Army of the Ukraine, workers in the coal and metallurgical industries in the Donetz basin are declared to be militarized for the purpose of increasing production.

"In connection with this a special increased food ration, equal to the Red army ration at the front, is accorded.

"The Donetz basin is the fundamental nerve of the economic organism of the Republic, having a colossal importance in the industry of Russia in the procuring of coal, and forming the basis of our metallurgical industry. It should, therefore, command the special attention of food organization with a view to the complete satisfaction of the needs of the workers, in accordance with the scale established by soviet of the Ukraine Labor Army.

"In actuality, we observe a complete lack of organization in the supply of the workers of this district.

"According to data collected by the workers' and peasants' control, the issue of food products for the workers is so insignificant that it does not satisfy their minimum demands, as a result of which strong tendencies prevail for workers to go away into the corn districts of the Ukraine. With a view to substantiating this, we attach the following table, which clearly shows how completely unsatisfactory the situation is:

Name of products.	Total rations due in poods to workers and families, January-February.	Actually issued.	Issue due period, Mar. 1-15.	Actually issued.
Bread.....	720,000	133,719	193,213	34,917
Krupa (form of millet).....	66,000	87,995	27,890	36,261
Butter.....	33,000	8,291	9,844	1,861
Meat and fish.....	220,000	1,709	82,032	794
Sugar.....	36,500	10,085	12,032	2,000
Tobacco ("makhorka").....	9,130	None.	2,814	None.
Matches.....	1,610	None.	730	None.
Soap.....	43,500	None.	8,204	None.
Sugar prep.....	22,000	None.	4,376	None.
Tallow.....	33,000	None.	6,563	None.
Herrings.....	22,000	None.	10,938	None.
Vegetables.....	70,000	None.	17,500	None.

"These figures speak for themselves. During two and a half months only 18 per cent of bread, 22 per cent butter, 17 per cent meat and fish, and 25 per cent sugar has been issued. With the exception of krupa, which has been issued in quantities larger than the prescribed ration, products like makhorka, matches, soap, sugar products, tallow, herrings, and vegetables are never available for issue in the co-operative shops of the Don Basin union. If we take into account that for more than a year the workers have not received a single arshin of textile material, thanks to which they are in great want of clothing and the children walk about naked and barefooted, then it becomes clear that it is absurd to think of keeping the workers in the Don Basin under such conditions, and, above all, of increasing production.

"The food situation in April did not improve; it is evident that there is no hope of an improvement even during the summer months, for supplies usually decrease everywhere at this time, and in the Ukraine, more than elsewhere, will be insignificant.

"The supply of the Don Basin with food has been entrusted to the Prodonbas—a body directly subordinated to the people's commissariat for food for the Ukraine, which is with regard to the supply of food products.

"The unsuccessful activities of the Ukraine people's commissariat for food is to be explained not only by the failure to organize the departments of supply, by the absence of any definite plan of operations, by simultaneously applying military and civilian methods in the course of the work, etc., but chiefly owing to the fact that the Ukraine peasantry, who have displaced during the last two years or more about ten different governments, has now come to the conclusion that there is no government which would be capable of administering the Ukraine. And the soviet government has so far no roots in the masses. Its existence for the time being is nominal. The degree of influence of the dictatorship of the working class on the peasantry in the Ukraine is so slight that the soviet government does not extend to the villages, while in the towns unrestrained freedom of trade flourishes. In such a state of affairs when it comes to taking bread from the peasants on credit on a promise of future good things, it goes without saying that a very powerful influence of the workers on the villages is demanded. The small numbers of the Ukraine workers and their weak organization makes it impossible to subject the peasants to the hegemony of the working class, to achieve which demands long and stubborn work. As long as the proper influence of the working class on the peasants does not exist, it is impossible to hope for any speedy solution of the food question in the Ukraine, and any distribution of bread and other products must necessarily exist only on paper.

"The deduction, therefore, is that the Donetz Basin, which has an exclusive importance in relation to our industry and transport, can not be satisfactorily supplied with food by the Ukrainian food organs. It is essential to find other sources of supply. All the institutions of the Republic interested should turn their attention to this.

"(Signed)


YAKUBOV."

APPENDIX XII.

Statement giving an estimate of the cost of the preparation, printing and publishing of this report, which estimate includes the cost of the preparation, printing and publishing of the interim report.

	£.	s.	d.
Office accommodation, furniture, fuel and light—from particulars supplied by His Majesty's office of works.....	239	0	0
Telephones—from particulars supplied by the general post office.....	15	0	0
Stationery—from particulars supplied by His Majesty's stationery office.....	74	0	0
Salaries, wages.....	1,330	1	10
Expenses of witnesses reimbursed.....	107	8	3
Expenses in connection with translations.....	213	9	0
Traveling and incidental expenses.....	35	16	0
Printing and publishing reports (including printing of Minutes of Evidence)—from particulars supplied by His Majesty's stationery office.....	504	0	0
Total.....	2,518	15	1





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